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DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS
of the secund part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session
Paris, 29th November-2nd December 1993
MONDAY 2fth NOVEMBER
Morning l0 um.
Meetings of political groups.
Afternoon 2.30 p.m.
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session.
2. Examination of credentials.
3. Address by the President of the Assembly.
4. Adoption of the draft order of business of the second part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session.
5. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
6. Address by Mr. Wtirner, Secretary-General of NATO.
7. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
8. Address by Mr. van Eekelen, Secretary4eneral of WEU.
9. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: Enlargement of WEU:
(a) Creation of an associate member status:
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Finsberg on behalf of the Committee on Rules
of Procedure and Privileges.
(0,/ Accession of Greece:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ferrarini on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges.
(c) Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ferrarini on behalf of the Committee on Rules of
Procedure and Privileges.
Debate.
TUTSDAY 3fth NOVEMBER
Morning l0 a.m.
l. Revision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure: Enlargement of WEU:
(a) Creation of an associate member status;
(6/ Accession of Greece;
l2
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(c) Creation of an observer status, a permanent observer or guest member status:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft decisions.
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wintgens on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
ll e.m.
3. Chairmanshipin-Office of the Council 
- 
Presentation of the first part of the thirty-ninth
annual report of the Council 
- 
Address by Mr. Poos, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence of Luxembourg.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
1. Address by Mr. Aleksandrov, Minister of Defence of Bulgaria.
2. WEU's relations with Central and Eastern European countries:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
3. Political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their consequences for the
development of WEU:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Soell on behalf of the Political Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. Opinion on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the financial
year 1993:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Biichler on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
5. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Alfairs and Administration.
6. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1992 
- 
the
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Rathbone on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration.
Debate.
Votes on the operative texts.
WEDNESDAY lst DECEMBER
Morning 10 a"m.
l. An operational organisation for WEU 
- 
naval co-operation:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the Defence
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
l3
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2. Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
Afternoon 3 p.m.
l. The European corps:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Ziercr on behalf of the Defence Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
2. Parliaments, military service laws and public opinion:
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations.
Debate.
Vote on the draft resolution.
530 p.m.
3. Address by Mr. Jupp6, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France.
THLJRSDAY 2nd DECEMBER
Morning l0 a.m.
l. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and
the consequences for Europe:
presentation of the report tabled by Iord Dundee on behalf of the Technological and Aero-
space Committee.
Debate.
2. Address by Mr. Zlenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
3. The evolution of advanced technology in the Commonwealth of Independant States (CIS)
and the consequenoes for Europe:
Resumed debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
4. The development of a European space-based observation system 
- 
Part II:
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace
Committee.
Debate.
Vote on the draft recommendation.
CLOSE OF THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRTY.NINTH ORDINARY SESSION
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DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1994I
submitted on behalf of
the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Expr-nNetonv MeuonnNnuvr
L lntroduction
II. Head I 
- 
Expenditure relating to permanent staff of the Office of the
Clerk of the Assembly
III. Operating budget
IV. Pensions budget
V. Conclusions
Sutvtunny oF ESTTMATES oF ExpENDITURE AND RECErprs FoR THE FINANCIAL vrnn 1994
Part I: Operating budget
Section A 
- 
expenditure
Section B - receipts
Part II: Pensions budget
Section A 
- 
expenditure
Section B 
- 
receipts
APPENDICES
I. Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff of the Office of the
Clerk of the WEU Assembly proposed in the 1994 budget
II. Organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk of the WEU Assembly
III. Description of the post of Chief Accountant
IV. Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions
V. Five-year modernisation and 
_maintenance programme for the
equipment of the Office of the Clerk
VL Trend of the Assembly budget from 1993 to 1994
VII. Implications of the various heads for the 1993 and 1994 budgets
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee and approved by the Presidential Committee.
2. Members of the commitlee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Covi (Alternate: Rubner), Redmond (Vice-Chairmen); MM.
Alvarez, Antretter, Biefnot, Branger, Biichler, Curto, Daniel, Diaz, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM.
Garcia Sanchez, Howell (Alternate: Lord Mackie of Benshie), Jurgens, Maass, Manisco, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Pinto. Pl::o,
Regenwetter, Tatarella, Thissen.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rappodeur)
I. Introduction
l. At a meeting with the Council in London on 24th June 1992, the President of the Assembly and
the Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration were able to explain the
strategy decided upon by the Assembly in the light of the political situation stemming from the
upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Maastricht Treaty and to describe the political guidelines that
should govern the preparation of the budget for 1993.
2. The broad lines of this strategy and the political guidelines they imply are still valid and the
Assembly is determined to follow them with due tenacity and energy in view of the growing importance
of WEU's place in the new organisation of Europe.
3. The Council has extended its activities to many areas and with the transfer of its seat from
London to Brussels it has been able to adapt its structure and the organisation of its services to the new
requirements. Conversely, the Assembly's requests for the means it considers essential for carrying out
its programme have not been met, with the result that, in 1993, it is having to work with an operational
budget (Heads II to V) that includes no substantial improvements compared with the budget for the
previous year. The 6.500/o growth rate granted for the operating budget (Heads I to V) for 1993 is hardly
enough to cover the increase in the salaries of permanent and temporary staff recommended by the ad
hoc committee of the co-ordinated organisations.
4. It is therefore now essential for the Council to grant the Assembly adequate means to carry out
its tasks while taking into account the concern for budgetary stringency similar to that shown by the
governments of member countries. For that purpose, the Assembly has included in the budget for the
financial year 1994 the sums set out below, which are necessary for it to adapt its structures and have
the necessary resources available for exercising its new activities.
IL Head I 
- 
Expenditure relating to permanent staff
of the Ollice of the Clerk of the Assembly
5. The draft budget for the financial year 1993 (Document 1325) included the creation of three
grade 83 posts and the regrading of one grade L post and three grade C posts. These proposals, which
had already been included in previous budgets, were not accepted by the WEU Council, in spite of the
favourable conclusions drawn in the study on the organisation of the Office of the Clerk carried out in
1990 by three parliamentary experts.
5.1. However, the need to apply the changes set out in the organogram of the Office of the Clerk
which the Assembly proposed is confirmed in full during the financial year 1993. Corresponding sums
therefore have to be included in the draft budget for 1994 with a reminder of the justifications which
accompanied the presentation of the proposals in question.
5.2. Regarding the proposal to create three new posts of assistant, the experts, in their report on the
organisation of the Office of the Clerk (Part 3, paragraph 3), expressed the following opinion:
" The creation of three grade 83 posts of assistant is justified by the creation of new senior posts
and the increase in the tasks of the research and administrative services although the Office of
the Clerk proposes only two.
The post of assistant to the Political Committee is essential insofar as the committee would be
run independently of the Clerk Assistant.
While the duties and responsibilities of the administrative Clerk Assistant are not questioned
and must remain as they are, the creation of a post of assistant in the administrative services is
made necessary by the increase in material tasks resulting from the Assembly's opening to the
outside world (mail, printing, etc.).
The third post of assistant should bring the research and documentation service up to strength
and allow it to be equipped with modern documentary data retrieval systems essential for the
smooth running of the Assembly bodies. "
t6
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5.3. It should also be mentioned that, in the explanatory memorandum to the draft budgets for l99l
(paragraph l3) and 1992 (paragraph l2), the place of the two grade 83 assistants in the committee
service of the Office of the Clerk is specified: they will be assigned to the two new grade A officials.
According to the opinion of the experts, this service should be able to count on:
" 
- 
a secretariat for the Political Committee consisting of a grade A5 secretary and a grade 83
assistant. This is essential to allow the Clerk Assistant, now Secretary of the committee, to
carry out his new tasks in full;
- 
a grade A3/4 head of the research and documentation service and a grade 83 assistant. The
creation of an efficient research and documentation service specific to the Assembly is
essential to allow the presidency and the committees to give a new dimension to their work.
This service should not have a cumbersome structure but a dynamic organisation using
modern technology for the retrieval and processing of documentation so as, in particular, to
ensure a computerised link with existing sources of documentation (national parliaments,
specialised institutes, etc.). However, the attribution of enough staff from the outset is a
condition for the success of this operation. "
5.4. As for the third post of grade B3 assistant for the archives, the Office of the Clerk has a true need
for this since the archives section is also responsible for sending out documents for sessions (the Office
of the Clerk does not have a dispatching office as is the case, for instance, in the Council of Europe)
and is faced with an increase of 2500/o in the numbers sent out since 1989 and this figure will probably
be higher in 1993. It is quite clear that the person in the archives service, in spite of the occasional
assistance of temporary staff and recourse to a mailing firm, is no longer in a position to carry out all
these duties alone.
5.5. Finally, for the regrading of four existing posts, the Assembly considers it fair to confirm in the
1994 budget the regrading of two of these posts, i.e. one grade L3 and one grade C4.
5.6. Regarding the regrading, in a personal capacity, ofthe post oftranslator-interpreter from grade
L3 to grade L4, it should be noted that the holder has thirty years'experience as a linguist, sixteen of
which in NATO (at grade L4 for ten years). Transferred to the WEU Assembly after having worked for
the WEU agencies for security questions, she has taken over, under the responsibility of the Clerk
Assistant for Administrative and Financial Questions, the management of the teams of interpreters
and also takes part herself in the work of these teams, which allows the Assembly to limit recruitment
to twenty interpreters instead of twenty-two for each session and five interpreters instead of six for
other meetings, thus making a considerable saving. In addition, she also works in conjunction with the
French translation section, which is particularly valuable since she also translates from Italian and
Spanish. Finally, at the request of the WEU Secretariat-General, the Assembly places the services of
this official at the disposal of the Council for ministerial meetings; the Secretariat-General has
expressed its oflicial appreciation of the extremely valuable assistance thus provided (worth more than
the total cost of her regrading .for the Assembly: approximately F 15 000). To sum up, the official
concerned is at the ceiling of grade L3, which corresponds neither to her duties as chief interpreter nor
to those of a translator/reviser (Grade L4lL5 in the Secretariat-General).
5.7. The other regrading concerns the post of the official responsible for storing and accounting for
equipment and the reproduction service. Several times in its reports on the budgets of the ministerial
organs, the Assembly has drawn the Council's attention to the problem of the staff's career
possibilities, an essential condition for ensuring maximum motivation. This problem arises more
specifically for this grade C6 official who, having reached the ceiling of his grade, has no further
prospect of advancement, although his work has changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. This
regrading is thus fully in line with the principle that there should be concordance between duties to be
carried out, qualifications and the professional category of staff. This is justified by the staff member's
qualifications and increased knowledge. It should be recalled that the official responsible for storing
and accounting for equipment in the Secretariat-General, who has no other duties, has a grade B4lB5.
5.8. Conversely, the proposal to regrade the two grade C3 posts will be proposed again next year to
allow a degree ofprogress in the reorganisation ofthe service concerned. By giving priority to regrading
the post of head of the printing workshop, at the same time responsible for accounting for equipment,
the importance of his responsibilities is recognised.
6. The growth in the WEU Assembly's relations with the governments and parliaments of
European countries, including Eastern Europe, and some countries outside Europe makes it necessary
to strengthen the English translation team which at present consists only of one reviser and one
translator. The creation of a grade L2 post of translator with as wide a range of languages as possible is
therefore included in the budget for the financial year 1994, the total expenditure involved being
F 548 000. It will also be necessary to provide for an increase of F 50 000 under Sub-Head 8 for the
temporary translation service, this being essential to allow the translation into one of the two working
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languages (French/English) of texts received in languages that the staffof the Offrce of the Clerk are not
currently able to translate, e.g. Russian, Polish, Greek, etc.
7. For the reasons set out in the introduction and in view of the very clear increase in
administrative requirements linked with the relations between the WEU Assembly and the
governments and parliaments of member and non-member countries, including the Central and
Eastern European countries, and with a number of international organisations, provision should be
made for the creation of a grade 83 post of assistant in the Private Office of the President, the
expenditure involved being F 325 000.
8. The Assembly should also propose the creation of a grade C3 post for an official combining the
duties of usher, messenger and driver of the Assembly's offrcial car. The creation of this post, which
has been requested for several years, can no longer be deferred. The cost ofthis post (F 205 000) would
be partly offset by savings of approximately F 60 000 under Sub-Head 22 because it would no longer be
necessary to hire a chauffeur-driven car for the President. It should be emphasised that, at the presentjuncture, the Assembly is the only WEU organ in the paradoxical situation of having no official car
with driver, which is real discrimination compared with the other WEU organs.
9. Finally, the regrading of the post of chief accountant from grade B6 to grade ,A2 corresponds to
the principle of the concordance between the duties exercised and the professional category. The
Assembly's chief accountant 
- 
as can be seen from the description of his post at Appendix III - is
responsible for keeping the accounts of commitments and expenditure and the budget, with the recent
addition of individual accounts in the Provident Fund of all WEU staff, this having previously been
the task of MIM in London under the supervision of the administrative service of the Secretariat-
General. It is worth mentioning that such duties are exercised in the Secretariat-General by at least two
grade A2lA3 officials.
10. To sum up, the proposals on the restructuring of the Offrce of the Clerk included in the draft
budget for the financial year 1994lead to the following increases in the budget:
- 
creation of three grade 83 posts assigned respectively to the Committee for
Parliamentary and Public Relations, the Research Oflice and the Archives
- 
creation of a grade L2 post of translator for the Translation Service (English
section)
- 
creation of a grade 83 post of assistant for the Private Oflice of the President
- 
creation of a grade C3 post of usher/messenger/driver
- 
regrading of a grade L3 post to grade L4
- 
regrading of a grade C6 post to grade 84
- 
regrading of a grade 86 post to grade A2
Tornl
ll. With particular regard to Sub-Head 4 "Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of
permanent officials ", the relevant estimates take into account, apart from the cost of travel and
removal and installation allowances linked with the creation of new posts, those relating to the
replacement of a senior official who is to retire on lst July 1994.
12. It should be underlined that the estimates under Head I have been calculated on the basis of the
scales provided for in the nineteenth co-ordination report. The possible increase in the salaries of
permanent and temporary staff in 1994 is not taken into account since, at the time of preparing this
budget, the results ofthe relevant studies by the Inter-organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices
are not yet known. Any adjustments to these estimates that may prove necessary will be given in an
addendum to this draft budget.
III. Operating budget
13. Estimates under Heads II to V have been calculated in accordance with the directives of the
Presidential Committee, which decided on the overall course of the political activities of the Assembly
bodies for 1994, reflecting the changed circumstances and direction of the Assembly's work in the post-
Maastricht era, as frequently identified by ministers. To make an accurate analysis of the financial
implications of these directives, they should be grouped in the following categories:
(a) implications of Greece's accession to WEU;
(b) programme of work of the Presidential and other committees;
/c,/ equipment modernisation programme;
(d) other operating expenditure.
l8
F 777 000
F 548 000
F 325 000
F 205 000
F 15 000
F 57 000
F l0 000
F l 937 000
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14. Implications of Greece's accession to WEU
14.1. Since the process of ratifying the agreement on Greece's accession to WEU is under way, it is to
be expected that Greece will participate as a full member in both parts of the fortieth session of the
Assembly. The draft budget for 1994 therefore takes this possibility into account along the same lines
as the contingency budget item included for 1993. The following sums have been included under the
various sub-heads of the budget for this purpose:
Sub-Head 6.1 - Sittings service(2 Greek sub-editors)
Interpretation service
4 Greek interpreters)
Translation service
(2 translators)
Provident fund for interpreters
Insurance for interpreters
F 35 000
Sub-Head 6.2 
-
Sub-Head 6.3 -
Sub-Head 9.2 
-
Sub-Head 9.3 
-
F 80000
F 240 000
F 60000
F 28 000
F 1000
Sub-Head l2 
- 
Installation of an eighth interpretation booth in the chamber of
the ESC F 125 000(including the purchase of electronic equipment, building a dais,
labour required for the installation and hire of the booth)
Sub-Head 30 
- 
Expenses for political groups
The Greek Delegation will probably have fourteen members
(seven representatives and seven substitutes)
Tornr F 569 000
14.2. lt should be pointed out that no credit is requested for an office for the Greek Delegation and
temporary staff since, when the time comes, it will be possible to solve this problem only by
redistributing offices in the building in agreement with the Secretariat-General.
14.3. It should also be pointed out once again that no further national delegations can be
accommodated in the present Assembly building. Considerable relocation costs will have to be met
when that becomes due 
- 
though these administrative costs will be nothing like the same magnitude as
those associated with the move of the Secretariat-General to Brussels.
15. Programme of work
15.1. The Assembly's programme of work was examined closely by the Presidential Committee, which
studied the proposals for meetings (and the travelling associated with them) prepared by the various
committees on the basis of the following political guidelines already indicated by ministers:
(a/ establishing and maintaining relations between the WEU Assembly and:
(i) the European Parliament;
fr) NATO and the North Atlantic Assembly;(iii) the Assembly of the Council of Europe;(iv) parliaments of observer and associate countries and member countries of the Forum
of Consultation;(v/ parliaments of other European countries;(vi) parliaments of " out-of-area " countries;
(b) increased contacts between the WEU Assembly and the parliaments of member
countries;
(c) work arising from the development of the CSCE and WEU's r6le in that body.
15.2. The financial implications of the very intensive activities planned by the Assembly for 1994
concern three sub-heads in particular, i.e. Sub-Heads 7 " Interpretation staff required for Assembly
work between sessions ",24 " Travelling and subsistance allowances and insurance for the President of
the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs " and 27 " Oflicial journeys of members of the
Offrce of the Clerk ". Under each of these sub-heads, it is estimated that an increased cost of 200/o
should be anticipated, particularly due to the zero increases allowed over recent years. In regard to
Sub-Head 24 in particular, it should be pointed out that, in 1994, the President of the Assembly will be
making a certain number of important visits associated with the start of his term of office; and there
are inevitably increased costs associated with travel to and from the seat of the Assembly in Paris in the
exercise of his duties.
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16. Programme for the modernisation of equipment
16.1. The five-year programme for the modernisation of equipment, updated for the period 1994-98
(see Appendix V), takes account of:
(a) reorganising the printing workshop with the purchase with maintenance contract in 1993 of a
RX 5380 photocopier to replace the old Gestetner 2382 ZDS; this is crucial to meet the vast
increase of workload;
(b) cancelling the hire and maintenance contracts for the abovementioned Gestetner
photocopier and the maintenance contracts for two stereotypers and one offset machine no
longer in use;
(c) a new maintenance contract for the committees' computers and those used by the French
verbatim and summary reporters;
(d) the purchase of a second telecopier which is essential since the single telecopier now
available will not be enough to cope with the growing requirements of the various services of
the Assembly which are frequently obliged, for reasons of urgency, to transmit to the national
delegations their reports and other documents by the fastest possible means.
16.2. Taken as a whole, this programme shows an increase of F 97 000 (F l5 000 under Sub-Head 16
and F 82000 under Sub-Head 17) compared with the financial year 1993.
16.3. The higher cost of this programme is largely offset by savings achieved by reorganising the
printing workshop. Thanks to the acquisition of the RX 5380 photocopier, it is possible to stop hiring
two other copiers during sessions (savings of F l8 000 under Sub-Head 6. I " Staff recruited for sessions
of the Assembly - Sittings service ", F 50 000 under Sub-Head 13 " Various services for the
organisation of sessions " and F 3 000 under Sub-Head l9 " Duplication paper, headed writing paper
and other office supplies ").
17. Other operating expenditure
17.1. Estimates under other sub-heads of the budget, except for Sub-Heads 6, 9, l8 and 29, generally
correspond to those of the previous financial year, increased by 2.50/o, the foreseeable rate of inflation
in France. It was in this spirit of economy that estimates under the sub-heads of the operating budget
not specifically examined above have been worked out.
17.2. ln regard to Sub-Heads 6 and 9, which cover the salaries of temporary staff recruited for
Assembly sessions, by reorganising the services concerned, the Office of the Clerk has managed to
reduce the number of temporary staff recruited (four in the sittings service and one in the translation
service) and the number of days worked in the translation service, thus making significant savings
which largely offset additional costs of the Assembly's expanded rOle.
17.3. Estimates under Sub-Head 18 "Postage, telephone, telefax and transport of documents" are
based on experience and also take account of the rise of about 100/o in postal rates that has been
announced.
17.4. For the press service, an increase of about F 80 000 is requested to allow the Press Counsellor:
- 
to invite three additional journalists to each session (whereas at present only two have been
invited to sessions on a regular basis). This would allow a rotation among the representatives
of member countries;
- 
to allow proper presentation to journalists of all the Assembly documents;
- 
to have an optical system for storing data allowing access to remote users such as universities,
libraries, etc.;
- 
to have a second laser printer to back up the only printer assigned to his service which is
shared by three people and is now quite inadequate for the present workload;
- 
to provide a slide projector instead of continuously hiring one for the briefings frequently
given to groups of students or specialised associations.
17.5. Conversely, the proposals submitted to the Assembly by the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations (Document 1378) are not taken into account in this draft budget. They will be
considered separately when the Council's answer to Recommendation 546, adopted by the Assembly
on lTth June 1993, has been received.
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IY. Pensions budget
18. Two new pensions are included in the estimates for this financial year. One is payable to a grade
,{2 oflicial who has taken early retirement with effect from lst October 1993 and the other to a grade
A6 official whose contract expires on 30th June 1994. These estimates therefore cover the pensions for
17 officials (14 retirement pensions,2 invalidity pensions and I survivor's pension), calculated in
accordance with the nineteenth co-ordination report. As for the salaries of permanent staff, any future
adjustments to these scales will be set out in an addendum to the present draft budget.
19. For receipts under this part of the budget, i.e. contributions by the permanent staff to the
pension scheme (7.50/o of basic salary), account has been taken of the fact that these contributions have
been increased from 7o/o to 7 .50/o by a Council decision based on the fifteenth co-ordination report. The
amount included in the budget includes contributions relating to the new posts to be created and those
to be regraded, which amount to approximately F 84 000.
Y. Conclusions
20. In conclusion, as shown in the table at Appendix VI, the net grand total of estimates in the draft
budget of the Assembly for 1994 (operating budget plus pensions budget minus receipts) amounts to
F 34 326 500 which, compared with the net grand total for the financial year 1993, shows a growth rate
of 8.040/0. The operating budget (expenditure under Heads I to V) shows a growth rate of 8.350/o
whereas the figure for overall estimates under Heads II to V, where the Assembly has budgetary
autonomy, is 6.970/o.
Summary of estimates of receipts and expenditure
for the financial year 1994
Details Receipts Expenditure
Pnnr I: Operating
Section A:
Head I:
Head II:
Head III:
Head IV:
Head V:
Section B:
budget
Expenditure
Permanent staff
Temporary staff
Expenditure on premises and
equipment
General administrative costs
Other expenditure
Receipts
Penr II: Pensions
Section A:
Head I:
Section B:
Net rornl
budget
Expenditure
Pensions, allowances and social
charges
Receipts
Ner rornI-
NEr rornI- BUDcET
9s 000
l9 450 000
4 332 000
2 199 000
2 238 500
2 539 000
95 000 30 7s8 s00
9s 000
30 663 s00
92s 000
4 s88 000
4 588 000
925 000
3 663 000
34 326 500
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Budget estimates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
HeadI-Permanentstaff
* Including F 305 130 carried over from the financial year 1992 to financial year 1993 to meet 1992 commitments which fall
due in 1993.
Sub-Heads
Estimates
[or
t994
Budget
for
l 993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head I - Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances:
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and
other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges:
3.1. Social security 1826000
3.2. Supplementary insurance 688 000
3.3. Provident fund 106 000
Sub-Head 4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and deParture of Permanent
officials
4.1. Travelling expenses of
candidates for vacant posts 25 000
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival
and departure of permanent
offrcials and their families 29 000
4.3. Removal expenses 225 000
4.4. Installation allowance 150 000
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
Torel on Hrnn I
I 456 000
703 000
795 000
43 000
76 000
2 000
80 000
50 000
13 180000
3 205 000
2 620000
429 000
l6 000
t2 614 9 50
2 662 340
2 526 840
0
l3 000
l2 515 000
2 707 000
2 s00 000
0
7 000
l l 340 938
2374 37t
2223024
81 306
4 633
l 9 450 000 17 817 130 17 729 000 L6 024 272
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Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to
permanent staffin accordance with Chapter III of the StaffRules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on
30th June 1992t set out in the nineteenth co-ordination report.
These estimates also take account of the financial implications of creating six new posts (one
Grade L2, four grade 83 and one grade C3) and the regrading of three existing posts. Expenditure
involved in these proposals amounts to F I 937 000.
The table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, showing grades, is given at Appendix I and
the organogram at Appendix II.
Sub-Head 3
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from:
- 
application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1)2;
- 
application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3;
- 
application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the
Provident Fund, amounting to l4Vo of basic salary for staff not affiliated to the pension
scheme (Sub-Head 3.3).
Social charges (F 219 000) relating to the creation of six new posts and the regrading of three
existing posts are included in the total for this sub-head.
Sub-Head 4
These estimates relate to the expenditure involved in recruiting new offrcials.
Sub-Head 5
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the annual medical check-up which all members of the
staff must undergo in accordance with Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in
Paris are carried out at the OECD medical centre.
l. These scales are worked out by the Inter-organisation Study Section on Salaries and Prices and approved by the WEU Council
and the Councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA, ECMRWF).
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exceptron of family allowances and
retirement pensions.
3. Under this convention, WEU staffbenefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the
beneficiaries he has named.
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Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for
l 993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head 6 
- 
Staffrecruited forsessionsof the
Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
l 440 000
890 000
865 000
90 000
190 000
8 000
Sub-Head 7 
- 
Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 
- 
Temporary stafffor the Office of
the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 
- 
Social charges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff
other than interpreters 9 000
9.2. Provident fund for
interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
Toru or Hrno II
3 285 000
765 000
7s 000
207 000
3 249 550
638 000
25 000
199 700
3 000 000
650 000
20 000
l 70 000
2 837 725
602 383
23 601
r45 874
4 332 000 * 4 t12250 3 840 000 3 609 583
* Including F 47 750 carried over from the financial year 1992 to the financial year 1993 to meet 1992 commitments which fall
due in 1993.
Erplanations
Sub-Head 6
Estimates under this sub-head relate to:(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the
reimbursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation
and translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at
Appendix IV. It should be underlined that, with the accession of Greece to WEU, two extra
parliamentary sub-editors for the sittings service as well as four interpreters for the Greek booth are to
be recruited.(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post
office technician, typewriter mechanic, guards for the security service, etc.).
Salaries for temporary staff are calculated in accordance with scales in force on lst July 1992, as
set out in the nineteenth co-ordination report.
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the
International Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated
on the basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 60/o.
Sub-Head 7
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at
meetings between sessions (salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, travelling time and
travelling expenses).
Salaries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (see
Sub-Head 6 (b) above).
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Sub-Head 8
An increase of F 50 000 is foreseen under this sub-head to recruit temporary translators to
translate into English and French texts received by the Assembly in languages that cannot be translated
by the Office of the Clerk.
Sub-Head 9
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges:
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters
Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 600/o of the premium being paid by the Offrce of the Clerk and
400/o by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premiums as from May
I 988.
Provident fund for interpreters
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACI, WEU
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a
contribution of l4o/o, which is added to a contribution of 7o/o by interpreters.
Insurance for interpreters
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London,
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them
from working. The premium of l.l0lo of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk
(0.70/o) and the interpreters (0.40/o).
Head III 
- 
Expenditure on premises and equipment
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1994
Budget
lor
I 993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head l0 
- 
Share of joint expenditure on
the Paris premises
Sub-Head I I 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head 12 
- 
Technical and other
installations for Assembly
sessions
Sub-Head 13 
-
Sub-Head 14 
-
Sub-Head 15
Sub-Head 16
Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions
Maintenance of the premises of
the Oflice of the Clerk
- 
Purchase or repair of office
furniture
- 
Purchase of reproduction and
other office equipment
Sub-Head l7 
- 
Hire and maintenance of repro-
duction and other equipment
Torel or Heno III
s8s 000
l0 000
815 000
55 000
l5 000
40 000
2s 000
654 000
570 000
l0 000
645 000
105 000
l5 000
40 000
10 000
572 000
570 000
0
690 000
54 000
l5 000
40 000
l0 000
570 000
446 088
6 304
669 345
l l0 353
5 869
20 472
4 000
498 260
2 199 000 I 967 000 l 949 000 t 760 69t
Explanations
Sub-Head l0
Estimates under this sub-head represent the 300/o share of joint expenditure relating to the
management of the WEU premises in Paris. Following the abolition of the agencies, the Council
confirmed the validity of the previous system of sharing this expenditure and made the administrative
service of the WEU Institute for Security Studies responsible for managing joint services.
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Sub-Head I I
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hiring a room or installing portable interpretation
equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the Assembly to
cover such expenditure if necessary.
Sub-Head l2
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous
interpretation equipment, telephone booths, a telefax, screens, a detection gate and other installations
in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly sessions.
The large increase in these sums compared with the previous financial year is due to the
proposed installation of an eighth interpretation booth for Greek (F 125 000) and the installation of a
seventy-five seat television area in the lobby of the Economic and Social Council. This area, for which
the need arose at recent sessions, is intended to accommodate guests and the public for whom there is
not room in the galleries because of security measures under which no more than seventy persons may
be admitted to the galleries.
Sub-Head l3
Estimates under this sub-head relate to contracts for the provision of various services during
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises, cost of using reproduction machinery
loaned free of charge, etc.) and are based on experience. It should be specified that, following the
modernisation of the printing workshop, the hire of two additional photocopiers during sessions is no
longer necessary. A saving of F 50 000 compared with the previous financial year is therefore shown
under this sub-head.
Sub-Head l4
As in the past, this sum is requested to allow minor repairs to be carried out to the premises of
the Office of the Clerk.
Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year maintenance and modernisation
programme for equipment given at Appendiv V to this budget.
Head IY 
- 
General administrative costs
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for
t993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head 18 
- 
Postage, telephone, telefax and
transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed
writing paper and other office
supplies
Sub-Head 20 
- 
Printing and publication of
documents
Sub-Head 2l 
- 
Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 
- 
Offtcial car
Sub-Head 23 
- 
Bank charges
Toru or Heao IV
646 000
237 000
l 215 000
75 000
65 000
500
630 000
240 000
l 185 000
75 000
125 000
s00
680 000
200 000
l 100000
60 000
90 000
0
70't 566
199 567
t 163 rt2
48 336
58 950
556
2238 s00 2 255 500 2 130000 2 r78 087
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Explanations
Sub-Head 18
Like last year, estimates under this sub-head take account of the considerable increase in the
volume of documents being posted and of communications by telephone and telefax. Account has also
been taken of an increase of about 100/o in postal charges that has been announced.
Sub-Head 19
The reduction of F 3 000 under this sub-head is due to the use of a new photocopier.
Sub-Head 20
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected rate of inflation (2.50/o).
Sub-Head 21
Estimates under this sub-head are the same as in 1993.
Sub-Head 22
Estimates under this sub-head include the cost of running the Assembly's official car (garage,
petrol, servicing, insurance, etc.). Since it will be driven by the driver-usher-messenger whose
recruitment has been requested, no estimate is included for hiring a chauffeur-driven car for the
President of the Assembly.
Sub-Head 23
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged.
Head V 
- 
Other expenditure
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1994
Budget
for
1993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head 24
Sub-Head 25
Sub-Head 26
Sub-Head 27
Sub-Head 28
Sub-Head 29
Sub-Head 30
Sub-Head 3l
Sub-Head 32 
-
Torrl or Heeo V
Travelling and subsistence
allowances and insurance for
the President of the Assembly,
chairmen of committees and
rapporteurs
Expenses for representation
Committee study missions
Official journeys of members
of the Office of the Clerk
Expenses of experts and the
auditor
Expenditure on information
Expenses for political groups
Contingencies and other expen-
diture not elsewhere provided
for
Non-recoverable taxes
295 000
360 000
s 000
708 000
60 000
5 10 000
569 000
3 000
29 000
246000
3s0 000
5 000
590 000
50 000
430 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
260 000
3s0 000
0
724 000
60 000
450 000
534 000
0
28 000
140 l19
326 242
0
750 595
79 210
444 7 5l
534 000
l8 304
2t t78
2 s39 000 2236000 2 406 000 2 3r4 399
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Explanations
(Expenditurc under all these sub-heads reflect experience dariag 1993
to date as well as anticipated increasing activity costs ia 1994)
Sub-Head 24
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries, as are those of members of the
Bureau and the Presidential Committee.
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for visits by the President
of the Assembly, rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these visits are
connected with the preparation of a report or the work of the Assembly. Journeys by committee
chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee.
Sub-Head 25
The participation in sessions of the Assembly of very high-ranking official speakers and the ever-
increasing number of visits to the Assembly by parliamentary delegations from countries of Eastern
Europe and the Mediterranean justify the increase in credits requested under this sub-head.
Sub-Head 26
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure for committee study visits. As
these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year.
Sub-Head 27
Estimates under this sub-head are based on the programme of work of the various Assembly
committees in 1994.
Sub-Head 28
This sum is to cover the cost of auditing the Assembly's accounts and the participation of experts
in the symposia organised by the Assembly.
Sub-Head 29
There is an increase of F 80 000 in the estimate for this sub-head to allow the Press Counsellor to
develop and improve his service.
Sub-Head 30
Compared with the previous financial year, there is an increase of 6.50/o in the estimate under
this sub-head since, with the accession of Greece to WEU, the Assembly will probably have fourteen
more parliamentarians (seven representatives and seven substitutes).
In accordance with the decisions taken by the Presidential Committee, each of the political
groups of the Assembly has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number of
members listed. All the groups have to submit a balance sheet at the close of the financial year. All the
balance sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to
verification by the auditor.
Sub-Head 3I
The same amount is requested as for 1993.
Sub-Head 32
There is a small increase of F I 000 in the estimate for this sub-head.
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Estimates
for
1994
Budget
for
I 993
Expected
receipts
in 1993
Actual
receipts
in 1992
l. Sale of publications
2. Bank interest
3. Receipts
(Reimbursements, social security, etc.)
Tornl Recprprs
25 000
60 000
l0 000
40 000
60 000
l0 000
30 000
70 000
l5 000
30 389
160 655
30 389
95 000 r l0 000 115000 221 433
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Explanations
Estimates for bank interest and social security reimbursements are based on experience. Those
relating to the sale of publications take account of the fact that one sales agent has cancelled his
contract for economic reasons and that there has been a fall of l2o/oin sales in the United States. Efforts
are being made to improve this position.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
Head I 
- 
Pensions, allowances and social charges
* IncludingFl43950carriedoverfromthefinancialyear1992tothefinancialyearl993tomeetl992commitmentswhichfall
due in 1993.
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for 1993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
n 1992
Sub-Head I 
- 
Pensions and leaving
allowances
l.l. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invalidity pensions
1.3. Survivors' pensions
1.4. Orphans' or dependants'
penslons
1.5. Leaving allowances
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Familyallowances
2.1. Household allowances
2.2. Children's and other
dependants' allowances
2.3. Education allowances
3 708 000
477 000
63 000
0
160 000
33 000
0
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Supplementary insurance
Torel or Heeo I
4 248 000
l 93 000
l 47 000
3 963 650
188 300
105 000
4 015 500
189 500
l 36 000
3 332 294
166 855
92 675
4 588 000 * 4 256 950 4 341 000 J 59t 824
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Explanations
Sub-Heads I and 2
ln 1994, the Assembly will be paying seventeen pensions, as follows:
- 
fourteen retirement pensions;
- 
two invalidity pensions;
- 
one survivor's pension.
Estimates of expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the
provisions of the pension scheme rules on the basis of the scales set out in the nineteenth co-ordination
report.
Sub-Head 3
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19 bls of the
collective convention in force.
Estimates of expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid
by the Assembly.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for
l 993
Expected
receipts
in 1993
Actual
receipts
in 1992
Contrihrrfions hv nermanent nffi cial 925 000 765 000 794000 699 870
Explanations
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by the
thirty-nine permanent staffmembers of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7.5o/o of basic salary)
affiliated to the pension scheme. By a decision of the Council taken on the basis of the fifteenth
co-ordination report, this contribution has been raised from 7o/o to 7.5o/0.
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APPENDIX I
Recapitulatory table showing changes in the staff
of the Olfice of the Clcrk of the WEU Assembly
proposed in the 1994 budget
Grade Duties 1993 budget 1992 budget +or-
H.G.
A6
A5
A4
L4
L3
L2
A2
A2
A2
B6
B4
B4
B3
B3
B3
C6
c4
C3
Clerk
Clerk Assistants
Counsellors
First secretaries
Translator-interpreter
Translator-interpreter
Translator
Head of General Services;
office
Head of private
Translators; Documentalists
Chief accountant
Chief accountant
Qualified assistants
Equipment accountant;
Head of documents reproduction service
Accountant
Bilingual shorthand-typists
Switchboard operator
Head of documents reproduction service
Offset operators
Usher/messenger/driver
I
2
5
2
I
I
2
4
I
7
I
I
8
I
2
I
I
2
5
2
I
2
4
I
7
I
4
I
I
2
0
0
0
0
I
-l
I
0
0
I
-l
0
I
0
4
0
-l
0
I
40 34 6
3l
Presidential
Commrttee
Notes:
. Service organised/staff recruited during sessions of the Assembly.
Posts underlined are those it is proposed to create in 1994.
* Posts proposed for regrading in the 1994 budget.
I ) The duties of Head of the Committee Sewice are exercised by the Clerk Assistant for Pohtical
Affais. His assistmt helps him in the exercire of these duties.
2) The Clerk and his assistant rc responsible for the serctariat of the Comminee on Rules of
Procedure and Pnvileges.
3) This post is normally filled by the asslstant rn the English Translatron Service.
4) The duties of Head of the Administration md Finance Seruice, Head of the Pesonnel Section,
Secunty Officer and Secretary of the Commrttee on Budgetary Affais and Admrnistration re
carried out by the Clerk Assistant forAdministration and Finance. His assistant helps him in the
exercise of these duties.
5) These duties arc exercised by the translator/mterpreter in the French section of the Trmslation
Seruice.
6) The Deputy Head of the Adminisration md Finmce Seruice is rcsponsible for General
SeNices.
7) The assistant to the Deputy Hqd of the Administration md Finance Sewice is also the assistmt
for the Mail and Archives Service.
8) The staff responsrble for storing and accounting for equipment is responsible for the operation
of the printing workshop.
9) The duues of Head of the Translation and Publicatrons Service are exercrsed by the most senior
reviser who, since lst October 1986, ha ben the English rcviser. He is helped in the exercise of
ftese duties by his assistant.
l0) The assistant in the Private Office of the President rs responsible for the receptron desk.
1HE
rnt(
(a) [(
fd
2l
(b) r(
bt
ai
Clerk Assistant (A6)
(Political Affaim)
Assistant (8314)
2 Presidentral Counsellors
2 Parhamentary Secretanes
2 Assislants
5 Ushers
Press and External
Relations Seruice
Head of Seruice (A5)
Assistant (8314)
4 Joumahsts
2 Asslstants
1 Messenger
Head of Seroice (l)
Assistmt (1)
Secretary (A5)
Assistant (8314)
Secretary (A5)
Assistant (8314)
Secrctary (A5)
Assistant (8314)
Committe for Parhamentary
md Public Relations
Private Ofrice of the President
Head of Private Office
Assistant (10)
Assistant
-G;l
(B4) 
|
Administration and
Finalce Seruice
{ead of Seruice
)eputy
{ssistant
(4)
(A2)
(4)
Mail and Archives
Head of the Archrves (B4)
(E?
and accounting
Head Storekeeper * (B4)
2Assistans * (C4)
Installations attendmt*
o
od
si:S
Oe
s
.S
!.G
\rEt t0Grfl
.sz
s=Gai
R.
?F
.S
i.
G\
u,UtGI
+g
2 Heads of Section
20 Verbatim reporters
6 Verbatlm writers
2 Principal Assistants
l6 Assistants
Clerk Assistant (A6)
(Administration and Finance)
Assistant (B4)
2 Heads of Sertron
6 Summary reporters
6 Assistants
I Messenger
Head ofservrce (8)
2 Assistants (8)
8 Temporary staff
I Switchboard operator (B3)
I Chauffeur (S3)
I Cloakroom Attendmt
Head of Servrce (9)
Assistant (9)
Assistant
TemPorary Staff'
3 Revises
5 Translaton
7 Assistants
Reviser (A4l5)
Translaror (A2)
Tmslator/Interpreter + (IA)
Assistant (B3/4)
Temporary Staff.
5 Revrsers
7 Translators
5 Assrstants
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APPENDIX III
Descrtption of the post of Chief Accountant
Grade: 86
I. Duties
1. Management of the budget and accounting
(a) Supervises and assumes responsibility for:
- 
the accounts of the Assembly's commitments and expenditure;
- 
the preparation of files on expenditure of all kinds and ensures the relevant payments
(salaries, per diem allowance and travelling expenses of staff, purchase or hire of equipment
and various supplies, representation expenses, etc.);
- 
the preparation and updating of administrative files on permanent staff (sick leave, social
security, provident fund, overtime, medical check-ups, etc.) and also files on retired staff.
(b) Prepares monthly financial statements for the President of the Assembly and the Clerk.
(c) Prepares the Assembly's final accounts for submission to the auditors.
(d) Assists the auditors during their audit.
(e) Keeps the accounts of the provident fund and prepares individual annual statements.
(/) Prepares monthly and annual statements for the social security and the complementary
rnsurance company.
2. Finance
(a) Keeps financial accounts of :
- 
contributions received from the Secretariat-General;
- 
transfers to and withdrawals from the budgetary account to which these contributions are
credited;
- 
receipts paid into that account.
(b) Payment of all current expenditure : salaries, pensions, oflicial journeys and travelling expenses
of staff, bills for all purchases (offrce supplies, equipment, etc.), the salaries of temporary staffrecruited
for sessions and fees of interpreters recruited both for sessions and for committee meetings.
(c) Scrutiny of the financial balance with the WEU Secretariat-General and the bank holding the
Assembly's account.
(d) Keeps an account of sums to be recovered from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in respect of
certain valued added taxes paid by the Assembly.
II. Qualifications
- 
Secondary education and training and diploma in accountancy or equivalent.
- 
Approximately five years' practical experience in a similar post.
- 
Experience of working on a personal computer, in particular for the study and application of
accountancy programmes.
- 
Good knowledge of one of the working languages of WEU; knowledge of the other desirable.
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APPENDIX IV
Salaries of staff recraited for Assembly sessions
1. Sittings semice
Duties Number No. ofdays
Daily
remune-
ration*
F
Total
F
Total
F
Counsellors to the President of Assembly
Heads of sections
Sergeant-at-arms ...
Parliamentary secretari;;... :.... :....,
Pr6cis writers
Verbatim reporters
Editors
Principal assistants
Assistants to the President's counsellors
Assistants assigned to other services ...
Ushers
Messengers
Installations attendant
Cloakroom attendant
Photocopier-assemblers ....
Adjustment for 1994
lb
2a
2b
3a
3b
6a
l4b
l0a
20blb
6a
3a
la
la
4a
la
1b
2alblb
2a
4b
2a
3b
la
1b
t4
l6
8
10
t2
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
8
l0
t4
t6
8
l0
t2
8
l0
t4
8
l0
t 240
207t
l 358
2 r89
2 r89
I 931
I 100
r 931
l 100
l 931
l 101
l 931
l 100
r 931
716
t 248
493
l 025
628
I 160
l 160
520
520
409
520
520
t7 360
33 136
2t 728
2l 890
26 268
l9 310
l7 600
38 620
26 400
57 930
52 848
270 340
l7 600
77 240
l0 960
48 520
6 608
l6 000
48 080
22s 800
l3 548
24 960
l5 600
5 726
4 160
20 800
50 496
69 886
l9 310
56 220
84 330
323 188
94 840
369 516
50 446
20 800
96 t 139 032
Travelling expenses
t r39 032
300 000
Rounded up to
t 439 032
I 440 000
* In accordance with scales in force on lst July 1992.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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2. Interpretatioa semice
Duties Number No. of days Total
F
Infcrtrreters 14a 8
l0
392 224
375 900
Adiustment for t994
l0b
24 768 124
Travelline
768 124
l 20 000
Rounded up to
888 124
890 000
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
N.B.: On lst July 1992,the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 3 502. In addition, interpreters recruited outside
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem)
corresponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent offrcial, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses.
3, Translation semice
Duties Number Dailyremuneration
F
Estimates I Total
F
Revisers
Translators
Principal assistants
Assistants
5a
2b
5a
5b
la
2b
4a
5b
l 383
2 2t4
I 093| 924
s63
l 095
493
l 025
138 300
88 560
109 300
t92 400
t4 075
54750
49 300
t28 t25
226 860
301 700
68 825
t77 425
Adiustment for 1993
29 774 8t0
Travelling expenses
774 8r0
30 000
Rounded up to
Financial implications of translating Greek texts into the WEU offrcial languages
804 810
805 000
60 000
865 000
l. Based on 20 days for revisers and translators and 25 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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APPENDIX V
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment
of the Olfice of the Clerk
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices)
Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
1994 l 995 l 996 t997 r 998
I
1.1
r.2
1.3
t.4
1.5
2
3
2.1
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
4.t
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
5.1
A. Reproduction and
printing equipment
Photocopiersl Rx 1090
RX s380
Gestetner 2382 ZDF
RX 5034
5317RX
Offset machines
I Gestetner 3l I
E I ectros t atic st er eo ty pe rs
I Gestetner PlvI/9
I Gestetner DTI
I Gestetner l00PM
Binding machines
I Gestetner 100
I Orpo Planax
I Orpo Thermatic
M isce I laneous equi pme nt
I Logabax-Ordina 7630
assembling machine
with stapler
Hire since l99l (rate blocked).
The contract expires at end of
1995. Maintenance contract for
240 000 copies per quarter
included in the hire cost.
This photocopier, hired in June
1993, replaces the old Gestetner
2382 ZDF rate blocked.
Maintenance (indexed).
Maintenance calculated on the
basis of the number of copies
over and above 225 000 copies
per quarter.
This is leased for a five-year
period. The contract expires in
April 1996. Cost of hire
The cost of maintenance depends
on the number of copies made.
As from 1992. Cost of hire
The cost of maintenance depends
on the number of copies made.
This photocopier replaces the old
Gestetner 2200 assigned to the
archives and mail office. The
cost of maintenance is calculated
on the basis of a fixed number of
4 500 copies per quarter.
Purchased in 1984.
Purchased in 1980.
Purchased in 1985.
Purchased in 1986.
As these machines are not often
used, the maintenance contracts
have been cancelled.
Property of the Assembly. This
machine is in condition. Normal
maintenance by the staff
concerned is enough to keep it in
good working order.
Purchased in 1977, this machine is
serviced when required, since the
c.ost of a maintenance contract is
exorbitant. It is no longer consid-
ered necessary to replace it as the
printing workshop was equipped in
1991 with photocopiers that
assemble.
104 500
74 600
72 000
25 000
31 700
8 000
29 000
23 000
2 800
104 500
74 600
72000
25 000
31 700
8 000
29 000
23 000
2 800
104 500
74 600
72000
2s 000
8 000
8 000
29 000
23 000
2 800
r04 500
74 600
72000
2s 000
8 000
960
23 000
2 800
r04 500
74 600
72000
25 000
8 000
23 000
2 800
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
t994 r 995 t996 1997 r 998
5.2
5.3
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
7
7.t
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
I AM International
5000 addressograph
I Fortematic 655
B. Typewriters
and calculators
Office of the Clerk
8 Olivetti ET l2l elec-
tronic typewriters
I ET 2z|Olivetti
I ET 2400 Olivetti
4 calculators
For use during
the sessions
4 RX 6015 electronic
typewriters (English
keyboard)
I IBM electric
typewriter (French
keyboard)
2 ET 109 typewriters(Italian keyboard)
I Editor electric
typewriter (Italian
keyboard)
2 Olivetti ET 2400
electronic typewritersI Portuguese
keyboard
I Spanish keyboard
Hired typewriters
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
Purchased in 1976.
Purchased between l98l and
1983, these typewriters are in
good condition.
Purchased in 1983, it is in good
condition.
Purchased in 1989, it is in
excellent condition.
These machines are in good
working order.
These machines were purchasedin 1986 and are assigned to
session services.
Assigned to a political group.
Assigned to the Italian
Delegation and the Italian
summary reporters.
Assigned to the Italian summary
reporters.
Purchased in 1989, they
assigned to the Portuguese
Spanish Delegations.
are
and
All typewriters and calculators
are serviced by a mechanic twice
a yeat, before each session.
A single lump sum should be
earmarked for possible repairs at
other times.
To meet the requirements of the
various services during Assembly
sessions, the following hire
programme is envisaged for each
sesslon:
- 
14 electric machines with
English keyboards,
- 
6 electric machines with
French keyboards,
- 
3 electric machines with
German keyboards.
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 300
9 000
17000
4 300
9 000
l7 000
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Ref.
No. Equipment
Modernisation and
equipment programme
Budgets
t994 l 995 t996 t997 l 998
8
8.1
8.2
9
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
9.5
9.6
l0
10. l
10.2
10.3
10.4
ll
Typewriters in reserve
6 Olympia SGE 5l
electric typewriters
2 English keyboards
5 French keyboards(one with long
carriage)
2l Olympia mechanical
typewriters
19 English keyboards
2 French keyboards
C. Miscellaneous
equipment
Dictaphones
2 Uher 5000
6 Sony BM
8 Grundig Stenorettes
telefax
stenotype machine
Grandjean
D. Word processors
and computers
Computers and
word processors
6 Olivetti M 300
3 Olivetti M 300/05
2 Olivetti M 300/08
6 Olivetti M 300/15
2 Olivetti M 300/30
I Olivetti M 24
3 Macintosh
II CI
SE
sE 30
E. Oflice furniture
Office of the Clerk
Purchased between 1966 and
1979, they are kept in reserve
in case of need (e.g. at the
request ofjournalists or in the
event of an electricity cut)
Purchased in 1971, they will
remain in service as long as
possible.
Purchased in 1987, 1990, 1992
and 1993. These dictaphones are
in very good working order.
Purchased between 1963 and
1987, they should be replaced
gradually as from 1992.
Purchased in 1974, this machine
is in good working order.
Provision for an overall sum in
the budget for possible repairs to
equipment in this category.
These have been hired on a
five-year leasing basis. The
contracts expire in May 1995,
January 1998 and July 1998.
Cost of hire
Property of the Assembly.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
for all word processors and
computers described in
paragraphs 10.1
Purchased in 1988,1990 and
199 r.
Maintenance contract (indexed)
Purchase or replacement of
various items of furniture in the
Offrce of the Clerk.
25 000
4 000
I 86 000
48 800
l4 000
40 000
4 000
145 000
s0 000
l4 000
40 000
4 000
106 300
s0 000
l4 000
40 000
4 000
106 300
50 000
l4 000
40 000
4 000
54 900
50 000
l4 000
40 000
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Breakdown by budget classification
Budget classification Ref. No.
in programme
Budgets
Head Sub-Head t994 l 995 r 996 t997 l 998
III
III
III
15. Purchase or repair of office
furniture
Purchase of reproduction and
other oflice equipment
Hire and maintenance of
reproduction and other oflice
equipment
16.
17.
Tornl
RouNoro up
ll
9.4
l.l
t.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
5.2
7.6
7.7
9.6
l0.l
10.3
10.4
40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000 40 000
25 000 9 000 9 000
104 500
l71 600
39 700
52 000
2 800
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 000
186 000
48 800
l4 000
104 500
l7l 600
39 700
s2 000
2 800
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 000
145 000
50 000
14 000
104 500
l71 600
l6 000
52 000
2 800
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 000
106 300
s0 000
l4 000
104 500
l71 600
8 000
23 960
2 800
4 300
9 000
l7 000
4 000
106 300
50 000
l4 000
104 500
l7l 600
8 000
23 000
2 800
4 300
l7 000
4 000
54 900
50 000
l4 000
653 700
654 000
613 900
614 000
575 200
576 000
547 160
548 000
494 800
494 800
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APPENDIX VI
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1993 to 1994
t994
a
l 993
b
olob - a
a
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Head IV. General administrative
costs
Head V. Other expenditure
l 9 450 000
4 332 000
2 199 000
2 238 500
2 s39 000
17 817 130
4 tt2 250
l 967 000
2 255 500
2 236 000
+ 9.16
+ 5.34
+ 1l 79
0.75
+ 13.55
Total expenditure
Receipts
30 758 500
9s 000
28 387 880
I 10 000
+ 8.35
- 
13.64
Net Total 30 663 500 28 277 880 + 8.43
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receipts
4 588 000
92s 000
4 256 950
765 000
+ 7.77
+ 21.44
Net Total 3 663 000 3 491 950 + 4.89
GeNennl NEr rorAl (A + B)
Torel oF HEADS II ro V oF opERATtNG
BUDGET
34 326 500
l I 308 500
3l 769 830
l0 570 750
+
+
8.04
6.97
4t
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APPENDIX VII
Implications of the various heads lor the 1993 and 1994 operuting budgas
I 993 1994
Amount
9o of
Amount
o/o of
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
HeadI 
-Permanentstaff
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Head III 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head IV 
- General administrative
costs
Head V 
- 
Otherexpenditure
A. Tornr-
Receipts
l7 817 130
4 tr2 250
I 967 000
2 255 500
2236000
62.76
14.49
6.93
7.95
7.8',1
63.01
14.54
6.96
7.98
7.90
l9 450 000
4 3320N
2 199 000
2238 5N
2 539 000
63.24
14.08
7.15
7.28
8.25
63.43
14.r2
7.t7
7.30
8.28
28 387 880
I 10 000
100.00 100.39
0.39
30 7s8 s00
95 000
100.00 100.30
0.30
B. Ner rorAl 28 277 880 100.00 100.00 30 663 500 100.00 100.00
Column A - Total of expenditure.
Column B = Net total (expenditure less receipts).
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Addendum 1
9th September 1993
Draft budget of the administatite *penditure
of the Assembly for the financial year 1994
ADDENDUM I to the REPORT
submiued on behalf ol the Committee on Budgetary Atfairc and Administration
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and. Rapporteur
Expbnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mt Rathbac,, Cluirman ud Rappneur)
l. In paragraph 12 of the explanatory memorandum to the draft budget of the Assembly for 1994,
it was underlined that estimates for the salaries of permanent and temporary staff and for pensions
- 
calculated on the basis of the scales in force on the date when the budget was prepared 
- 
were subject
to adjustment in accordance with decisions to be taken by the Council on the new scales proposed at
co-ordination level.
2. These scales, which were the subject of the twenty-second report of the CCR (Co-ordinating
Committee on Remuneration), were approved by the Council with effect from lst July 1993. Hence it
is now possible to make the necessary adjustments to the initial estimates, taking into account the fact
that, for 1994, it is possible, in accordance with information communicated to the Assembly by the
Deputy Secretary-General of WEU, to foresee an increase of 2o/o in the total amount resulting from the
new scales.
3. The following tables, showing the new estimates, replace the tables given in Document 1383
* Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1994":
- 
summary of estimates of receipts and expenditure for the financial year 1994;
- 
estimates under Head I 
- 
Permanent staff;
- 
estimates under Head II 
- 
Temporary staff;
- 
estimates under Head I of the pensions budget;
- estimates for receipts under the pensions budget;
- 
Appendix IV 
- 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions;
- 
Appendix YI 
- 
Trend of the Assembly budgets from 1993 to 1994:.
- 
Appendix VII 
- 
Implications of the various heads for the 1993 and 1994 operating budgets.
4. It should be underlined that, apart from the implications of the new salary scales, no other
change has been made to the draft budget circulated under reference Document 1383.
5. As shown in the table at Appendix VI, the new grand net total of estimates relating to the draft
budget of the Assembly for 1994 (operating budget plus pensions budget less receipts) amounts to
F 35 304 500, representing, compared with the grand net total ofthe budget for the financial year 1993,
a growth rate of 11.130/0. In the operating budget (expenditure under Heads I to V), there is a growth
rate of ll.32o/0, while the total under Heads II to V, where the Assembly has budgetary autonomy, is
8.2lVo.
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Summary of estimates of receipts aad *penditure
for the financial year 1994
Details Receipts Expenditure
Panr I: Operating budget
Section A:
Head I:
Head II:
Head III:
Head IV:
Head V:
Section B:
Expenditure
Permanent staff
Temporary staff
Expenditure on premises and
equipment
General administrative costs
Other expenditure
Receipts
Ner rorAt.
Pnnr II: Pensions budget
Section A:
Head I:
Section B:
Expenditure
Pensions, allowances and social
charges
Receipts
Nrr rorru.
Ner rorAl BUDGET
95 000
20 163 000
44620W
2 199 000
2 238 s00
2 539 000
9s 000 3l 601 500
95 000
506 5003l
958 000
4 756 000
4 756 000
9s8 000
3 798 000
35 304 500
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Budget estimates
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
HeadI-Permanentstaff
* Including F305 130 carried over from the financial year 1992 to financial year 1993 to meet 1992 commitments which fall
due in 1993.
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for
I 993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head I 
- 
Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Allowances:
2.1. Expatriation allowance I 575 000
2.2. Household allowance 690 000
2.3. Allowance for children and
other dependent persons 790000
2.4. Rent allowance 45 000
2.5. Education allowance 100 000
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000
2.7. Overtime 80 000
2.8. Home leave 50 000
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Social charges:
3.1. Social security 1885000
3.2. Supplementary insurance 710000
3.3. Provident fund 116000
Sub-Head 4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent
officials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 25 000
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival
and departure of permanent
offrcials and their families 29 000
4.3. Removal expenses 225 000
4.4. Installation allowance 150000
Sub-Head 5 
- 
Medical examination
Torlr or Hneo I
l3 67s 000
3 332 000
2 7tt 000
429 000
l6 000
t2 614 95(
2 662
2 526
340
840
0
l3 000
l2 515 000
2 707 000
2 500 000
0
7 000
l 1 340 938
2374371
2223 024
8l 306
4 633
20 163 000 17 817 130 t7 729 000 t6 024 272
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Head II 
- 
Temporary staJf
Sub-Heads
Estimates
for
1994
Budget
for
1993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head 6 - Staffrecruited for sessions ofthe
Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
t 474000
923 000
893 000
90 000
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for
Assembly work between sessions
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary stafffor the Oflice of
the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 
- 
Socialcharges
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff
9.2.
other than interpreters 9 000
Provident fund for inter-preters 197 000
Insurance for interpreters 8 000
Tornr or Hrno II
9.3.
3 380 000
793 000
75 000
214000 199 700
3 249 550
638 000
25 000
170 000
3 000 000
650 000
20 000
145 874
2 837 725
602 383
23 601
4 462000 * 4112250 3 840 000 3 609 583
* Including F 47 750 carried over from the financial year 1992 to the financial year 1993 to meet 1992 commitments which fall
due in 1993.
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section A 
- 
Expenditure
Eeod I 
- 
Pensions, allowances and social charges
* Including F 148 950 carried over from the financial yar 1992 to the financial year 1993 to meet 1992 commitments which fall
due in 1993.
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET
Section B 
- 
Receipts
Estimates
for
t994
Budget
for 1993
Expected
expenditure
in 1993
Actual
expenditure
in 1992
Sub-Head I 
- 
Pensions and leaving
allowances
l.l. Retirement pensions
1.2. Invalidity pensions
1.3. Survivors' pensions
1.4. Orphans' or dependants'
pensions
1.5. Leaving allowances
Sub-Head 2 
- 
Familya[owances
2.1. Household allowances
2.2. Children's and other
dependants' allowances
2.3. Education allowances
3 845 000
495 000
64 000
0
160 000
34 000
0
Sub-Head 3 
- 
Supplementary insurance
Tornr. oF HEAD I
4 404 000
200 000
l 52 000
3 963 6s0
188 300
105 000
4 015 500
189 500
l 36 000
3 332294
166 855
92 67s
4 756 000 * 4 256 950 4 341 000 3 59t 824
Estimates
for
1994
Budget
for
1993
Expected
receipts
in 1993
Actual
receipts
in 1992
Contributions by permanent officials 958 000 765 000 794 000 699 870
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Sabries of *atf recruited for Assembly sessions
1. Sittings scnice
Duties Number No. ofdays
Daily
remune-
ration *
F
Total
F
Total
F
Counsellors to the President of the Assembly
Heads of sections
Sergeant-at-anns . ..
Parliamentary secretari;; : : :.. : : :. . : : : :
Pr6cis writers
Verbatim reporters
Editors
Principal assistants
Assistants to the President's counsellors
Assistants assigned to other services ...
Ushers
Messengers
Installations attendant
Cloakroom attendant
Photocopier-assemblers ....
Adiustment for 1994 2o/o
lalb
2alb
1b
2a
2b
3a
3b
I
6a
l4b
2a
4b
2a
3b
l0a
20blb
6a
3a
1a
1a
4a
b
la
lb
t4
t6
8
10
r2
l0
8
10
8
l0
8
l0
8
10
8
l0
t4
t6
8
l0
t2
8
l0
t4
8
l0
| 259
2090
t 379
2210
22r0
| 949
I 118
t 949
I 118
I 949
l 118
t 949
l 118
t 949
728
t 260
501
I 033
638
I 170
I r70
529
529
415
529
529
t7 626
33 440
22064
22 100
26 520
r9 490
l7 888
38 980
26 832
58 470
s3 664
272860
l7 888
77 960
ll 648
37 800
7 014
16 528
sl 040
234 0N
t4 040
25 392
15 870
5 810
4232
2t 160
51 066
70 684
t9 490
56 868
85 302
326 524
95 848
372070
51 304
21 160
96 l 150 316
23006
Travelline
t 173 322
300 000
Rourrded up to
I 473 322
l 474 000
* In accordance with scales in force on lst July 1993.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
48
DocuMENT 1383 aoorNouu I
2. Interyrcturton semicc
Duties Number No. of days Total
F
Internrefers 14a 8
l0
398 608
388 140
Adjustment for 1994 2o/o
l0b
24 786 748
t5 735
Travelling expenses
802 483
120 000
Rounded up to
922 483
923 000
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
3, Trunslatioa senice
Duties Number Dailyremuneration
F
Estimates I Total
F
Revisers ...
Translators
Principal assistants
Assistants
5a
2b
5a
5b
la
2b
4a
5b
l 405
2236
l lll
t 942
572
I 104
501
l 033
140 500
89 440
lll 100
194 200
l4 300
55 200
50 100
t29 t25
229 940
305 300
69 500
179 225
Adjustment for 1994 2%
29 783 96s
t5 679
Travelling expenses
779 644
30 000
Rounded up to
Financial implications of translating Greek texts into the WEU official languages
829 644
830 000
63 000
893 000
l. Based on 20 days for revisers and translators and 25 days for assistants.
a. Recruited locally.
b. Recruited outside Paris.
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Trend of the Assembly budgas frum 1993 to 1994
l 993
a
t994
b
%+
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff
Head II. Temporary staff
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment
Head IV. General administrative
costs
Head V. Other expenditure
l7 817 130
41t2250
r 967 000
2255 500
2236000
20 163 000
4462W0
2 199 000
2238 5N
2 539 000
+ 13.17
+ 8.51
+ 11.79
- 
0.75
+ 13.55
Total expenditure
Receiots
28237 880
I l0 000
31 601 500
95 000
+ 11.32
+ 13.64
Net Total 28 277 880 31 506 500 + 11.42
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances
Receipts
4 256 950
765 000
4 756 000
958 000
+ 11.72
+25.23
Net Total 3 491 950 3 798 000 + 8.76
GnNencL NEr rorAl (A + B)
Torer oF HEADs II ro V oF oPERATTNc
BUDGET
3l 769 830
l0 570 750
35 304 500
ll 438 500
+ I l.13
+ 8.21
Implications of the various heads for tlv 1993 aad 1991 oproting budgets
1993 t994
Amount
%of
Amount
%of
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
HeadI 
-Permanentstalf
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Head III 
- 
Premises and equipment
Head IV 
- 
General administrative
costs
Head V 
- 
Other expenditure
A. Torer
Receipts
t7 817 t30
4 t12250
l 967 000
2 255 500
2236m/0
62.76
14.49
6.93
7.94
7.88
63.00
14.54
6.96
7.98
7.91
20 163 000
4 462000
2 199 000
2238 500
2 539 000
63.80
14.12
6.96
7.08
8.04
64.N
14.1 6
6.98
7.10
8.06
28 387 880
I l0 000
r00.00 100.39
0.39
31 601 500
95 000
100.00 100.30
0.30
B. Nrr rorAt- 28 277 880 100.00 100.00 3l s06 500 100.00 100.00
Column A = Total of expenditure.
Column B - Net total (expenditure less receipts).
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Addendum 2
l6th November 1993
Draft budget of the administrative *penditure of the Assembly
for the financial year 1994
Opinion of thc Council
ADDENDUM 2 to the REPORT I
submitted on behalf
of the Comminee on Budgaary Atlairc and Administration2
by Mn Rathbone, Chairman and Rappfteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ExprnNerony Mgraon eNpuu
submitted by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman and Rapporteur
AppnNorcrs
I. Document C-B (93) 3 of l5th November 1993: Secretary-General's Note
II. Recapitulatory table of amendments to the draft budget of the Assembly on
the basis of the opinion of the WEU Council
III. Trend of Assembly budgets from 1993 to 1994
IV. Implications of the various heads for the 1993 and 1994 operating budgets
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mt. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Covi, Redmond (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alvarez, Antretter,
Biefnot, Branger, Biichler, Curto, Daniel, Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenno, MM. Homs I Ferret,
Howell (Alternate: Cummings). Jurgens, Maas, Manisco, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez, MM. Pinto, Pizzo,
Tatarella, Thissen.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote'are printed in italics.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(sabmittd by Mr, Rothbte, Chairmaa aad Rapponcar)
1. The draft budget of the Assembly for 1994 was examined by the WEU Budget and Organisation
Committee at its meetings on 22nd October and l2th November 1993. As can be seen in Document
CB (93) 3 of l5th November 1993 (See Appendix I), the committee recommended that the Council
grant the Assembly an operating budget with a $owth rate of 4% as a working basis. In taking this
decision, the committee specified that within these limits the Assembly was free to make adjustments
in its estimates and also in regard to the organogram of the Oflice of the Clerk on the basis of its
priorities.
2. At its meeting on 16th November 1993, the Council confirmed this recommendation.
3. The following measures might be envisaged to bring the 1994 budget within the 4% growth rate:
(a) creation of two Grade 83 posts of assistant for the Committee for Parliamentary and Public
Relations and the Archives Offrce involving a total expediture of F 463 000.
(b) regrading of the following posts: one Grade L3 to Grade L4; one Grade 86 to Grade A2; one
Grade C6 to Grade 84 involving a total expenditure of F 82 600.
(c/ withdrawal of the credits requested with a view to the accession of Greece to WEU(F 569 000). It is in fact unlikely that the process ofratification ofthe protocol ofaccession
of that country will be completed before the second half of 1994.
(d) increase of F 35 000 in the estimates for sub-head24* Travelling and subsistance allowances
and insurance for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of committees and rapporteurs "
and of F l6 000 for sub-head 27 * Offrcialjourneys of members of the Offrce of the Clerk'to
take account of recent actual expenditure.
(e) increase from F 95000 to F 110000 in the estimate of receipts.
4. For the draft budget of the Assembly (Documents 1383 and 1383 addendum), these measures
would involve the amendments set out in Appendix II. All in all, as Appendix III shows, the revised
draft budget would represent an increase ofF I 132 120 over the financial year 1993, corresponding to
the 4Vo gowth rate in the operating budget. Accordingly, the Assembly's initial proposal for the oper-
ating budget would be reduced by F 2 096 500.
5. There are no amendments to the pensions budget except for receipts which are reduced by the
amount of contributions to the pension scheme relating to the new posts withdrawn from the draft
budget.
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APPENDIX I
Document C-B (93) 3 of 15th November 1993
Secretary- General's Note
Subject: WEU Assembly's draft 1994 budget [B (93) 36]
In accordance with the WEU Financial Regulations, Article 21 and the Western European
Assembly's Charter and Rules of Procedure, Article 49, the Budget and Organisation Committee has
examined the WEU Assembly draft 1994 budget at its 12th November 1993 meeting.
The committee expressed the following recommendation:
* The Budget and Organisation Committee, having considered that the percentage increases of
the draft budget were too high, has invited the Assembly to revise the draft budget downwards,
taking a 4o/o rate of increase in Chapters I to V as a working basis. "
If the Council confirms this recommendation, the Secretariat will immediately inform the Clerk.
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APPENDIX II
Recapitulanry tuble of onendments to thc draft budget of the Assembly
oa the bosis of the opinion of the WEU Council
Heads and sub-heads
Draft budget
for 1994(Doc. 1383 -
1383 Add.)
Amendments
resulting
from the opinion
of the Council
Revised budget
for 1994
Heno I 
- 
PrnlanNeNrsrAFr
Sub-Head:
I 
- 
Basic salaries ...
? 
- 
Allnwanees
13 675 000
3 332 000
27tt ow
429 000
l6 000
- 
775 000
- 
331 000
- 
158 000
- 
295 500
-3000
12 900 000
3 001 000
2 553 000
133 500
l3 000
3 
- 
Social charges
4 
- 
Expenses relating to the recruitment
and departure of permanent offrcials . .
5 
- 
Medical examination ..
ToraroFHEADI .... 20 163 000 - l 562 500 18 600 500
Heno II 
- 
TnuponenY srAFF
Sub-Head:
6 
- 
Staff recruited for sessions of the
Assemhlv 3 380 000
793 000
75 000
214 000
- 
380 000
-rr*
3 000 000
793 000
75 000
185 000
7 
- 
Interpretation stall required for Assem-
bly work between sessions
8 
- 
Temporary staff for the Oflice of the
Clerk
9 
- 
Social charges ..
Tornr or HncD II 4 462000 - 409 000 4 053 000
Hrao III 
- 
ExprNptruRE oN PREMISES
AND EQUIPMENT
Sub-Head:
10 
- 
Share. of joint expenditure on the Paris
585 000
l0 000
815 000
ss 000
l5 000
40 000
2s 000
654 000
- 
125 000
585 000
l0 000
690 000
55 000
l5 000
40 000
2s 000
654 000
I I 
- 
Hire of committee rooms
12 
- 
Technical and other installations for
Assembly sessions
13 
- 
Various services for the organisation of
14 
- 
Maintenance of the premises of the
Clerk
15 
- 
Purchase or repair of office furniture .
16 
- 
Purchase of reproduction and other
office equipment .
17 
- 
Hire and maintenance of reproduction
and other office equipment .
Torlr or Heno III ... 2 199 000 - 125 000 2074000
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Heads and sub-heads
Draft budget
for 1994(Doc. 1383 -
1383 Add.)
Amendments
resulting
from the opinion
of the Council
Revised budget
for 1994
Hrno IV 
- 
GrNrner ADMrNrsrRATrvE cosrs
Sub-Head:
l8 
- 
Postage, telephone, telex and transport
of documents ....
19 
- 
Duplication paper, headed writing
paper and other office supplies. .... . .
20 
- 
Printing and publication of documents .
2l 
- 
Purchase of documents ....
)) 
- 
Officiel cers
646 000
237 000
l 215 000
75 000
65 000
500
646 000
237 000
l 215 000
75 000
6s 000
s0023 - Bank charges ...
Toru or Heeo IV 2238 500 0 2 238 s00
Hneo V 
- 
OrnenExpENDrruRE
Sub-Head:
24 
- 
Travelling and subsistence allowances
and insurance for the President of the
Assembly, chairmen of committees and
fennofterrrs 295 000
360 000
s 000
708 000
60 000
sr0 000
569 000
3 000
29 000
+ 35 000
+ l6 000
- 
3s 000
--l 000
330 000
360 000
s 000
724000
60 000
510 000
s34 000
3 000
28 000
- 
Expenses for representation
- 
Committee study missions
- 
Official journeys of members of the
Office of the Clerk .
- 
Expenses of experts and the auditor ..
- 
Expenditure on information
- 
Expenses for political groups
- 
Contingencies and other expenditure
not elsewhere provided for ..
- 
Non-recoverable taxes .
TorerorHmpV....
25
26
27
28
29
30
3r
32
2 539 000 l5 000 2 554 000
Operating budget
Receipts
31 601 500
95 000
- 
2 081 500
+ 15 000
29 s20000
I l0 000
Nnr rornr oPERATTNG BUDGET 31 506 500
- 
2 096 500 29 410 000
Pensions expenditure .. . . .
Peapinfc
4 756 000
958 000
- 
sg ooo
4 756 000
899 000
Nrr rorer PENsToNS BUDGET 3 798 000 59 000 3 857 000
Nsr cRANo rorAt. . 35 304 500
-2037 500 33 267 W
55
DocuMENr I 383 eopBr.rovu 2 npprNorx III
APPENDIX III
Trend of Assembly budgets fmm 1993 to 1991
i.
*rf
Tornr oF HEADs II ro V
OF OPERATING BUDGET ... l0 570 750 l0 919 500 + 3.30
1993
a
1994
b
%b-a
b
A. Operating budget
Head I. Permanent staff .
Head II. Temporary staff.
Head III. Expenditure on premises
and equipment ...
Head IV. General administrative
ansf(
t7 8r7 130
4 tr2 250
l 967 000
2255 500
2236000
18 600 500
4 053 000
2074000
2238 500
2 5s4 000
+ 4.40
1.44
+ 5.44
- 
0.75
+ 14.22Head V. Other expenditure
Tntel ernenditrrre 28 387 880
I l0 000
29 520000
l l0 000
+ 3.99
0.00Receipts
Nrr rornr 28 277 880 29 410 000 + 4.00
B. Pensions budget
Pensions and leaving allowances.
Receipts
4 256 950
765 000
4 756 000
899 000
+ 11.72
+ 17.52
Nrr rornr 3 491 950 3 857 000 + 10.45
Nsr xnr rorAr- (A + B) 3l 769 830 33267 000 + 4.71
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APPENDIX IV
Implications of the various heads for the 1993 ard 1994 operating budgets
r993 1994
Amount
%of
Amount
%of
A B A B
Operating budget
Expenditure
Head[ 
-Permanentstaff
Head II 
- 
Temporary staff
Head III - Premises and equipment
Head IV 
- 
General administrative
costs
Head V 
- 
Otherexpenditure
A. Torer
Receipts
l7 8r7 130
4 trz250
I 967 000
2255 500
2236000
62.76
14.49
6.93
7.94
7.88
63.00
14.54
6.96
7.98
7.9t
18 600 500
4 053 000
2074 000
2238 500
2 554 000
63.01
t3.73
7.03
7.58
8.65
63.25
13.78
7.05
7.61
8.68
28 387 880
1 l0 000
r00.00 r00.39
0.39
29 520 000
I l0 000
100.00 r00.37
0.37
B. NBr rorAl 28277 880 100.00 100.00 29 410 000 100.00 100.00
Column A - Total of expenditure.
Column B : Net total (expenditure less receipts).
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Replia of the Council to Recommendations 536 to 546
RECOMMENDATION 536I
oa the enlargement of WEU
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the Council's energetic action, which resulted in a protocol of accession to WEU
with Greece, a declaration on WEU observers regarding Denmark and Ireland and a document on
associate membership regarding lceland, Nonvay and Tuikey within ayear after the WEU declaration
on enlargement issued at Maastricht on 10th December l99l;
(i/ Regretting that the Council has felt it necessary to declare that the field of application of ArticleV of the modified Brussels Treaty will be subject to certain restrictions;
(lili 
. 
Noting that at an earlier stage it strongly expressed the wish for both Greece and Turkey to be
admitted simultaneously as full members and regretting that the Council was not willing to accept this
view;
(i!) Welcoming the fact that, according to the document on associate membership of WEU, Iceland,
Nonray and Turkey will become associate members on the day that Greece becomes a member of
WEU;
(v). Considering that Article IX of the modified Treaty is the foundation of the Assembly's r6le and
existence;
(vi) Noting the Counc_il's reply to Written Questions 300,311 and 312, where it suggests that the
existence of Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty does not preclude the Assembly retaining its full
autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in the Assembly's activities of representatives
from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU;
(vii) Stressing that the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic should also find expression in
specific relations between the WEU Assembly and the parliamentarians of those states;
(viii) Considering that national parliaments, when examining for ratification the protocol of Greece's
accession to WEU, will have to take account of the proposed suspension of Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty and of Greece's r6le in European efforts to solve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia;(ix) Stressing that the participation of parliamentary representatives from new member states, asso-
ciate member states and observer states in the activities of the Assembly will be a significant burden on
the budget, personnel, office space and chamber required for the Assembly to perform its task properly,
RecouurNos rHAT rHr CouNcrr-
1. Confirm the Assembly's full autonomy for resolving the problems of participation in its activ-
ities of representatives from states which are associate members of, or observers in, WEU and provide
sufficient accommodation and financial means for the Assembly to implement the consequences of the
accession of Greece, associate membership of Iceland, Nonruay and Turkey, and observer states of
Denmark and lreland, as decided in Rome on 2fth November 1992;
2. Indicate which countries will be asked to participate in the budget of the Assembly, and their
respective contributions to the financing of this budget, so that the Assembly may keep an account of
the effective participation in WEU;
3. Indicate whether Greece, which has not signed the document on associate membership, is never-
theless committed to this texU
4. Take no steps to promote ratification of the protocol of Greece's accession to WEU before
Greece has clarified its position regarding the solution of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
l. Adopted by the standing committee in Rome on 19th April 1993 (See Document 1360).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
'
to Ruommendation 536
1. The Council can only refer back to its reply to Written Questions 3l l and 312 afi confirm that
" the Assembly... retains its full autonomy for resolving the problems " of " full participation in the
Assembly's aclivities of representatives of states who are associate members of, or observers in,
WEU'. This reply itself referred to the wording of a previous reply to Written Question 300, whiq!
stated that onlylhe representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers could be full members of the WEU
parliamentary Assembly.
In the Council's opinion, however, this does not preclude full participation in the Assembly's
activities by the representatives of states that are WEU associate members or observers. The proce-
dures for this participation should be defined by the Assembly. The Council is confident that the
Assembly's declsion-making bodies will in their discussions bear in mind the political imPortance of
the texts adopted by the Ministerial Council and the positions it had taken regarding the place that it
hopes new associate members and observers in all WEU bodies will be granted.
2. The Council is aware that future decisions by the Assembly will affect the alterations to its
premises to accommodate new delegations. The initial study of the alteration work reqlired is a matter
ior the Assembly and the host country. In due course, the Council will assess any budgetary repercus-
sions in liaison with the Assembly's competent bodies.
A dgcision on a new cost-sharing formula for the contributions of associate member states and
observers to WEU's budget is on the agenda for the Council Working Group, which has been givenlhe
task of assessing the merits of the various proposals submitted by delegations and the Secretariat. The
Council will of-course inform the Assembly of its decisions on the subject as soon as they have been
reached.
3. Under the protocol of accession of the Hellenic Republic to WEU, the former accepted " the
agreements, decisions and rules adopted in conformity with the treaty and the deglarations starting
w-ith the Rome declaration of 27thOctober 1984 ". By its accession to the treaty, the Hellenic Republic
becomes party to the agreements concluded between the member states, as listed in an annex to the
protocol of aicession. During the process of Greece's ratification of its accession to ryEU, however, it
iannot be assumed that Greece is already bound by the document on WEU associate members, to
which it is not, moreover, a signatory. Nevertheless, the document is a part of the WEU * acquis ", and
Greece will be bound by this text as soon as it has in fact become a full member of WEU.
4. Member states could take steps * to promote ratification of the protocol of Greece's accession to
WEU' only on a national basis. The Council does not feel that there is any causal link between the
process of iatification of Greece's accession and developments in former Yugoslavia.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
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RECOMMENDATION 537 
'
on technical co-opcrution in the frantework of the Open Skies Treaty 2
The Assembly,
(i) Welcg-ming the new possibilities of transparency and openness regarding military forces and
activities offered by the opening of the airspace of North America, Europe and ihe Asian parts of the
Russian Federation from Vancouver to Vladivostok for reciprocal aerial observation agreed by the
Open Skies Treaty signed in Helsinki on 24th March 1992;(ii) Emphasisingthat this important confidence- and security-building measure can reach its goal of
creating a new multinational cb-operative security approach 6n[ if aI member states of the-Com-
munity of Independent States accede to the treaty and if no member country of the CSCE is excluded;
(!ii) Stressing further that more than one year after the signature of the treaty the parliaments of
WEU member states should shoulder their responsibility for allowing early entry into force and full
implementation of the treaty by accelerating their ratification procedures;(iv) Welcoming the decision of the WEU Council to form a single group of states in the framework of
the Open Skies Treaty;
(v) Noting however the difficulties encountered by the WEU Open Skies Expert Group in
harmonising the different options for practical WEU co-operation during nearly two years of diicus-
sions which made it impossible to reach an agreement for the use of a single tybe of observation air-
craft;
(vi) Noting that the WEU aircraft pool envisaged now is to be based on the number of aircraft
actually available equipped with appropriate sensors in order to conduct joint air observation missions
in accordance with the treaty in its most cost-effective conditions;
(vii) Considering that a number of questions are still open such as:
- 
the selection of appropriate sensors to equip the aircraft;
- 
the status of associate members and observers within the WEU group of states;
- cost-sharing;
- 
whether and to what extent should the WEU Satellite Centre be asked to take on the task of
interpreting the images gathered by the sensors;
(viii) Welcoming the efforts of the Council to negotiate the conditions of co-operation with the
Russian Federation, in particular regarding its participation in the WEU aircraft pool;(ix) Stressing however that the WEU contacts with the Russian Federation should not be exclusive
and that co-operation should be enlarged to include all interested countries of the Community of Inde-
pendent States and also the eight Central and Eastern European countries with which the Council has
established regular consultations;(x) Deeming it necessary for WEU as a group of states within the Open Skies Treaty to elaborate at
an early stage concepts for the possible extension of the open skies rdgime to wider areas as provided
for in the treaty and to establish close working contacts with the Open Skies Consultative Commission,
RrcouurNns rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Provide the Assembly with detailed information on its decision regarding the creation of a WEU
aircraft pool intended for air observation missions in the framework of ttre open skies r6gime;
2. Ensure that no type of aircraft made available by a member country shall be excluded from the
pool;
L Adopted by the Assembly on l4th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (lst sitting).
L Explanatory_Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Technological and Aerospa.ce Committee(Document 1364).
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3. Inform the Assembly:
(a) whether Greece, the associate members and the observers are already part of the group of
states created by the WEU Vienna declaration;
(b) whether WEU has decided in the meantime to transform this group in accordance with
Article III, Section II, paragraph 3 of the Open Skies Treaty, as announced in Vienna;
4. Give an enlarged mandate to the WEU expert group:
(a) to examine all the additional consequences not yet tackled and which arise from the decision
taken in Vienna to act as a group of states;
(b) lo evaluate the conditions for mandating the WEU Satellite Centre to interpret sensorlmagery;
(c) in liaison with the NATO Verification Co-ordinating Committee, to determine how to use
the open skies observation means for the CFE Treaty;
(d) to examine the possible extension of the open skies r6gime to wider areas such as conflict
prevention, crisis management and protection of the environmen!
5. Take a joint initiative urging Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkme-
nistan and Uzbekistan to accede to the Open Skies Treaty;
6. Seek co-operation similar to that envisaged with the Russian Federation also with other member
states of the Community of Independent States, in particular with Ukraine and.Kazakhstan, and
inform the Assembly of the results of the relevant negotiations;
7. Establish a perrnanent WEU representation with the Open Skies Consultative Commission in
Vienna.
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l. The Council takes note of the Assembly's request and undertakes to fonrard to the Assembly in
due course, * the preliminary set of rules for the operation of a pool of Open Skies observation
systems ".
2. The Council informs the Assembly that in principle no observation systems made available by a
member country is excluded from the aircraft pool.
3. The Council refers to the declaration by the Head of the German Delegation at the Open Skies
plenary meeting in Vienna on l6th, lTth and lSth March 1992:
'On behalf of the Delegations of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, I should like to state that our countries intend
to establish, effective from signature of the Open Skies Treaty, a gxoup of parties under Article
III, Section II, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. We also reserve our right to transform in due cource
this group according to paragraph 3 ofthe section referred to. In this connection, I should like to
recall the invitation which the member states of WEU have extended to a number of other states
in their declaration issued on the occasion of the 46th European Council meeting on 9th andlfth December l99l at Maastricht. "
4. A review of the other consequences arising from the decision taken in Vienna and a possible r6le
for the satellite centre, in particular in data analysis, has been on the agenda for the Ex-perts Group
since 3rd June 1993.
The Council shares the Assembly's concerns and will keep it informed of progress with negotia-
tions and any work by states party to the treaty in these fields.
5. The Council informs the Assembly that, pursuant to Article XVII, paragraph 33, of the Open
SliesTreaty, all the states mentioned in paragraph 5 of the recommendation may accede to the treity.
The decision to accede to the treaty is a matter of national sovereignty for the states mentioned. -
6. The Council informs the Assembly that all third states have been invited to participate in the
WEU aircraft pool on condition that they accept the general rules governing its operation. Not all the
third states' replies have yet been received by the Council. The Council will informthe Assembly of the
outcome of negotiations in good time.
7. The WEU Presidency is responsible for liaison with the Open Skies Consultative Commission in
Vienna. The Council considers that the establishment of a permanent WEU representation to the Open
Skies Consultative Commission in Vienna would not meet the cost-effectiveness criteria adopted-for
the Open Skies rdgime.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th October 1993.
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'
on security in the Mediterraneanz
The Assembly,
(t) Conscious that it is in Western Europe's own interest to have equally good relations with both its
eastern and southern neighbours;
(ii) Aware that prosperous socio-economic conditions and democratic institutions are not only the
most important factors for promoting the internal stability of each country and peaceful international
relations, but also contribute to the flourishing of each people's culture and traditions;(iit) Recognising that the stability of a whole region increases with the homogeneity of the political
institutions and socio-economic systems of the countries in that region;
(iv) Convinced that Western Europe's historic relations give it a specific responsibility to promote
economic and social development, peace and security in the Mediterranean as confirmed at the EC's
Lisbon summit in 1992;(v) Aware that throughout the southern Mediterranean region there is growing concern over the
increasing threat of Islamic fundamentalist movements, while in some of these countries terrorism may
endanger the stability of society;
(vil Conscious that Egypt, while not a Maghreb country, shares many of the Maghreb member coun-
tries' security concerns;
(vii) Convinced that a favourable conclusion to the Middle East peace process, which is vital for
peace and security in the Mediterranean as a whole, will also lead to increased European responsibility
for the promotion of economic and social development, peace and security in that region;
(viiil Noting the proposals for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean(CSCM) which would seek to emulate the success of the CSCE in arms control and reduction,
enhanced security through confidence-building measures, and the protection of human and minority
rights;(ix) Recognising that at the moment there is no military threat to Western Europe from any of the
states south of the Mediterranean;
(x) Convinced nevertheless that the risk of proliferation of weapons systems and technology,
whether nuclear, biological, chemical or conventional, might, if confirmed, be a serious threat to peace
and stability in the Mediterranean region;(xil Convinced that co-operation between universities and institues for research into and studies of
security matters on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean might lead to better mutual
understanding,
RBcorrrurNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr.
l. Implement its decisions to establish a gradual and phased security dialogue with the Maghreb
countries, starting with a restricted number of individual southern Mediterranean countries, which at a
later stage could be extended to include all the countries of the region and lead to true co-operation in
security matters;
2. In the perspective of a global, integrated concept of security, affirm its interest in the devel-
opment, prosperity and maintenance of peace and stability in the southern Mediterranean coun-
tries;
3. Promote bilateral military training and exchange programmes between its member states and
pountries in the southern Mediterranean region on a bilateral basis, as a first step towards a system of
tonfi dence-building measunes;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 15th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (2nd sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Roseta on behalf of the Political Committee (Document l37l).
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4. Promote efforts by its member states, both in their bilateral trade relations and in international
negotiations, to prevent or at least reduce the proliferation of weapons systems, be they_nuclear, bio'
logical, chemical or conventional, which could threaten peace and stability in the Mediterranean
re$on;
5. Commit itself to the principle of a CSCM and, at the appropriate time, pursue its establishment
with vigour and perseverance;
6. Encourage the WEU Institute for Security Studies to remain in regular contact with similar insti-
tutes in the area to the south of the Mediterranean;
7. Hold effective consultations with the Community institutions and European political
co-operation so that action to ensure security may be co-ordinated with a strategy of political and eco-
nomic co-operation in the'region.
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l. The Ministerial Council held in Rome on 19th May 1993 " asked the Representative of the
WEU Presidency and the Secretary-General to propose to the Brussels Ambassadors of the Maghreb
countries the principle of periodic meetings, on a twice-yearly basis, in order to pursue the dialogue in
greater depth by means of two-way information and an exchange of views, especially on the principles
likely to contribute to a resolution of security questions in the Mediterranean'.
Under the Ministerial mandate for contacts with the Maghreb countries, a representative of the
Presidency and the WEU Secretary-General met the Tunisian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in
Brussels on l9th July 1993. At the time, Tunisia held the Presidency of the Arab Maghreb Union(AMU).
2. The Council is aware of the fact that the new risks and uncertainties faced by Europe in the Med-
iterranean have their roots not just in cultural and political problems but also in social and economic
problems. In this respect, the Council looks forward confidently to the development of the future
common foreign and security policy of the European Union.
3. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation. Forms of co-operation between
WEU member states and countries in the Southern Mediterranean region are on the a$enda of the Per-
manent Council's Mediterranean Group.
4. The Council reminds the Assembly that the principles defined by its Mediterranean Working
Group which may contribute to the settlement of security questions in the Mediterranean includes the
non-proliferation of weapons. The aim in its implementation should be to prevent the risks arising in
particular from the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the region, as well as risks associated with
the proliferation of ballistic missiles that could carry nuclear, bacteriological or chemical warheads,
including those associated with the propagation of technical skills and expertise.
5. The Council's Mediterranean Group is the WEU forum for intergovernmental debate on the
CSCM concept. It is apparent from discussions within this group that most member states feel that the
time is not yet ripe for an initiative of this type covering the Mediterranean region as a whole.
6. The Council informs the Assembly that the r6le assigned to the WEU Institute for Security
Studies includes developing contacts with the Maghreb countries in accordance with the missions it has
been assigned by the Ministerial Council. For example, a seminar on the southern dimension of
European security: the Mediterranean area and the European security identity was held in Rome on
5th and 6th March 1993. Its aim was to launch a debate with the countries of the southern Mediter-
ranean on security in the Mediterranean. The institute's programme of work over the next few months
includes the development of this type of activity.
7. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's recommendation and will keep it informed of the
action it takes as a result, as soon as working relations and the exchange of information with the
European institutions can be fully developed in accordance with the terms of the WEU Maastricht and
Petersberg declarations.
1. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
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on the interpretation of Article XII of the modifwl Brussels Truatyz
The Assembly,
O Considering that the Council has so far given no juridically-based justification for its decision to
consider that the high contracting parties to the Paris Protocols of 23rd October 1954 would be
authorised to release themselves from their commitments in 1998;(iil Recalling that, in its answer to Written Questions 306, 309, 314 and 315, the Council at last
agreed to examine the Assembly's views on this matter;
(iiil Considering that the Assembly's competence to interpret, on the same basis as the Council, the
Protocols of 23rd October 1954 is established by Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty;
(iv) Recalling that, in its answer to Recommendation 372, the Council assured the Assembly that
* no substantial reforms of WEU will be undertaken withour prior consultation with the
Assembly ";
(v) Considering that the Paris Protocols are not simply a revision of the 1948 Brussels Treaty but
establish a new treaty because:
(a) they are directed towards new goals;
(b) they are the basis of a European union whose vocation is to be enlarged and entirely new
means are implemented;
(c) the Paris Agreements are not limited to Protocol No. I which modifires the Brussels Treaty
but include three other protocols whose aim is different;
(d) they create a new organisation;
(e) for the first time they associate the parliaments of the high contracting parties with the appli-
cation of an alliance;(vil Considering it quite clear that the high contracting parties, when signing and ratifying the Paris
Agteements, considered that the essential provisions of those agreements should remain in force for
half a century because of Article XII of the new treaty,
RrcorrauBNos rHAT rur CouNcrt-
Concur with its juridically-based interpretation of Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty,
according to which the 1954 Paris Agreements establish a new treaty, and conform to it.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l5th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Goerens on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1369).
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The Council considers that, following the thorough legal examination of this problem it has con-
ducted with the support of legal experts from member states, it has a given detailed reply to the series
of written questions put by members of the WEU parliamentary Asiembly on the interpretation of
Article XII of the modified Brussels Treaty, which took up the wording of Article X of ihe Brussels
Treaty. It points out that this consultation confirmed the position previously expressed by the Council
in its reply to Written Question 288.
The Council does not therefore feel that the wording of the reply to Written Questions 306, 309,
314 and 315 calls for reconsideration or amendment.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th October 1993.
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'
on Earupean secadty polq - reply to the thiry-eighth annual report of the Councilz
The Assembly,
(t) Aware that the replacement of the former threat of a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact by the
risk of smaller-scale conflicts has not improved stability in Europe;
(ii) Considering that in these circumstances all existing security organisations have a r6le to play in
ensuring and preserving peace and security;
(iii) Considering that Western European countries will have to assume their. respo-nsibilities in a
number of security issues which are apparently less vital for their North American allies;
(iv) Noting that, apart from the criteria for recognition of new st-ates adopted 
-by the- Europeanbouncil, thJre is an urgent need for a more detailed definition of the rights of peoples to self-
determination;
(v) Noting that, without close co-operation between member states of the EC in 
_intelligence-
gitnering and analysis, a common European foreign and security policy cannot be alert and effective;
(vi) Aware that the deep changes in Europe since the end of the cold war are influencing the
reipective responsibilities bf both the United States and Western F.urope to such a degree-that lqe
transformation of the old transatlantic bargain into a new partnership should be considered, as this
could reinforce the existing close relationship and safeguard it for the future;
(vit) Aware that geostrategic changes have also influenced the r6le of nuclear weapons in European
security;
(viirl Noting that the work of the WEU military planning cell is of the greatest importance in pre-
paring any operational activity by WEU;
(ix) Considering that, for the implementation of an effective European foreign and security policy, it
is itso vital for the EC, in conjunction with WEU, to start making contingency plans for crisis man-
agement and conflict solution;
(x) Recalling the recommendations already passed on the issues of conflict prevention and peace-
making in the former Yugoslavia;
(xi) Considering that a European security policy implies:
- 
assistance to Central and European states, often with no experience of democracy, to find
their way to pluralist societies;
- 
financial and economic support for states to help them move away from command economies
towards market economies;
- 
cultural, educational and financial support to help states, peoples and minorities deal with the
strife unbridled by the unfreezing of historic rivalries which, until recently, have been sup-
pressed by imposed collectivism;
(xiil Considering that this policy must give priority to the following goals:
- 
to prevent any cross-border attack by one European state on another and to work towards
ensuring that this principle is accepted by all European states;
- 
to ensure that, within states, different ethnic or religious groups tolerate each other, minority
rights are respected and to ensure that, if conflict does arise in one state, neighbouring states
are not drawn into the conflict;
- 
to ensure that Europe is able to resist any covert or overt threat to its security from outside
Europe and is in a position to respond to crises, aggression and arms proliferation outside
Europe;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l5th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (3rd sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Marshall on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1370).
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- 
to provide a collaborative structure for western security ties with the former Soviet Union;
- 
to encourage democratisation throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the republics of the
former Soviet republics and encourage the development of shared liberal democratic values;
- 
to seek to ensure stability in Central and Eastern Europe through extensive economic
co-operation and a fully-developed system of conflict resolution, peace-keeping and possibly
peace-making;
- 
to avoid the re-emergence of nationalism amongst European armies; and
- 
to maintain a close relationship with the United States, based on a new partnership in order to
pursue common economic, political and security interests,
RrcouurNos rHAT rHe CouNcu-
1. Start to examine the aspects concerning European security which should be part of a new
Atlantic partnership;
2. Re-examine the r6le of both United States and European nuclear weapons in European security
in conjunction with a parallel re-examination in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance;
3. Give priority to the establishment of contingency plans for crisis management, conflict solution
and the employment of forces under WEU auspices, including decisions regarding the necessary
command, control and communication arrangements;
4. Establish as a matter of exceptional urgency ways of ensuring that CSCE and WEU are in a
position to prevent the conflict in the Balkans from spreading, especially to Kosovo and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
5. Always inform the Assembly of issues arising from ministerial and other meetings and to do so
before communicating with the European Parliament.
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l. To examine those aspects of European security which should be part of a new Atlantic part-
nership is a fundamental and challenging exercise, faced as we are with a twofold prospect of the devel-
opment of the European Union and of transatlantic relations. The WEU Council is determined not
only to continue to increase its contacts and exchanges of information with Atlantic Alliance bodies
but above all to prepare, through its discussions, to formulate joint views during discussions on
adapting transatlantic relations to the changing Euro'Atlantic geostrategic situation.
2. The Council takes note of the suggestion in point 2 of the Assembly's recommendation, pointing
out that nuclear questions are not at present on the agenda of the Council or its working groups.
3. The Council reminds the Assembly that the Planning Cell is responsible for:
- 
preparing contingency plans for the use of forces under WEU auspices;
- 
preparing recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication arrange-
ments for operations, including standing operating procedures for those headquarters that
might be chosen;
- 
keeping an updated list of forces and $oups of forces that might be assigned to WEU for spe-
cific operations.
Where necessary, the Council may ask the Planning Cell to conduct studies on the reinforcement
of WEU's operational r6le in pursuance of the Petersberg declaration which states that * military units
of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for humanitarian and
rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-
making'.
At the Council of Ministers in Rome on l9th May 1993, Ministers set it as a priority for the
Planning Cell to advance studies with a view to enhancing European air-maritime co-operation and
develop those relating to capabilities for strategic mobility.
At the Council of Ministers on l9th May 1993, ministers * welcomed the fruitful working links
which had been established in Brussels between the Defence Representatives Group, the Military Dele-
gates and the Planning Cell. This had enabled the Planning Cell to start work on a firm foundation, and
had also led to the establishment of principles for the organisation and functioning of WEU in times of
crisis. They also welcomed the valuable contribution made by the WEU CHODs at their meeting in
Rome on 22nd April 1993, the first such meeting to be attended by future members and associate
members of WEU. On the basis of earlier studies and following the recommendations of the CHODs,
ministers agreed that the Planning Cell should advance studies with a view to enhancing European air-
maritime co-operation and develop those relating to capabilities for strategic mobility ".
4. The Council is fully aware of the risk of the conflict in the Balkans spreading. It constantly mon-
itors developments in the situation. Its member states have thought fit to contribute towards * ways of
preventing the conflict from spreading " in the broader framework of the United Nations.
5. The Council takes due note of this point and will treat it as a matter of priority to keep the WEU
parliamentary Assembly informed at a date as close as possible to its meetings, especially those taking
place at ministerial level. A meeting between the Presidency and the Assembly Presidential Committee
is planned for 23rd November 1993, on the day following the Ministerial Council in Luxembourg.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
70
DOCUMENT 1384
RECOMMENDATION 541 
'
on the situatbn in formcr Yugoslavia2
The Assembly,
(i) Noting that the lack of an effective international response to counter the policy of ethnic
cleansing perpetrated by Serbian forces has created the precedent of impunity which has allowed them
to continue their action and which has encouraged Croatian forces to adopt the same policy;(iil Considering that the Security Council resolution authorising troops to be sent to protect the six
" safe areas " in Bosnia-Herzegovina, combined with the apparent lack of willingness among the
United Nations member states to provide the additional troops and equipment required to implement
this resolution effectively is most probably further proof of the international community's inability to
put an end to the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
(iii) Aware that defensive air protection of blue berets throughout Bosnian territory is to be ensured
by NATO, under the control of the United Nations, on the basis of structures already in place for mon-
itoring air space;(iv) Considering that the lives of peace-keeping troops (blue berets) in Bosnia should not be put at
risk by what might seem to be an undermining of their neutral status following air strikes against
Bosnian Serb positions or a lifting of the United Nations arms embargo;(v) Considering that any plan of action which, on the one hand, in fact accepts the status quo,
including the territorial gains made by the Serbs, and, on the other hand, fails to include guarantees for
terminating ethnic cleansing practices and protection for the Muslim population in the safe areas is not
a just and equitable solution to the conflict and may create a situation of permanent instability and
violence;
(vi) Noting that, despite operation Deny Flight, it is said that there have been some 500 violations by
Croat and Serb helicopters making night flights to transport equipment, ammunition, food and even
troop reinforcements to the Bosnian lines;
(vii) Noting that there is still a serious risk of the present conflict spreading to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo where heavily-armed Serbian security forces retain control over a
900/o ethnic Albanian population, which is liable to lead to a further extension of the conflict;
(viii) Aware that the United States has decided to send 300 troops to the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia to avoid an extension of the conflict;
(ix) Noting that both humanitarian aid convoys and United Nations forces in former Yugoslavia are
increasingly under deliberate attack by the warring parties;(x) Noting that the sudden removal of Dobrica Cosic from the post of Federal President, the ill-
treatment of Vuk Draskovic, head of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO), the largest opposition
party, and his arrest together with his wife and other opposition politicians and journalists are further
evidence of the anti-democratic character of those holding power in Serbia-Montenegro;(xi) Noting that the action programme has put a de facto end to the territorial integrity and the main-
tenance, wanted by some, of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina, independently of its future consti-
tutional organisation;
(*ii) Noting that the refusal of the WEU countries to accept any_fait accompli.in Bosnia-Herzegovina
is coming up against the fact that they are proving incapable of ensuring application of the
Vance-Owen plan and the implementation of United Nations resolutions on this matter, including
those demanding the retreat of Bosnian Serb forces from the territories they have conquered;
(xiii) AJso noting the apparent resignation of the international community in face of this situ-
ation;
(xiv) Noting that every new day of inconclusiveness by the international community constitutes new
encouragement for Bosnian Serbs and Croats to make new territorial conquests;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l6th June 1993 during the fint part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (4th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Baumel on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1379).
7t
DOCUMENT I384
(n) Convinced that, in spite of tacit agreement by the West on the " evolving " status quo in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including the territorial gains made at the expense of the Muslim population, such gains
will certainly be challenged by that population and this will lead to the creation of a Palestinian-type
situation in the heart of Europe;
(xvi) Wishing the working methods of the United Nations to be strengthened and a more effective
command to be created for its operations;
(xviil Noting that, at present, diverging opinions among Western European countries and the indif-
ference of the United States are major obstacles to any early solution of the conflict;
(xviii)Convinced that, in view of continuing hesitation and delay in implementing the Washington
common action programme, economic sanctions seem, for the time being, to remain the main means
of leverage for ending the fighting;
(xrxl Noting that, under the Security Council resolution adopted last April on tightening economic
sanctions against Yugoslavia, United Nations members are required to take action against firms iden-
tified as working on behalf of Belgrade;
(xx) Noting that, on its borders with Bosnia, the Republic of Serbia does not acc€pt the deployment
of United Nations monitors responsible for ensuring that it stops sending supplies to the warring Serbs
in Bosnia, except for food and medical supplies,
RrcoulmNps rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Support and strengthen the action of the United Nations, now involved in a series of regional
conflicts which are bringing it face to face with a serious crisis of responsibility;
2. Ensure the strict application of Resolution 836 on the creation of security areas on the territory
of Bosnia-Herzegovina, adopted by the Security Council on 4th June 1993;
3. In particular, help the adjustment and reinforcement of forces of WEU countries that may be
required by the implementation of Resolution 836 and consider assigning some of these forces to the
support of units responsible for protecting security areas;
4. Help to strengthen measures to apply economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and to
maintain the embargo on arms for all the belligerent parties, including Croatia;
5. Make every effort to avoid the conflict spreading to Vojvodina and Kosovo;
6. Arrange to send WEU units to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to ensure stability
and security in that area of the Balkans;
7. Strengthen the operational structures and arrangements of WEU so that it may play a major rOle
in preventing future crises under the aegis of the United Nations and, if necessary, in agreement with
NATO.
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l. The Council is aware of the heavy responsibilities borne by the United Nations in the field of
peace-keeping and international security. The member states of WEU support and reinforce the United
Nations action by their various contributions. A typical example is provided by the operations in the
Adriatic and on the Danube aimed at ensuring compliance with the embargo measures laid down in a
series of Security Council resolutions. The Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to a letter
sent by the WEU Secretary4eneral to his United Nations counterpart on 25th June 1993, in which it
is planned to step up contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations.In
that letter, it is stated that: " the mission to the United Nations in New York of the country holding the
Presidency of WEU will act as a point of contact for the United Nations and will be responsible for the
introduction of WEU contributions to the United Nations. In addition, WEU is ready to discuss with
you ways to develop appropriate contacts and exchanges of information between the WEU Secretariat
and Planning Cell and the relevant United Nations Secretariat bodies ".
2. The Council reminds the Assembly that WEU ministers, at their meeting in Rome on l9th May
1993, mandated the Permanent Council * following the WEU planning undertaken on Sarajevo Safe
Haven which was submitted to the United Nations, to arrange for a study to be carried out on the
establishment of different safe areas referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 824, as
well as Mostar and other possible areas ". Since Resolution 836 contained provision for ensuring full
respect for the safe areas referred to in Resolution 824, the Council can assure the Assembly that it is
giving this question all the attention it deserves.
3. The Council reminds the Assembly that, at their meeting in Rome on l9th May 1993, Ministers
mandated the Permanent Council inter alia " to study the possibility for WEU to co-ordinate the
rotation of the contingents deployed by its member states in the framework of UNPROFOR and the
possible participation of WEU member states in the protection of the abovementioned safe areas under
a mandate of the United Nations ". The Assembly will be informed in good time of the outcome of this
work.
4. The Council reminds the Assembly of the member states'contribution to the WEU/NATO com-
bined operation Sharp Guard in the Adriatic and the police and customs operation on the Danube,
both of which aim to strengthen the application of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Council is aware of
the need to " help to strengthen measures to apply economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
and to maintain the embargo on arms for all the belligerent parties, including Croatia ".
5. The Council takes due note of points 5 and 6 of Assembly Recommendation 541 and fully shares
the Assembly's concern to make every effort to prevent the conflict spreading to other regions of
former Yugoslavia. It wholeheartedly welcomed the preventive deployment of Scandinavian and
American contingents in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
6. [n answer to point 7 of Recommendation 541, the Council reminds the Assembly that the
Petersberg declaration on WEU and European Security states: * As WEU develops its operational
capabilities in accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared to support on a case-
by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-
prevention and crisis-management measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the
United Nations Security Council ". The establishment of the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels meets
this fundamental requirement and is a first step in the development of the organisation's operational
capabilities.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
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'
on United Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEUT
The Assembly,(il Determined to uphold the authority of the United Nations Organisation and to support moves
to make it much more effective;(it) Welcoming therefore the UN Secretary-General's intention to improve the working of the
United Nations and in general supporting the ideas expressed in * An Agenda for Peace ";(iit) Strongly supporting the establishment of a UN military planning staff together with a 24 hour
situation centre, appropriate training, logistics, transport, communications and intelligence-gathering
facilities to enable the UN to play its proper r6le in command of its own operations;(iv) Pleased that increased links are now evident between Western European Union and the United
Nations and that the presidency of the WEU Council has taken a series of initiatives to that end;(v) Convinced that the example shown by those nations which have traditionally supported the UN
could serve us in good stead for the future conduct ofUN operations, and congratulating those govern-
ments which have made forces available for [IN, NATO and WEU operationg and the men and
women who serve in those forces, often in diflicult, trying and frustrating circumstances, at sea, on
land and in the air;(vi) Believing that WEU's experience of operations both during the Gulf conflict and now con-
cerning the former Yugoslavia is worth sharing with the UN and that there are many parallels between
the two organisations which may be used to mutual benefit;
(vii) Considering that the question of whether or not WEU may be declared a regional organisation
under the terms of the UN Charter should be fully debated and that in general WEU should take action
in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty only under the aegis of a UN mandate;
(viii) Recognising that sanctions can be an alternative to war and believing that when such sanctions
have been approved by the United Nations they must be enforced, calling therefore on the Council of
Ministers and national administrations to publish the evidence available to them of significant
breaches of sanctions;(ix) Seeking support in national parliaments to ensure that defence budgets are restructured to take
account of the need to participate in UN operations,
Rrcout*,mNos rHAT rue CouNcrr-
l. Include the subject of participation by member countries in UN operations promptly and regu-
larly on its agenda and on that of the Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the planning cell, the
Secretariat-General and its various working groups and keep the Assembly informed;
2. Study the possible participation in UN operations by WEU per se, with appropriate WEU
co-ordination;
3. In parallel with the Assembly, make a thorough examination of the pros and cons of declaring
WEU a regional organisation within the meaning of the UN Charter and reaflirm WEU's acceptance of
the principle of possible action in accordance with Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty under
the aegis and in support of the UN;
4. Establish a working relationship with the UN Secretary-General using both the WEU Chairman-
in-Office's good offices and those of the WEU Secretary-General and his staffand instruct the planning
cell to offer advice for the IIN Secretary-General's Military Adviser in New York, especially with a
view to facilitating the creation of a similar planning cell for the UN;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l6th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman on behalf of the Defence Committee(Document 1366).
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5. Direct the WEU planning cell to examine ways in which WEU governments might support the
UN in terms of:
- 
logistic co-operation and procurement;
- 
transport pooling;
- 
communication arrangements;
- 
intelligence gathering;
- command and control for operations;
- 
the formulation of rules of engagement;
- 
training co-ordination.
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l. The Council points out that, in the Petersberg Declaration, Ministers stated that they were pre-
pared, in accordance with the Declaration they adopted in Maastricht on l0th December 1991, to
support, on a case-by-case basis, the implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management
measures, including peace-keeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations.
2. WEU co-ordination of the contributions and action of its member states, which have been called
on by the United Nations to participate in peace-keeping operations, is one of the major topics which
the WEU Council, both at Ministerial and Permanent Representative level, has placed on the agenda
for political consultation on topical questions in accordance with the work programme contained in the
Petersberg Declaration. Furthermore, the Special Working Group has been mandated to examine in
greater detail WEU's role in peace-keeping. The Planning Cell, for its part, is at the Council's disposal
to prepare contingency plans on the basis of any directives the Council may issue in response to pos-
sible needs in connection with, for example, the rotation of member states' units or the formation of
multinational units within a WEU framework.
3. This matter is on the Permanent Council's agenda. The Assembly will be informed of its conclu-
sions in good time.
4. The Council recognises the importance of increased contact and exchanges of information
between the United Nations and WEU. The mission to the United Nations in New York of the country
holding the WEU Presidency will henceforth act as a point of contact with the United Nations and will
be responsible for presenting WEU contributions to the competent United Nations bodies. The WEU
Council fully recognises the importance of promoting co-operation with the United Nations so as to
support its work of safeguarding international peace and to give it the necessary resources to carry out
peace-keeping operations with the requisite effectiveness. To this end, WEU contributions in the field
of planning and periodic contacts between the Planning Cell representatives and the United Nations
staffresponsible could be of real value. The Council wishes to draw the Assembly's attention to a letter
dated 25th June 1993 from the WEU Secretary-General to his United Nations counterpart, in which it
is planned to step up contacts and exchanges of information between WEU and the United Nations.
5. WEU is prepared to envisage, with the United Nations Secretary-General, the development of
contacts and exchanges of information between the WEU Secretariat-General and Planning Cell on the
one hand and the appropriate United Nations bodies on the other.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
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'
initiatives on the Danube and in the Adriatic -
the thitty-eighth annual relnrt of the Council
512,519,525, 530 and 531 and in particular the recommen-
to be tabled by WEU members of the United Nations Security Council
rnt embargo at least to the level of that enforced against Iraq in 1990/91
account of the problem of cargo in transit and also of the complica-
vention and to publish evidence at an early stage ofany significant
WEU member states to " offer expertise, technical assistance and
ments of Danube riparian states to prevent the use of the river
of circumventing or breaking the sanctions imposed by United
ncil Resolutions 713 and 7 57 " and in particular respond to Romania's
NATO authorities, rationalise naval and maritime air operations in
form composite and cost-effective forces;
signed Memoranda of
Danube and that such
Understanding with Bulgaria, Hungary and
operations are already producing a deterrent
)
countries are in one way or another fully supporting United Nations-
Criatic, on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia or Slovenia
lready a symbol of European willingness to co-operate in the field of
s between WEU and both Russia and the Ukraine over the appli-
ncil should initiate a specific exercise programme so that forces now
together on a regular basis at all levels and further suggesting that the
programme would be the forthcoming Ardente 93 exercise in Italy;
the terms of the Memoranda of Understanding signed with Bulgaria,
particular make explicit any security guarantees given to any or all of
political implications of WEU's involvement in operations on the
Danube and in the Adriatic fully studied and appreciated;
l. Adopted by the Assembly on I June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (5th sitting).
report tabled by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed on behalf of the Defence Committee2. Explanatory Memorandum: see(Document 1367).
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3.. 
. Pxplore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure complete and visible compliance
with all United Nations sanctions even to the extent of asking member stat-es to second customs and/or
police oflicers to help with the task;
4: Fncourage the Russian authorities to give practical expression to their offer to help ensure that
all embargos are fully respected on the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Heruegovina;
5. Develop th-e liaison established with the Ukranian authorities with a view to signing a possible
Memorandum of Understanding for WEU to provide technical assistance to the Ukraine-so that
United Nations sanctions may be seen to be fully respected;
6_. Urge the United Nations to implement a compensation scheme to reimburse at least in part
those countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which have suffered considerible
financial loss as a result of embargo enforcement;
7. Publish full details of the nationality, identity and characteristics of all vessels found breaking
the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of United Nations resolutions.
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l. The Council will consider the possibilities of informing the Assembly of the terms of the memo-
randa of understanding.
The memoranda of understanding contain no security guarantees. The Council would however
reiterate the terms of the last subparagraph of paragraph 4 of the communiqud of the meeting of the
WEU Forum of Consultation at Ministerial level, held in Rome on 2fth May 1993: * Moreover, Min-
isters underlined the importance of containing the current conflict and agreed that, were any country to
suffer from aggressive action as a consequence of their support for United Nations-mandated opera-
tions, this would be a matter of direct concern to the international community'.
2. The Council is fully aware of the need to study and appreciate the " longer-term political impli-
cations of WEU's involvement in operations on the Danube and in the Adriatic ".
3. The Council reiterates that the embargo is the responsibility of the United Nations Security
Council. WEU's assistance to the Danube riparian states was sought by those countries. In this context,
the Council is not planning " to explore with the Greek authorities ways of helping them ensure com-
plete and visible compliance with all United Nations sanctions even to the extent of asking member
states to second customs and/or police oflicers to help with the task ".
4. The Council takes due note of the Assembly's proposal. Member states' governments have been
unstinting in their encouragement, both within the United Nations Security Council and in their
bilateral relations with the Government of the Russian Federation.
5. The Council attaches the utmost importance to compliance with United Nations sanctions. The
main aim of the contacts established with Ukraine was to consider supplying equipment to help the
Ukrainian authorities implement the embargo. There were no plans, however, to ask WEU to
coordinate a technical assistance operation to this end.
6. This problem comes under the sole responsibility of the member states as members of the
United Nations.
7 . The Council notes the Assembly's wish that " full details of the nationality, identity and charac-
teristics of all vessels found breaking the embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of
United Nations'resolutions " be published. The embargo was imposed by the United Nations and it is
they who are coordinating the economic sanctions imposed on 3fth May and l6th November 1992.
The Sanctions Committee holds all the information on violations. The Council possesses no more than
fragmentary information regarding the embargo in the Adriatic.
The Council is studying the possibilities of declassifying the data in its possession regarding the
embargo in the Adriatic and on the Danube. In this event, such declassified data will be communicated
to the Assembly.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on l4th October 1993.
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'
oil the situation in Somaliaz
The Assembly,
(t) Noting that the United Nations operation in Somalia is degenerating in a way that may be
harmful to the authority of the United Nations;(ii) Recalling that armed forces from four member countries of WEU are taking part in Operation
UNSOM 2;
(iii) Considering that it is for WEU to ensure that any action in which forces of several of its
members are involved conforms with Articles VI and VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty,
Rrcour*lrNos rHAT r:sr CouNcrr-
Meet as a matter of urgency to co-ordinate the efforts of member countries in order to ensure
that the operation in Somalia respects the principles governing action by the United Nations.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on l6th June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (5th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorand"m: see the motion tabled by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the Political Committee (Document 1377).
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The Council takes due note of the Assembly's Recommendation.
On many occasions the Council has, under the heading of " topical questions " on the agenda of
its weekly meetings, discussed the contribution made by WEU member states to operations UNSOM I
and II, but it has not been considered appropriate for WEU to make a specific contribution, in the
form of planning, logistic support or the rotation of units, to the European commitment to the United
Nations action in Somalia.
In the case of Somalia, the United Nations Security Council decided to assume full control of the
operations, authorising the Secretary-General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, and the Governments con-
cerned to take the necessary steps as regards the unified command and control of the various forces.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th October 1993.
8l
DOCUMENT 1384
RECOMMENDATION 545 
'
on anti-missile defence for Eumpe - guidelinu drawn from the symlnsium2
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the recent progress achieved in international effo_rts__.1!o strengthen disarmament mea-
iures and to proirote non-proliferation by concluding the START II Treaty and.the chemical weapons
convention (^CWC) and by extending the scope and membership of the missile technology control
r6gime (MTCR);
(ii) Concerned, however, about certain Far Eastern, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean countries
*trictr do not yet intend to join the chemical weapons convention and the MTCR r6gime;
(iii) Disturbed by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty;
(iv) Observing that the proliferation of theatre and strategic missile technology into sensitive regions
which might affect the security of Europe is still continuing;
(v) Concerned that certain countries in unstable regions are continuing their attempts to try to
obtain ABC and missile capabilities;(vi) Gratified that the symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe held in Rolne provid.ed a uselrl
bpportu"iii to d.a* the attention of decision-makers to the riski stemming from missile prolife-
ration;
(vit) Convinced therefore that the European governments, and in particular those of WEU member
torintries, must shoulder their responsibilities by taking appropriate decisions to guarantee the security
of their populations and military forces before risk becomes threat;
(viii) Taking note of the recent decision by the United States to abandon further research and devel-
bpment of in orbital-based antlmissile ilobal protection system (SDI) in favour of a land-based
system;(ix) Convinced that all the discussions and negotiations sg far initiated on a bilateral or multina-
iionat basis on possible means of creating a system of protection of any kind whatsoever should lead to
openness and enhanced international confidence and not a new arms race between a privileged group
of states and others outside the system;(x) Reiterating that Western European Union has made great pro€Iess in taking a leading r6le in
ipace observatio-n and that - as demonstrated at the symposium - European industry has excellent
eiperience and expertise of anti-missile technology;(xi) Convinced that the appropriate approach in the present situation should first be to create a uni-
ueisal Jarfy *a*ing and surveillance systim, concrete defence and protection requirements remaining
initially under regional or national control,
RrcouuENos rHAT rnr CouNctt-
L Take a leading r6le in promoting, in relevant international conferences and institutions, further
initiatives for developing and strenglhening disarmament, confidence-building measures, non-
proliferation r6gimes and political dialogue;
2. Take an initiative in the United Nations with the aim of establishing an international early
warning and surveillance centre open to all countries interested in sharing data and information on
missile-activities and linked to an obligation to notify all missile flrrings and space launches;
3. Adopt without delay its position on a global protection system discussed between the United
States and-Russia and ask for there to be prior consultations between the United States and its allies
before resuming these talks;
4. Decide on the basis of a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to
mandate European industry to conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-
effective anti-missile protection system for Europe.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on lTth June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee(Document 1363).
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1. The Council takes due note of points I all.d 2 of the Assembly's Recommendation. Political dis-
cussions on further initiatives for developing and strengthening disarmament, confidence-building
measures, non-proliferation regimes and political dialogue, as well as the establishment of an inter-
national early warning centre, have not yet come to a conclusion and the Council feels that it is too
early to take them further in the immediate future. The Council congratulates the Assembly on the
success of its symposium on anti-nlissile defence for Europe held in Rome on 2fth and 2lst April.
The Assembly's seminar conflrmed the considerable interest in Europe in the development of a
long-range missile-launch detection system provided by means of one or more geostatic satellites. The
Council will take the conclusions of this seminar into account in all future initiatives that the member
states may wish to adopt in this field and will keep the Assembly duly informed.
2. The Council takes due note of points 3 and 4 of the Assembly Recommendation. It confirms that
the question of global protection against limited strikes and its implication for Europe is on the agenda
of the Special Working Group, as already pointed out in its reply to Recommendation 533. The
Council is closely following the discussions between the United States and Russia and attaches the
utmost importance to consultation among all allies within the alliance on this subject. An assessment of
the risks to Europe in this field is also within the Special Working Group's terms of reference. The
Council will inform the Assembly as soon as current discussions lead to a concrete result.
Following the example of the d6marche in the field of space cooperation within WEU,
European industry should be associated with feasibility studies and an assessment of the requirements
entailed in the creation of an antimissile protection system for Europe. Nevertheless, decisions as to
principle need to be taken and the framework for European co-operation needs to be defined.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th October 1993.
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'
oil the Assembly's ammunicatioa policyz
The Assembly,
(t) Convinced that the use by WEU of a form of graphic identification might help to ensure a
clearer perception of the organisation and eventually a better knowledge of it among the public;(ii) Considering it necessary therefore that WEU, on the one hand, and its subsidiary organs, on the
other, adopt a logo of their own;(iiil Taking into account paragraph 8 of Recommendation 530 asking that the Council:
" Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to
use it to distinguish their military forces 
- 
ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel 
- 
taking part in
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of
such a badge ";(iv) Recalling Order 74,
RecoprrrlrNns rHAT rur CouNctr-
l. Arrange for WEU to adopt a specifically European form of graphic identification;
2. Include WEU's information policy in its agenda as a matter of urgency with a view to examining
specific measures that it might take, including:
(a) the publication of guidelines for the press at the close of meetings of the Permanent Council;
(b) the preparation and publication of basic information on WEU, presented in an under-
standable form with a view to wide circulation in all member countries;
(c) the establishment of WEU information offrces in the European member countries of the
alliance, the United States and Canada;
(d) the development of initiatives taken by the Institute for Security Studies to strengthen
co-operation with groups, associations and private institutes that already exist in order to
increase the interest aroused by studies of Western European security matters;
3. Take the necessary steps to ensure closer co-operation between its own press and information
service and that of the Assembly.
l. Adopted by the Assembly on lTth June 1993 during the first part of the thirty-ninth ordinary session (6th sitting).
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the report tabled by Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and
Public Relations (Document 1378).
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1. The Permanent Council has received a proposal for a WEU flag, which it has asked the Council
Working Group to consider. The Council will inform the Assembly in good time of any decisions it
may take in the light of the Council Working Group's recommendations.
2. Since its establishment in Brussels, the Council has not placed on its agenda a discussion of the
communication policy of WEU ministerial organs. In essence, the points made in its reply to Written
Question 285 still apply.
The Council shares the Assembly's concern that public opinion be widely informed of WEU's
activities. It feels that an active public relations policy is an intrinsic part of WEU'S dynamic devel-
opment.
To make WEU's rOle more widely known to the general public, two types of action have been
stepped up: informing the public on Council positions and, where appropriate, on its institutional deci-
sions, and stimulating public awareness of the changing requirements of European security.
The Council feels that at this stage such action should be conducted in various ways through
WEU'S bodies, each in its own sphere of competence, rather than setting up special new communi-
cation structures. Members of the different bodies also have a rOle to play in their own countries as a
channel for making WEU better known.
Over the past six months, no fewer than six press releases have been issued following major
Council meetings, including those issued after the three Ministerial Councils convened since the
beginning of the year.
The Council Presidency bears the main responsibility for providing political information to the
Assembly, and its Ministers present a progress report on WEU's work at each of the sessions of the
Assembly. On 7th September 1993, during the meeting between the Permanent Council and the Pres-
ident of the Assembly, the Luxembourg Presidency's Permanent Representative proposed coming reg-
ularly to brief the appropriate Assembly Committees on the Council's Work.
The Secretary-General also has an important r61e in public relations and contacts with the press
through his participation in international seminars, meetings with political personalities and inter-
views with the press.
One of the missions of the WEU Institute for Security Studies is to contribute towards the emer-
gence of the European security identity. The Institute has already made numerous contacts with study
and research centres in WEU member countries and in the rest of Europe. It has arranged several series
of seminars on subjects pertaining to the new security structures in Europe, relations with Central
Europe and EFTA Countries, the EC Political Union and security in the Mediterranean.
The WEU Instiiute for Security Studies also has close links with academics, industrialists, the
press and parliamentarians. One of the Institute's special priorities is the question of European arma-
ments co-operation.
Lastly, the Council welcomes the Assembly's dynamic r6le in informing public opinion; in their
respective Parliaments, its Members contribute towards a broader awareness of the requirements of
European security, more particularly the work of WEU in the new geostrategic context.
3. The Council takes due note of the suggestion made in point 3 of Recommendation 546. It feels
that it is highly desirable for the Assembly's and Council's Press and Information Services to
co-operate actively, where necessary, within the limits of their respective remits and resources.
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 5th October 1993.
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WEU Flag
Letter from the Secretary-General of WEU
3rd November 1993
Dear Clerk,
At its meeting on 26th October last, the WEU Permanent Council confirmed the proposed WEU
flag presented by the Council's Working Group.
I enclose in English and in French the corresponding extract of the summary report of that
meeting and an illustration of the new logo for your information.
Yours sincerely,
Willem van Errrlpu
Mr. H. BuRcrun
Clerk of the Assembly of WEU
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75775 PARIS Cedex l6
WEU F'lag
On the CWG's recommendation, the Council accepted the proposal submitted on 2lst October,
i.e. a flag with nine stars, the number of stars standing for the number of WEU member states.
A star would then be added whenever a new member joined WEU (a new ten-star flag would be
made once the procedure for the ratification of the Hellenic Republic's accession to WEU was com-
pleted).
White letters
Golden stars
Background: European blue
*
*
*
U
E
o
*
*
*
*
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WEa Fbs
Letter from Mr. Holtlmlf, Deputy Secretary-General,
to Mr. Burgelin, Ckrk of the Assembly
llth November 1993
Dear Clerk,
At its meeting on Tuesday, 9th November, the Permanent Council of WEU specified the method
of use for the new flag of the organisation, which was adopted on 26th October, as you were informed
by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 3rd November.
In order to complete this information, please find enclosed the relevant extract, in French and in
English, of the minutes of the meeting of 9th November 1993.
Yours sincerely,
Horst Holruorr
Ambassador
3. WE(J Flag
Further to a point raised by the Italian Permanent Representative, it was confirmed that the new
WEU flag would be flown by WEU vessels taking part in the Adriatic operation.
It was also confirmed that the WEU flag should now be flown in front of the WEU building in
Brussels and Paris.
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Parliaments, military semice laws and public opinion
REPORT 
'
submiued on behalf of the Committee for Parlianrentary and Public Relations2
by Sir Russell lohnston, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr ResoruloN
on parliaments, military service laws and public opinion
ExpLeNeronv MruoneNourvt
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Parliaments and national service
(a) Parliaments and the drafting of the laws on national service
( b) P arliamentary debates
III. The laws and reforms of national service
(a/ National service laws now in force
(b,) Ongoing national service reforms
IV. Defence, national service and public opinion
(a/ Informing the public about defence and national service
(D/ National service and the state of public opinion
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: I&lr. Tummers (Chairman); Mrs. Fischer, Sir John Hunt (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Amaral, Birraux,
Boucheron, Biihler, Caldoro, Colombo (Alternate: Visibelli), Decagny, Sir Anthony Durant, Mrs. Err, MM. Eversdijk,
GhesquiCre, Dr. Godman, Mr. Gouteyron, Sir Rz.sse// Johnston, MM. Kempinaire,l-opez Henares, Martins, Pfuhl, Reimann,
RodotA (Alternate: Pizzo\, T abladini (Alternate: Trabacc hi ni), N..., N...
N.B.: Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Resolution
oa parlianents, militory senice laws and public opinion
The Assembly,
(i) Recalling its Recommendations 469, 534 and 535 in which the Council is asked:
(a) to take steps to give practi^cal expression-to the European pillar of defence, in particFar by
encouraging the creation of multinational units, and to take action to allow, at an individual
level, the exchange of military personnel between countries to enhance their awareness of
European cooperation and to serve as a useful recruiting incentive for their armed forces;
(b) to take every opportunity to ensure that the debate on reserve forces and national service
benefits from the common fund of experience and requirements, to stimulate informed
debate in member countries on revised r6les for reserve forces, as well as reductions in and
possible restructuring of national service, and to invite WEU parliamentarians to participate
in discussions on these topics;
(c/ to ask the ministries of defence of member states to organise the dissemination of appro-
priate information regarding military matters to all parliamentarians and especially those
who have no service background;
(ii) Recalling Resolution 90 inviting the parliaments of member countries to encourage the partici-
pation of members of the WEU Assembly in activities dealing with European security and defence
policy;
(iiil Noting that reforms are being conducted in the member countries of WEU with the aim of
reducing the duration of national service, changing its form or terminating it outright and that sub-
stantial reductions in the strengths of the armed forces are being made;
(iv) Aware of the need to reform the armed forces in order to prepare them for the geostrategic con-
ditions of the post-cold war era and the new tasks being assigned to them in the framework of multi-
lateral operations by WEU, NATO and the United Nations;
(v) Convinced of the importance of reinforcing the link between citizens and the armed forces with
a view to achieving an integrated European defence capable of playing its full r6le as the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as the operational component of the European Union;
(vi) Stressing the need to keep public opinion informed of what the reform of national service and
the structure of the armed forces implies for the defence of Europe,
INvNTS THE PARLIAMENTS OF MEMBER COUNTRIES
l. To hold debates on the reform of national service as appropriate and the structure of the armed
forces, taking into account national requirements and also the overall requirements of European
defence with due consideration for the reforms being conducted in member countries;
2. Taking into account the information drawn from debates in 1954, to encourage their defence
and foreign affairs committees to co-operate with the defence and foreign affairs committees of the
parliaments of other member countries of WEU, associate members and observers with a view to
examining the present requirements of integrated European defence and, as necessary, the possibility
of organising a European civil and military service;
3. To examine the harmonisation of legislation in member countries governing national service and
the status of military personnel in order to reduce present differences and foster the exchange of per-
sonnel and the formation of European multinational military units;
4. To encourage the participation of parliamentarians, particularly those who are members of the
WEU Assembly, in activities for informing the public about what the defence of Europe means and the
need to pool defence efforts, resorting to the greatest possible extent to radio and televised means of
communication;
5. To keep the WEU Assembly informed of their deliberations in this domain.
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Expbnatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Rassell lohastoa, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. An important factor in the era of
upheaval in the European continent since the
second half of the eighties is a challenge to
hitherto established ideas in defence questions.
In the period of confrontation between the
Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, it was
necessary to have vast human resources to meet
the possibility of major warfare in Europe.
2. Although in every western country there
was already a tendency towards reducing troop
levels and the duration of military service,
progress in this direction still depended to a
large extent on the constraints ofthe geostrategic
situation resulting from the second world war
and it was essential not to weaken the defence
posture of the alliance in face of the superiority
of the enemy in both troops and equipment.
3. Everything changed with the collapse of
the Berlin wall. The end of the Warsaw Pact and
the diminishing threat of widespread hostilities
in Europe gave the member states of the alliance
and of WEU considerable elbow room for
reforming the armed forces and both national
and European defence arrangements in general.
Pressed by economic problems, this process
accelerated and moved very quickly from the
framework of concerted reductions and reforms
between allies to a purely national framework
where far greater consideration was paid to eco
nomic and electoral matters peculiar to each
country at the risk, in the medium and long
term, of jeopardising the whole edifice of
European defence.
4. Although each country may act according
to its own criteria, there ate a few easily-
recognised common features, be it at the level of
motivation (economic, electoral) or method
(reduction of strengths and duration of national
service, reform in the sense of greater
professionalisation of the armed forces
depending on the national particularity of each
country). In the front line of these changes
decided and desired by the existing political
authorities are the parliaments, which have to
vote the laws governing the reform of national
service and the structure of the armed forces.
The r6le of the legislative power is very
important in this matter even if the process of
drawing up texts is essentially under the control
of the executive power and its administrations.
Parliaments discuss the texts taking into account
both the considerations of a general national
order and the impact of the laws voted on the
regional network, since members of parliament
are responsible to their constituencies. Any
reform of national service will have local eco-
nomic repercussions which are not negligible:
the reduction or suppression ofnational service
will result in the closing of bases and other mil-
itary installations which sometimes make a sig-
nificant contribution to the economic welfare of
different regions in each country. Even if in
most cases the outcome of the debates is gen-
erally approval of governmental decisions, par-
liaments may make amendments or changes to
the texts proposed which allow them to play a
supervisory r6le in matters concerning the
reform of national service and the armed
forces.
5. Since parliamentary activities are in the
public domain (auditions and debates open to
the public and the media) this allows public
opinion to be associated with these questions
other than through sociological studies whose
results are only relative depending on whether
those who organise the studies are governmental
organisations or private institutions. In turn, the
attitude of the public expressed nowadays
through opinion polls and other public inquiries
will have an impact on the debates on national
service and the reform of the armed forces
because, with an eye to the elections, politicians(future ministers and members of parliament)
will be inclined to wish to follow the opinion of
the electorate on these matters.
6. Coupled with economic problems, this
partly explains why a similar process can be seen
in most European countries with compulsory
national service, i.e. the wish to reduce national
service (a measure which is highly appreciated
by the populations concerned, i.e. young people
of call-up age) and possibly to suppress it out-
right, resorting increasingly to professional
armies. If, initially, it is welcome news that
states are reducing their armed forces and
defence expenditure as a result of their per-
ception of a more stable security environment in
Europe and in spite of crises in the East, one
must reflect on the medium- and long-term con-
sequences of this process which is at the dis-
cretion of each state depending on their various
concepts and interests. Here, parliamentary
action is important because parliamentary
debate can help to enlighten the executive and
public opinion on what the reforms involve, not
immediately, since the principle of reform is
almost always accepted, but in the more distant
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future where instability seems to be the only
prospect.
7. In this context, it is important to reflect
on the reform of national service and the armed
forces not only in the national framework, but
also taking due account of similar reforms being
conducted in neighbouring and allied countries.
Here too, parliaments have a r6le to play
through their members who are in contact with
other members of parliament from other coun-
tries in the various European interparliamentary
institutions dealing with European political, eco-
nomic and defence questions.
8. These institutions must also develop close
cooperation on these matters with the parlia-
ments and it is their responsibility to provide a
framework for close examination of questions
regarding the creation of an efficient joint
defence system. The exchange of ideas and expe-
rience will be a means of transition from the
national framework 
- 
which is still the first pri-
ority 
- 
to a European framework which will
allow the foundations to be laid for a true
European defence system based not only on
texts but also confirmed in practice by the exis-
tence of a true European anny composed of cit-
izens of the various countries concerned which
have had the same basic training and education,
due account being taken ofthe specifics ofeach
country.
9. Unity being strength, a credible European
army must also have human resources which
will allow it to carry through the tasks it is
accorded at any time and in any place without
losing sight of its principal raison d'Otre 
- 
the
defence of each of its members which provide
units and belong to the organisation concerned.
This calls for the harmonisation of legislation
governing national service which takes account
of future priorities without which the defence of
Europe will long depend on outside backing
from others whose interests may not always
coincide with those of Europe.
10. In the framework of this report on the
member countries of WEU which are in the
process of conducting reforms of national
service and the armed forces and in order to
illustrate further the need to harmonise legis-
lation and inform public opinion of what is at
stake, other than economic and electoral consid-
erations, in the reforms being conducted, we
shall first examine the responsibilities of parlia-
ments in defence questions and military service,
then present the laws in force in each country
concerned and the reforms being conducted and,
finally, present the attitude of public opinion
towards these questions and its influence on
those who take decisions and the reforms in
question. This will offer an overall picture of the
question of national service and its impact on
the defence of Europe.
II. Parliaments and national semice
11. In Recommendation 534t, the WEU
Assembly recommended that the Council * stim-
ulate informed debate in member countries on
revised r6les for reserve forces as well on reduc-
tions in and possible restructuring of national
service " and " invite WEU parliamentarians to
participate in discussions on these topics ". It
has to be noted that in reality there is truly a
restructuring of national service in the member
countries of WEU which over-rides any other
consideration concerning the question of reserve
forces and their tasks. As in an economic
process, strengths are first pared down with a
view to improving productivity at least cost, for-
getting that defence is not a commercial under-
taking. Again, this process of restructuring of
national service remains cloistered in the
national framework of each country without
WEU parliamentarians, who are above all repre-
sentatives of their nations, being able to
influence the decisions of their parliaments
towards harmonisation of legislation and the
search for solutions at WEU level. Moreover, in
its reply to Recommendation 534, the Council
merely confirms this state of affairs by aflirming
repeatedly that * questions pertaining to the
debate on reserve forces and national service in
any member country are not, at present, on the
agenda of the Council and its working groups ".
In other words, these questions are still exclu-
sively a national matter to the detriment to prior
consultation between members of WEU. It is
therefore for the parliaments of each country
concerned to decide on these questions in the
national framework alone and in a manner
peculiar to each country.
(a) Parlianeats and tlrc draftiag of laws
on national semice
12. In western democracies, the laws of the
country are at the top of the hierarchy of rules
governing the operation of the national com-
munity. In theory, therefore, parliaments have
the task of deciding on important questions con-
cerning that community. National service, as
one expression of the commitment of citizens to
national defence, is one of the questions which
are the responsibility of parliaments.
13. [n most cases, the responsibility of parlia-
ments in questions of national service is
affirmed in the constitution or basic law of each
country in often identical terms, as can be seen
from the following table:
l. Document 1338,
Mr. De Decker.
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Sources of parliamentary responsibility
Country Source Text
Belgium Constitution, Art. ll8 The method of recruitment of the armv is determined
by law. It also governs the promotion, rights and obliga-
tions of military personnel.
France . Constitution of 4th October
1958, Art. 34, alin'ea 2
The law fixes the rules concerning... the constraints
imposed by national defence on citizens in their person
and in their property.
Germany. Parliamentary law Article 73
paragraph 1
The Federation has exclusive legislative competence in
the following matters:
1. Foreign affairs and defence, including the protection
of the civilian population...
Italy . Constitution, Art. 52 The defence of the homeland is a sacred duty of the
citizen. Military service is compulsory within the limits
and in accordance with the means fixed by law.
Netherlands Constitution, Art. 98, para-
graph 3
The law governs compulsory military service. It also
governs the obligations that may be imposed for the
defence of the country on those who are not members
of the armed forces.
Portugal Constitution, Art. 167,
alinea (d)
The Assembly of the Republic has exclusive legislative
responsibility in the following matters:
... (d) The organisation of national defence, definition
of the duties stemming from programme laws fixing the
fundamental principles of the organisation, operation
and discipline of the armed forces.
Spain . Constitution of
27th December 1978, Art. 30,
paragraph 2
The law shall fix the militarv oblieations of Spaniards
and will regulate, with the necessary guarantees, consci-
entious objection and other cases of exemption from
compulsory military service. If necessary, it may
impose alternative social service.
14. Thus parliamentary responsibilities
regarding national service seem to be well defined
in constitutional texts, this rule also being valid
for Luxembourg 2. Article 96 of its constitution
stipulates that everything concerning the armed
forces is governed by law. Parliament can legiti-
mately debate questions of national service even if
in practice the initiative for reforms and changes
is almost always a task for the executive i.e.
defence ministers. When national service laws are
discussed, this forces a procedural and funda-
mental balance between parliament and the gov-
ernmental agencies concerned.
(b) Parliamcntary debates
15. Consideration of bills presented in par-
liament follows specific procedures which vary
2. Luxembourg does not have national service, the armed
forces are composed solely of volunteers.
from country to country in accordance with par-
liamentary tradition. In view of its implications
for the defence preparedness of a country,
national service calls for special precautions
when the corresponding legislation is voted. In
most countries, procedure is simple but the
outcome is the result of a running compromise
between parliament, its specialised committees,
ministers of defence and sometimes of the
economy, and other government authorities.
Generally, parliaments have only a very narrow
margin of maneuvre which hardly encourages a
wide-ranging debate that has an impact on
public opinion, the only aspects which draw
attention being the reduction in the duration of
service or its suspension in favour of purely vol-
unteer armed forces. The consequences of
reforming national defence generally pass unno-
ticed, this being even more true when it is a
question of European defence. This focalisation
on the more attractive aspects of reforming
national service leaves little choice to parlia-
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mentarians who have to take into account the
favourable judglnent of pnblic opinion regarding
plans to reduce or terminate national service.
16. Another important factor in the debate on
national service is the information available to
parliamentarians regarding the intentions and
plans of the executive. In principle, the appro-
priate committees are informed but they have
few possibilities of changing significantly the
texts submitted to them and in most countries
the government is able to obtain approval for its
progfirmmes should views differ in the com-
mittees and in parliament. At the end of this
process, parliaments have only an a postiori
power of supervision of the correct application
of the texts approved.
17. If, on the one hand, handling questions
regarding national defence requires certain
special rules to be respected (the secrecy or con-
fidentiality of certain information provided to
members of parliamentary defence committees)
on the other hand, the same rules leave little
scope for open parliamentary debate on these
matters. The British example is quite interesting
in this matter concerning national defence and
structure of the armed forces. All government
information, including defence matters, is
covered by the Official Secrets Act. This makes
the unauthorised disclosure of information an
offence. This leads to information on defence
being much less readily available to parliament
and the country at large than in many other
democracies. In the British system, it is assumed
that parliament has no automatic rights of infor-
mation to state information unless it is released
by the executive for a particular reason. Despite
this general principle, several conventions have
grown up which entail that parliament does have
some influence over defence policy. The gov-
ernment presents an annual defence white
paper, the statement on the defence estimates
(SDE), usually between April and July. The SDE
is subject to a twoday debate, usually held in
the following October. By convention, three
one-day debates are also held, one for each
service, which provide a further opportunity for
defence policy to be scrutinised. Individual
members can also raise specific defence matters
of interest during adjournment debates, which
are held late at night on Monday to Thursday
evenings and on Friday afternoons. Subjects
debated might include a defence order for apar-
ticular company in a member's constituency, the
closure of a local defence base or the dis-
bandment of a local regiment.
18. Besides the SDE, two other sets of defence
estimates are also subject to parliamentary
approval. The former concerns the maximum
number of personnel allowed for each service in
the next financial year. The second set of esti-
mates are the financial supply estimates.
Although a limited analysis of expenditure is
provided in the SDE for the forthcoming year,
which is usually published before the consoli-
dated fund debate, and a more detailed analysis
of procurement expenditure is later released in
the major project statement, parliament must
vote for the defence budget in its entirety.
Unlike the United States or German systems,
for example, there is no possibility for par-
liament to amend or veto a particular project or
item of expenditure.
19. Members can also obtain information
through the use of parliamentary questions. The
Secretary of State for Defence is subject to oral
questioning approximately once a month when
the House is sitting. Defence ministers can and
do refuse to comment on certain questions if
they involve sensitive areas of policy. Under the
constitution, ministers are responsible for the
conduct of government policy and of civil ser-
vants to parliament. There is therefore little
direct contact between MOD oflicials and MPs.
One means of contact is via the Defence Select
Committee which publishes reports on a wide
variety of subjects. The committee is provided
with much information which is not available to
the public, particularly in relation to the costs
and status of equipment projects. In doing so,
the committee takes evidence from MOD offi-
cials in public and in camera, as well as min-
isters, and visits defence bases. Civil servants
and ministers can, however, refuse to reply to
particular questions. The situation is hardly dif-
ferent in other member countries of WEU since
parliamentarians are fairly dependent on infor-
mation they receive from their respective
administrations. Instead of examining the con-
sequences of the proposed reforms in the
medium and long term, there is merely a debate
on the immediate effects of such reforms(reduction of the duration or termination of
national service). Furthermore, such a debate is
always limited to the national framework
without problems being tackled at European
level, although certain members attend
European or Atlantic parliamentary institutions
with responsibility in defence matters.
20. This situation and the resulting concern
are illustrated in paragraph 5 of the Assembly's
Recommendation 535 3 which recommends that
the Council * ask the ministries of defence of
member states to organise the dissemination of
appropriate information regarding military
matters to all parliamentarians and especially
those who have no service background ". The
Council's reply that this question is'within the
competence of the respective governments of
WEU member states, not within that of the
Council', confrrms that the national factor is
still the most important and the only reference
for laws and reforms of national service.
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III. The laws and reforms of national senice
21. Except for the United Kingdom and Lux-
embourg, where there is no national service, all
the other member countries of WEU have
started to reform their national service and the
structure of their armed forces. The reasons
invoked are the same in all cases: the end of the
cold war, the peace dividend and economic
problems in European countries.
22. The end of the cold war and the agree-
ments signed concerning reductions in equip-
ment and troops in Europe a have resulted in the
redpction of personnel and the duration of
national service and even plans for terminating
service altogether.
23. The peace dividend is the result of the
near disappearance of the threat of major hostil-
ities in Europe. The need for huge armies with
heavy equipment and prepared for total warfare
is no longer felt. At the same time, peripheral
fighting, as in the GuIf and ex-Yugoslavia, has
turned military thoughts towards light, highly-
mobile units 
- 
although with very sophisticated
equipment - composed mainly of professional
soldiers or volunteers to take part in various
operations to re-establish international order,
maintain peace, protect peace and humanitarian
or other operations. With the help of the media,
the idea that it is possible to ensure the defence
of a country by the means used for humanitarian
assistance or the relative protection of civilian
populations has made an impression on public
opinion and certain leaders too. This is leading
to reforms tending in the medium or long term
to create armies almost completely composed of
regular soldiers or volunteers prepared to accept
fairly long contracts.
24. A determining factor is the need to reduce
public expenditure in a period of economic aus-
terity. Choices have to be made between main-
taining armies of conscripts, procuring new
technology, maintaining armaments pro-
grammes, all in a context of reducing defence
budgets. In accordance with the predominant
economic theory, strengths are reduced first
without too much regard for future conse-
quences in terms of national or European
defence and also the social and economic reper-
cussions. By amending existing laws on national
service, the way is opened for reforming the very
structure of the armed forces with a view to
adapting them to the requirements of the day.
(a) National senice laws now ia force
25. It is difficult to speak of a national service
law in each case. In each country several texts
overlap, tackling this question from different
angles depending on the evolution of the con-
cepts of national defence and of society - modi-
fi cation of the duration, conscientious objection,
dual nationality. It is possible, however, to
isolate texts which cover more or less all the
rules of national service. By comparing the dif-
ferent laws, it is also possible to pick out the
various national concepts regarding defence
questions and find common points which will
perhaps one day allow a European law on
national service to be drawn up. Table II pre-
sents the laws on national service in force in
each country.
26. Over and above differences of form such
as the number of articles, more or less detailed
provisions, national particularities, the laws gov-
erning national service have one common char-
acteristic: affrrmation of the principle that
national service is the fundamental contribution
of citizens to national defence, and not just in
military terms as can be seen from the French
and Italian laws. This basic idea of the partici-
pation of citizens in defending common values
and their territory is the main pillar of national
cohesion.
27. This does not mean that in countries
where there is no national service the link
between the citizen and national defence is less
strong. In the United Kingdom, where con-
scription was abolished at the end of the fifties,
the conversion to a professional army was
accompanied by measures to maintain and
strengthen the standing and image of the armies
in the nation and to promote recruitment. The
press and television are used to convey to the
public a good image of the arrny, recruitment
oflices have action programmes directed
towards young people in schools and univer-
sities to convince future recruits and everyone
around them ofthe value ofthe anny as a prG
fession. These measures allow a link to be main-
tained between citizens and defence in a context
where there is no national service. Each country
has its own military tradition, however, and
national standards are not completely inter-
changeable.
O) Ongoiag aatioaal senice reforms
28. Flexibility and rationalisation are key-
words in the reform of armed forces. It is a
question ofcreating forces prepared for action at
short notice, highly mobile and polyvalent, with
the task oftaking part in actions in conventional
warfare (the Gulf war), low intensity fighting
and conducting operations in the framework of
United Nations missions. This type of force calls
for highly motivated personnel, trained to act in
all circumstances with a high degree of technical
knowledge and able to us€ increasingly sophisti-
cated weapons involving advanced technology.4. CFE-I and CFEI A.
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Tesle II
Natioaal semice lawss
5. These basic laws on national service have subsequently been amended to take into account various changes concerning
duration and conditions of servie but they are still in application.
6. Application of the laws on the militia will be suspended with effect from 1994.
In order to create such units on a wide scale,
while reducing defence budgets, choices have to
be made in terms of personnel and equipment
starting from the principle that strengths have to
be lower but better prepared and equipped, less
mat6riel but more modern and of higher per-
formance. In terms of strengths, the greatest
changes will be made in national service from
reduction to its complete suppression.
(i) Germany
29. By the year 2000, the Bundeswehr will
have 300 000 men, far less than the 370 000
planned in the framework of the 2 + 4 agree-
ments on the reunification of Germany. Com-
pulsory military service will be reduced
probably from one year to nine months. The
basic structure of the armed forces will be built
around rapid action units and units destined
mainly for the defence of the territory.
(it) Belgium
30. Compulsory military service will be ter-
minated from 1994 in accordance with the law
of 3lst December 1992 amending the laws on
the co-ordinated militia. It should be noted that
these laws have not been abrogated but the law
of 3lst December 1992 has inserted a new
article limiting their scope of application to the
1993 contingent and previous contingents. The
Country Laws Details
Belgium. Laws on the co-ordinated
militia of 30th April 1962 6
Art 2 E I All Belsian cifizens mref ec.nmnlish rnilif
service. $ 2. Apart from the cases provided for in ,
present law and without prejudice to the execution
international conventions, this service has
exception. It takes priority over all other service.
the
Lof
no
France . l-aw 7l-424 of 10th January
l97l on military service
Art. L.l. National service is universal. It is in the form
of military service to meet the requirements of the
army; civil service to meet the other requirements of
defence and of solidarity...
Germany. Law of l3th June 1986 on
national service
tut. I $ I (1). Military service is compulsory for all
German citizens, in accordance with the Basic Law,
with effect from l8 years of age...(2). Military service is compulsory but it may be
deferred for Germans resident abroad.
$ 3. The obligation to accomplish military service has
two aspects: military service itself and civil service.
Italy . Law 958 of 24th December
1986
Art. I $ 1. The armed forces serve the republic for the
defence of the country; they participate in safeguarding
institutions and the national wealth in the event of
public catastrophe.
Netherlands Law of 4th February 1922 This is the oldest national service law still in force.
Portugal Law 30187 of 7th July 1987 Art. I $ l. Defence of the country is the duty and funda-
mental right of all Portuguese.
$ 2. Military service, the accomplishment of which is
compulsory in accordance with this law, is the military
contribution of each citizen to the defence of the
country.
Spain . Law l9ll984 of 8th June
1984
Art l E 2- Militarv service in fhe errnerl fnrces is a fi
damental personal contribution of Spaniards to
national defence.
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duration of service has been reduced to six
months in Germany and eight months in
Belgium for 1993. In the year 2000, the armed
forces will be composed of 40 000 men (civilian
and military) instead of 81 000 at present. A
reserve of 30 000 will be maintained.
(ii, Spain
31. Spain wishes to have a smaller, more
flexible army which can be mobilised quickly.
The total ofall services by the year 2000 is to be
some 180 000 men, half of which will be called
up only in the event of an emergency. Command
authorities wish to stress the formation of
militia and reservists who will serve in units
formed only in times of emergency. About 5090
will be regulars. National service has been
reduced to nine months and it will be possible to
recall the militia only during the three years fol-
lowing the end of their service.
(iv) France
32. In 1997, the ground forces will have
225 W0 men 7, I l0 000 of which will be regulars
and 1 I 5 000 conscripts. The navy and the airforce
will remain at their present level of about 155 000
men. Compulsory military service will be main-
tained at ten months. The law of 4th January 1992
amending national service increased the list of
possibilities oflered through various forms of civil
service, which now includes civil service in the
police, the national security service, the civil
service of conscientious objectors, the VSNE
system (volontaires service national entreprise)
and military service in cities. At present, 60/o of
recruits do civil service but this number will
probably increase in future years. It should be
noted that in his general policy statement on 8th
April 1993, the Prime Minister, Mr. Balladur,
described his aim as being to establish a white
paper analysing the new situation at present,
potential threats and the means for the country to
ensure its independence and survival in all cir-
cumstances. He added that it was on the basis of
the conclusions of that white paper that the min-
ister of state would draw up a military programme
for submission in spring 1994. Pending this law,
no change concerning national service is to be
introduced before 1995-1996.
(v) Italy
33. Italian armed forces will be composed of
15 brigades instead of 25 at present, five of
which will be regulars and ten in what is known
as a " second intervention " capacity with
training and monitoring tasks. It is planned to
form four replacement brigades in the event of
emergencies.ln 1997, the armed forces will have
about 287 000 men. The number of volunteers
7. To which will be added the forces of the national gendar-
merie.
will be increased by about 35 000 men and com-
pulsory military service will continue to be
reduced, starting with a reduction of l5 000 men
in 1993. In the new approach to the armed
forces, a grcater place is to be accorded to
women on a voluntary basis.
(vi) Netherlands
34. The Netherlands Government is planning
a reduction of 44o/o in five years - for the ground
forces the reduction will be 540/0. Compulsory
military service will be reduced to nine monthsin 1994 and abolished progtessively in five
years. At the beginning of 1998, the Netherlands
armed forces will be wholly professional. Their
strength will be 70 000 including civilian per-
sonnel. In case of need, it is planned to be able
to increase strengths to 100000 calling upon
voluntary reservists.
(viil Portugal
35. In 1994, compulsory military service will
be four months after a transitional period during
which the period will be eight months. Stress is
laid on the recruitment of volunteers, initially
for a period ofone year and subsequently for the
longer period of eight years. The duration of
service will be reduced to four months only if
the number of volunteers meets the require-
ments of the armed forces. Basic training will be
the same for conscripts and for volunteers,
except for those who serve in the airborne
brigade.
36. Considering these plans for reforms, some
of which have already been started, it can be
concluded that the idea of compulsory military
service now seems to be losing much of its
attractiveness. It will not be possible for discus-
sions between advocates and opponents of
national service to change the course of the
reforms started which seem to be increasingly
irreversible. Even the United Kingdom, where
national service no longer exists, is not evading
the process ofreducing strengths. By the end of
the century, the United Kingdom armed forces
will have 241000 men (119000 in the army,
70 000 in the airforce and 52 000 in the navy)
compared with some 293 500 today. The main-
tenance of 40 infantry battalions instead of the
38 planned in the reform plans (compared with
55 in 1992) will be possible only to the det-
riment of equipment investment.
3'1. Faced with these plans for reform, one
may wonder what forces WEU with its present
membership will have after 1998 in order to
exercise to the full its r6le of defending the
interests of the member countries.
38. Another factor that has to be taken into
account is the aging of the population due to
falling birth rates. This will have an impact on
available reserves and on the recruitment of vol-
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TesI.r III
WEU: praent strcngths, plaaned relorna aad limits impovd by the CFE-LA agneemeils
Country Strengths in 1993(thousands)
Strengths by 1997
after reforms
(thousands)
Ceilings under
the CFE lA
agreement
Belgium . 81 40 70
France 4tt 370 325
Germany . 408 300 345
Itelv 325 287 315
Luxembourg 0.8 0.8
Netherlands. 74 70 80
Portugal . 58 35-40 75
Spain 20t 180 300
United
Kingdom 259 241 260
8. The Military Balance, 1993-1994.
unteers 
- 
two aspects which are important for
the success of the planned reforms 
- 
due to the
demographic deficits which will affect those
reaching the age of recruitment, i.e. mainly 16-
18 years. This partly justifies increasing the
number of women in the armed forces to offset
the shortage of men.
39. What is important in this process is to
avoid breaking the link between the citizen and
national defence. Informing the public is an
important and necessary factor in guaranteeing
the participation of citizens in the defence effort
in time of peace and parliaments and govern-
ments have a crucial rOle to play in this
respect.
IY. Defence, national semice and public opinion
40. Be it in countries with compulsory mil-
itary service or in those that have a professional
anny, the commitment of citizens towards
defending national community values is pri-
mordial for strengthening their national defence
capabilities. This can be done by two main
means: recourse to national service (compulsory
military and civil) and informing the public of
what is at stake in defence questions, the activ-
ities of the armies and the relevant social and
economic aspects. Here, each country acts in
accordance with its own traditions and possibil-
ities, but with slight adaptation certain experi-
ences may be generalised.
41. In the period of transition from a con-
scription army to a professional or largely pro
fessional army, it is essential to keep the public
informed of what is at stake in defence questions
so that all citizens feel they have an interest in
what is happening. At the time that available
financial resources are being reduced, it is
important to go beyond the national framework
and think about defence at European level. Here
too citizens can be mobilised from different
countries around the defence of joint values.
This r6le of European defence is the responsi-
bility of defence organisations, i.e. NATO or
WEU, and, in the latter framework, its
Assembly can and must play an information r6le
towards the parliaments and public in the
member countries.
(a) Inlormiag the public abut dolence aad national senicc
42. At a time when most information passes
through audiovisual means, it is paradoxical to
note that practically nothing is seen or heard
about debates on defence and the armed forces
and their r6le, not to speak of national service.
Images and information dealing with defence
are reduced to the presentation of technological
warfare as in the Gulf war, or peace-keeping
operations and their more or less violent aspects(former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia, etc.).
In these operations, many European soldiers are
seen, mainly regular troops or including a very
high proportion of volunteers.
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43. This ultimately creates the dangerous
illusion that all future hostilities can be managed
by resorting to advanced technology weapons
albne in operations conducted by the United
Nations and that national defence or collective
defence obligations can be fulfilled with a small
number of well-trained men with modern
equipment. How will a country defend itself if
its duly prepared and equipped forces suffer a
high level of casualties in fighting an enemy
equally well prepared and equipped? There has
been no discussion of any such eventuality. It
therefore becomes very important to keep cit-
izens regularly informed about every aspect of
the problem of national defence, particularly in
countries where national service is undergoing
far-reaching changes. Several examples can be
quoted of the action necessary for shaping a
spirit of defence.
44. (a) When conscription was terminated in
the United Kingdom, the defence authorities
launched far-reaching information campaigns to
ensure that an adequate flow of manpower
enlisted in the regular army that was being
formed. The press and television also followed
up this action which was also extended in the
direction of schools and universities. Mobile
information units were created to present the
army throughout the territory by projecting
films. The KAPE plan (keep the army in the
public eye) was launched. The purpose was to
organise the presentation of army detachments
in their areas of recruitment, thus establishing a
link between the publicity campaigns and the
local recruiting teams; subsequently, periods of
training in units were organised for young
people who were thus able to establish true
contact with military life. These measures did
much to ensure enough enlistments to meet the
needs of the United Kingdom armed forces e.
45. (b) ln order to increase the number of vol-
unteers for a longer period (eight years), the Por-
tuguese authorities resorted to modern mar-
keting techniques for disseminating televised
spots and announcements in the press. The
armed forces stress the practical advantages of
long service; as soon as the first contacts have
been established with the recruitment offrces,
candidates are informed about the training and
professional measures which will be available to
them. They may have technical training in their
units or in civilian professional training centres.
Measures are proposed to improve cultural
levels and a percentage of places available in
universities (where places are limited) is
reserved for volunteers. Enlisted men zlre pro-
vided with information about their military
9. Recruitment was also encouraged by various material and
social measures for enlisted men which allowed the reform
to be successful.
career prospects and also the facilities they will
be accorded for employment afterwards. On
returning to civilian life, their career as volun-
teers will give them access to preferential loans
for purchasing accommodation or starting pro-
fessional activities. This shows that military
service also plays an important r6le in eco-
nomic, social and cultural matters which makes
it more attractive for citizens.
46. (c) By developing the aspects of national
service leading to civil activities (police, civil
security, municipal service, firms), the French
authorities are endeavouring to make service
more interesting for young people and bring
their training closer to matters of concern to
them such as employment, security or the envi-
ronment. At the same time, the development of
these activities draws military personnel closer
to the population insofar as they are required to
help the community. The strictly military aspect
is giving way in part to the social and economic
aspect which might have favourable repercus-
sions on the public and recruits.
47. In parallel, SIRPA (the French army
information and public relations service) is
making a considerable effort to inform the
public by resorting to written and audiovisual
means in addition to its work of presenting
units, conferences and symposia organised by
that service. The results obtained are not negli-
gible and contribute much to maintaining a
good image for the armed forces in French
public opinion. This service regularly conducts
polls and research on public opinion and
defence, the results of which, although generally
positive, are sometimes contradictory as can
also be seen in other countries.
A) Ndiaiol senie and tLc ctde of public opiaioa
48. The spirit of defence links citizens with
national defence. This is not a concept that is
easy to measure because it varies according to
age, social standing and the level of education.
Opinion polls confirm these remarks and the
same points of reference are found from one
country to another.
(t) France
49. In May and June 1993, SIRPA ordered
two polls on questions of defence policy and the
image of the armies and national service. Each
poll was conducted with a selection of I 000
persons over 15 years of age. Reg;arding military
service, 66% of those questioned considered it
essential to ensure the defence of France (com-
pared with 60Vo of favourable opinions in 1992).
It should be noted, however, that among execu-
tives and intellectual professions, opinions are
split at around 50% (48% consider that military
service is not essential for the defence of
France). Conversely, 75qb d those questioned
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were in favour of a regular armyro compared
with 170lo in favour of conscription, but 27%
were in favour of maintaining the present
system. Regarding the duration of military
service (ten months), 590/o considered it satis-
factory but 580/o considered that far too many
people evaded service and 670/o thought that
during military service young people were too
often inoccupied. It also emerged from the
enquiries that information is good on the
various possibilities of civil service, 950/o of
those questioned having said that they knew
what it was all about. The principal aims of
national service are set out in Table IV. One
should note the growing importance of non-
military activities in the framework of national
service such as service for the collectivity and
professional training for recruits.
TnsLE IV
Aims of netional senicc in Fmrce (opinions)
To train soldiers to defend France 44olo
To have young people take part in
improving public services 43%
To contribute to the professional
training of recruits 35o/o
To make young people aware of the
need for national defence 330/o
To allow young people from different
social classes to know each other
better 17o/o
50. Regarding general defence questions, 8390
of those polled were prepared to fight for the
defence of the territory, but only 29Yo believed
that it was necessary to fight for a country with
which France had contracted agreements of
alliance. Possible use of armed forces is mas-
sively but unequally approved as shown in the
following table.
51. The use of national servicemen in the
event of armed intervention is still a sensitive
subject. Only 130/o of those questioned were in
favour of sending recruits to any place of inter-
vention whatsoever, compared with 32Vo
against. 3990 believed it was justifiable to send
recruits to defend the frontiers of France and
only l17o if the intervention was elsewhere in
Europe.
52. Nuclear weapons are considered by 65Yo
to be essential for the defence of France but 600/o
are opposed to the resumption of nuclear tests.
10. This option obtained a m4jority of flavourable opinions
in all categories of persons questioned.
Tesl-r V
Approwl of the use of the armed forces
To obtain the release of French hos-
tages 90olo
To preserve French lives abroad 84%
To intervene in the framework of the
United Nations to obtain respect for
international law 840/o
To destroy a terrorist hideout 830/o
To afford assistance to a population in
distress 8 lolo
To restore peace in a region of the
world 72o/o
To avert a case of major economic
aggression 64%
To honour France's agleements with
African countries 6Wo
The plan to restructure the armies is still not
known to the public and 900/o of those ques-
tioned said they did not feel they were con-
cerned. Regarding alliances, 44o/o arc in favour
of the alliance between the countries of Western
Europe and the United States compared with
3090 who advocate a European alliance inde-
pendent of the United States; 6990 of those ques-
tioned considered the creation of the European
corps to be a good thing. In conclusion, it should
be emphasised that 68% of those questioned
considered that military personnel should play a
larger part in the public debate concerning
defence policy.
(it) Italy
53. ln 1992, after a contingent of 12 000 men
was sent to Sicily and Sardiniarr to maintain
public order, the ltalian Defence Minister had
an opinion poll taken on the use of armed forces
for maintaining internal order. A sample of
I 072 persons over 18 years of age throughout
Italy responded to this inquiry. In regard to the
r6le of the armed forces in the nineties, answers
gave a prominent place to the growing impor-
tance in public opinion of using armed forces for
purposes of assistance in the event of internal
problems in the country or in the framework of
United Nations operations, be they humani-
tarian or peace-keeping missions. For many this
result is due to the increasing rOle of the Italian
army in such operations and public opinion thus
gives its endorsement.
11. Operations Forza Paris and Vespri Siciliani in July
1992.
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Assistance in the event of national
catastrophe 92.20/o
Humanitarian aid in Italy and abroad 90.50/o
Participation in United Nations
peace-keeping operations 88.40lo
Maintenance of public order 84.4V0
Antiterrorist struggle 74.8Vo
To prevent secessionist attempts 70olo
To control immigration 64.5%
Military operations under United
Nations control s4.9%
Operations under NATO control in
Europe 54.6%
Operations under NATO control
outside Europe 39.4Vo
Tenlr VI
R6lz of the ltalbn anned lorces in the nineties
54. Regarding the defence of Europe, 330/o of
those questioned were in favour of NATO, fol-
lowed closely by 30/o in favour of a reformed
NATO in which the European countries would
have greater decision-making powers @uropean
pillar). Only 570 of those questioned were in
favour of a purely European defence and 2lVo
were in favour of neutrality. Compulsory national
service obtained l79o of favourable opinions mm-
pared with 32Vo in favour of a regular army and
490/o for a mixed system. The presence of women
in the armed forces was approved by 66Vo of those
questioned (27.5o/o being against).
(iiil Portugal
55. ln 1992 the National Defence Institute(NDI)t2 of Portugal conducted an inquiry into
the state of public opinion and security and
defence questions. The inquiry was restricted to
a sample of I 250 persons (continental Portugal,
the Azores and Madeira) from 18 to 65 years of
age.6o0/o of those questioned said they were very
or fairly interested in national defence in general
compared with 31% who showed little interest in
this question. For those questioned, national
defence meant first the defence of the territory
(30V0) and then the defence of Portuguese
interests (29%). On the other hand, amongst the
most important duties of the citizen, national
defence took only third place (40o/o) after work
(79.40/o) and defence of the environment
(60.7%). The defence of national territory was
designated as the first cause for which one
should fiefi (a2.7%\ followed by defence of
democracy and freedom (35%) and equality
between citizens (39.4%). Assistance to an allied
country victim of aggression was mentioned
only in 14% of the answers (1970 for the Azores
and 22% for the island of Madeira). It is inter-
esting to note that only 24% ofthose questioned
in continental Portugal considered that it was
worth fighting to defend the Atlantic islands.
The main task of the armed forces is the defence
of national territory Q0.9o/o) followed by
assistance to populations in the event of emer-
gency (70.7%). In peacetime, the armed forces
must supervise forests to prevent fires (58.790),
co-operate in the preservation of the envi-
ronment (41.301o) and assist old people (32.4Vo).
On national service, opinions were divided, with
45.8Y0 of favourable answers for compulsory
military service compared with 51.990 for a
wholly voluntary army. 76% favour the presence
of women in the army. Regarding military alli-
ances, NATO is still the first preference with
35.8V0 of the answers, followed by the idea of an
alliance limited to European countries (2l0lo).
However, 83.'7o/o are against the stationing of
nuclear weapons on Portuguese territory, 52.9Vo
against sending Portuguese troops abroad and
5590 against the presence of foreign troops in
Portugal. Participation in United Nations oper-
ations and other peace-keeping missions is
reserved for East Timor (60/0) and former Yugo-
slavia (43.9Vo for and 42.60/o against). On
European defence, the idea of a joint European
armed defence force has the backing of 65.890 of
those questioned in continental Portugal, 73.8%
in the Azores and 82% in Madeira.
56. Three main ideas emerge from these three
studies: armed forces are necessary for national
defence to meet aggression, and also for
domestic purposes (environment, assistance to
the populations, the struggle against banditism) ;
compulsory military service is no longer a
necessity for defence in the nineties; the idea of
a European arrny or, failing this, the creation of
multinational European military units seems to
be an attractive prospect for many of the
persons questioned. This latter aspect is not the
prerogative only of countries resorting to
national service; according to a recent poll of
public opinion in the United Kingdom with
regard to the European Community published in
The Times t3 55% of those questioned endorsed
the idea of integrated European armed forces
compared with only 3701o for the idea of a joint
European foreign policy. Politicians who pay
heed to public opinion cannot not take these
tendencies into account.
57. It is nevertheless necessary to proceed
step by step with restructuring and reforms,
12. An institution depending on the Defence Ministry.
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always ensuring that there is an indispensable
margin of maneuvre in the event of any sigrif-
icant deterioration in the geostrategic situation on
frontiers, in the largest sense of the word, of
Europe. In wishing to create more professional
armed forces, one should not try to give them obli-
gations such as education, professional training
and police operations which are the duty of other
state administrations. In the long term, the armed
forces might be tempted to use much of their
diminishing budgets to take on these tasks to the
detriment of traditional duties such as defending
national sovereigrty, integrity of the territory and
the protection of interests abroad.
58. The parliaments required to vote on the
reform of national service and the armed forces
should take all these aspects into account and
not lose sight of the long-term consequences of
the decisions to be taken regarding the defence
effort of a country. These consequences must be
examined in the national framework and also in
the light of experience in allied countries.
59. The move from the national framework to
the European framework is indeed the way to
create an efficient European armed force to
serve European interests and the responsibilities
stemming from transatlantic commitments. The
harmonisation of legislation on national service
between allied countries would thus be the first
step towards meeting present needs in terms of
European defence and would facilitate the con-
stitution, by allied countries, of multinational
military units composed of regular or volunteer
soldiers and also national servicemen.
60. Moreover, the WEU Assembly had
already drawn the Council's attention to this
question in 1989 in paragraph 6 of Recommen-
dation 469 t4 on the state of European security
when it recommended that the Council urge
member countries to recommend to NATO:
" that through the member countries of
WEU the following steps should be takento give practical expression to the
European pillar of defence:
(a) encovage more multinational units...;
(b) take specific action to allow at an indi-
vidual level the exchange of military
personnel between countries to
enhance their awareness of European
co-operation, give them greater oppor-
tunity for travel and a more inter-
esting work environment, and serve as
a useful recruiting incentive at a time
when the demographic levels are
making recruiting most difficult. "
61. Today, more than ever, the question is
still topical, be it merely because of the diffi-
culties some member countries of WEU are
14. Document 1183,
Mr. Speed.
having in terms of personnel fulfilling their mul-
tilateral commitments to WEU, NATO and the
United Nationsr5.
62. In their national parliaments, the parlia-
mentary members of the Assembly of WEU are
able to establish the link between the national
and European frameworks for the discussion of
defence questions. At the same time they can
help to enlighten public opinion on the Euro-
pean aspect of defence and make the public
understand the importance of having a
European defence system. Whether the defence
of Europe is ensured by regular soldiers, con-
scripts or by a mixture of the two, it is essential
for all citizens to feel they are concerned with
the defence of their country and European
interests. At present, it is national service that in
most member countries of WEU makes the link
between defence and the citizen. The domi-
nating tendency is towards reform and other
means of defence but this process must take full
account of future requirements for an auton-
omous European defence.
63. Thoughts must therefore be turned
towards creating a European service for both
military and civil purposes which would be the
basis for the formation of true European armed
forces. There the defence of Europe would find
its link with the citizens it has the task of pro-
tecting, provided it is possible to avoid the
stumbling-blocks of inequality and lack of adap-
tation to today's realities in defence questions
which are darkening the image of national
service in many countries.
64. Defence is a concept in permanent evo-
lution which must adapt itself to society in order
to improve its protection. To become reality,
European defence must take account of this
need to become more than a simple institutional
framework and to respond to the expectations of
those who are committed to building the Europe
of defence. A condition for the success of this
process is to make Europeans aware of the
problems of defending their values and theirjoint space. Here, WEU and its Assembly have a
broad area of action to foster a concerted
approach by states and to inform the public of
what is at stake in defending Europe.
65. Europe is an evolving reality and its
defence must become a point of reference on the
same footing as the defence of national territory
and interests, provided the governments and
national parliaments shoulder their European
responsibilities. The defence of Europe must not
be just the sum of national defence capabilities:it must be planned and built up as a clearly
defined whole in which national interests find
protection and security.
15. The debates about sending a NATO ground force to
former Yugoslavia to monitor the application of the Geneva
peace agreements clearly illustrate the limits confronting
European countries members of the alliance.
l0l
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Draft Recommendation
on WEU's rclatiotu with Ccntrul and Eostern European countries
The Assembly,
(t) Reiterating its constant commitment to the establishment of a new order of security and stability
throrrghout Europe as attested by the many reports it has prepared on this problem sincqthe fall of thi:
Berlin wall;
(ii) Recalling in particular its Recommendations 5ll, 516, 526 and 528;(iii) Welcoming the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation in which nine countries of Central
Europe are participating;
(iv/ 
. 
Noting, nevertheless, that the great majority of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe still
consider that they have no firm security guarantees;(v) Aware-of the risk of division of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into two groups of
states, one of which would have the benefit of membership of western institutionJ, the other r6maining
outside;
(vti 
- 
Deplolg the 
-inadequacy of information provided by the Council on specific co-operationimplemented in the framework of the forum and on the political aims it is pursuing in that body;(:iil. But welcoming the operational co-operation between WEU and Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria
for implementing the blockade on the Danube;
(viii) 
. 
Feaing, nevertheless, that fighting on the territory of former Yugoslavia might spread to neigh-
bouring areas;
(i9 Dismayed at the refusal of the Greek Government to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia;
(x) 
_Disturbed also by-the unstable situation in several regions of the CIS and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the foreign policy of Russia;
(xi)- 
. 
Concerned by the am.biguity of Ukraine's policy, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons
and its hesitation about ratifying the START I Treaty and the nuilear lonlproliferation treaty;
(xji) 
.ln-vitin-g all the Central European countries in the Forum of Consultation to settle their problems
of n_eighbourliness by pegceful means using the good oflices of the appropriate European, Atlintic and
worldwide institutions for crisis-management and peace-keeping;
(xiii)-Emphasising,the. importance of the forthcoming NATO summit meeting insofar as it must
redefine the transatlantic partnersh_ip between allies and also establish a partnership of a new type with
the countries taking part in NACC;
(xlv/_ 
_ 
Stressing the importance of parallelism between the approach of the European Union and of
WEU to the development of their relations with the Central and Eastern European countries after the
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty,
RrcorrrueNos rHAT rnr CouNclr-
l. Define without d,elay the nature of its future relations with Austria (taking into account its rela-
tions with the Visegrad countries) and with Finland and Sweden (in vieri of tleir rOle in the Baltic
region), these countries being candidates for membership of the European Union, offering them means
of co-operation corresponding to the specific situation-of each one;
2. Study forthwith whether and to what extent circumstances allow Slovenia to be associated with
the work of the Forum of Consultation;
3. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions it reaches on the two questions mentioned above;
4. Remind the member countries of WEU of the joint decision taken by the Twelve on 2nd May
1992 to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
5. Urge Greece to recognise the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia without further delay;
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6. Intensify the work of the Forum of Consultation by giving it a specific programme of work
including, inter alia, the joint elaboration of risk and threat assessment;
7. Offer the Central European countries which are partners in the Forum of Consultation the possi-
bility of taking part in the work of the Western European Armaments Group and all forms of European
armaments co-operation;
8. Determine:
- 
the areas in which these countries can be associated with the activities of the WEU satellite
centre;
- 
the conditions in which they can take part in meetings of WEU chiefs of staffand the work of
the planning cell;
9. Examine what security guarantees it can give Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in face of the risks
these countries are running because of the blockade on the Danube and study the possibility of granting
them appropriate financial compensation;
10. Intensify its political dialogue with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Albania.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. lViatgens, Rapporteur)
I. Intmduaion
l. The subject entrusted to your Rapporteur
is particularly difficult to handle for several
reasons:
- 
first the situation in Russia is still
unstable even after the removal of the
principal leaders of the conservative
opposition to President Yeltsin in the
wake of the failed coup in Moscow on
3rd and 4th October 1993. Likewise, it
is difficult to identify a coherent and
rational foreign and security policy
within Russia; the most recent indica-
tions emanating from the leadership are
extremely varied and at times contra-
dictory;
- 
second, there is a growing impression
that the period of grace that followed
the end of the cold war and of the com-
munist system is giving way to a feeling
of growing perplexity regarding the
path to be followed to give EuroPe a
security architecture satisfactory to all
concerned;
- 
third, the victory in the elections on
19th September last by the successors
of the former communist parties in
Poland, one of the Visegrad group of
countries considered to be the closest to
Western European institutions, arouses
uncertainty regarding the future policy
ofthat country and the consequences of
this ballot for other countries in the
region, Hungary for instance, where
elections are to be held at the beginning
of 1994.
2. To complicate even further your
Rapporteur's task, the Assembly has not yet
received the thirty-ninth annual report from the
Council of WEU and the Secretary-General has
stopped sending his letter of information. The
Assembly is therefore not aware of the Council's
activities in the evolution of its relations with
the cbuntries of Central and Eastern Europe
since the publication of its Bonn declaration of
June 1992t which reported on its meeting with
the states of Central Europe and the Rome
communiqu6 on the meeting with the WEU
Forum of Consultation held at ministerial level
on 20th May 1993 2.
l. Document 1322,29th June 1992.
2. See Document A./WEU/DG (93) 14, 24thMay 1993.
3. The present report is nevertheless espe-
cially important, because it will indicate the
direction in which the Assembly must move and
consolidate its position following the series of
reports that the committee has produced since
l99l on relations with Central and Eastern
Europe and the enlargement of WEU 3, and also,
because it should be considered in the context of
the preparation of the next NATO summit
meeting, dealt with in the report presented by
Mr. Baumel, and of the relations the European
Union will develop with the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
II. The activitiu of the WEU Forum
of Consultation
4. It should first be recalled that in June
1992 the Council of Western European Union
decided to select the following eight countries to
start an institutionalised dialogue with Central
Europe: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Romania. With the division of Czechoslovakia
into two states, the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia, there are now nine countries with which
WEU is conducting regular consultations in the
WEU Forum of Consultation.
5. With the backing of the Assembly, the
Council therefore decided not to follow the
example of the North Atlantic Co-operation
Council which extended its dialogue to all the
countries of the former Warsaw Pact plus the
members of the Community of Independent
States. By limiting the number of Central
European participating states, WEU thus
decided to follow the course set by Maastricht
and establish relations with countries that might
be expected sooner or later tojoin the European
Union a.
6. To implement this policy the ministers of
WEU member states and those of the countries
of Central Europe that make up the Forum of
Consultation took the following decisions inter
alia 5:
" The focus of consultations will be the
security architecture and stability in
Europe, the future development of the
CSCE, arms control and disarmament, in
3. See especially Documents 1263,27th March 199I, 1309,
l3th May 1992, 1340,6th November 1992 and 1370,24th
May 1993.
4. Document 1342, 6th November 1992, paragraph 76.
5. See Document 1322,29th June 1992.
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particular the implementation of the CFE
and Open Skies Treaties, as well as the
1992 Vienna Document. Developments
in Europe and neighbouring regions will
be of particular interest to the partici-
pants. "
- 
Foreign and defence ministers will meet
once a year. Additional meetings at
ministerial level may be convened if
circumstances require.
- 
A Forum of Consultation will be estab-
lished between the WEU Permanent
Council and the ambassadors of the
countries concerned. It will meet at the
seat of the WEU Council at least twice
a year.
- 
These meetings will provide an oppor-
tunity to monitor the implementation of
the measures adopted and, where apprG
priate, to make proposals for the
inclusion of other fields of co-operation.
- 
Consultations at ministerial and WEU
Permanent CounciVambassador level
on security issues may be comple-
mented by meetings with an ad hoc
WEU troika at senior official level.
- 
The following initiatives will be con-
tinued and encouraged:
- 
Regular exchanges of documents and
information;
- 
Growing co-operation between the
WEU Institute for Security Studies
and the corresponding bodies in the
countries concerned. An increasing
number of seminars and colloquia
will be organised. The programme of
scholarships will be continued. "
Ministers also advocated the development of
relations between the WEU Assembly and the
parliaments of the states concerned 6.
7. In the absence of information from the
Council on the specific work undertaken by the
Forum of Consultation, the committee is merely
aware, through a publication on " WEIJ's
security r6le in post-cold war Europe ", circu-
lated by the Secretary-General in September
1993 (no specific date), that " WEU member
states consider that the twice-yearly meetings...
have a dual objective: to explain WEU's r6le,
objects and activities in the evolving framework
of European security architecture on the one
hand and, on the other, to understand more fully
the security concerns ofCentral European coun-
tries ".
6. See in this connection the report presented by Mr. Ward
on the enlargement of WEU, Document 1340, 6th
November 1992.
8. According to the Rome communiqu6 of
20th May 1993, the ministers in the WEU
Forum of Consultation subsequently agreed:
* on the setting up of a Counsellors Group
in Brussels, composed of senior represen-
tatives in the delegations of the WEU
member countries and embassy coun-
sellors of the consultation partners. This
group would meet at least three or four
times a year, would hold more detailed
exchanges of view and would prepare the
meetings of the Forum of Consul-
tation ".
9. The communiqu6 in question also con-
tained the following statement:
* The ministers warmly welcome WEU's
initiative on the Danube to assist and
co-operate with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania in the strict implementation of
the sanctions provided for in UN Security
Council Resolutions 820,787, 757, and
713. They welcomed the signature of
three memoranda of understanding in
Rome to this effect.
Ministers stressed that the Danube
mission, which was of a civilian character,
represented a concrete example of
co-operation between WEU and certain of
its consultation partners.'
10. In point of fact the WEU Council of Min-
isters had already taken a decision in
Luxembourg 7 on 5th April 1993 to propose that
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania be offered spe-
cific non-military assistance in order to
strengthen their means of enforcing compliance
with the embargo against Serbia on the Danube.
Thus police and customs oflicers of the WEU
member countries would co-operate with their
counterparts from the three countries bordering
the Danube in monitoring river traflic 
- 
with
the aid also of some ten or so high-speed patrol
boats 
- 
in intercepting, as necessary, vessels sus-
pected of trying to break the embargo.
ll. The three countries concerned having
accepted this offer, the operation has been
organised since June 1993 on the basis of memo
randa of understanding signed in Rome between
WEU and Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. In
the opinion of the German Government, this
action constitutes a precedent in two respects:
- 
it shows that operational co-operation
exists between WEU and certain coun-
tries within the Forum of Consul-
tation,
- 
and that the operational rOle of WEU is
not limited to military action.
7. See declaration on the implementation of sanctions
imposed on former Yugoslavia by the United Nations, Doc-
ument A/WEU/DG (93) 9, 5th April 1993.
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12. Without knowing the content of the
annual report of the WEU Council on this
subject, it seems necessary to emphasise how
much the WEU Assembly appreciates the com-
mitment these countries have made in their
decision to assist WEU and the international
community in implementing the sanctions
imposed on Serbia by the United Nations. The
Assembly is well aware that the implementation
of the embargo is very costly to these three coun-
tries, not just in purely economic terms but also
politically, because some of them, Romania for
example, have traditionally had friendly rela-
tions with Serbia, and because others, like
Hungary, fear Serbian reprisals and have no
guarantee of security from western nations.
Apparently Hungary is already suffering Serbian
reprisals and during the committee's visit to
Hungary an official of the United Nations
department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
asked whether it might be possible to organise
WEU patrols in the Serbian controlled waters of
the Danube. It appears that Bulgaria may be
worst hit by the economic fallout of the
embargo.
13. Regarding the future development of
WEU relations with the member states of the
Forum of Consultation as a whole, the Rome
communiqu6 provides insuffrcient information
to enable one to form an idea of the essential
security concerns of the Central and Eastern
European countries belonging to the WEU
Forum of Consultation.
14. The communiqu6 merely states that the
ministers * reaffrrmed the importance of intensi-
fying these relations as a valuable contribution
to the emergence of a more stable and peaceful
order in Europe based on partnership and
co-operation ".
15. Regarding the withdrawal of Russian
troops from the territory ofthe Baltic states, the
communiqu6 refers to the declaration adopted
at the 1992 Helsinki summit meeting and the
CSCE Council meeting in Stockholm. The min-
isters also declared that:
" The development of WEU's relations
with its consultation partners would con-
tinue to reflect increasingly close relations
between the countries of Central Europe
and the future European Union and its
member states with the aim of extending
the area of stability and security in
Europe. "
16. What is the particular significance of the
interest shown in this communiqu6 for an
exchange of views on peace-keeping? If WEU
wishes to avoid duplicating what has already
been achieved in the framework of NACC, it
should provide more detailed information on
the aims of such an undertaking. This is of
interest to the forum countries and the Assembly
too.
17. However, regarding the fundamental
question of how WEU can respond to the aspira-
tions of the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe to live within a security architecture that
meets the satisfaction of all concerned, the
Council has not yet indicated the guidelines it
intends to follow. During the meeting with the
Permanent Council, held in Brussels on 5th
October 1993, the Secretary-General confined
himself to defining the tasks that await us. The
true security concerns of the countries in
question are yet to be determined; also whether
we have to give them security guarantees. The
impression is often that these concerns relate to
a regional context and consequently it may be
diffrcult to find answers.
III. The signifrcance of creating various groaps
and ossociations of certain Central
and Easurn European countries
after the collapse of the lVarsaw Pact
and of the Soviet Union
18. The Petersberg declaration is precise in its
definition of the group of states with which
WEU has entered into a Forum of consultation
as the 'States of Central Europe " (and not
Eastern Europe). Similarly the Rome com-
muniqu6 of 2fth May 1993 refers to " Central
European consultation partners ". If this title
seems entirely justified given the states partici-
pating in the Forum of Consultation, the present
report would not be complete if it did not also
consider the evolution of the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
which lie to the east of Central Europe, namely
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, together with that
of the Balkan states not directly involved in the
conflict in former Yugoslavia. Developments
taking place in all these regions will be of vital
importance for the future security architecture
of the entire continent of Europe. The present
report rightly, therefore, takes as its subject-
matter WEU's relations with the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe.
(i) The Yisegrd gmup
19. In Visegrad, near Budapest, on l5th Feb-
ruary 1991, the Presidents of Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and Poland met to exchange views on
the risks of destabilisation in Eastern Europe, to
co-ordinate their approaches to association with
the European Community and to organise
regular meetings between their countries in
order to co-operate more closely in political,
economic and cultural matters.
20. The Visegrad group had long been con-
sidered to have made the most progress in
reforms and democratisation and it therefore
seemed possible to envisage a privileged status
of association with European integration and the
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Atlantic and Western European security
systems. After Czechoslovakia split into two
independent states, the European Commission,
on 24th June 1993, initialled new agreements of
association with the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic taking up, in the main, the con-
tents of the agreement already concluded
between the European Community and Czecho-
slovakia.
21. For some time, there has been discussion
in the Atlantic Alliance about opening NATO to
the Visegrad countries and preparing decisions
in this respect for the NATO summit meeting to
be held on lfth January 1994. The pace of this
discussion increased after the visits by the
Russian President to Poland, the Czech
Republic and Slovakia at the end of August
1993 during which he made no objections to the
wish of these countries to draw closer to NATO.
The discussion however took a new turn when at
the end of September the Russian President
reversed his position in messages addressed to
the signatories of the treaty on the final set-
tlement of the German situation (2 + 4 Treaty).
On this occasion the Russian President declared
himself opposed to any eastward enlargement of
NATO, instead proposing that NATO and
Russia should together guarantee the security of
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Under these circumstances and in view of the
fact that the situation within Russia remains
unstable in the wake of the attempted coup of
3rd and 4th October, it is hardly probable that
the NATO summit meeting will reach firm deci-
sions on its possible enlargement.
22. It should be noted that the now four
Visegrad countries decided, at a meeting in
Krakow at the beginning of September, to
co-operate further in armaments questions and
to give priority to the compatibility of their
equipment with NATO systems. The deputy
defence ministers and chiefs-of-staff of the four
countries reached agxeement on the exchange of
military equipment and spare parts and the
assistance they could afford each other at the
level of maintenance. A final document and
several bilateral agreements were signed at the
close of the meeting. According to information
gleaned from this document, the replacement of
certain equipment now used by the Polish forces
will promote compatibility with NATO equip
ment and particularly with its command
systems. A further meeting of this type is to be
held in Hungary in September 19948.
23. It cannot be considered, however, that the
division of Czechoslovakia will not be without
repercussions on the foreign policy of the two
newly-created countries and the position of the
Visegrad group as a whole. It can be seen that
the foreign policy of the Czech Republic is
intended to bring that country into close associ-
ation with the West as swiftly as possible, pri-
ority being given to a close partnership with the
countries of Western Europe, the United States
and Germany. On the other hand, it seems that
ceoperation with its neighbours such as Poland,
Hungary, Austria and Slovakia is based rather
on bilateral relations, whereas the importance of
co-operation in the framework of the Visegrad
group and of the Central European initiative
would take second place.
24. Certain negative declarations about the
usefulness of co-operation between the Visegrad
countries made by Prime Minister Klaus and his
sceptical remarks about the Maastricht process
have caused some irritation. However, it was at
the beginning of September during the meeting
of the Union of European Democrats in
Budapest that the Czech Prime Minister made
the most surprising statement, aflirming that his
country would not be interested in joining the
Atlantic Alliance since it was not threatened and
one had to calculate the high cost of incorpo-
rating his country's armed forces in the western
security structures e.
25. During his recent visit to Prague, your
rapporteur was reassured by the representatives
of the Czech Government that the remarks by
the Prime Minister were misunderstood and
that the Czech Republic's wish to adhere to all
the political, economic and defence institutions
of the West is so clear that further repetition is
unnecessary. Moreover, they confirmed that
Visegrad co-operation no longer seemed to be
primordial at political level for co-ordinating the
rapprochement of the four countries with
Western Europe. It almost seems that the Czech
Republic, having thrown off certain problems
which are now the sole responsibility of Slo-
vakia, and aware that its economic situation is
not of such great concern as that of some of its
Visegrad partners, feels that it can stand on its
own feet and possibly thus join up with the
structures of Western Europe.
26. The separation of Czechs and Slovaks was
no doubt a painful operation which made it nec-
essary for the two newly-created countries to
allow themselves time to redefine their positions
and their policies. It is undoubtedly for Western
Europe to make sure that neither of the two
countries feels that it is being isolated, and par-
ticularly Slovakia.
27. This small country of some 5 million
inhabitants, with significant Hungarian, Czech,
Ukrainian and Ruthenian minorities, not
counting a large number of gypsies, is sur-
rounded by far more powerful neighbours such
as Poland, Ukraine, Hungary and Austria. Its
problems are not easy to solve. Weighed down
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by its past as a faithful ally of Germany during
the second world war, this country's task is not
limited to establishing an equitable policy with
regard to its minorities: it also has differences
with Hungary over the consequences of building
the Gabcikovo dam. Furthermore, the domestic
situation is delicate because the Prime Minister
has to rely on the backing of a minority gov-
ernment.
28. The country's economic problems are
worsened by its dependence on steel exports and
its large armaments industry which in the past
was one of the pillars of Czechoslovakia's mil-
itary power in the framework of the Warsaw
Pact. The armaments export market has col-
lapsed and the European Community has
reduced its quotas for the importation of steel
and Slovak agricultural products.
29. It is all the more important to take note of
the decisive progress this country has made in
making its structures democratic because of its
very firm determination to settle questions of
minorities, in particular the problem of the
Hungarian minority, to the satisfaction of all
concerned; one may therefore hope that these
problems will be progressively depoliticised,
including the disputes with Hungary over the
Gabcikovo dam.
30. It should also be noted that all the
political parties are unanimously in agreement
with the government about joining the process
of integration with the political, economic and
military structures of the West. The Slovak Gov-
ernment is therefore very reserved towards the
Ukrainian proposal to create a special security
zone between the Baltic countries and the Black
Sea that it considers as a kind of safety belt
which does not improve the security of Slo-
vakia.
31. Yet the image of Slovakia is not without
blemish in certain western political circles nor in
some of its neighbouring countries. It is inter-
esting to note that some politicians and editori-
alists do not even mention Slovakia when they
speak of possibly accelerating the accession of
the Visegrad group to NATO 
'0. It is certain that
the Slovak Republic has an interest in estab-
lishing firm relations with its powerful neigh-
bours to the East, particularly with Ukraine and
Russia, but your Rapporteur believes it would
be dangerous to give the Slovaks the impression
that they would no longer be welcome in the
West after their separation from the Czech
Republic.
32. It is still too soon to say what foreign
policy the new Polish Government will pursue
10. International Herald Tribune, 8th September 1993,
" NATO opens up routes to the East European Democ-
racies'. Mi. Klaus Kinkel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Germany, in a radio interview on 5th September 1993.
after the 19th September 1993 elections,
although the three victorious parties have given
to understand that a Polish government, even
one dominated by the left, would wish to
become a member of the Atlantic Alliance at the
earliest opportunity. So far, Poland has been one
of the most active countries in drawing closer to
the Atlantic Alliance and WEU, but at the same
time it is trying to improve its security by con-
cluding bilateral military co-operation agree-
ments with its eastern neighbours (except
Belarus). Its signing of these agreements was
above all a question of strengthening confidence
between partners. In this context the fact should
not be overlooked that a substantial Polish
minority lives in Lithuania (forming approxi-
mately 70lo of the population). Poland's future
position within a European security structure
will depend largely on the evolution of its rela-
tions with Ukraine, whose rOle is not entirely
unambiguous as will be seen in a subsequent
chapter of this report.
33. Since May 1992, relations between
Poland and Ukraine have developed consid-
erably with reciprocal visits by the Heads of
Government of the two countries and the
signing of many bilateral agreements. Russia
cannot remain aloof from this insofar as it might
consider the development of such relations with
Poland as an attempt to increase Russia's iso-
lation.
34. In this respect, a more detailed study will
have to be made of Ukraine's policy which offi-
cially is one of neutrality and non-membership
of alliances, be they eastern or western.
However, this did not prevent Ukraine from
making a proposal to establish a security area
including the Baltic countries, Belarus, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Romania and Austriatt.
35. The idea of including the member coun-
tries of the Visegrad group in the Atlantic
Alliance will most certainly arouse some
concern in Kiev, where it is feared that Ukraine
will be isolated between Russia and a western
alliance which is not concerned with this matter:
one more reason for the West to define more
clearly the future architecture of European
security. Indeed, the danger of the Central and
Eastern European countries being divided into
two groups, one of which would have the benefit
of acceding to western institutions and the other
remaining outside, is a matter of growing
concern in certain capitals of Eastern Europe.
36. Turning to Hungary, the Political Com-
mittee's visit on 20th and 2lst October 1993
was a particularly fruitful experience, yielding a
wealth of information and likely to lead to
numerous exchanges of views. However this
11. Jan J. Brezinski, Survival, Volume 35, No. 3, autumn
1993, page 31.
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visit also revealed the seriousness of the difli-
culties experienced by neighbouring countries
that Hungary currently has to deal with and
which are unlikely to make any easier the task of
restoring stability in the unsettled region at the
centre of which Hungary lies.
37. However, before a more thorough investi-
gation of the problems, it should be recalled thatit was Hungary that broke through the iron
curtain in 1989 and instigated the dissolution of
the Warsaw Pact. Hungary was the first country
to see Soviet troops withdraw from its territory.
Moreover, while it was still a member of the
Warsaw Pact, Hungary had already sought a rap
prochement with wEU, the European com-
munity and NATO, and its Minister for Foreign
Affairs addressed the WEU Assembly in 1990.
38. The integration of Hungary in the
European Community and its membership of
European and Atlantic security structures
appeared to pose fewer difliculties than was the
case for certain other countries of Central
Europe. Hungary's cooperation in the Visegrad
framework was given new impetus with the con-
clusion of a Central European free trade
agreement in December 1992. Hungary,
however, also seems to feel that the Visegrad
group still has some political importance which
might help it to draw closer to Eastern
Europe.
39. However, during the various talks we had
with our Hungarian colleagues it became very
clear that the presence of 3.2 million Hungarians
within neighbouring countries (2 million of
them in Romania and some 600 000 in Slo-
vakia) is a political consideration which raises
difficulties for Hungary's bilateral relations
with its neighbours, especially Slovakia and
Romania.
40. Despite parliamentary representatives'
repeated allusions to " Hungary's traditional
borders " the Hungarian authorities and first
and foremost the Minister for Foreign Affairs
clearly demonstrated their determination not to
wish to alter existing borders but to seek, in
co-operation with neighbouring countries, to
ensure that the collective and individual rights
of the Hungarian minorities should prevail and
be safeguarded. The Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Alfairs in particular said that the fact
that the Hungarian Government accepted
responsibility for all ethnic Hungarians did not
mean that Hungary was seeking to re-establish
its traditional borders, nor that it intended to
exercise a form of political control over Hun-
garian minorities living in other countries.
4L. The Hungarian Parliament has, more-
over, adopted exemplary legislation guaran-
teeing very wide rights and freedoms for foreign
minorities living in Hungary in the hope of
obtaining a similar status for its own minorities
abroad. However, as the discussions during the
Council of Europe summit meeting in Vienna
on 8th and 9th October last demonstrated, the
problem of defining the rights of national
minorities remains a controversial issue
throughout Europe; Germany, supported by
Austria and Hungary, wishes to go a long way in
this direction, imposing very high standards
based on collective rights, while France, the
United Kingdom, Spain and Italy all share the
apprehension that this issue might pave the way
for demands for regional autonomy and prefer
to think in terms of individual rights 
'2.42. All things considered, it can be said that
the will exists in Hungary, and in its neigh-
bouring countries (with the exception of Serbia),
to reach a satisfactory settlement of problems
between neighbouring countries and in par-
ticular minorities so as to avoid these disputes
interfering with regional security. Recent talks
between the Hungarian and Romanian Foreign
Ministers are an encouraging sign in this
direction; however, a rapid decision on the
inclusion in the bilateral treaty currently in
preparation of a form of words attesting to the
fact that Romania and Hungary did not intend
to pursue any claim to each other's territory,
would constitute a truly decisive step.
43. While differences between Hungary and
Slovakia over minorities and over the
Gabcikovo dam appear to be becoming less
politicised, tension persists in Hungarian-Serb
relations, Hungary being concerned over the fate
of the large Hungarian minority in Vojvodina.
Despite Serb reprisals against Hungarian patrol
boats on the Danube and the economic loss
Hungary has suffered, that country is partici-
pating fully in the embargo measures in
co.operation with WEU; it has also opened its
air space to NATO AWACS aircraft.
44. Although the proximity of the conflict in
former Yugoslavia and the risk of involvement
is a source of extreme concern to Hungary, its
wish to be integrated at the earliest opportunity
into western security structures 
- 
a point made
forcefully by Hungarian repnesentatives to the
members of the Political Committee 
- 
dates
back much further in time and derives from a
profound feeling that the country is part of the
West. In this connection it was very moving to
hear the Hungarian Foreign Minister's impas-
sioned warning to western politicians that they
must in no circumstances yield to pressure to
adopt a new policy of appeasement towards
Russia. Certain Hungarian representatives even
went so far as to state that in point of fact Russia
had already accepted the idea of the Central
European countries joining the Atlantic
Alliance.
45. After all, it must be noted that circum-
stances are not the same for the various coun-
ll0
12. k Monde and Le Figaro, 8th October 1993.
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tries of the Yisegrad group and for some time
their interests have appeared to diverge. It is dif-
ficult therefore for the security and defence
authorities of Western Europe, and particularly
of WEU, to determine whether they ought to con-
tinue to count on this group as a stabilising factor
with which continued co-operation is worthwhile
in order to facilitate a joint rapprochement of its
members with the structures of western security
or whether they should give preference to a
piecemeal approach whereby, for instance, the
Czech Republic might be considered as the only
country fulfilling all the required conditions. It is
perhaps still too soon to make a final assessment,
but your Rapporteur believes Western Europe
should avoid anything that might fan the flames
of rivalry between these four countries, but
should on the contrary encourage anyone who
may wish to continue to use this group as a useful
instrument for cooperation and rapprochement
with the West.
(ii) The Centrul Eumpean initiative
46. Created in 1989 by Italy as pentagonal
co-operation for developing co-operation bet-
ween the countries of South-Eastern Europe
with a view to strengthening joint structures in
transport, telecommunications, the envi-
ronment, culture and science, this group has
been enlarged in the meantime to include nine
member countries, i.e. Italy, Austria, Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia. At the last
annual summit meeting of the group in
Budapest, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia was accepted as the tenth member.
47. Although the purpose of this forum is not
to deal with questions that are of primary
interest to WEU, it contributes to regional sta-
bility insofar as it aims to encourage a better
climate of European relations and to carry
forward the Helsinki process. This forum also
provides an opportunity for working gxoups to
discuss bilateral problems and harmonise
various points of view on questions of mutual
interest with particular regard to the conse-
quences of the fighting in former Yugoslavia for
refugees and minorities. This group is important
because of its composition, which includes ltaly
as a member of the EC, NATO and WEU,
neutral countries and former members of the
Warsaw Pact and countries of former Yugo-
slavia. The interest expressed by several other
countries, such as Belarus, Ukraine and
Romania in the activities of the Central
European initiative has so far involved the par-
ticipation of their experts in the various working
groups.
(iii) Thc Black Sct economic co-operution area
48. Economic co-operation between Black
Sea countries was started in Istanbul on 25th
June 1992 in order to examine how to
strengthen economic co.operation between par-
ticipating countries. This initiative includes
Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia,
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Greece
and Albania. This co-operation can also help to
stabilise a difficult region in which partners
defending very different interests co-habit.
Bilateral contacts in the context ofthe first con-
ference, for instance, led to Russia agreeing for
the first time to envisage withdrawing, in the
long term, the l4th army stationed in Moldova.
Bulgaria is to organise a meeting of I I ministers
for foreign affairs of this group in Sofia on 9th
December 1993.
(iv) The Huagarian Carpatas Tisu plan
49. Considering that the growing porousness
of frontiers in Europe might lead to stronger sol-
idarity between frontier regions, the President of
the Hungarian Republic in July 1990 launched
an initiative called Carpatas Tisza grouping the
frontier regions of Hungary, Ukraine, Poland
and Slovakia. The plan, drawn up on l4th Feb-
ruary 1993, brought out a certain community of
interests between the regions concerned, partic-
ularly in economic problems, and obtained the
support of their governments. Moreover, it is set
in a Euroregion type of framework and does
not therefore rule out participation by Romanian
regions.
(v) Baltic co-operution
50. The future of the Baltic countries, which
were called upon by the heads of state in a joint
declaration adopted at the European summit
meeting in Copenhagen on 2nd June 1993 to
start negotiations for association with the
European Community before the end of 1993,
should also be of interest to the European
security authorities including WEU, with which
the three countries are co-operating in the
Forum of Consultation. At the Helsinki summit
meeting on lfth July 1992, the CSCE had asked
for the rapid and full withdrawal of all foreign
forces from the territory of the Baltic countries.
However, Lithuania was the only one of the
three Baltic countries from which all Russian
soldiers were withdrawn on 3lst August 1993.
51. Lithuania, governed by former commu-
nists, has a Polish minority (lVo of the popu-
lation). Troops of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) being withdrawn from the
former German Democratic Republic are cur-
rently crossing Lithuanian territory - a process
scheduled for completion by 31st August 1994.
Lithuania is uneasy, however, about a major
Russian military presence in the Russian
enclave in the Kaliningrad region (the northern
part of former East Prussia) and has already
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demanded the demilitarisation of this region
several times. Moreover the emergence of a
small ultranationalist armed faction hiding out
in the forest areas of Lithuania to pursue the
" struggle against the communists " has caused
the government considerable embarrassment.
That apart, there is free movement of persons
and goods between Russia and the Kaliningrad
region within Lithuanian territory, based on an
agreement between Russia and Lithuania
reached on 29th July 1991. The Russian
minority in Lithuania is relatively small (about
8ryo).
52. Elections were held in Latvia on 5th and
6th June 1993; Latvia's Way obtained about a
third ofthe votes and thirty-six seats out ofthe
hundred in the Saeima. This led to the for-
mation of a centre-right coalition headed by Mr.
Anatolijs Gorbunovs, formerly responsible for
ideology in the local communist party. Most
people of Russian origin, i.e. 350/o of the popu-
lation did not have the right to vote and this
aroused strong protests in Russia. True-born
Latvians represent only just over halfofthe pop-
ulation. However, in spite of this, the ultrana-
tionalists of the National Independence
Movement of Latvia (LNNK) and the Father-
land and Freedom Party obtained respectively
only 13.590 and 5.5Y0 of the vote13.
53. Unlike Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia has
not yet been admitted to the Council of Europe
because it still has not presented satisfactory leg-
islation governing citizenship and the rights of
foreigners. The protracted presence of Russian
troops in the country and particularly Russia's
insistence on maintaining its antimissile early
warning system at Skrunda is a matter of
concern for the country. It remains to be seen
whether the agreement concluded on lst Feb-
ruary 1992 between Latvia and Russia for the
complete withdrawal of Russian troops from
Latvian territory before the end of 1994 will be
carried out. According to Latvian sources, on
23rd April 1993 a contingent of some 23 000
men was still on Latvian territory (about 17 000
according to the Military Balance 1993194 plb-
lished in October 1993).
54. Estonia has a Russian-speaking minority
that accounts for 3890 of a population of some
1.6 million inhabitants. In 1940, before the
country was annexed by the Soviet Union, the
proportion was 8.290. The Russian population is
principally concentrated in the towns of Narva
and Tallin and in a referendum organised at
Narva on autonomy for this region 97.2o/o of the
inhabitants of that town voted in favour.
However the turn-out was only 54010.
55. The Estonian authorities immediately
declared the referendum " illegal " and its rela-
tions with Russia have since been diflicult
because of the latter's displeasure at the new law
defining the rights of foreign citizens, which
makes it difficult to obtain Estonian citizenship,
and also because of the delay in the withdrawal
of Russian troops from Estonian territory.
About 7 000 troops are still there ra. The Russian
authorities imposed the following conditions for
the withdrawal of their forces from the Baltic
countries: (i) $ant legal status to the armed
forces there in the interim so as to ensure their
normal functioning, (ii) accept Russia's strategic
installations for the time being, (iiil drop com-
pensation claims for the damage inflicted upon
their territories by the USSR from 1940 to 1991,(iv) help construct housing in Russia for the
departing troops, (v/ guarantee transit rights for
military caryoes going to Kaliningrad, (v/
provide compensation for the land and property
vacated by the troops, (vii) gwrantee social
security (including pensions) and human rights
for Soviet officers retired in the Baltic states and
their families, (viii) alter laws that infringed
upon the political and economic rights of the
Russian-speaking population, and (ix) drop ter-
ritorial claims on land annexed by Russia from
the Baltic states after world war [I.
56. As matters now stand, the impression is
that the Baltic states have not yet adopted a
coherent position on a firm direction for their
foreign policies. Moreover there is no close
coordination between the three countries,
whose relations with Russia are all still quite
delicate and this should not be discounted when
studying ways and means of bringing the Baltic
states closer to Western European structures. In
any event, it is impossible to talk of Baltic unity
for the three countries.
57. It has been suggested that the Baltic coun-
tries might act as a bridge between Russia.and
Western Europe, a course which Lithuania in
particular seems to be following, but in the
longer term all these countries see themselves as
being finally anchored to the latter region. Their
aspirations are therefore concentrated on co-
operation with the Scandinavian countries, par-
ticularly Sweden, which has succeeded in
obtaining European Community recognition for
incorporating the free-trade treaties it has con-
cluded with the three Baltic countries, in the
framework of Sweden's accession to the
European Community.
58. To sum up, it may be said that none of the
abovementioned regional groupings can offer an
alternative to the determination of the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe to be integrated
into western institutions. They should be con-
sidered rather as a means of directing the efforts
of their members towards the West, which has
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not yet found a strategy for a new European
security architecture at the level ofthe historical
challenge constituted by the collapse of the
Soviet bloc.
(vi) Romania and Moldova
59. In this context, account must be taken of
the fact that some of these countries, particu-
larly Bulgaria and Romania, may be considered
as second zone countries in terms of their
present relations with the West, in spite of their
participation in the embargo on the Danube,
NACC and the WEU Forum of Consultation.
The visits made by the committee at the end of
March/beginning of April 1993 to these two
countries provided an excellent opportunity to
become better acquainted with the problems
and concerns specific to these countries and to
intensify the dialogue with them.
60. Since the admission of Romania as a full
member of the Council of Europe at the
beginning of October 1993 and after the encour-
aging results of the talks between the Romanian
and Hungarian foreign ministers last September
with a view to achieving a satisfactory set-
tlement of the problems that exist between the
two countries 
- 
in particular the issue of
minority rights and recognition of existing
borders 
- 
it is to be hopod that Romania will
gradually feel less at a disadvantage in com-
parison with other countries of Central Europe
in terms of its connection with the structures of
Western Europe. Many problems still remain,
however.
61. In terms of domestic policy, the left to
centre-left coalition in government hardly seems
stable, even though, should it fall, it has no
obvious successor. The 1989-90 revolution now
seems to have been more of a sudden, sharp
change in the majority than a complete break
with the previous r6gime. The removal of the
old leadership has therefore been only very
partial and many members of the old com-
munist party have retained high office and now
seem to be loyally serving a different policy.
According to recent information in the British
Press a growing trend has been observed among
a number of Romanian political parties towards
accusing Hungarian minorities in particular of
" conspiring " with the Hungarian Government.
62. Romanian legislation on minority rights
has recently been supplemented by laws to
improve the condition of minorities. However it
appears that -these elicited the traditionally
extremely nggative reactions among the popu-
lation at large to fellow-citizens belonging to
6thnic minorities. Economic difliculties, partic-
ularly in agriculture, industry, transport and
foreign investments are still giving cause for
concern.
63. In his speech to the WEU Assembly on lst
December 1992, Mr. Melescanu, Romanian
Minister of State, emphasised that relations with
the Republic of Moldova had a special place
in Romanian policy, " practical objectives in
Romania's relations with this country being eco-
nomic integration and the creation of a common
space, and freedom of movement of individuals,
capital and services ".
64. However, in the debate, the minister did
not hide his personal convictions that * the
reunion of Moldova and Romania is a process
which will unfold concurrently with the inte-
gration of Romania and the Republic of
Moldova in the European Community " rs.
65. Indeed, the population of Moldova which
declared its independence on 27th August 1991,
is about 6470 Romanian, the remainder being
Russian, Ukrainian, Gagatz and Bulgarian.
Moldova, initially a member of the CIS, refused
to sign the charter of that organisation in
January 1993. On the other hand, it asked tojoin the Council of Europe and would wish to
establish permanent relations with WEU and
NATO. Furthermore, the parliament has
decided to organise early elections on 27th Feb-
ruary 1994.
66. The possible reunification of Moldova
and Romania, which raises some hope in the
two countries separated as a result of the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, will necessarily affect
Romania's relations with Russia which has its
14th army in the Transdnestr region. This
region raises special problems because its popu-
lation has a large proportion of Russophiles nos-
talgic for the former Soviet r6gime which, with
the backing of the l4th army, constituted the
Moldovan Soviet socialist republic of
Transdnestria virtually separate from Moldova.
The situation in this respect might change,
however, insofar as the leaders of Transdnestria
rallied to the Moscow rebels during the events
on 3rd and 4th October last. Western Europe
and particularly WEU therefore have many
reasons to attach great importance to the evo-
lution of this country and its relations with
Romania.
67. This matter also affects relations between
Romania and Ukraine, which includes part of
Northern Bucovina separated from Romania in
1940 after the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.
Recently, Romanian and Ukrainian media and
authorities have accused each other of discrimi-
natory practices towards their minorities.
68. Even if the Romanian nation as a whole
does not insist on territorial claims, it is con-
cerned about the occupation of Moldova by the
15. Thirty-eighth ordinary session, oflicial report ofdebates,
December I992.
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Russian 14th army and a fortiori the evolution
of Russia and Ukraine, their relations and
claims to re-establish order in the CIS, includingin Moldova. Faced with such uncertainty,
Romania is waiting for guarantees from the
West. Moreover, the Romanian army seems to
be very ill-equipped for any modern military
operation and little is being done to change this
situation.
69. Considering WEU's future relations with
Romania, it should be recalled that this country
is firmly turned towards the West and any
impression of being rejected by the West might
have unforeseeable oonsequences for political
developments in that country.
70. The application of the blockade on Serbia
and Montenegro is very expensive for Romania
because it is cutting off an important source of
trade for the Romanian economy and is also
putting an end to joint Romanian-Yugoslav ven-
tures on Romanian territory resulting in very
large financial and economic losses and consid-
erable unemployment in the frontier regions.
Romania is appealing to the solidarity of
Western European Union to offset these losses
and has the impression that its appeal is falling
on deaf ears.
(vii) Bulgafia
7 l. In spite of its participation in the embargo
on Serbia and Montenegro, Bulgaria is trying to
keep out of the fighting in the Balkans insofar as
possible. It is determined to take no part in any
intervention abroad and not to place its territory
at the disposal of any such operation. Its
bilateral relations with neighbours such as
Romania, Ukraine and Greece raise no special
problems as now also with Turkey and its
minorities living on Bulgarian territory. Bulgaria
sees its relations with neighbouring countries as
a factor of stabilisation in the region.
72. However, the Bulgarian authorities have
frequently affrrmed that they considered they
had always been closer to Western Europe than
to Russia in spite of their historical and cultural
links with that country. Bulgaria is interested injoining NATO (and the European institutions),
but when its Minister of Defence met his
German colleague in Bonn at the end of Sep-
tember, the Bulgarian minister said that his
country would make no such request before
having completed its evolution towards a stable
democracy.
73. Indeed, it seems that a growing
polarisation is developing in the domestic
political life of the country and many are
speaking of early elections for the beginning of
next year. In that event, however, it is not impos-
sible that socialists emerging from the former
communist party might win these elections.
74. Bulgaria recognised the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia on l4th January 1992
and was thus one of the first countries to do so; it
has a pragmatic approach to that country which
it criticises for pursuing something of an anti-
Bulgiarian policy. However, to avoid the Bosnian
conflict extending to the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, it is strongly insisting on
Serbia and particularly Greece recognising that
country. It has therefore agreed to a detachment
of 300 American soldiers being stationed on the
territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia in the framework of United Nations
preventive action.
(viii) Sloteaia
75. Slovenia, which at ttre present juncture no
longer feels directly concerned by the conflict in
former Yugoslavia, has recently intensified its
efforts and initiatives to draw closer to the insti-
tutions of Western Europe. Thus, it has started
negotiations with the European Community for
an association that should result in full accession
not earlier than in five years' time. Slovenia is
also negotiating with the Visegrad group of
countries for the conclusion of a trade
agxeement.
76. After President Kucan announced at the
end of September his country's intention to join
WEU and NATO, on 26th October 1993, the
Slovenian parliament adoped a resolution
according to which it would ask for the status of
permanent observer in WEU and that of asso-
ciated national delegation in the North Atlantic
Assembly. Certain politicians in Slovenia con-
sider a resumption of hostilities between Serbs
and Croats to be inevitable and consequently
wonder, in that event, where the West will fix
the peace line within which it will afford its pro-
tection.
(i*) Altunio, thc formet Yupsbv Rcpublic
of Muedonia cnd Gre*e
77. The relations of Albania, which is also
trying to draw closer to NATO and the
European Community, with its neighbours are
fairly complicated. This is particularly so for its
relations with Greece after the recent expulsion
of a priest who was believed to be a leader of dis-
turbances among the Greek minority in Albania.
Albania is also concerned about the situation in
Kosovo where there are about 100 000 Serb sol-
diers and also about its relations with the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. A large
Albanian minority is present in both countries.
The Albanian point of view is that the President
of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
has not yet managed to overcome the prejudices
of Macedonians against Albania and Alba-
nlans.
tt4
DOCUMENT 1387
78. Even more alarming were the comments
that the new Greek Prime Minister, Mr.
Andreas Papandreou, who, in presenting his
government's programme to parliament on 23rd
October 1993, declared that his defence policy
would be based on the concept of a united Hel-
lenic space including Cyprus, the Aegian, Greek
Macedonia and Epirus (the Greek province on
the Albanian frontier). Turkey would always be
the enemy number one and Greece would never
recognise a state bearing the name of Macedonia
or one of its derivatives 15. He also said that mil-
itary expenditure of 7% of the GDP compared
with 370 and less in the other countries of the
European Community would be reduced once
the balance of forces was ensured in the
region.
79. Such a speech from the leader ofa country
that has signed a protocol of accession to the
modifred Brussels Treaty cannot be without
repercussions on the procedure for ratifying that
protocol in the member countries of WEU. The
fact that the French Minister for Foreign Alfairs
recently assured the President of the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that France
would have to reconsider the question of
recognising that republic is quite significant in
this respect.
(x) Developtuats ia the CIS
80. Without prejudging the outcome of the
power struggle in Russia, it is clear that no
European or Atlantic concept for a European
security architecture can be validly worked out
without defining the place of Russia and, a for-
tiori, the CIS in this architecture. Several factors
should be taken into consideration. It is still dif-
ficult to assess the consequences of President
Yeltsin's final victory over his conservative (and
nationalist) opponents with the decisive
assistance of his army which was very hesitant
about intervening in this constitutional conflict.
The position of the army will certainly be
strengthened because of its decisive rOle in
halting the putsch on 3rd and 4th October last as
certain information gives us to believe.
8 I . The organisation of legislative elections to
be held on 12th December 1993 is proving dif-
ficult since the democratic parties have very
little time to conduct an electoral campaign that
might reach the population. Discussion of con-
stitutional questions also proved to be extremely
complicated. President Yeltsin's recent
announcement of his intention to remain at his
post until the end of his term of office after
having promised to hold presidential elections
next year merely increases doubts about the
coherence of his policy. The ban on certain
opposition newspapers decreed by the gov-
ernment and the Russian President's severe crit-
icism of his government regarding its inability to
put down the rebellion on 3rd and 4th October
and to take effective economic decisions are also
signs that the situation inside the country is far
from being consolidated.
82. Regarding developments within the CIS
as a whole, there are signs that Russia is taking
more and more initiatives to resume control of
the composite parts of the former Soviet Union
and to bring order to regions it considers to be
close neighbours abroad. The presentation of
what might be called a Russian Monroe doctrine
in the United Nations, Azerbaijan and Georgiajoining the CIS, dominated by Russia, and Rus-
sia's request to amend some of the provisions of
the treaty on conventional forces in Europe to
allow it to deploy additional forces in the Cau-
casus are examples. The announcement of a new
Russian military doctrine should be examined
carefully in this changed context.
83. This latter development will inevitably
have repercussions on Russia's relations with
Turkey, particularly in regard to the fighting in
Nagorno-Karabakh and in the Caucasus region
in general. It is not therefore surprising that
Turkey is opposed to any revision of the treaty
on conventional forces in Europe.
84. Furthermore, it is important to note that
on 7th September 1993, six CIS states 
- 
Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Armenia 
- 
signed an ag;reement on the prin-
ciple of creating a rouble zone of a new type.
The significance of a single currency for the
future political relations of the participating
countries still has to be assessed, but it may be
important. It should also be noted that ot 24th
September 1993, nine CIS members 
- 
Russia,
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan,
Taj ikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, together
with Moldova 
- 
signed a framework agreement
intended to lead to an economic union. Ukraine
and Turkmenistan have asked for associate status.
85. Belarus, whose capital, Minsk, is the seat
of the CIS and whose government, in the hands
of former communists, has practically no
credible opposition, has so far taken no note-
worthy initiatives to give itself an identity of its
own in face of its Russian neighbour. Relations
between the two countries are therefore free of
major problems and at its national level, Belarus
has not hesitated to ratify the START I Treaty
and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Fur-
thermore, it has shown no intention of wishing
to accede to the status of nuclear power and had
no objection to the nuclear missiles stationed on
its territory being placed under Russian control
before being transferred to that country.
86. Conversely, relations are far more dif-
ficult between Russia and Ukraine whose evo.
lution is still arousing serious concern. There is
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considerable uncertainty regarding the future
evolution of Ukraine. The ambiguities of its
foreign and security policy (policy of neutrality,
on the one hand, and the proposal for a safety
belt from the Baltic through to the Black Sea on
the other), its differences with Russia over the
problem of its nuclear weapons and the Black
Sea fleet, its economic problems and the diffi-
culties with its domestic policy call for closer
study which your rapporteur wished to make on
the basis of a visit to Kiev which has not yet
proved possible. The proposal to invite the
Ukrainian Minister for Foreign Affairs to speak
at the next ordinary session of the Assembly is
therefore of particular interest.
87. After the resigpation of the Ukrainian
Prime Minister at the end of September 1993,
President Kravchuk attempted to put an end to
the rivalry between parliament and the executive;
parliament has to prepare legislative and presi-
dential elections for next year. The economic situ-
ation in the country is still deteriorating.
88. The most disturbing factor is the ambi-
guity of Ukraine's policy in regard to nuclear
weapons. After much hesitation, on 18th
November 1993 the Ukrainian Parliament
voted the " partial " ratification of the START I
Treaty, a decision giving cause for concern in
the international community. In fact, Ukraine
will destroy only 36 of its ICBMs and 420lo of its
nuclear warheads. Furthermore, ratification was
made subject to various conditions including
international security guarantees and additional
foreign assistance. Conversely, Ukraine has not
yet acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty. Even after the recent meetings between
the United States and Ukrainian foreign min-
isters, information is confusing.
89. Ukraine at present has 1600 nuclear war-
heads and 174 intercontinental missiles,
including 130 SS-l9s and 46 SS-24sr7. State-
ments in parliament and that of the Ukrainian
President on the need to retain SS-24 missiles
for the time being and Ukraine's insistance on
obtaining security guarantees before disarming
its nuclear means illustrate the diffrculty of
the situation. All these uncertainties betray
Ukraine's fear of not being able to maintain its
independence vis-i-vis a Russia that has not yet
clearly revealed whether or not it will accept the
emergence of new states resulting from the
breaking up of the Soviet Union and, conse-
quently, accept the new frontiers that will ensue.
IY. Consequences to be drawn
for WEU's future polq
90. Many questions are raised for WEU: first,
what will be the consequences of discussions on
the possible enlargement of NATO towards the
East in the framework of preparing the forth-
coming NATO summit meeting and the reaction
of Russian leaders to these discussions for the
future evolution of WEU's relations with the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
particularly with those taking part in the Forum
of Consultation?
91. WEU's policy towards these countries is
not affected directly by these discussions but
there is an indirect effect insofar as WEU
intends to be the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. WEU must not overlook the fact,
however, that the modified Brussels Treaty
accords it specific responsibilities allowing it to
draw conclusions in an independent manner and
take decisions coresponding to its vocation.
92. In this respect, mention should be made
of the message our former President, Mr. Soell,
addressed to all the countries concerned during
his visit to Romania in the spring of this year, a
message which is still very topical:
'What enabled Western Europe to
develop an eflicient security system is the
homogeneity of its states and peoples.
None would have undertaken to help its
neighbours in the event ofan attack from
outside without being certain that its
neighbours would not use the additional
power afforded them by the alliance for
the pursuit of specific aims. The texts of
treaties are not enough to grve this
assurance which is based above all on the
continuity of a policy backed by demo-
cratic practices in each nation. Countries
wishing to benefit from the guarantees
offered by NATO and WEU must provide
proof of internal stability, the deeprooted
backing of the majority of the population
for democratic practices, the continuity of
foreign policy that takes precedence over
national ambitions, however legitimate
they may be, and the requirements of
maintaining and consolidating peace in
Europe.'
93. Through peaceful settlement, solutions
have to be found to the problems of relations
between neighbouring countries with particular
regard to minorities and frontiers. Implemen-
tation of the Balladur plan for a European sta-
bility pact based on a series of bilateral agree-
ments between the countries concerned might
prove to be useful in this respect. Such an
approach under the aegis of the Twelve (and not
in the framework of the Council of Europe or of
the CSCE) would have the advantage of
revealing to the countries concerned the
ultimate aim of the undertaking: to prepare their
association with the institutions of Western
Europe.17. Le Figaro, 27th October 1993.
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94. WEU would not be following a good
policy if it had privileged relations with one or
other of the countries of the WEU forum. Con-
sequences must be drawn, however, from the
existence of special operational co-operation
with three countries of the forum, i.e. Hungary,
Romania and Bulgaria in the framework of the
embargo on the Danube. These three countries
are co-operating loyally with WEU and NATO
without being compensated by any kind of pro-
tection or guarantee against possible reprisals
from the countries against which the United
Nations has imposed sanctions.
95. It is not possible to disregard such a short-
coming for ever and WEU should take firm
steps to give these three countries security assur-
ances corresponding to the risks they are having
to face. In addition, greater use should be made
of the contacts that can be established in the
framework of the Forum of Consultation for
giving participants the opportunity to explain
their perception of the threat in order to work
out a joint approach and solution. It is possible,
for instance, that the Baltic countries, the Czech
republic and also other countries concerned,
particularly Ukraine, will not assess the threat in
the same manner.
96. Another factor of crucial importance is
that the Maastricht Treaty came into force on
lst November 1993 which means that WEU has
become an integral part of the European Union.
It is therefore necessary to ensure that there is
parallelism between the approach of the
European Union and that of WEU in regard to
the development of their external relations.
97. So far, the European Community has con-
centrated its political dialogue and negotiations
of association on six countries of Central
Europe, i.e. the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria and
Romania. No association agreements or formal
negotiations with the European Community yet
exist for the Baltic countries. The Franco-
German proposal of 12th November which
hopes to see:
* WEU adopt an association status that
should be open to the partners in the con-
sultation that have already signed an asso-
ciation agreement with the European Union
and, when the time comes, to those that
will have signed such an agreement. "
consequently seems turned in the right direction
by proposing an opening which excludes none of
the partners in the Forum of Consultation. Con-
versely, considerable progress has already been
made in negotiations on the accession of
Austria, Sweden and Finland (and Norway) to
the Community.
98. This evolution cannot be without conse-
quences for the corresponding activities of WEU
which should give serious thought to redeflrning
its relations with the the latter three countries.
Furthermore, it should study carefully what its
future relations with Slovenia should be and rec-
ommend that all member states recognise the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
99. In practice, the activities of the Forum of
Consultation should be increased considerably.
To this end, the subsidiary organs of WEU
should be associated more closely with its work,
including the Institute for Security Studies
which has already played a useful r6le; the
Council should also study whether and to what
extent it would be possible for countries of the
forum to take part in some of the work of other
subsidiary organs.
100. Regarding WEU's relations with the CIS
countries and particularly with Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus, it is mainly a question of increasing
confidence on the basis of practical co-
operation, a good example of which is the imple-
mentation of the Open Skies Treaty. The
political dialogue with these countries, however,
should be the principal means of increasing
understanding, confidence, stability and co-
operation.
Y. Conclasions
l0l. The more the partners of WEU and of the
European Union in Central and Eastern Europe
develop their co-operation in specific areas, the
more the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe will succeed in the peaceful settlement of
problems and disputes with their neighbours;
the more Russia and the other members of the
Community of Independent States are asso-
ciated with a broader process of dialogue and
co-operation, the less will feelings of isolation
and threat prevail and the less will security guar-
antees be foremost in the minds of all con-
cerned.
102. It is thus for all European and Atlantic
bodies to strengthen cGoperation with their
partners in the East with a view to promoting
the feeling of confidence and solidarity that will
enable them jointly to face up to future chal-
lenges, which may be of a quite different
kind.
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APPENDIX
Summary of the electoral position of Central Europun
countries in the |YEU Forum of Consultation
Bulgaria
Form of Government: Parliamentary republic. The President is elected by universal suffrage for a
term of five years.
Head of State: Jelio Jelev, elected lst August 1990 and re-elected in the first direct election
of a Bulgarian Head of State on l9th January 1992.
Head of Government: Lyuben Berov, who replaced Filip Dimitrov on 3fth December 1992.
Iast elections: October l99l: Union of Democratic Forces: 110 seats; Bulgarian Socialist
Party (former communists): 106 seats. The MRF ethnic Turkish minority
party holds the balance of power.
The crisis in the country was resolved in December 1992 with the appointment of L-yuben pe.rov
as head of a * government ofexperts ". The parliamentary setbacks experien-ced by the former Prime
Minister, Filii Dimitrov, had i variety of causes, but were the result of profound-disageement
between a treai of state who was determined to rule by consensus politics, on account of the very con-
siderable influence still wielded by the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and a head of government opposed to
any form of compromise.
Estonia
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy.
Head of State: Lennart Meri, elected on 5th October 1992, replacing Arnold Ruutel, Pres-
ident of the Supreme Council of Estonia.
Head of Government: Mart Laar, who succeeded Triit Vahi on 21st October 1992.
On 23rd January 1992 the severe economic crisis in Estonia forced the Prime Minister, Edgar
Savisaar, to resign. Hewas replaced by an administrator, Triit Vahi, who launched an unadventurous
reform programme.
On 28th June 1992 over 900/o of the Estonian electorate voted in favour of the new constitution,
drawn up not without difficulty by an assembly, 50% of whose membership was drawn from the
Soviet-style supreme council and niembers of the Citizen's Cong;ress - an assembly elected solely by
those whb traied their Estonian citizenship back to the prewar period, or their direct descendants.
On 2fth September 1992 parliamentary elections were held that resulted in victory for Isamaa(the centre-right nationalist grouping).
On 5th October 1992 parliament elected Lennart Meri as President.
Hungary
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy since 1990. The Head of State appoints the Prime
Minister who has the responsibility of forming the government.
Head of State: Arpad Gdncz, elected President of the Republic by Parliament on 3rd
August 1990.
Head of Government: Jozsef Antall, from 3rd May 1990.
Last elections:
Result:
25th March and 8th April 1990.
Coalition led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) (centre-right).
The emergence of a new ultra-nationalist trend in 1992 has led to the risk of a radicalisation of
politics. The Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) is the main party in-the ruling coalition. The Fede-
iation of Young Democrats (FIDESz) is the only party to escape the fall in popularity of all parties,
ll8
APPENDIX DOCUMENT I387
while the former communist party has made a notable come-back on the political scene. As the 1994
parliamentary elections draw closer, political struggles have intensified; in December 1992, members
of parliament failed to pass a long-awaited law on the media which would have allowed privatisation of
the radio and television networks. In July 1993, the two main opposition liberal parties 
- 
Alliance of
Free Democrats (SZDSz) and the Federation of Young Democrats (FIDESz) 
- 
signed an electoral and
parliamentary co-operation pact.
June 1993: Exclusion of the MFD, its extreme right-wing elements and the leadership of the
liberal wing.
Form of Government:
Head of State:
Head of Government:
Last elections:
Form of Government:
Head of State and
President of Parliament:
Last elections:
Latvia
Parliamentary democracy.
Guntis Ulmanis, President of the Republic, who replaced Anatolijs
Gorbunovs (Former President of the Supreme Council) on 4th July 1993.
Valdis Birikavs, who replaced Ivars Godmanis on 7th July 1993.
5th and 6th June 1993, resulting in a victory for Latvian Way which
obtained a third of the votes, and leading to the formation of a centre-right
coalition.
Lithuania
Parliamentary democracy.
Algirdas Brazauskas, President of the Republic, who replaced Bronisolvas
Lubys on 10th March 1993.
25th October 1992 resulting in the DLP (former communist party) winning
72 of Parliament's 141 seats.
Poland
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy.
Head of State: Lech Walesa, elected on 9th December 1990.
Last elections: l9th September 1993.
Representation in the Sejm (percentage of votes)
l. Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 20.4o/o
2. Polish Peasant Alliance (PSL) . 15.4o/o
3. Democratic Union (UD) . l0.6Yo
4. LabourUnion .....7.30/o
5. Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) 5.890
6. Non-partisan bloc in support of reform (BBWR) 5.4V0
The new government under Waldemar Pawlack (PSL) is based on a coalition between the SLD(former communists), the PSL (Polish Peasant Alliance) and the UP (Labour Union). The new Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Oleszewski, belongs to the non-partisan bloc in support of reform(BBWR). The new Defence Minister, Mr. Kolodziejczyk has no political afliliation.
Romania
Form of government: Parliamentary but with strong presidential powers.
Head of State: Ion Iliescu was elected on 2fth May 1990 for a two-year term of office.
Head of Government: Nicolae Vacaroiu, since 4th November 1992.
The parliamentary and presidential elections held on 27th September and 4th October 1992led
to the re-election of Ion Iliescu as Head of State, to the great disappointment of the democratic oppo-
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sition. The democratic candidate, Emil Constantinescu, although unknown to the majority of the elec-
torate, managed to attract 340t/o of the votes in the second round. These elections brought about a
degree of fragmentation of the political scene since a parliamentary majority could not be formed, par-
ticularly after the split in the National Salvation Front in July 1992 as a result of differences between
supporters of lon Iliescu and Petre Roman, the former Prime Minister.
Slovakia
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy.
Head of State:
Prime Minister:
Head of State:
Prime Minister:
A split occurred in the party currently in power, the Movement for a Dernocratic Slovakia(HZDS) which had lost a $eat deal of its popularity, resulting in the departure of its second-in-
command, Milan Knazko, and his supporters. Thus it became the minority party in the Slovak
National Council and had to make new alliances. At the beginning of November 1993, the HZDS and
the Slovak National Party (SNS) formed a coalition. The next legislative elections are to be held in
1996.
The Czech Republic
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy.
Michal Kovac, elected bn l5th February 1993.
Madimir Meciar (HZDS).
Vaclav Havel, elected 26th January 1993.
Vaclav Klaus.
After much hesitation Vaclav Havel agreed to stand as a candidate for the Presidency of the
Republic, supported by the right-wing goverment in power which regarded him as the * least of all pos-
sible evils "; he was elected by a very slim majority. The next legislative elections are to be held in
1996.
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Amendments I and 2 29th November 1993
WEU'I relations with Central and Eastern Euroyrcan countriu
AMENDMENTS I and 2l
tobled by Mr. Wintgens
l. After paragraph (xiv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as
follows:
'Consequently endorsing the Franco-German proposal of l2th November 1993 for creating a
status of association with WEU for the parties of the Forum of Consultation which have already
reached an agreement of association with the European Union and, when appropriate, for those
which will reach such agreement, but regretting that the Ministerial Council of WEU, at its
meeting in Luxembourg on 22nd November 1993, did not adopt this proposal;"
2. Before paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
* Adopt before the NATO summit meeting a specific proposal to improve qualitatively its rela-
tions with its partners in the Forum of Consultation on the basis of the Franco-German proposal
of 12th November 1993 so as to be able to start negotiations with the countries concerned in
January 1994;"
Signed: Wintgens
l. See 9th sitting" 30th November 1993 (amendments agreed to).
l2l
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Amendment 3
3fth November 1993
WEU's relations with Ceatral and Eastera European countfies
AMEI\DMENT 3 
'
tabW by Mr. De Deckcr and othen
3. I-eave out paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper.
Signed: De Decl<cr, Ferrarini, Phcriaux
l. See 9th sittin& 3fth November 1993 (amendment agreed to).
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Amendment 4
30th November 1993
WEU'I relations with Central and fustern European countries
AMENDMENT 4 
'
tabled by MM. De Decler and Ferrarini
4. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper and insert:
" Remind the countries of the European Community of their decision to recognise the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; "
Signed: De Decker, Ferrarini
l. See 9th sittin& 30th November 1993 (amendment agreed to).
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Document 1388 8th November 1993
WEU Assembly proposals for
the forthcoming NATO summit meeting
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee2
by M. Baumel Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcoutvlrNpntoN
on WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting
Expr.eNeroRy MrMon c,Nou I\4
submitted by M. Baumel, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. What is at stake?(i) The enlargement of NATO(i/ NATO's commitment to peace in the world
frfl NATO and WEU
III. Conclusions
l. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to I with 0 abstentions.
2.-_Memben of the committee: I[lr. Stolfekn (Chairman); L,ord Finsberg (Alternate: Marshalt), Mr. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen) ;yM: +alts, Agnelli (Alternate: Fenari.nil, Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Schelfer,Ehrmann, Fabra, Feldmann,
fgryni,Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston,Mr. Kaspereit, Lord Kirkhill lNtinatel:-Citdman'1,tr.dM,. Kitielmann, de
I11nt9ws_t1 (Alternate: Baumel), Miiller, Pdcriaux, Polli, de Purg Reddemann, Rodrigues. Seeuws, Seiilinger, Soel/, vindon,
W ard, Wintgens, Tapatero.
N.B. Ire names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on WEU Assembly propsals for the for"thcoming NATO summit mcaing
The Assembly,
O Convinced that one of the main aims of the NATO summit meeting to be held on l0th January
1994 is to put an end to the uncertainty over the manner in which the security of Europe will be guar-
anteed in future decades 
- 
a matter of concern both for the nations of the Atlantic Alliance and for the
peoples of the countries that have regained their freedom;
(it) Stressing the crucial importance for European security of maintaining NATO's credibility as
major guarantor of the defence of Europe and of keeping an adequate American military presence on
the continent of Europe particularly after the recent announcement by the Russian authorities of a new
military doctrine;
(iit) Disturbed by the differences that have recently emerged between Americans and Europeans on
economic matters and world trade and also on questions of security policy and crisis management
throughout the world;
(iv) Convinced of the need to establish a new credible and stable transatlantic partnership based on:
(a) an American pillar which leaves no doubt about the importance it still attaches to main-
taining peace in Europe and the security of the members of the Atlantic Alliance;
(b) a European pillar strengthened by a WEU that has achieved full operational status;
(v) Convinced that the NATO summit meeting must examine the feasibility of a new allocation of
r6les, risks and responsibilities between American and European members;
(vi) Understanding that all Central and Eastern European countries wish to obtain reliable security
guarantees;
(viil Convinced nonetheless that the definition of future relations between NATO and the nations of
Central and Eastern Europe depends on:
(a) defrning a priori new goals for the alliance;
(D/ continuing the evolution towards democracy within the countries concerned;
(c) the peaceful settlement of problems of coexistence between the countries concerned, particu-
larly with regard to minorities and border disputes;
(d) a closer definition of relations between NATO and a Russia which is still in internal
upheaval and must not be placed in a position which it might believe to be a threat to its own
security, but without there being any question of Russia being granted a right of inspection in
Central Europe;
(e) the evolution of policy in Ukraine and the other countries of the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States and their relations with Russia;
(viii) Considering therefore that it is too soon to extend to other countries the security guarantees
which full membership of NATO implies, but believing that any increase in the threat to the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe would at the same time constitute a danger for Western Europe;(ix) Convinced however that it is necessary initially to use the framework of NACC to strengthen
confidence between Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and to examine whether
the American proposal for a partnership for peace and the French proposals for developing bilateral
relations can contribute to this aim;
(x) Welcoming NATO's decision to participate if necessary in peace-keeping operations under the
mandate of the United Nations and of the CSCE in areas outside the North Atlantic Treaty area and
particularly in the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
(xi) Deploring nevertheless the difliculties encountered in implementing a concerted approach both
inside NATO and between NATO and the United Nations on ways and means of interaction between
the two organisations, with particular regard to operational command;
(xiil Recalling the urgency of determining procedures governing interaction between WEU and
NATO in peace-keeping matters, in accordance with the Petersberg Declaration,
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RecouusNos rHAT rnr CouNcrr,
Present joint proposals to the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994 for a new Atlantic
partnership on the following basis:
l. In joint defence matters:
(a) study attentively, in consultation with representatives of Russia, the significance of recent
Russian statements on the use of nuclear wealnns and examine theii consequences for
NATO's defence concept;
(b) confirm the commitment of substantial American forces on the continent of Europe as an
essential factor of European security and reassurance for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe;
(c/ confirm the attribution to the United States of supreme command of NATO allied forces;
(d) strenglhen the process of consultation under Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(e) lur:ge NATO to acknowledge the efforts made by European countries within the framework of
WEU to strengthen their defence contributions, specifically;
- 
the inauguration of the European Corps;
- 
the work of the WEU Planning Cell;
- 
the work of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG);
- 
the importance of the work undertaken by the WEU Satellite Centre at Torrej6n;
Within the context of a possible enlargement of NATO:
(a) encovage all measures likely to strengthen confidence between Russia, Ukraine and the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the framework of NACC based on the American
proposals for creating a partnership for peace;
(b) at the same time intensify WEU's relations with the countries involved in the work of the
WEU Forum of Consultation, by seeking to achieve greater cohesion with the work of the
European Communities in Central and Eastern Europe;
In peace-keeping throughout the world:
(a) plt the present consensus among the members of the Atlantic Alliance on a sound legal
footing;
(b) make proposals on ways and means of interaction between NATO, WEU and the United
Nations, particularly as regards operational command;
(c) reach an agreement with NATO for the latter to make NATO facilities available to WEU, as
necessary;
(d) promote the formation in the framework of NATO of a special force capable of providing
WEU commands and NATO commands with the appropriate means for their taiks;
In disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation:
propose a formula for task- and responsibility-sharing between WEU and NATO based on the
past experience of the two organisations.
3.
4.
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Explanutory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Bunel Rqporteur)
I. Introduction
1. The development of a European defence
organisation in the framework of WEU,
although foreseen in the Maastricht Treaty, has
since been held up by the slowness and difficulty
encountered in the process ofratifying the treaty
and by continuing uncertainty over the way
NATO should evolve. The January 1994
summit meeting should put an end to this uncer-
tainty by defining:
- 
new guidelines for NATO;
- 
its relations with the former Warsaw
Pact countries;
- 
a European defence policy to face the
threats that might re-emerge;
- 
the political and military means of
action NATO can place at the disposal
of a peace-keeping or peace-restoring
policy in Europe and perhaps, too,
throughout the world.
2. Clearly, WEU will subsequently have to
take the measures necessary for Europe to be
able to act in areas where NATO may not fully
meet its security requirements. It is already nec-
essary, however, for Europeans to concert their
approach to the NATO summit meeting with
the clearest possible views on the requirements
oftheir security. For that reason, encouraged by
the WEU Council, the Assembly has decided to
include the present report in its agenda so that
WEU will not appear merely as an organisation
allowing Europe to accomplish what others are
unable or unwilling to do as has so far been the
case, but will confirm its position as the voice of
Europe in its own particular domain, i.e. as the
true European pillar of the alliance and the true
defence organ of a Europe that wishes to play a
political rOle commensurate with its economic
capabilities, its place in the cultural life of the
world and the requirements of its security.
II. What is at stalco?
3. It was decided to hold the NATO summit
meeting at the request of the United States Gov-
ernment. It is to be understood that President
Clinton's main purpose was to achieve apparent
success in his foreign policy by reaflirming the
importance of NATO as an instrument of
United States policy, particularly in the eyes of
public opinion and the media.
4. The European members of the alliance
agree in considering that a United States mil-
itary presence in Europe is an essential factor of
stability and peace on the European continent.
They are therefore all prepared to make a
number of concessions to ensure that this
presence is maintained.
5. Will the western structures, which have
ensured peace in Europe, security and the
freedom of the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance
for more than forty years, be able to provide
such a reassuring response to the new challenges
facing European security and transatlantic soli-
darity since the end of the East-West confron-
tation? There are many reasons for concern in
this respect.
6. What then is at stake? The vision of a new
world order based on the rule of law that was
believed to be almost achieved after the success
of the Desert Storm operation following Iraq's
attack on Kuwait is still a distant goal. On the
contrary, the multiplication of regional conflicts
and the crisis centres in many countries which
are liable to affect the stability and security of
neighbouring countries and also of an interna-
tional community that is incapable of con-
trolling them, obliges us to face up to the
question of whether the world is not moving
increasingly towards disorder and instability.
7. In Bosnia, only a few hours from the cap-
itals of Western Europe, fighting, killing, ethnic
cleansing and indescribable suffering are still the
lot of the population. Fighting in the Balkans
might extend to other areas of former Yugo-
slavia and neighbouring countries and there is
still a very real danger of hostilities being
resumed between Serbs and Croats.
8. The inability of the European govern-
ments and that of the United States to agree on
the initiatives to be taken for re-establishing
peace in that area in the more than two years of
frghting is the main cause of the failure of the
United Nations, the CSCE, twelve-power
Europe, NATO and WEU to bring hostilities to
a halt. This has seriously undermined their cred-
ibility, including that of NATO and of WEU, in
spite of the effectiveness of the military mea-
sures taken by these two organisations to ensure
that the embargo decided by the Security
Council in the Adriatic and on the Danube is
respected.
9. This situation might jeopardise the recip-
rocal confidence of Europe and the United
States in that one might wonder whether the hes-
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itant position of the .United States in the
Yugoslav crisis is not a tangible sign of its
intention to be more selective in its com-
mitment to security in Europe insofar as the
threat to Europe ofa regional conflict is not con-
sidered as a significant threat to the United
States. Any great divergence between Europe
and the United States in assessing the threat
would be particularly disturbing at a time when
commercial differences between Americans and
Europeans in the framework of GATT might
have repercussions on political relations
between the opposite shores of the Atlantic. Any
such tendency would also affect the cohesion of
NATO in its recent efforts to extend its field of
action outside the area defined by Article 6 of
the North Atlantic Treaty to allow it to take part
in maintaining and/or re-establishing peace in
other areas of the world.
(i) The enlargemcnt of NATO
10. The western governments' loss of credi-
bility as a result of the fighting in former Yugo-
slavia is a source of perplexity among the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are
endeavouring to establish as quickly as possible
links with the European Community, WEU and
NATO, the only organisations they feel can
guarantee their future security.
I l. WEU's relations with these countries are
examined in the report presented by Mr.
Wintgens, which shows clearly the possibilities
of strengthening the co-operation WEU can
offer the countries that are interested. It also
shows, however, that these countries are trying
to obtain security guarantees that WEU alone is
incapable of offering them: the guarantee of an
alliance backed by the strength of the United
States. Some members of NATO, including
Germany, have expressed support for allowing
the Visegrad countries to join NATO. The latter,
however, has been faced with a difficult choice
since the President of Russia sent the signatories
of the 2+4 treaty (governing the conditions of
the reunification of Germany) a letter warning
against any integration of former Warsaw Pact
countries in the Atlantic Alliance. This did not
correspond to his statements in Warsaw and
Prague to the effect that Russia had no objectionto the wishes of these countries in this
respect.
12. Other factors bring further complications:
uncertainty regarding the internal and external
evolution of Russia after the events in Moscow
on 3rd and 4th October is still not dispelled and
this raises the question of how NATO can
develop its future relations with that country.
Some advocate a kind of strategic partnership
with Russia, but what does this mean in prac-
tical terms? The recent American offer of a part-
nership for peace including the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, together with
Russia, might perhaps satisfy the Russians, butit will inevitably increase doubts among the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
13. Even if there are no legal obstacles and
even if it may be a factor of stabilisation for
Central and Eastern Europe, any enlargement of
NATO would involve a number of drawbacks:
(a) lf limited to the Visegrad countries, it
would constitute a new iron curtain in
Europe and would exclude countries
that are seeking to develop relations
with Western Europe (Romania, Bul-
garia, Baltic countries).
(b) lf extended further, it would lead to
the isolation ofthe successor countries
of the USSR and add to their feeling
of being surrounded by hostile
forces.
(c) Enlargement exending to the successor
countries of the USSR would deprive
the Washington Treaty of its content
since it would subject its application
to the goodwill of countries whose
present is uncertain and future unfore-
seeable. It would raise the very dif-
ficult question of whether the coun-
tries of NATO are prepared for Russia
or Ukraine to take part in possible
peace-keeping operations in former
member countries of the Warsaw Pact
and whether the member countries of
NATO are prepared to take part in
similar operations in the CIS coun-
tries alongside Russia, which would
clearly exercise a preponderant
political and military r6le in these
matters.
14. Elections in Poland on l9th September
and the putsch attempted by the Supreme Soviet
in Russia showed that it is neither desirable nor
possible to open the alliance to countries whose
rdgime is not stabilised or is not homogenous
with that of the members of NATO. Russian
hesitation towards the action of the United
Nations in the Yugoslav affair arouses fears that
participation by these countries in alliance deci-
sions might lead to paralysis in any deliberations
on measures to maintain or re-establish peace.
15. As matters now stand, it would seem wise
to defer any enlargment of NATO but, pending
more favourable circumstances:
(a) to strengthen the activities of NACC,
whose aim is to develop co-operation
with countries of the East and possibly
with former neutral countries which
may so wish on questions of joint
security;
(b) to limit NATo to its present mem-
bership with the proviso that its
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enlargement can be examined when
the time is ripe;
(c) to ensure, in these conditions, the
maintenance of a United States mil-
itary presence in Europe;
(d) to reserve for NATO all exchanges
with the countries of the CIS whereas
the WEU Forum would continue to
develop exchanges with member
countries and other former members
of the Warsaw Pact;
(e) to promote the progressive creation,
through bilateral agreements with the
countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, of the conditions for a global
organisation of security throughout
the European continent.
16. The evolution of the member countries of
the Community of Independent States and of
their reciprocal relations is also uncertain. All
attend the North Atlantic Co-operation Council
together with the nine countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and Finland, which has observer
status. NACC's various activities are fairly
similar to those of the CSCE with the exception
that neutral and non-aligned countries (except
for Finland) do not take part and its ultimate
aims still have to be defined.
(ii) NATO'I commitment to peaoe in the world
17. In this respect, the work of NACC's ad
hoc group for co-operation in peace-keeping
matters is worthy of special attention in view of
present fighting in the Caucasus, Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan. The steps recently
taken by Russia, which has asked for changes in
the sections of the treaty on the reduction in
forces in Europe which limit military equipment
stationed in the Caucasus, are intended to
strengthen its military presence in that area and
have brought protests from Turkey.
18. The r6le of NATO and NACC in peace-
keeping matters is certainly of interest to the
United Nations which has recently increased its
efforts to invite regional organisations to play a
greater part in such matters (reference is made
in this respect to the report by Mr. Soell on
political relations between the United Nations
and WEU and their consequences for the devel-
opment of WEU). However, ways and means of
interaction between NATO and the United
Nations in peace-keeping matters are far from
being harmonised. NATO has declared its pre-
paredness to use force in Bosnia if necessary,
provided the operations ane conducted under a
United Nations mandate but not under the
direction of that organisation. The United
States, for its part, agrees to send armed forces
on peace-keeping missions only if its vital
interests are at stake and if these missions are
placed under the direction of NATO or a coa-
lition similar to the one formed for the Iraq
operation.
19. If NATO wishes to remain a credible
actor in peace-keeping without thereby playing
the full r6le of world policeman which belongs
to the United Nations, it cannot be content to
base its new r0le on an ad hoc consensus and on
considerations of expediency which may differ
from one case to another.
20. A major aim of the forthcoming NATO
summit meeting should therefore be to clarify
the aim of that organisation with regard to the
United Nations for strengthening its authority
and not weakening it. kgitimation of any action
for peace organised by NATO should remain a
prerogative of the United Nations with the
backing, if necessary, of the CSCE.
21. An important characteristic of the
Atlantic Alliance is the difference between the
very limited commitments under the Wash-
ington Treaty, the development of political con-
sultation and the remarkable proficiency of the
military organisation. These arrangements were
adequate when there was agreement between all
members on the nature and importance of a
threat. They are no longer so appropriate in cir-
cumstances where risk assessment is no longer
clear-cut and each member has to decide
whether or not to take part in any military oper-
ation. Proof is to be found in the considerable
reduction in force levels and the difficulty the
allies are having in agreeing on effective actionin Yugoslavia. If NATO wishes to avoid
political paralysis, its member states must
accept more specific and binding legal obliga-
tions than those to which they subscribed in
t949.
(a) ln view of the United States'
unswerving reluctance to enter into
formal commitments by its forces, it is
not very realistic to envisage its
acceptance of a clause similar to the
one in Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty.
(D/ Conversely, the scope of Article 4 of
the Washington Treaty might be
extended to oblige the allies to consult
with each other on any threat to inter-
national peace wherever it might
arise. In fact, such consultations have
already been held on many occasions,
but the solidarity of the allies would
be strengthened by making them com-
pulsory.
(c) From the fact that NATO cannot be
iransformed into an offensive alliance,
i.e. determine, on its own authority,
armed intervention for goals other
129
DOCUMENT I388
than the defence of the territory of
member states, signatory countries
should agree to fix the conditions and
ways and means of possible joint
action to fulfil any mandate that
might be entrusted to them by the
Security Council of the United
Nations, with particular regard to
humanitarian action or peace-keeping
or peace-restonng operatlons.
Obviously, the authority of the United Nations
would be considerably strengthened if it were
evident: (i) that, in specific cases, joint forces of
the alliance could be permitted to show respect
for United Nations decisions; (ii) if the United
Nations calls upon forces from the member
countries of the alliance, they would have accessto NATO infrastructure for intelligence,
transport, logistics, etc.
(d) Finally, the aim of the summit
meeting should be to achieve, if not
necessarily a revision of the Wash-
ington Treaty, at least a reinterpre-
tation of its clauses with particular
regard to the link between the geo-
graphical area it covers and the mil-
itary obligations of its members so
that it will be able to meet the new
requirements of maintaining peace in
Europe and throughout the world.
This is what WEU managed to do
when it adopted the platform in The
Hague. It is now for NATO to do
likewise.
(iii) NATO aad tlEU
22. Unlike NATO, WEU has no need to seek
new legitimation nor new fields of action. The
modified Brussels Treaty provides it with the
necessary bases for launching action to counter
any threat to peace wherever it may occur. The
Maastricht Treaty merely confirms and
strengthens this legitimation by giving WEU the
mandate to act on behalf of the future European
Union. This is already embodied, moreover, in
the preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty
which invites the contracting parties to take the
necessary measures " to promote the unity and
to encourage the progressive integration of
Europe ".
23. Conversely, NATO has the necessary mil-
itary infrastructure for the defence of Europe
which WEU did not need to develop since
Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty
allowed it to resort to the military forces of
NATO should it have to contend with major
aggression on the continent of Europe.
24. The development of WEU's own opera-
tional structures proved necessary from the
moment the member governments started to
apply in full the modified Brussels Treaty in
areas extending beyond the scope of the North
Atlantic Treaty. The more NATO is prepared to
enlarge its area ofaction, the easier it should be
for it to place its structures at the disposal of
WEU. On the one hand, this would avoid devel-
oping conflicting structures and, on the other,
NATO might thus take advantage of the means
WEU has under the modified Brussels Treaty
for exercising the necessary political control of
peace-keeping operations.
25. It is for the WEU Council to ensure that
the NATO summit meeting recognises the
advantages the Atlantic Alliance can derive
from a true partnership with WEU on the basis
of a credible definition of the risks, r6les and
responsibilities of both one and the other.
26. Regarding rOles, there is a danger that dis-
cussions on NATO's new tasks, on a broader
interpretation of Article IV of the North
Atlantic Treaty and on the appearance of new
notions such as partnerchip for peace, strategic
partnership (with Russia) or even collective
concept of security will add further doubts
regarding the future direction of NATO and par-
ticularly future credibility in its primary task of
defending Europe. It is essential for the summit
meeting to reach a very clear decision on the
direction NATO will have to take in order to
have a chance of survival and to be understood
by public opinion.
27. The main purpose of the NATO military
system was to deter any Soviet attack on
Western Europe. This meant a certain
deployment of forces, a certain dose of anna-
ments, a certain breakdown of national strengths
and certain command structures adapted to this
goal. The maintenance of a powerful army and
modern nuclear weapons in Russia and uncer-
tainty over the future of that country preclude
the complete dismantling of NATO's military
apparatus and particularly its nuclear capability.
However, the reunification of Germany, the
forthcoming withdrawal of Russian forces from
the former GDR, and the radical change of
direction in Russian policy allow considerable
reductions to be made.
28. Integrated military commands can
operate effectively only insofar as all the
member countries of NATO take part in the
operations entrusted to them. It is far from
certain that this will always be the case in the
event of peace-keeping or peace-restoring opera-
tions not covered by the Washington Treaty.
29. However this may be, in view of the all-
round reduction of defence budgets, the use of
the forces of member countries in such opera-
tions will increasingly require them to have
access to means of information, transportation
and logistics that only NATO can provide.
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30. The members of NATO would therefore
have to agree on the cases and the conditions in
which the organisation would be able to afford
its support to one or several member countries
for such operations. These arrangements would
obviously have to cover cases in which WEU
would undertake action of its own. The condi-
tions in which WEU vessels are deployed in the
Adriatic show how necessary it is to have such
arrangements.
31. Regarding risks, it must be realised that
threats to peace now weigh more heavily on the
European continent than on the American con-
tinent. This situation is also the result of the end
of the cold war during which solidarity with the
United States was more evident.
32. The United States' request to redistribute
the burden of the joint defence of Europe is
therefore understandable. It would consequently
be highly desirable for WEU to be able to give
its allies, at the NATO summit meeting, con-
vincing assurances regarding the specific mea-
sures the Europeans are prepared to undertake
in order to handle their own defence.
33. This is not just a budgetary question, but
one of co-operation in armaments, rapid air
transport capability and the maintenance of
credible armed forces in each member
country.
34. With the Torrej6n satellite centre, WEU
can already show that it has taken the first step,
albeit modest, for equipping Europe with space-
based means of obsenration. Conversely, the
idea of setting up a European armaments agency
has so far only produced a regrouping in the
framework of WEU of the activities of the IEPG
under a new name, i.e. the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG), but no new
mission has yet been defined for this future
agency. It remains to be seen whether and to
what extent the French proposal to set up a
Franco-German agency for armaments will be
able to give fresh impetus to this undertaking.
35. However, burden-sharing cannot be con-
fined to material contributions. It should also
concern responsibilities.
(a) lt is clear that maintaining American
forces in Europe implies the military
command of NATO forces remainingin American hands. Any other
solution, moreover, would mean
appointing a European SACEUR andit would be very diflicult for the
European members of the alliance to
agree on his nationality.
(D/ Conversely, application of the prin-
ciples of transparency and comple-
mentarity between NATO and WEU
should result in a very senior oflicer
nominated by WEU being appointed
SACEUR's deputy and at the same
time he should be given the supreme
command of any operation under a
WEU hat.
(c/ France's return to the NATO Military
Committee would help to find a new
politico-military balance in the
alliance.
(d) Above all, it is in the political field
that it is necessary to make Europe's
voice heard, particularly in the North
Atlantic Council.
36. For its voice to be heard, Europe will have
to be united. It is gratifying that, for the first
time, the WEU Council has decided to make
preparations for the NATO summit meeting.
Even so, it will have to agree on how to express ajoint position.
37. It is also essential for Europe to be able to
act on behalf of continental and international
peace outside the framework of NATO. This
means:
(a) the WEU Council retaining the ability
to take independent decisions;
(b) havingeffective access to information,
logistic means and predetermined
armed forces which should be pro-
vided either by NATO, which would
imply a prior and unconditional com-
mitment by the United States, which
is not very probable, or by member
states on the basis of national deci-
sions, which means building up
European means outside NATO. Hos-
tilities in the Gulf and former Yugo-
slavia show that Europe is still far
from achieving this.
38. No true balance is conceivable between a
power that uses its armed forces at will and a
Europe that does not have any. It is for Europe
to assert itself and make the necessary effort
without which there could be no true reform of
NATO.
39. WEU is still the only organisation that
might be able to mobilise the national means of
European countries, including those assigned to
NATO, to defend the security of Europe as a
whole. To deny it this capability would be tanta-
mount to refusing any balance within NATO
and, hence, would condemn the NATO summit
meeting to failure.
III. Conclusions
40. NATO has recently been compared to a
large ship equipped with a powerful engine but
no rudder; one might even wonder whether it is
not in the process ofchanging from the work of
a warship to that of a pleasurecraft. To dispel
l3l
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uncertainty and to ensure that NATO remains
the factor of stability it has been for the last
forty years, members of the alliance must first
re-establish order in transatlantic relations by
putting an end to differences between the
United States and Europe regarding present
options in security and defence matters.
41. The more the alliance asserts itself as a
homogenous and stable entity in its inner
workings, the more it will be capable of
exporting this stability to the outside. In this
respect, Europeans have a special responsibility
to assume by showing their allies across the
Atlantic that the European defence identity is
becoming a reality that will strengthen the whole
alliance.
42. To achieve that, Europeans and, above
all, WEU, still have considerable efforts to
make. The defence of a European point of view
at the NATO summit meeting will have
meaning only if Europe decides at long last to
pursue, in the framework of WEU, initiatives it
has defined itself, but whose implementation is
still far too slow and far too limited. One of the
results of the NATO summit meeting should be
to help WEU to give tangible shape to plans that
have so far been little more than vague ideas and
make WEU a truly operational organisation.
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Amendment I 29th November 1993
IYEU Assembly pmposals for thc
fonhcoming NATO summit meeting
AMENDMENT 1 I
,abled by Mr. Atkinson and otlwrc
l. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words * a possible
enlargement of NATO: " and insert the following new text:
'the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other appli-
cants for membership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:
(a) give urgent consideration to the enlargement of WEU by accepting Council of Europe
member states as full members of WEU; "
Signed: Atkinson, Hunt, Lentz-Cornette
l. See 7th sitting, 29th November 1993 (amendment withdrawn).
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Amendment 2
29th November 1993
WEU Assembly prulnsals for the
fofihcoming NATO summit meeting
AMENDMENT 2 
'
tabled by Mn Atkinson and othen
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out the words * a possible
enlargement of NATO: " and insert the following new text:
'the interest shown by the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and other appli-
cants for mdmbership of the Council of Europe, to join NATO:
(a) give urgent consideration as to how a closer relationship between WEU and the member
states of the Council of Europe who have expressed an interest in joining NATO can be
achieved;'
Signed: Akinson, Hunt
l. See 7th sitting, 29th November 1993 (amendment agreed to).
134
Document 1389 8th November 1993
Political relations between the United Nations and WEU
and their consequenoes for the development of WEU
REPORT 
'
submitted on beha$ of the Political Committee2
by Mr. Soell, Rapponeur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RrcouuguonnoN
on political relations between the United Nations and WEU and their conse-
quences for the development of WEU
Expr.nNlrony MruoneNouu
submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Correspondence between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and
the Secretary-General of Western European Union
III. The new challenges facing the United Nations and their consequences
IY. The modified Brussels Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations
V. Thoughts on ways and means of enhancing political relations between the
United Nations and Western European Union
VI. Conclusions
ApprNorx
Extract from the Agenda for Peace by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: I[lt. StoJfelen (Chairman); Lord Finsberg (Alternate: Marshall), Mt. Roseta (Vice-Chairmen) ;MM. Aarts, Agnelli (Alternate: Ferrarini), Alegre, Andreotti, Benvenuti, Bowden, De Hoop Scheffer, Ehrmann, Fabra,
Feldmann, Foschi, Goerens, Homs I Ferret, Sir Russell Johnston, Mr. Kaspereit, tord Kirkhill (Alternate: Godman), MM.
Kittelmann, de Lipkowski, Polli, Miiller, P6criaux, de Puig, Reddemann, Rodrigues, Seeuws, Seitlinger, Soel/, Vingon, Ward,
Wintgens., Zapatero.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on political rebtions between the United Nations aad WEU
and their consequences for the development of llEU
The Assembly,
(il Considering that, with the end of the cold war, the East-West confrontation has been replaced by
a series of different conflicts of a new type that have broken out in several areas of the world;(iil Considering that it is now crucial to determine whether the United Nations can henceforth
become the essential instrument for ensuring the prevention and settlement of conflicts and safe-
guarding peace in the world;(iii) Recalling that the year 1995, which will be the fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the United
Nations, will be of particular importance for the prospect of reforming the organisation;(iv) Recalling the importance of the United Nations and the special responsibility of the permanent
members of the Security Council for disarmament and non-proliferation with particular regard to the
extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1995;(v) Welcoming the success achieved so far by the opening of the register of conventional arms kept
by the United Nations enabling better supervision of exports of armaments at world level;(vil Noting the considerable increase in requests to the United Nations in the last five years for
peace-keeping operations;
(viil Noting that it lacks adequate financial, organisational, technical, military and political means for
the effective conduct of these operations;
(viii) Concerned at the alarming financial position of the United Nations, due to the late payment of
contributions by the majority of the member countries;(ix) Noting, on the one hand, the desire of the United Nations to seek gleater co-operation with
" regional arrangements or agencies' in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter and, on the other
hand, the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-
General of WEU in this respect;(x) Noting, however, that, contrary to the United Nations, WEU is subjected to parliamentary
supervision and, consequently, should consult its Assembly prior to any exchange of views with the
United Nations;(xi) Recalling that all the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty are based on the right of legit-
imate self-defence guaranteed by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and not on the provi-
sions of Chapter VIII of that Charter;
(xii) Consequently, convinced that WEU is an independent organisation, whose decisions are not
subject to Security Council authorisation;
(xiii) Convinced, nevertheless, that the fundamental political interest of WEU is to strengthen the
vocation of the United Nations in playing the r6le of primordial instrument for maintaining peace in
the world and to submit its activities to the views expressed by the United Nations;
(xiv) Recalling the Petersberg Declaration, according to which WEU aflirmed that it was prepared to
support " the effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures,
including peace-keeping activities, of the United Nations Security Council ";
(xv) Recalling also that the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the maintenance of peace
in ex-Yugoslavia and particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina are addressed to " states, acting nationally or
through regional agencies or arrangements ";(ni) Consequently, dismayed that WEU does not consider it has been called upon to take coercive
action on the pretext that the United Nations has made a specific request only to NATO;
(xvii) Emphasising that any constructive evolution in relations between WEU and the United Nations
depends on solving the problems that may arise from the fact that WEU represents the start of a pro.
gressive integration of Europe in defence and security matters, whereas the United Nations and its
Security Council are based exclusively on the principle of the sovereignty of member states;
(xviil) Noting, further, that the United Nations is intervening increasingly in the internal affairs of
member states, whereas the Charter does not provide sufficient legal bases for doing so;
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(xix) Convinced that WEU and the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) of the European Union must co-operate and further co-ordinate their activities in preventive
diplomacy and crisis-management and, possibly, place their means at the disposal of other regional
organisations,
RrcouupNos rHAT rHr CouNcrr-
l. Work out forthwith a new platform of European security interests on the basis of an assessment
of the new threats and risks in the world and their consequences;
2. Define WEU's vocation in relation to the United Nations and the specific areas in which it can
offer its assistance to the United Nations while retaining its independence;
3. Without waiting for the United Nations to make a specific request to WEU:
- 
establish contact with the bodies concerned with the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) of the European Union in order to reach agreement on the areas of joint activity and
the sharing of responsibilities in peace-keeping, with particular regard to preventive
diplomacy and the consolidation of peace at the end of hostilities;
- 
co-ordinate with NATO ways and means of sharing peace-keeping responsibilities between the
two organisations;
- 
instruct its planning cell to have a report prepared by experts on the requirements and time
necessary for implementing coercive measures in former Yugoslavia with particular regard to
available resources and necessary personnel;
- 
instruct the Torrej6n satellite centre to present a report on the capabilities and experience it
can offer for peace-keeping, particularly in establishing facts, monitoring and early
warning;
- 
inform the Assembly of the results of these studies;
4. Make proposals for reforming the United Nations and its Security Council with a view to
strengthening its effectiveness in peace-keeping and improving WEU's participation in the decision-
making process in the United Nations;
5. Give a new mandate to the representatives of the member countries of WEU at the United
Nations headquarters in New York to hold regular consultations in order to co.ordinate their positions,
particularly in the committees and working groups of the United Nations whose activities come within
the framework of the responsibilities of WEU.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Soell, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. Since Western European Union has been
developed into an operational organisation car-
rying out - in accordance with relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions 
- 
its first
military operations and contingency planning in
the framework of the conflicts in the Gulf and in
former Yugoslavia, the problem of interaction
with the United Nations has become evident.
2. The Assembly's Defence Committee has
already examined the operational aspects of the
problem on the basis of the report submitted by
Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman in June 1993 
'. 
For the
necessary basic information on the international
post-cold war realities, with the dramatic
increase in regional conflicts and trouble spots
in several world regions, and for a description of
the various organisational and operational chal-
lenges the United Nations is now facing, your
Rapporteur refers to the relevant chapters of
that report.
3. What is still needed is an assessment of
the consequences of the new world situation for
the future political r6le of the United Nations
and its Security Council, for the implementation
of the United Nations Charter and for political
relations between the United Nations and other
organisations with the aim of maintaining the
international peace and security within which
Western European Union is called upon to
assume an enhanced r6le.
4. The character of the United Nations'
future activities in security matters and of its
relations with WEU cannot be without conse-
quences for the development of WEU itself
which is based on the ideals proclaimed in the
United Nations Charter in general and on the
right of individual and collective self-defence in
accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of
the Charter in particular. This might also have
an impact on WEU's position as the European
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the defence
component of the future European political
union, and a fortiori on its efforts to define a
common European security and defence policy.
5. In order to cover the whole range ofpolitical areas in which either the United
Nations or Western European Union or both
might be challenged, an analysis of the relevant
provisions of the United Nations Charter and
of the modified Brussels Treaty will be
unavoidable. However, it is not the purpose of
this report to present legal expertise to be used
as a basis for argument in the case of different
interpretations of the respective responsibilities
and rOles of the two organisations. On the con-
trary, the purpose of this report is to analyse the
conditions under which the United Nations and
Western European Union assume their responsi-
bilities and to identify possible areas of
co-operation. Such a task also requires an
vassessment of the new character of conflicts in
which the United Nations is at present involved
and, in particular, an analysis of the direction in
which the United Nations itself has developed
and is developing.
II. Conespondence between
the Secretary-General of tlu Uaited Nations
and the Secretary-General
of Western European Union
6. Such an assessment is the more urgent
since the United Nations has, for the first time,
actually approached Western European Union
to ask it to strengthen its efforts in maintaining
international peace and security and to improve
co-ordination with the United Nations.
7. Following a statement by the United Na-
tions Security Council issued on 28th January
1993, in which it took note with appreciation of
the Secretary-General's report entitled " Agenda
for peace' and in particular the views presented
in paragraphs 63, 64 and 65 2 of this report,
' concerning co-operation with regional arrange-
ments and organisations ", the Secretary-Gen-
eral, at the request of the Security Council, sent
the following letter, dated lst April 1993, to the
Secretary4eneral of Western European Union:
8. * The Secretary-General of the United
Nations presents his compliments to the
Secretary-General of Western European
Union and has the honour to transmit a
copy of the statement made by the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, on behalf of
the Council, in connection with its consid-
eration of the item entitled " An agenda
for peace: preventive diplomacy, peace
making and peace-keeping " (S/25184). The
statement reads, inter alia, as follows:
The Security Council... invites within the
framework of Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter, regional arrangements
and organisations to study, on a priority
basis, the following:
- 
" ways and means to strengthen their
functions to maintain international
l. United Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU, Doc-
ument 1366, 19th May 1993.
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peace and security within their areas of
competence, paying due regard to the
characteristics of their respective
regions. Taking into account the
matters of which the Security Council
has been seized and in accordance with
the United Nations Charter, they might
consider, in particular, preventive
diplomacy including fact-finding,
confidence-building, good offices and
peace-building and, where appropriate,
peace-keeping;
- 
ways and means to further improve
co-ordination of their efforts with those
of the United Nations. Being aware of
the variety of mandate, scope and com-
position of the regional arrangements
and organisations, the Council stresses
that the forms of interaction of these
arrangements and organisations with
the United Nations should be flexible
and adequate to each specific situation.
These may include, in particular,
exchange of information and consulta-
tions, with a view to enhancing the
United Nations capability including
monitoring and early-warning, with the
Secretary-General or, where appro-
priate, his Special Representative, par-
ticipating as observers in the sessions
and the work of the General Assembly,
secondment of offrcials to the United
Nations Secretariat, making timely and
specific requests for United Nations
involvement, and readiness to provide
necessary resources.
The Security Council requests the Secre-
tary-General:
- 
to transmit this statement to those
regional arrangements and organi-
sations which have received a standing
invitation to participate in the sessions
and the work of the General Assembly
as observers, and to other regional
arrangements and organisations, with a
view to promoting the aforementioned
studies and encouraging the replies to
the United Nations;
- 
to submit as soon as possible and pref-
erably by the end of April 1993 to the
Security Council a report concerning
the replies from the regional alrange-
ments and organisations. "
The Secretary-General would be grateful
if the replies requested by the Security
Council could be communicated to him
by Monday, 26th April 1993. "
9. Identical letters were sent to those inter-
governmental organisations that have received a
standing invitation to participate in the sessions
and the work of the United Nations General
Assembly as observers, among those the Com-
monwealth Secretariat, the Council of Europe
and the European Community; the text was also
transmitted to " other regional arrangements
and organisations " in Africa, North and South
America, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the
Middle East. In Europe, the following
organisations (apart from WEU) received it:
Black Sea Economic Co-operation, the Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS), the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe (CSCE), the Nordic Council of Ministers
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation(NArO).
10. As at l4th July 1993, nine organisations
out of fifty-two having received such letters had
replied, including the European Community (on
20th April 1993), the CSCE (on llth June
1993), NATO (on l2th May 1993) and WEU(on 25th June 1993). The text of WEU's reply
has already been communicated to members of
the Assembly in a separate document 3 but,
because of the importance of the matter, it seems
useful to reproduce the full text hereafter:
11. Reply by the WEU Secretary-General
dated 25th June 1993 to the letter of the United
Nations Secretary-General of lst April 1993:
' I thank you for your letter of lst April in
which you transmitted to me the note
5/25184 of the President of the Security
Council. WEU attaches great importance
to enhancing the r6le of the United
Nations and its Security Council in main-
taining international peace and security. I
welcome therefore this opportunity to
indicate how WEU envisages future co-
operation with the United Nations in the
fields mentioned in your letter. My reply
is without prejudice to the question of
whether WEU is a regional arrangement
or agency as referred to in Chapter YIII of
the United Nations Charter.
In their declaration agreed at Maastricht
on 10th December 1991, the member
states of Western European Union com-
mitted themselves to develop WEU as the
defence component of the European
Union and as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
Since then, WEU has concentrated its
efforts on giving concrete expression to
this dual vocation notably by developing
its operational r6le. In their Petersberg
Declaration of l9th June 1992, foreign
and defence ministers of WEU defined
the three types of missions for which mil-
itary units acting under WEU authority
could be employed, namely: humanitarian
and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and tasks
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of combat forces in crisis management,
including peace-making. The WEU
Planning Cell was created to conduct the
necessary planning for these missions,
inter alia. It is in the context of WEU's
operational r6le that WEU member states,
at the Petersberg meeting, declared their
readiness to support, on a case-by-case
basis and in accordance with WEU proce-
dures, the effective implementation of
confl ict-prevention and crisis-management
measures including peace-keeping activ-
ities of the CSCE and United Nations
Security Council. Participation in specific
operations will remain a sovereign
decision of member states in accordance
with national constitutions.
I wish to recall the various activities
which WEU has undertaken, or is pres-
ently conducting, which are relevant to
the subjects mentioned in your letter.
During the conflict between Iran and Iraq
in 1987-88, WEU ships conducted mine-
clearing operations in the Gulf to ensure
the unhindered movement of interna-
tional maritime traflic in this area. Sec-
ondly, in the context of the measures
taken by the international community fol-
lowing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, ships
of WEU member states conducted mine-
clearing and embargo enforcement opera-
tions in the Gulf. All these measures were
undertaken in the framework of the rel-
evant United Nations Security Council
resolutions.
WEU is also contributing in various ways
to the search for a resolution of the con-
flict in former Yugoslavia. Since July
1992, ships and aircraft of WEU member
states have been conducting first embargo
monitoring and, subsequently, embargo
enforcement operations in the Adriatic.
Now, following the decision taken by thejoint session of the Council of Western
European Union and the North Atlantic
Council held on 8th June, combined
WEU/NATO operations are underway in
the Adriatic to ensure the strict imple-
mentation of United Nations Security
Council resolutions, in particular 820.
WEU member states are also assisting
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in
enforcing sanctions and the embargo on
the Danube.
Furthermore, WEU has conducted con-
tingency planning on a number of aspects
relating to the situation in former Yugo-
slavia, notably regarding the possible cre-
ation of the safe haven around Sarajevo.
The results of this planning were trans-
mitted to the United Nations earlier this
year. WEU ministers, at their meeting in
Rome on l9th May last, have now
requested that a study be made on the
implementation of the United Nations
Security Council resolutions relating to
safe areas and on the possible rotation of
UNPROFOR contingents from the WEU
member states.
In response to your letter and in the
context of WEU's enhanced r6le as out-
lined above, it therefore seems important
to increase contacts and exchanges of
information between the United Nations
and WEU.
The mission of the United Nations in
New York of the country holding the pres-
idency of WEU will act as a point of
contact for the United Nations and will be
responsible for the introduction of WEU
contributions to the United Nations.
In addition, WEU is ready to discuss with
you ways to develop appropriate contacts
and exchanges of information between the
Secretariat-General and Planning Cell and
relevant United Nations Secretariat
bodies.'
12. As far as your Rapporteur is aware,
Western European Union is to date the only
organisation to have stated explicitly that its
reply is " without prejudice to the question of
whether WEU is a regional arrangement or
agency as referred to in Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter'. In contrast to that,
the CSCE confirmed in its reply that at the Hel-
sinki summit meeting in July 1992, it has
declared its understanding that the CSCE is a
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter
VIII of the United Nations Charter.
13. The Political Committee and Defence
Committee's joint meeting with the Permanent
Council and the Secretary-General of WEU on
5th October 1993 provided an opportunity to
throw some light on the considerations that led
the Council to draft in such terms the answer the
WEU Secretary-General sent to the United
Nations.
14. However, the committee first had to learn
from the Secretary-General of WEU:
- 
that regarding the coercive measures
that would possibly be taken to ensure
the security of the populations in
Bosnia-Herzegovina for which WEU
had prepared the contingency plans,
WEU did not consider it had been
approached since the United Nations
had made a specific request only to
NATO and
- 
that there was no co-ordination be-
tween the member countries of WEU in
the case of Somalia.
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15. Furthermore, the Secretary-General con-
firmed that the Council was unanimous in con-
sidering that WEU was not a regional
organisation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the
Charter of the United Nations but a collective
defence organisation and that, consequently,
certain member countries had even contem-
plated not answering the letter from the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations at all. The
committee was also informed that at the present
time there were no plans for appointing a liaison
officer to the United Nations and that there had
been no co-ordination with NATO or the
European Community before sending WEU's
answer to the letter from the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
III. The new challonges facing
the United Nations ud their conseqaences
16. A number of other questions were still
outstanding and in particular what was really
behind WEU's wish to strengthen the rOle of the
United Nations in international security and
peace-keeping and how did WEU intend to
increase contacts and exchanges of information
with the United Nations as indicated in its letter
of 25th June 1993. Before examining in detail
the contents and significance of the United
Nations approach to regional organisations it is
important to realise that, with the end of the
cold war, requests for United Nations peace-
keeping operations have increased dramatically.
Since 1988, fifteen new peace-keeping opera-
tions have been initiated compared with
thirteen such operations over the previous forty
years.
17. Of the operations now involving the
United Nations, nine started no earlier than
1991, including:
- UNIKOM (United Nations lraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission) since June 1991.
Its mission is to monitor the Khor Ab
Dullah (water way) and a demilitarised
zone (extending 10 kms into Iraq and
5 kms into Kuwait), to deter violations
of the boundary through its presence
and surveillance of the demilitarised
zone, to observe any hostile or poten-
tially hostile action mounted from the
territory ofone state or the other. Since
5th February 1993, UNIKOM has also
had the power to prevent physically,
and if necessary redress violations of
the border or the demilitarised zone.
UNIKOM has an authorised strength of
three hundred military observers pro-
vided by more than thirty-four coun-
tries, plus two hundred other military
personnel and some one hundred and
eighty-six local civilian staff. WEU
member countries involved with military
personnel are France, the Uniled
Kingdom, Italy, Greece (as a future
member) Norway (as an associate
member) and Denmark (as observer).
- 
UNAVEM 1/ (United Nations Angola
Verification Mission II) since 1991. Its
original mandate was to monitor the
withdrawal of Cuban forces, the main-
tenance of the cease-fire and elections.
However, the crisis that developed after
the elections thrust UNAVEM II into a
central mediating r6le. The deterie
rating security situation has further
limited the ability of the United Nations
to facilitate negotiations between the
government and UNITA. Since January
1993, frghting has intensified between
the Angolan Government and UNITA
forces. Despite all efforts to achieve a
cease-fire, the civil war in Angola
developed to such an extent that the
United Nations Secretary-General
described it as the most murderous con-
flict in the world with more than a
thousand people dying every day as a
consequence of the fightinga.
- 
The United Nations Security Council,
by adopting Resolutions 864 on l5th
September 1993, therefore decided for
the first time to impose sanctions on a
rebel organisation (UNITA) and not on
a sovereign state. Originally, UNAVEM
I['s authorised strength was three hun-
dred and fifty military observers and
ninety police observers together with
some eighty-seven international and a
hundred and fifty-five local civil-ian staff (not counting electoral
observers). WEU member countries
were involved with military personnel
from the Netherlands, Spain and
Norway (as an associate member).
Bearing in mind the dramatic deterio-
ration of the situation in the country, it
is especially peculiar that the United
Nations Security Council agreed to
reduce the strength of UNAVEM II to
seventy-eight military and thirty police
observers.
- 
Since July 1991, ONUSAL (United
Nations Mission in El Salvador) has
been established with the mandate to
monitor the cease-fire agreements
between the government of El Salvador
and the FMLN (Frente Farabundo
Marti para la Liberaci6n Nacional) and
to reform and reduce the armed forces,
create a new police force, reform thejudicial and electoral system and verify
human rights. Its mandate also includes
t4t
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economic and social issues. WEU mem-
ber countries involved with military and
police observers are France, Italy, Spain
and Norway (as an associate member).
- 
MINURSO (United Nations Mission
for the Referendum in the Western
Sahara) was established in September
l99l with the mandate to monitor the
cease-fire between Morocco and the
Polisario and the confinement of each
party's troops to designated areas, to
facilitate exchanges of prisoners of war
and to organise and monitor a refe-
rendum for the self-determination of
the people of the Western Sahara. For
the some three hundred and twenty-
eight military observers and military
support personnel in the area, the fol-
lowing WEU member countries are
involved: Belgium, France, Italy, the
United Kingdom and Greece (as a future
member).
- 
One of the most difficult tasks is to be
fulfilled by UNPROFOR / (United
Nations Protection Forces in former
Yugoslavia) established in March 1992
and UNPROFOR // established at the
end of June 1992. The problem of
resolving the conflicts after the
break-up of Yugoslavia, in particular in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, was already the
subject of Recommendation 541
adopted by the WEU Assembly on l6th
June 1993 on a report 5, submitted on
behalf of the Political Committee by
Mr. Baumel, Rapporteur. It is the
subject of a report to be submitted by
Sir Russell Johnston on behalf of the
Defence Committee at the forthcoming
session of the Assembly. Depending on
the actual development of the situation
in the area, the Political Committee will
eventually present a further special
report on this particular subject.
18. The involvement of several organisations
such as the United Nations, the CSCE, the
European Community, NATO and WEU in the
efforts to terminate hostilities in former Yugo-
slavia provide a concrete example of the
problems involved in organising their various
political and military activities in such a
complex situation. This became particularly
evident when a dispute arose recently between
Britain and France on the one hand and the
United States on the other after President
Clinton said he would send United States peace-
keeping troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina only if
the operation was under the control of NATO, not
the United Nations. Furthermore, Mr. Wdrner,
NATO Secretary-General, said in Brussels on
10th September 1993, that 'NATO cannot be
regarded as an instrument or as a military sub-
contractor to the United Nations. Both must
maintain the possibility to act independently ".
19. UNPROFOR, based on a United Nations
Security Council decision was to be an interim
arrangement for creating the conditions of peace
and security for negotiating an overall settle-
ment of the crisis. Its mandate was enlarged
several times to include support for efforts to
deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia
and Herzegovina and to protect convoys of
released civilian detainees, as well as monitoring
certain areas in Croatia. UNPROFOR includes
military, police and civilian components of
some twenty-three thousand personnel from
more than thirty-five countries. The following
WEU member countries are contributing per-
sonnel: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom,
Norway (as an associate member) and Denmark
(as an observer country).
20. UNPROFOR M (United Nations Pro.
tection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia) offers the first example of the
deployment of military forces of some thousand
men including an American unit in the
framework of a preventive diplomacy measure.
At the request of the Macedonian President, Mr.
Gligorov, the United Nations Security Council
authorised this deployment to monitor the fron-
tiers of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia with Albania, Serbia and Montenegro.
21. UNTAC (United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia), preceded by UNAMIC(United Nations Advance Mission in Cam-
bodia), was established in March 1992 to ensure
maintenance of the cease-flrre, to organise the
demobilisation of the factions' armed forces, to
arrange free and fair elections, to create a
neutral political environment for those elec-
tions, to oversee human rights observance, to
repatriate those displaced by war and to start the
rehabilitation of the country. For these purposes
UNTAC has about twenty-two thousand mil-
itary and civilian personnel, to which the fol-
lowing WEU member countries contribute:
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, the United Kingdom and Norway (as an
associate member).
22. A particularly complicated situation has
developed following the intervention of the
United Nations in Somalia on the basis of
UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in
Somalia) set up in April 1992. From the very
beginning, major differences arose on the defi-
nition of the mission to be carried out in a
country which has been deprived of a central
government since January 1991 and where
fighting between opposing warlords has resulted
in the death of hundreds of thousands, millions
t42
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of refugees, and catastrophic famine in the
country. The first mandate of UNOSOM was
concentrated on national reconciliation and
humanitarian assistance. But following con-
tinuous fighting between the rival militias, the
next option was to pursue country-wide action
by a group of member states authorised by the
Security Council to ensure that the current vio-
lence against the international relief effort was
brought to an end.
23. Following an offer by the United States to
organise and lead such an operation, and
bearing in mind that the United Nations Secre-
tariat did not have the ability to command and
control an enforcement operation of the mag-
nitude required, the Security Council authorised
by its Resolution 794 the use of " all necessary
means to establish as soon as possible a secure
environment for humanitarian relief operations
in Somalia ", acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter. Thus a Unified Task Force (UNITAD
spearheaded by the United States was deployed
in Mogadishu, including military units from
twenty-one countries including the following
WEU member countries: Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Turkey
(as an associate member).
24. In parallel, UNOSOM remains fully
responsible for the political aspects and humani-
tarian assistance to Somalia. It is composed of
military personnel from seventeen countries
including units from Belgium and Norway. The
heavy losses several United Nations units suf-
fered in carrying out their duties in Somalia, in
particular those of Pakistan, Italy, Nigeria, the
United States and others, and the failure so far
of allied operations to restore security and peace
in the country has led to serious differences
between the participants in the operation.
Doubts have also been voiced regarding the
ability of the United Nations to bring this oper-
ation to a successful conclusion. It should
therefore be recalled that in Recommendation
5446 on the situation in Somalia in a report sub-
mitted by Mr. De Decker on behalf of the
Political Committee, the Assembly reminded
the Council that any action in which forces of
several of its members are involved conforms
with Articles V and VIII, paragraph 3, of the
modified Brussels Treaty and asked for an
urgent WEU Council meeting on the matter.
The Council's answer on this matter is not at all
satisfactory.
25. The total absence of political and logistic
co-ordination between the member countries of
WEU which is characteristic of the operations in
Somalia, where the United Nations is faced with
difficulties of such gravity that they may lead to
the failure of the whole operation, leaves little
hope that the WEU Council will show the
political determination to shoulder its responsi-
bilities under the terms of the modified Brussels
Treaty.
26. Finally, UNOMOZ (United Nations
Operation in Mozambique) created in December
1992, is mandated to verify the cease-fire
between the government and the RENAMO
rebels after fourteen years of devastating civil
war, the separation and concentration offorces,
their demobilisation and the collection, storage
and destruction of weapons; to verify the com-
plete withdrawal of foreign forces and provide
security in the transport corridors. Furthermore,
UNOMOZ's electoral division is to monitor and
verify all aspects and stages of the electoral
process which is to be organised in October
1994. About seven thousand or eight thousand
military and civilian personnel members are
involved in the process including units from the
following WEU member countries: Italy, Por-
tugal and Spain, whereas ltaly, France, Portugal,
the United Kingdom and Germany are members
of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
which is to guarantee the implementation of the
general peace agreement.
27. Among the other activities of the United
Nations, one must not overlook the information
missions conducted in Armenia and Azerbaijan
regarding the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh
where the r6le of the United Nations is mainly
to back up CSCE efforts to manage this crisis.
Moreover, after fighting started in Abkhazia, the
United Nations Security Council decided on
24th August 1993 to create a United Nations
Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIfl.
28. Finally, the action started by the United
Nations to re-establish democracy in Haiti
shows that the United Nations is increasingly
called upon to intervene in the internal affairs of
states and that it is difficult to fulfil such tasks
even in close collaboration with the
Organisation of American States (OAS). To
ensure the implementation of the New York
agreement for returning President Aristide to
Haiti, the United Nations had decided to
organise in that country a peace-keeping mission
known as MINUHA, mobilising about 1300
men with a view to modernising the Hailian
army and creating a new police force. A serious
obstacle was raised to the implementation of
this undertaking when armed demonstrations
managed to prevent the debarcation of
American and Canadian forces of the United
Nations at Port au Prince.
29. It is difficult to assess the risk that the
increased number of United Nations peace-
keeping missions will lead to operations which
will never be determined. The number of armed
forces serving under the United Nations flag has
been increased dramatically: in 1987, 9 666
United Nations troops and military observers
were deployed in different regions of the world,6. Document 1377.
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compared with 75 738 on 31st May 1993 ?. (In
an article published in Der Spiegel on l6th
August 1993, the United Nations Secretary-
General reported 85 000 soldiers under the
United Nations flag). Most of them are serving
in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Mozambique,
Lebanon and Somalia.
30. Freed from being paralysed by the global
East-West conflicts, the United Nations has
emerged as a central instrument for the pre-
vention and resolution of various regional con-
flicts and for the preservation of peace, as its
Secretary-General describes it in his report
" Agenda for peace " which he presented to the
United Nations Security Council in June 1992.
But assuming its new and enhanced responsibil-
ities, the United Nations is confronted with
various new problems and difficulties of a very
different type. The multiplication of burdens
has led the United Nations to ask for the
support of relevant regional organisations in
order to decentralise its various tasks and
responsibilities.
31. There is first the question of creating a
United Nations armed force on a permanent
basis in accordance with Article 43 of the
Charter 8. This is strongly advocated by the Sec-
retary-General in his " Agenda for peace ". But
in view of the rather limited response so far
from member states which are reluctant to
transfer the control of their armed forces to the
United Nations, the Secretary-General now
seems to favour extending the existing practice
of assigning armed forces and civil experts
under bilateral agtreements with the largest pos-
sible number of member countries. As the Secre-
tary-General explained to your Rapporteur
during his visit to the United Nations Head-
quarters in New York, the formation of proper
United Nations armed forces would require new
bureaucratic and command structures involving
higher expenditure. The United Nations
therefore had to rely on the help of member
countries in this area too.
32. The bilateral agreements on assigning
peace-keeping forces to the United Nations are
normally concluded by verbal notes without ref-
erence to the United Nations Charter.
According to the present practice of United
Nations peace-keeping operations, the United
Nations takes the decisions on missions and
employment of the troops. The whole internal
composition of the units, however, remains the
responsibility of the relevant member state.
7. Source: Enid C.B. Schoettle, Europa Archiv, No. 16,
1993, page 453.
8. Article 43, paragraph I stipulates: * All members of the
United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make
available to the Security Council, on its call and in accord
with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces,
assistance and facilities, ..., necessary for the purpose of
maintaining international peace and security. "
33. The present staff of the Secretariat-
General is quite insufficient for coping with this
task of commanding and controlling the
increased number of peace-keeping operations.
The peace-keeping department is therefore
planning a large increase in staff from the
present thirty-five to about ninety. Furthermore,
the department is asking for additional experts
from member countries who should be seconded
to the United Nations for a certain period free of
charge. The organisational situation within the
Secretariat-General is not facilitated by the fact
that the responsibilities of the peace-keeping
department vis-i-vis the other departments, in
particular the political and humanitarian
departments, have not yet been spelled out in
detail. Furthermore, any staff increases run
counter to the efforts of the Secretary-General to
tighten his organisation and come up against the
policy of real zero-growth followed by certain
member countries.
34. Furthermore, the United Nations lacks
experience in commanding and controlling oper-
ations and does not have the requisite intelli-
gence means. What it needs in particular is
information about the political situation in
certain countries, the powers of different
political $oups and individuals and relations
between them. Offers from intelligence services
of certain countries to provide some infor-
mation are diflicult to accept because of the dif-
ficulty of protecting classified information and
because such information is possibly given only
in a selective way. At a later stage, consideration
might be given to how it might be possible to
improve the monitoring and early warning
activity of the United Nations by offering infor-
mation obtained by the WEU Space Obser-
vation Centre in Torrej6n. The conditions and
ways of providing such information and the
actual requirements of the United Nations
might affect the effective communication of
information. At present, your Rapporteur has
the impression from his talks in New York that
the United Nations is interested in information
in the framework of preventive diplomacy and
early warning. Regarding early warning, the
" Agenda for peace " mentions in particular
" environmental threats, the risk of nuclear
accident, natural disasters, mass movements of
populations, the threat of famine and the spread
of disease. There is a need ...to strengthen
affangements in such manner that information
from those sources can be synthesised with
political indicators to assess whether a threat to
peace exists and to analyse what action might be
taken by the United Nations to alleviate it.
...Regional arrangements and organisations have
an important r6le in early warning ".
35. It does not seem that the United Nations
is prepared to develop its own intelligence
service for the moment. However, the question
of recruiting United Nations experts for satellite
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imagery interpretation capable of interpreting
raw data or exploiting interpreted imagery from
the WEU Satellite Centre is worthy of consider-
ation.
36. In this respect, mention should be made
of the long-standing activities of the United
Nations in elaborating legal conditions to
prevent or limit the military use of outer space,
beginning with the outer space treaty of 1967
and the agreement governing the activities of
states on the moon and other celestial bodies
prohibiting inter alia the use of the moon and
other celestial bodies for military purposes.
37. The United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space set up in 1959 is
the focal point of United Nations action in this
field. In considering the military uses of outer
space, the United Nations Assembly expressed
grave concern at the extension of an arms race
into outer space and urged all states, in par-
ticular those with major space capabilities, to
contribute actively to the goal of preventing
such an anns race. Considering those efforts in a
framework of peace-keeping in a broader sense,
Western European Union, which is on the way
to assuming a leading European r6le in space
matters, should add this item to the agenda of
how to develop its relations with the United
Nations in this area.
38. Another important area for maintaining
international peace and security in which the
United Nations recently has considerably
increased its efforts is disarmament and control
of armaments transfer. Global and regional
approaches in these matters need to be
harmonised. What will be the respective rOle of
the United Nations and other international
organisations in preparation of the conference
due in 1995 that will decide on the extension of
the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons? What will be the responsibility of the
flrve nuclear powers which are permanent
members of the Security Council in this respect?
How will they reach a common position? How
will NATO and Western European Union in
which some of the nuclear powers are members
reach a common position?
39. The nuclear test conducted by China on
5th October 1993 again raises the question of
extending the moratorium on nuclear tests by
the other nuclear powers and also the even more
fundamental question of whether the planned
negotiations to conclude a treaty banning all
nuclear tests still have any real chance of
success.
40. The problem of the use of chemical
weapons has been settled by the signing of the
chemical weapons convention (CWC), but since
members of the Arab League and a number of
Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries did
not sign, a regional problem in the matter
remalns.
41. In the United Nations much importance
is attached to preventing the proliferation ofbal-
listic missile technology; however, the elabo
ration of United Nations guidelines in this area
is diflicult because of differences between the
positions of industrial and developing countries.
This is a major obstacle for the worldwide
extension of the missile technology control
rdgime.
42. It seems however that the United Nations
is well satisfied with the success so far in estab-
lishing the United Nations register of conven-
tional arms for collecting data on international
arms transfers. It is pleased with the response to
calls for all member states to provide annual
data on their imports and exports of armaments.
According to United Nations sources, so far
seventy-three member countries have responded
to the request to provide information on their
anns exports and imports covering 9590 of
weapons exports and 7070 of imports. All major
arms suppliers have replied.
43. Some countries, such as the United States,
are naming in their replies the countries to
which they export weaponry. An expert group of
the United Nations set up to work out the follow-
up activities of the register, will begin its work
next year. There is no doubt that the creation of
the register should give new impetus to
European efforts to achieve a common and
harmonised arms export policy. The United
Nations is interested in stimulating efforts in
conversion where it lacks appropriate means but
where European countries could provide val-
uable assistance.
44. A fundamental and growing problem for
the United Nations is that a continuing financial
crisis is paralysing its ability to carry out its
rapidly-expanding activities. Since I 956, peace-
keeping has been financed outside the regular
budget through a separate assessment for each
operation. The current special assessment
formula for peace-keeping divides member
states into four categories. The economically
least-developed states pay 100/o of their
assessment rate for the regular budget and the
economically less-developed states pay 20V0.
The industrialised countries pay the same
assessment rate as for the regular budget. The
five permanent members of the Security Council
pay the remainder, or approximately 22o/o over
and above their regular assessment rates. In
1992, this meant that the permanent memberspaid 5601o of the entire peace-keeping
assessment e.
45. Member countries assigning armed forces
for United Nations peace-keeping operations
normally bear first and foremost their own
expenses and are reimbursed by the United
9. Enid C.B.
l 993.
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Nations. But this is possible only if all the
member countries have paid their regular
assessment. This is far from so, however.
According to an assessment published in Der
Spiegel on l6th August 1993, for peace-keeping
operations, in July 1993, the United States owed
the United Nations (in S million) 318.6, Japan
99.1, Germany 78.2, Russia 4l7.9,Frunce 42.5,
Great Britain 1.1, ltaly 49.7; Ukraine 58.7 and
Brazil 10.7. Lord Finsberg nevertheless clarified
that the United Kingdom Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office had drawn his attention to the
fact that the United Kingdom had no debt to the
United Nations and paid all its contributions to
WEU without delay.
46. In the meantime, on 6th October 1992,
the United States paid about half its debt to the
United Nations, i.e. $ 284 million to the regular
budget and $ 188 million for financing peace-
keeping operations. The Secretary-General of
the United Nations recently stated that only 62
of the 184 member countries had paid their
regular assessment in full for the year 1993,
which would normally be paid on lst January,
and the states owed the organisation $ 1.7
billion r0. The only weapon against non-payment
is Article 19 which provides that such a member
state may lose its vote in the General Assembly
under certain conditions, but so far this article
has not deterred late payments. On the other
hand, the United Nations is from time to time
obliged to defend itself against reproaches of
financial mismanagement, waste of money or
even corruptionrr. These are undoubtedly very
serious problems which will have a strong
influence on all questions related to the future
rOle of the United Nations in a new world order.
A number of proposals to improve the financial
position of the United Nations are under dis-
cussion and your Rapporteur will revert to this
problem at a later stage.
47. But first a major political problem is to be
assessed relating to the changing nature ofactiv-
ities in which the United Nations is increasingly
involved and for which it is seeking the help of
those organisations it considers as regional or
agencies in the sense of Chapter VIII of the
Charter.
48. United Nations activities have developed
in two different directions: first they cover far
more responsibilities in regard to human rights
monitoring, refugee assistance and repatriation,
the conduct ofthe elections and referenda, civil
administration, public information pro-
grammes, humanitarian assistance and eco.
nomic and social development. In playing a
growing rdle in the internal problems of coun-
tries, the United Nations is treading on
uncertain legal grounds. Such activities are not
10. Lr Monde, l9th October 1993.
ll. NZZ, l8th August 1993.
covered by Chapter VI of the Charter dealing
with the peaceful settlement of disputes, because
they are totally different. If the United Nations
wishes to use armed forces, police or other
civilian experts for carrying out the type of
assistance just mentioned, it needs the con-
sensus of all the authorities concerned.
49. The United Nations Charter is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
members (Article 2, paragraph 1). It provides a
legal basis only for purely interstate relations
and for the settlement of conflicts between sov-
ereign states. If a peaceful settlement of an inter-
state dispute has been reached and the United
Nations is requested to monitor such an
agreement with peace-keeping troops, Chapter
VI of the United Nations Charter provides no
legal basis for the deployment of such forces.
The traditional peace-keeping forces have
therefore been formed outside the Charter and
need the consensus of all the countries in which
they are to be deployed.
50. Whereas the coalition war against Iraq,
similar to the war in Korea, might be considered
as a classic application ofcollective self-defence,
conducted by an allied coalition approved by the
Security Council, matters become more compli-
cated when the United Nations intervenes in
civil wars in cases they consider to be a threat to
international peace and security allowing
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the
Charter. In doing this, for instance in Somalia,
the United Nations is departing from the prin-
ciple of Article 2, paragnph 7, which confirms
that:
* Nothing contained in the present
Charter shall authorise the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any state or shall require the
members to submit such matters to set-
tlement under the present Charter. "
51. This broader interpretation of the Charter
has several consequences: it makes it even more
difficult to establish clear differences between
peace-keeping operations requiring a consensus
between the relevant parties and those of
coercion which are particularly delicate when
they are for humanitarian purposes. In some of
these cases such enforcement action for humani-
tarian objectives has endangered the activities of
the humanitarian organisations themselves.
52. It appears that the system of means pro-
vided by the United Nations Charter for main-
taining peace and security, in particular in
Chapters VI and VII, contains deflrciencies
which already existed in the past but which
become more serious the more the United
Nations extends its competence in maintaining
international peace and security and becomes
the central world instrument for the prevention
and resolution of conflicts in the world.
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53. Conversely, another important aspect
could offset deficiencies in the Charter: this is
the degree of confidence the United Nations and
its Security Council might have achieved since
the end of the cold war by demonstrating its
ability to play its r6le as a leading watchdog of
international peace and security. Both consider-
ations might have an influence on the position
and r6le of regional organisations in the
framework of Chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter and on the r6le Western
European Union can play in this context.
IY. The nodifud Brusseh Treaty
and the Charter of tlu United Nations
54. The question of future relations between
the United Nations and Western European
Union is not just a legal question of whether
WEU is to be considered as part of the regional
arrangements or agencies in the sense of Chapter
VIII of the United Nations Charter. However,
this question, which is one for long drawn-out
disputes between legal experts, is not just aca-
demic. The answer has important political con-
sequences.
55. Chapter VIII of the United Nations
Charter on regional arrangements begins with
Article 52, the first three paragraphs of which
are as follows:
" l. Nothing in the present charter pre-
cludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing
with such matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace
and security as are appropriate for
regional action, provided that such
arrangements or agencies and their
activities are consistent with the pur-
poses and principles of the United
Nations.
2. The members of the United Nations
entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make
every effort to achieve pacific set-
tlement of local disputes through
such regional arrangements or by
such regional agencies before refer-
ring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage
the development of pacific settlement
of local disputes through such
regional agencies either on the initi-
ative of the states concerned or by
reference from the Security Council.'
56. There was never a definition of what
regional arrangements or agencies meant, and a
proposed definition by the Egyptian Delegation
during the conference in San Francisco was
rejected. In the absence of such a legal deflr-
nition, the United Nations Secretary-General
interprets these words in the broadest possible
way, when he states in his 'Agenda for peace':
" The charter deliberately provides no
precise definition of regional alrange-
ments and agencies, thus allowing useful
flexibility for undertakings by a group of
states to deal with a matter appropriate
for regional action which also could con-
tribute to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security. Such associa-
tions or entities could include treaty-
based organisations, whether created
before or after the founding of the United
Nations, regional organisations for mutual
security and defence, organisations for
general regional development or for
co-operation on a particular economic
topic or function, and groups created to
deal with a specific political, economic or
social issue of current concern. "
57. For the United Nations Secretary-
General, a collective defence organisation such
as WEU belongs therefore to this category of
organisation. The first consequence of such an
interpretation follows from Article 53 of
the Charter which stipulates in paragraph I that:
* The Security Council shall, where
appropriate, utilise such regional arrange-
ments or agencies for enforcement action
under its authority. But no enforcement
action shall be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorisation of the Security
Council, ...'
(The only exception applies to measures against
former enemy states.) The second consequence
is the obligation in Article 54 of the United
Nations Charter, according to which:
'The Security Council shall at all times
be kept fully informed of activities under-
taken or in contemplation under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies for
the maintenance of international peace
and security. "
58. The dependence ofregional arrangements
or agencies on the United Nations in all cases of
enforcement actions relating to the maintenance
of peace and security is finally completed by the
provisions of Article 103 of the Charter stipu-
lating that:
" In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the members of the United
Nations under the present charter and
their obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement, their obligations under
the present charter shall prevail. "
59. Notwithstanding the non-existence of
legal criteria defining the character of regional
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arrangements and agencies, there seems to be no
major dispute over the fact that the objectives of
such organisations are first and foremost the set-
tlement of disputes between membersr2. Fur-
thermore, one cannot disregard the political
intentions of the contracting parties of a treaty
establishing a regional organisation when
deciding that the regional organisation they
create is to be governed by the provisions of
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
60. Apart from the required conformity of the
relevant organisation with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations (Article 52),
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali mentioned some
years ago as a further condition the explicit
desire of the organisation to be recognised as
such by the United Nationst3.
61. If one considers the modified Brussels
Treaty and the history of its origins, the result is
ambiguous. The precursor of the Brussels
Treaty, i.e. the treaty of alliance and mutual
assistance between Great Britain and France
signed in Dunkirk on 4th March 1947, con-
firmed in its preamble the resolve of the parties
* to co-operate closely with one another as well
as with the other United Nations in preserving
peace and resisting aggression, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and in
particular with Articles 49, 51, 52, 53 and 107
thereof ". Thus a clear reference to Chapter VIII
of the charter was expressed.
62. Neither the Brussels Treaty of 1948 nor
the modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 took up
such references. The preambles of both treaties
refer more generally to the ideals proclaimed in
the Charter of the United Nations and to the
will of contracting parties " to afford assistance
to each other, in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, in maintaining interna-
tional peace and security and resisting any
policy of aggression ". The cornerstone of the
treaty now became Article V (former IV), stipu-
lating:
" If any of the high contracting parties
should be the object of an armed attack in
Europe, the other high contracting parties
will, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 5l of the Charter of the United
Nations, afford the party so attacked all
the military and other aid and assistance
in their power. "
63. Thus the right of individual and collective
self-defence in a case of an armed attack from
outside, became the main objective of the treaty.
These rights are explicitly guaranteed by Article
12. Riidiger Wolfrum: Handbuch Vereinte Nationen,
Miinchen (Beck) 1991.
13. Boutros-Ghdi, "R6gionalisme et Nations Unies",
Revue dgyptienne de droit international, 1968, page 10.
5l of the charter which has its place outside the
framework of Chapter VIII of the charter and
are specified as follows:
' Article 5l
Nothing in the present charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Mea-
sures taken by members in the exercise of
this right of self-defence shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international
peace and security. "
64. In order to fulfil the provisions of the
charter, Article VI of the modified Brussels
Treaty (former Article V) confirms that:
" All measures taken as a result of the pre-
ceding article shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council. They
shall be terminated as soon as the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary
to maintain or restore international peace
and security.'
65. If it is thus evident that the character of
Western European Union makes it a system of
collective self-defence outside the framework of
Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter one
should not overlook the fact that the modified
Brussels Treaty also contains elements and pro-
visions dealing with the settlement of disputes
among members (Article X) and internal
matters as the control of armaments and the
level of forces within the union. All these factors
have characteristics similar to those of regional
organisations covered by Chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter. But since the treaty is
based first and foremost on the right of self-
defence under Article 5l of the charter,
according to some legal experts Western
European Union is not subject to the obligations
of Articles 53 and 54 of the charter ra.
66. This question assumes particular impor-
tance when assessing possible measures decided
by Western European Union on the basis of
Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified
Brussels Treaty according to which:
'At the request of any of the high con-
tracting parties, the Council shall be
immediately convened in order to permit
14. Riidiger Wolfrum, Handbuch
Miinchen, 1991, page 677.
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them to consult with regard to any situ-
ation which may mnstitute a threat to
peace, in whatever area this threat should
arise... "
67. It should be recalled that the French text of
the article uses the words * se concerter' which
allows the possibility of reaching common posi-
tions and decisions. According to the legal
opinion in the United Nations Secre-
tariat-Generd, WEU should be considered both
as an organisation for collective self-defence
and as a regional organisation in the sense of
Chapter VIII of the charter. Consequently, it
could not act without the authorisation of the
Security Council in cases outside the right of self-
defence defined by Article V of the modified
Brussels Treaty. Various measures might be
taken under Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the
modified Brussels Treaty. They may be through
co-ordination between armed forces as during the
Gulf crisis, but they may also agree economic
sanctions and embargoes and their co-ordination
or elaborate military contingency planning as in
the Balkan crisis. In all these cases, WEU has a
political interest in acting in accordance with the
United Nationsrs. But such a political interest is
not quite the same as a legal obligation.
68. The definition of enforcement action in
the sense of Article 53 of the charter might be
interpreted differently by the United Nations
and the regional organisation concerned. If
WEU consultations of any kind in accordance
with Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified
Brussels Treaty were felt to depend on United
Nations Security Council authorisation, this
could discourage member countries from
invoking this article and consequently reduce
the range of possible proposals. Furthermore,
other United Nations member countries and in
particular members of the Security Council
which are not members of Western European
Union might be tempted to influence consulta-
tions in WEU.
69. Consultations in the framework of Article
VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels
Treaty should be considered to be carried out in
WEU's overall self-defence framework. WEU
should always seek to co-ordinate its considera-
tions and activities in this respect with the
United Nations while at the same time safe-
guarding its ful autonomy of decision.
70. There is therefore no reason for WEU to
undertake any initiative in the United Nations
which might be viewed as a wish to be con-
sidered as a regional arrangement or agency in
the sense of Chapter VIII of the charter. But
15. For instance, the Chairman-in-Office of the WEU
Council informed the United Nations Secretary-General of
the measures envisaged by WEU after lraq invaded Kuwait;
the WEU Secretariat also gave the United Nations details of
its contingency planning regarding former Yugoslavia.
there are further reasons to avoid such an
approach: Article 53 of the Charter gives the
Security Council * where appropriate', the rightto make use of regional arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its
authority. It is yet too early to assess the full
consequences should the Security Council one
day wish to take such a decision with regard to
Western European Union. Certainly, two
member states of Western European Union are
permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council with a veto right. But what
would happen if both these members, on the
basis of a prior consensus reached in WEU,
agreed in the Security Council to the use of the
European Corps or other European multina-
tional forces 'answerable to WEU " being
deployed in United Nations enforcement
actions, and that one or several other WEU
member states did not agree?
71. Of course, the Petersberg Declaration16
states that * Participation in specific operations
will remain a sovereign decision of member
states in accordance with national constitu-
tions ". But if WEU is governed by Article 53 of
the United Nations Charter, difficulties of
harmonising United Nations obligations with
interests of WEU members cannot be
excluded.
72. Furthermore, nothing in the modified
Brussels Treaty obliges WEU representatives in
the Security Council to defend the interests or
decisions of WEU member countries in the
framework of the United Nations. Even the
Maastricht Treaty has only incomplete provi-
sions regarding the obligations of the permanent
Security Council members vis-d-vis other
members of the Political Union. Article J. 5 of
the Treaty provides that:
" Member states which are permanent
members of the Security Council will, in
the execution of their functions, ensure
the defence of the positions and the
interests of the union, without prejudice
to their responsibilities under the provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter. "
73. This provision is a clear indication that
permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council who are members of WEU and
the future political union can encounter a con-
flict of interest between their United Nations
responsibilities and those of relevant European
organisations. The United Nations is based on
the notion of sovereignty of members whereas
WEU's task is * to promote the unity and to
encourage the progressive integration of
Europe " particularly in security and defence
matters. The political will to enhance the r6le of
the United Nations and its Security Council
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expresqed in the letter from the WEU Secretary-
General to the United Nations Secretary-
GenerallT should therefore duly take into
account the different starting points of both
organisations.
74. Another problem to be resolved as
Western European Union moves towards basing
its future co-operation with the United Nations
on the United Nations Charter, is how parlia-
mentary control based on Article IX of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty will be able to find its place
in the framework of an increasing WEU com-
mitment to the United Nations which does not
include any parliamentary structure.
75. There is no doubt that careful exami-
nation of the whole system of the modified
Brussels Treaty leads to the conclusion that
WEU cannot be considered as a regional
arrangement or agency in the sense of Chapter
YIII of the United Nations Charter. But the rela-
tionship between Western European Union and
the United Nations should be seen as a dynamic
process, which might lead to better structured
and more constructive co-operation between
them than has so far been achieved.
V. Thoughts on wals and meons of enhancing
political rclations between the United Nations
ard Westera European Union
76. The last meeting with the WEU Per-
manent Council in Brussels confirmed the
impression gained from the very start of hostil-
ities in former Yugoslavia. Apart from working
out contingency plans and relatively modest par-
ticipation in measures to monitor sanctions
imposed by the United Nations on Serbia and
Montenegro, no decisive political will can be
discerned in the WEU Council that might
induce it to take initiatives whereby it would
shoulder its political responsibilities and impose
WEU concepts.
77. Quite the contrary, WEU is still counting
too much on the existence and activities of other
organisations, particularly the European Com-
munity, the CSCE, NATO and the United
Nations, taking refuge behind the fact that it has
not been called upon.
78. The lack of enthusiasm among most of the
member states to consult with each other on the
course to be followed in the Somalian problem,
for example, reveals that WEU has still not come
to grips with the full range of its responsibilities
under the modified Brussels Treaty and particu-
larly Article VIII. In these conditions, what value
can be attached to the Council's answer to Rec-
ommendation 542 to the effect that:
* WEU co-ordination of the contributions
and actions of its member states which
have been called on by the United
Nations to participate in peace-keeping
operations is one of the major topics
which the WEU Council, both at minis-
terial and permanent representative level,
has placed on the agenda for political con-
sultation... "
and, a fortiori, the affirmation by the WEU
Secretary-General in his communication on
" WEU's security r6le in post+old war Europe "
distributed in Brussels:
" Given the difliculties now encountered
by the United Nations in the execution of
its missions and the risks of its decision-
making mechanisms being blocked, the
future European Union must be in a
position to intervene on its own account;
both within its own continental area and
anywhere else where its vital interests or
its nationals are under grave threat "?
79. Your rapporteur can but advocate the
Council rallying to the opinion expressed by one
of its representatives at the meeting in Brussels,
an opinion that he shares in full: political deter-
mination and drive are necessary for imple-
menting co-operation in peace-keeping. In this
respect, WEU should play a greater r6le on the
international scene, including in prolonged and
preventive diplomacy. To this end, it must show
collective awareness which implies the existence
of a WEU defence identity. WEU cannot be
content to handle leftovers from the activities
undertaken by other organisations.
80. Particularly, since examples of actual
United Nations peace-keeping operations and of
other United Nations activities in maintaining
peace and security in the world listed in Chapter
III above show that WEU member countries or
WEU as an organisation are involved in United
Nations activities in an even more intensive
manner than described by the letter which the
Secretary-General of WEU sent to the United
Nations Secretary-General on 25th June 1993.
81. But despite the different declarations and
communiqu6s issued by the WEU Council since
the end of the cold war, including those of Maas-
tricht, Petersberg and Rome, WEU has so far
failed to make a new comprehensive assessment
of the changed European security situation
which is the essential basis for any concrete deci-
sions which might have to be made in the near
future. The very useful effort by the United
Nations Secretary-General, to describe the new
security challenge for the United Nations and
the consequences to be drawn in his " Agenda
for peace " has not yet found an equivalent in
the framework of Western European Union.
82. However,
necessary. For
is more than
platform on
such an effort
instance, a new
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European security interests could be drawn up
which could be presented as a major European
contribution to the NATO summit meeting
which is to be held at the beginning of 1994.
83. This new platform should define the new
types of threats in the world and their conse-
quences for armaments co-operation, training
and intelligence. It should also include the items
mentioned in the letter of the United Nations
Secretary-General, i.e. preventive diplomacy,
good offices, peace-building and peace-keeping.
84. In this respect, WEU should work out ajoint concept concerning ways and means of
closer co-operation and co-ordination with the
European Community and the common foreign
and security policy in the area of preventive
diplomacy, including means available for
imposing conditions in the framework of the
policy to be followed in foreign trade and the
granting of credits. Such a joint concept should
also include the establishment of conditions
whereby European institutions might possibly
place their means and infrastructures at the dis-
posal of other regional organisations.
85. An important part of such a task should
be devoted to the future r6le of the United
Nations and its co-operation with Western
European Union and NATO, in particular with
regard to armed forces assigned to the United
Nations. This would be also a suitable oppor-
tunity for harmonising, in agreement with the
United Nations, the different terms used in the
relevant areas. At the moment, for instance,
" peace-making " in the sense used by the
United Nations, means action to bring hostile
parties to agreement, essentially through
peaceful means, whereas the Petersberg Decla-
ration uses the term in connection with tasks of
combat forces for terminating hostilities.
86. In this respect, WEU should make better
use of the results of the work of the NACC
ad-hoc group on cGoperation and peace-keeping
presented at the meeting of the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council in Athens on l lth June
1993 
'8. NACC not only has the advantage ofhaving worked out terminology for the various
options in these matters corresponding broadly
to that used in the framework of the United
Nations, it has also worked out and started a
wide-ranging programme of work extending well
beyond what is known about the activities of the
WEU Forum of Consultation in these matters.It
has to be noted that WEU is lagging well behind
in an area that corresponds perfectly to its
responsibilities, its obligations under the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty and the ambitious inten-
tions it voiced in the Maastricht and Petersberg
Declarations.
18. Report published in the NATO Review, No. 4, August
1993, Volume 41, page 30.
87. Conversely, it should be recognised that
the tangible, civil, assistance WEU afforded to
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in order to
strengthen means at the disposal of those coun-
tries to enforce, on the Danube, respect for the
embargo on Serbia is a good example of WEU's
operational co-operation with its consultation
partners. This effort calls for many economic
sacrifices by the abovementioned countries and
some have asked your rapporteur whether patrol
boats cannot also be present in the Serb part of
the Danube.
88. During your Rapporteur's meeting with
the United Nations Secretary-General, the latter
underlined that after the cold war the world is
only starting to learn new experiences and new
terminologies in the area of maintaining peace
and security. After 1945, about a decade
was needed before everyone understood and
accepted the system of confronting pact systems.
The learning process regarding a new kind of
collective security would need almost as long.
89. An important matter for a new platform
would of course be to redefine the possibilities
and limits of the modified Brussels Treaty in the
new security environment with special regard to
Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the treaty. Nor
should WEU hesitate to voice its views on the
future development of the United Nations. The
principle that only states can become members
of the United Nations and its Security Council
will create increasing difficulties as the impor-
tance of the United Nations Security Council
increases and as European integration pro-
gresses. This is a particularly acute problem,
because any revision of the charter is a delicate
undertaking, but it has to be studied.
90. In practice, WEU should seek more
opportunities to hannonise positions in the dif-
ferent committees and working groups at the
United Nations headquarters dealing with
matters within the purview of WEU. To the best
of your rapporteur's knowledge, there has so far
been only one meeting of representatives of
WEU member countries in New York in order
to discuss confidence-building measures in outer
space. On the contrary, there are regular
meetings of mission representatives of the
Twelve, and there is even a special United
Nations mission of the European Community.
NATO has now seconded a liaison officer to the
United Nations.
91. There are many reasons why missions of
WEU countries should also meet in New York
in order to co-ordinate their positions. In the
special committee on peace-keeping operations
created by the United Nations General
Assembly, France, Germany, the Netherlands
and Great Britain are full members, and
Belgium, Luxemburg, Portugal, Norway and
Turkey are observers. This is a very important
committee, in which WEU should act with one
l5l
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voice as far as possible. The same should be
done in the framework of the Special Committee
on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the R6le of the Organisation
which devotes its activities in particular to
co-operation between the United Nations and
regional organisations in maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
92. But the most urgent question to which all
interested member states and organisations
should give priority is the steadily worsening
financial situation of the United Nations, in par-
ticular with regard to peace-keeping missions.
The United Nations Secretary-General said in
New York that everybody agreed that the
United Nations should be responsible for
stopping violence and killing in the world
because nobody else would be able or ready to
assume this task. During the cold war, most
countries spent vast sums of money to finance
their defence and armaments. Furthermore,
industrial countries delivered huge quantities of
armaments to the third world. These burdens
now have to be removed. This should not be too
difficult since the contributions of each country
are not excessive.
93. It is obvious that the financial aspect and
the question of sharing the financial burdens in
peace-keeping activities should also be discussedin WEU and in our national parliaments.
Several proposals, including taxes on anns
exports, creation of independent funds, etc.,
have been put forward. All these proposals
should be examined carefully, including the
study by the Stimson Centre in Washington
which seems worthy of special attention,
including the proposal to establish a two-year
budget especially reserved for peace-keeping
which would be revised each year jointly with
the ordinary budget of the United Nations.
According to this study, a special fund should be
created for establishing peace which would con-
stitute a collection centre for the contributions
to be paid. But the crucial condition for
improving the situation is whether there is
enough confidence in the ability of the United
Nations to assume its role of central instrument
for preventing and resolving conflicts and pre-
serving peace in the world.
YI. Conclusions
94. The debates and speeches during the
present session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations that opened in New York in
September 1993 have revealed important diver-
gencies between Americans, Russians and Euro-
peans regarding the future r6le and functions
of the United Nations, particularly in peace-
keeping and regarding the conditions for the
participation of member countries in such oper-
ations.
95. The United States, apparently influenced
by the failure of the Somalia operation, has rede-
fined in a more restrictive manner the guidelines
for its participation in United Nations actions,
interpreting very closely the charter of the
organisation, reserving the possibility of acting
unilaterally in the event of a threat to its vital
interests and asking for any peace-keeping oper-
ation in Bosnia to be conducted under NATO
command. This position seems to be shared to a
large extent by the United Kingdom.
96. On the other hand, France and Germany
seem to lay greater stress on the need to
strengthen the rOle of the United Nations and
the control exercised by the Security Council.
The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has
put forward something of a Russian Monroe
doctrinere claiming for Russia the exclusive
right to intervene within the frontiers of the
former Soviet Union in order to attempt to quell
national conflicts.
97. In the circumstances, it is not surprising
that certain public statements made recently by
the United Nations Secretary-General might be
interpreted as signs of resignation, particularly
with regard to the aptitude of the United
Nations to impose peace. In an interview
granted to Le Monde on l9th October 1993,
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted that the
United Nations could intervene only with the
agreement of the belligerents. If they did not
want peace, it could not be forced upon them.
98. Any weakening of the r6le of the United
Nations as the principal instrument for
legitimising the settlement of conflicts and safe-
guarding peace in the world would dangerously
affect the credibility of the United Nations itself
and would also weaken the credibility of initia-
tives taken by organisations with the necessary
infrastructures such as WEU and NATO in their
endeavours to become serious actors in peace-
keeping, provided they receive an appropriate
mandate from the United Nations to this end.
The two organisations and their member coun-
tries therefore share a heavy responsibility sinceit is their task to achieve the joint goal of
working out and implementing appropriate
arrangements for ensuring the maintenance of
peace wherever it may be threatened.
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APPENDIX
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
An Agenda for Peace
Extract
YII. Co-operation with rcgional afiangements
and organisations
63. In the past, regional arrangements often
were created because of the absence of a uni-
versal system for collective security; thus their
activities could on occasion work at cross-
purposes with the sense of solidarity required
for the effectiveness of the world organisation.
But in this new era of opportunity, regional
arrangements or agencies can render great
service if their activities are undertaken in a
manner consistent with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the charter and if their relationship
with the United Nations, and particularly the
Security Council, is governed by Chapter VIII.
64. It is not the purpose ofthe present report
to set forth any formal pattern of relationship
between regional organisations and the United
Nations, or to call for any specific division of
labour. What is clear, however, is that regional
arrangements or agencies in many cases possess
a potential that should be utilised in serving the
functions covered in this report: preventive
diplomacy, peace-keeping peace-making and
post-conflict peace-building. Under the charter,
the Security Council has and will continue to
have primary responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security, but regional
action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation
and co-operation with United Nations efforts
could not only lighten the burden of the Council
but also contribute to a deeper sense of partici-
pation, consensus and democratisation in inter-
national affairs.
65. Regional arrangements and agencies have
not in recent decades been considered in this
light, even when originally designed in part for a
r6le in maintaining or restoring peace within
their regions of the world. Today a new sense
exists that they have contributions to make.
Consultations between the United Nations and
regional arrangements or agencies could do
much to build international consensus on the
nature of a problem and the measures required
to address it. Regional organisations partici-
pating in complementary efforts with the United
Nations in joint undertakings would encourage
states outside the region to act supportively.
And should the Security Council choose specifi-
cally to authorise a regional arrangement or
organisation to take the lead in addressing a
crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the
weight of the United Nations to the validity of
the regional effort. Carried fonvard in the spirit
of the charter, and as envisioned in ChapterVIII, the approach outlined here could
strengthen a general sense that democratisation
is being encouraged at all levels in the task of
maintaining international peace and security, it
being essential to continue to recognise that the
primary responsibility will continue to reside in
the Security Council.
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Amendments I and 2 30th 
November 1993
Politicol relations befioeen tlu United Nations and WEU aad
their coasequences for the developmcnt of WEU
AMENDMENTS I and 2r
tabled by Mr. Soell
l. At the end of paragraph (niii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add the following
words:
' , but emphasising nevertheless that in practice the Security Council has introduced, since 1991,
the possibility of intervening in internal hostilities when they constitute a threat to the peace and
security of other states; "
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, delete: " Make proposals for reforming'
and insert " Study in detail the proposals made in the meantime with regard to reforming ".
Signed: Soell
l. See 9th sitting, 3fth November 1993 (amendments agreed to).
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Rqision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
enlargemcnt of WEU
I. Creation of an assuiate member status
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pfiviloges2
by Lord Finsberg, Raplorteat
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Durr DrcrsroN
on the revision of the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly with a
view to the creation of a status of associate member
Expr-eNeronv MruonnNourvt
submitted by Lord Finsberg, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. The status of associate member in the WEU Assembly
ApprNorcr,s
I. Order 85 on the enlargement of WEU
II. Written Question 300
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman); MM. Amaral, Ferrarini (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs. Aguiar, MM.
Battistuzzi, Bolinaga (Alternate: Grau I Buldu), Mrs. Brasseur, MM. Couveinhes, Cuco, Deniau, Dicks, Lord Finsberg (Alternate:
Dr. Godman'), MM. Hughes, Junghanns, Le Jeune, van der Maelen, Mignon, Ottenbourgh, Sainz Garcia (Alternate: Mrs. Sanchez
de Miguet), Scheer, von Schmude, Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg, MM. Trabacchini, Visibelli.
N.B. Ihe names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Decision
on thc rufision of thc Charter aad Ralas ol Pmcedurc of the Assenbly
with a view to ,he creatioa of a status ol associate member
The Assembly,
Drctoes
I. To revise the Charter of the Assembly as follows:
1. After the Iirst paragraph ofthe preamble, ending " 5th July 1955 " , add a second paragraph as
follows:
' In application of the decisions taken by the high contracting parties to the modified Brussels
Treaty set out in the Petersberg declaration of l9th June 1992 and in the'Document on associate
membership of WEU of the Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of
Turkey', signed in Rome on 2fth November 1992;"
2. At the end of Article II, add a new paragraph (c/ as follows:
' (c) The Assembly shall admit delegations of representatives and substitutes from the parlia-
ments of each associate member state of WEU and grant them prerogatives appropriate to the
participation of those states in the activities of WEU. "
3. Replace paragraph (a) of Article VI by the following text:
" (a/ Ministers who are members of the Council, other Ministers of member states and Ministers
of associate member states of WEU may be present at all sittings of the Assembly. Ministers of
member states may be heard by the Assembly at their own request and ministers of member or
associate member states at the Assembly's request. "
4. Replace the first sentence of paragraph (a) of Article VII by the following sentence:
" The Assembly shall set up a Presidential Committee which shall consist of the President of the
Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex offrcio, his predecessors as long as they remain representa-
tives or substitutes of the Assembly without intemrption, the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of
committees and one member appointed by each political group and by each delegation of an
associate member state of WEU. "
II. To revise the Rules of Procedure as follows:
l. Replace the first sentence of paragraph I of Rule 14 on the Presidential Committee by the fol-
lowing sentence:
* The Presidential Committee shall consist of the President of the Assembly, who shall be
Chairman ex oflicio, his predecessors as long as they remain representatives or substitutes of the
Assembly without intemrption, the Vice-Presidents, the chairmen of committees and one
member appointed by each political group and by each delegation of associate member states. '
2. After paragraph 2 of Rule 15, add a new paragraph 3 as follows:
' 3. Delegations of associate members shall participate and have voting rights in the Standing
Committee provided for in Rule 15 in accordance with the prerogatives deriving from their
status. The number of seats allocated to associate members shall be as follows:
Iceland: I
Norway: 2
Turkey: 3'
Renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
3. After Rule 16, add a new rule on the status of representatives of associate members of WEU in
the Assembly, as follows:
* Associate members
l. Associate member countries of WEU shall be represented at sessions of the Assembly by a
delegation of members from their national parliaments whose number shall be equal to that pro-
vided for in Article 26 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, i.e.:
Iceland: 3
Norway: 5
Turkey: 12
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These representatives shall be called 'associate members of the WEU Assembly'.
2. The Rules of Prmedure of the Assembly shall apply to the delegations of associate member
countries of WEU, with the exception of the following rules and paragraphs:
(a) Paragraph 1 of Rule 6 on the ratification of credentials shall not apply to the representatives
of associate member states.
(bi Rule l0 on the election of the Bureau shall not apply to the representatives of associate
member states.
(c/ Rule 2l on the languages of the Assembly shall not apply to the official languages of associate
member states.
(d/ Rule 29 on the debate on the annual report of the Council of Western European Union shall
not apply to the representatives of associate member states.
(e/ Rules 30 on motions,3l on amendments,32 on the right to speak,33 on procedural
motions, 34 on the organisation of debates, paragraph 2 of Rule 35 on methods of voting, 36
on majorities and 42 on procedure in committees shall apply to the representatives of asso-
ciate member states only in respect of debates in which they participate.
(fl Paragraph 4 of Rule 35 on methods of voting shall not apply to the representatives of asso-
ciate member states.
(g/ Rule 48 concerning the Oflice of the Clerk of the Assembly shall not apply to associate
member states.
(h) Bv a vote by absolute majority of the representatives of the modified Brussels Treaty powers,
the Assembly may suspend immediately the application of some or all of the provisions gov-
erning the status of associate member of the Assembly immediately in respect of representa-
tives of states whose actions cease to conform to the general aims liid down in the ireamble
to the modified Brussels Treaty.'
4. Former Rule 17 becomes Rule 18 and subsequent rules are renumbered accordingly.
5. At the end of Rule 37 on the quorum, add a new paragraph 4 as follows:
" 4. ln all cases, the quorum shall be calculated in accordance with the number of representa-
tives and substitutes authorised to take part in the vote. "
6. In paragraph 2 of Rule 40 on the appointment of committees, insert *Iceland l, Norway 2,
Turkey 4" forthe composition of the first and second of thepermanent committees and "Iceland l,
Norway 2, Turkey 3 " for the composition of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth of the permanent com-
mittees.
III. These amendments shall be included in the Charter and Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of
Western European Union as soon as the document on associate members of WEU, signed on 20th
November 1992, comes into force.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submined by lttd Fiasbery, Rapportear)
L lntroduction
1. The mandate of the Committee on Rules
of Procedure and Privileges in regard to the
status of countries becoming associate members
of WEU was defined in paragraph I (a) of Order
85 (see Appendix I), adopted by the Standing
Committee on l9th April 1993, as follows:
* The Assembly,
l. Invites its Committee on Rules of Pro-
cedure and Privileges:
(a) to examine the creation of a specific
'associate member' status for repre-
sentatives of associate member states
which will give full participation and
voting rights in committees and the
right to participate in the plenary ses-
sions of the Assembly with mem-
bership of delegations on the same
basis as the present Council of Europe
arrangements.'
2. It emerges from this mandate that:
(i) the Assembly wishes to gtant
'special status " to the representa-
tives of states becoming " associate
members " of WEU, i.e. not to grant
them the general status of representa-
tives of member states;
(ii) the Assembly intends them to partic-
ipate 'fully " in Assembly sessions
and committee meetings with, in
particular, the right to vote, which
means that it is not considering
having them enjoy all the other rights
granted to members of the Assembly,
particularly that of participating in
the bureaux of the Assembly and its
committees;
(iii) the Assembly considers that these
states, which are not signatories of the
modified Brussels Treaty, are not
bound by Article IX of the treaty, and
this conforms with the indications
given by the Council on the preroga-
tives of associate member states in its
reply to Written Question 300 (see
Appendix II). Consequently, their par-
liaments may constitute their delega-
tions " in accordance with the same
criteria as representatives to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe', i.e. delegations do not neces-
sarily have to be identical with their
countries' delegations to the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
3. These three considerations were taken by
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges as the basis for seeking to define a status
allowing the representatives of associate
member countries to participate fully in the
Assembly, taking into account the nature and
extent of their commitments to WEU as defined
in the Petersberg declaration and in the * Doc-
ument on associate membership of WEU of the
Republic of Iceland, the Kingdom of Nonray
and the Republic of Turkey ", signed on 20th
November 1992, and as set out in the Council's
reply to Written Question 300. It will be recalled
that the Assembly's wish was that Greece and
Turkey should be admitted simultaneously as
full members. This view was not shared by the
Council of Ministers, thus giving rise to some
unnecessary complications.
4. From a juridical standpoint, it is the doc-
ument on associate members that determines
their status in WEU. This text has neither the
form ofa treaty nor that ofa convention or pro
tocol as defined in the Vienna Convention on
treaty law. Certain signatory states (Turkey,
Germany) have nevertheless decided to submit
it to ratilication by their parliamentary bodies.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that all the
signatory states will do likewise, thus leading to
ambiguity about the nature and significance of
this document and about the will of the govern-
ments.
5. According to the document signed in
Rome on 20th December 1992, associate
member states of WEU are in no way parties to
WEU's constituent act, the modified Brussels
Treaty. The document does not say that they
subscribe to the aims assigned to WEU in the
preamble to the modified Brussels Treaty or
certain articles of that treaty, particularly its
Article IX. The Council confirmed this interpre-
tation in its reply to Written Question 300.
6. This fact being established, it limits the
implications of the will the Assembly might
have had to grant representatives of associate
members identical rights to those of representa-
tives of the modified Brussels Treaty powers.
II. The status of associate member
in the WEU Assembly
7. In view of the above considerations, the
proposals set out below on the status of delega-
tions of associate member countries in the
Assembly follow up Order 85 as far as this is
possible.
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8. Since associate members are not parties to
the WEU constituent act nor, consequently, to
the juridical basis of its Assembly, their repre-
sentatives do not have the right to approve or
disapprove the annual report of the Council.
This competence is set out expressis verbis in
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty,
whose content is not binding on associate
members.
9. In any event, as the Council said in its
reply to Written Question 300, representatives
of governments of associate member countries
participate neither in the drafting nor in the
adoption of the annual report of the Council. If
a decision were taken to grant parliamentary
delegations of those states the right to vote on
the annual report of the Council, Article IX
would then have to be interpreted infra
legem.
10. In accordance with Order 85, the status of
associate member provides for associate
member states to be represented in Assembly
bodies and participate fully in its activities on a
basis equivalent to that of member countries.
11. Granting the right to vote to members of
parliamentary delegations from associate
member states implies that they may be
appointed rapporteurs in all committees,
including the Standing Committee, which,
under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure,
ensures the continuity of the Assembly's action
between sessions.
12. Hence the status of delegations of asso-
ciate member countries includes, for their
members, the right to speak, the right to table
amendments, the right to vote and the right to
present documents in accordance with the provi-
sions applying to representatives of member
countries of WEU.
13. However, the fact that delegations of asso-
ciate member countries are not entitled to par-
ticipate in votes in the Assembly and its com-
mittees on certain points rules out the election of
their members to the bureaux of the Assembly
and its committees since the President and Vice-
Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairmen
and Vice-Chairmen of committees have to
preside over discussions that may relate to
matters outside their purview. It seems
desirable, however, for these delegations to be
represented in the Presidential Committee, in
view of their active participation in the work of
the Assembly, but they may be represented only
under a special provision of the Rules of Pro
cedure relating to them.
14. For the same reasons, associate member
countries are not entitled to phrticipate in the
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly or in the
appointment of its members. This provision cor-
responds with practice in the WEU Council.
15. Finally, associate members have not
entered into the juridical undertakings vis-i-vis
the aims of the modified Brussels Treaty that
bind the signatory countries except insofar as
these correspond to the aims of the Washington
Treaty and insofar as they are, by the document
of 20th November 1992, bound by the modified
Brussels Treaty. The Assembly should therefore
reserve the right to suspend the application of
certain provisions contained in the status of asso-
ciate member or even to suspend application of
that status in its entirety, for example in the case
of an associate member no longer fulfilling the
conditions essential for its participation in the
activities of the WEU Assembly. Unlike the
Council of Europe, the Assembly is not
empowered to exclude or suspend the partici-
pation of delegations of member countries from
its work. It may only recommend that the
Council denounce the application of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty where they are concerned.
However, such exclusion or suspension would
follow automatically in the event of exclusion or
suspension being pronounced by the Council of
Europe because of the lack of valid credentials.
This is not so for delegations of associate
member states since there is no juridical text
linking their participation in the WEU Assembly
with their membership of the Council of Europe.
The WEU Assembly should therefore have the
unfettered right to exclude or suspend them.
16. From these considerations stem the pro-
posed amendments to the Charter and Rules of
Procedure of the Assembly. These amendments
seek lo lay down a principle according to which
the Rules of Procedure are applicable to delega-
tions of associate member states of WEU and to
specify cases in which derogations from this prin-
ciple are necessary and to draw the consequences
of this principle and these derogations for the
functioning of the Assembly.
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APPENDIX I
ORDER 85 
'
on the enlorgement of WEU
The Assembly,
O Considering the protocol of accession of Greece to WEU; the declaration on WEU observers
regarding Denmark and lreland and the document on the associate membership of WEU regarding
Iceland, Norway and Turkey;
(it) Stressing the need to formalise the relationship between WEU Assembly and parliamentary rep
resentatives from Denmark and Ireland on the one hand and from lceland, Norway and Turkey on the
other, in an * observer statute " and an * associate member statute " respectively;(iiil Considering the enhancement of WEU's relations with Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the Slovak republic at various levels;
(iv) Noting that parliamentarians from the states mentioned under (iil should be invited to the
Assembly's plenary sessions on a pennanent basis as guest members, without voting rights;(v) lnsisting, however, that at all times, the Assembly should retain the right to suspend parlia-
mentary delegations from countries where the practice of parliamentary democracy is violated or
where human rights are not being respected;
(vil Considering that the participation of a disproportionate number of parliamentary observers
from non-WEU member states in the plenary debates of the Assembly may affect the character of the
dialogue between Council and Assembly;
(vit) Aware that any reasonable enlargement of the number of parliamentary delegations participating
in the Assembly will be impossible without major adjustments of the Assembly's accommodation and
budgeu
(viii) Considering that it is urgent to make a coherent examination of all political and budgetary ques-
tions, including the rules of procedure, in order to take full account of the consequences for the
Assembly of WEU's enlargement,
l. Invites its Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges:
(a) to examine the creation of a specific ' associate member " status for representatives of asso-
ciate member states which will give full participation and voting rights in committees and
the right to participate in the plenary sessions of the Assembly with membership of delega-
tions on the same basis as the present Council of Europe arrangements;
(b) to examine the creation of an * observer status " and a " permanent observer " or * guest
member status " for representatives of observer states and of the nine central European
countries assembled in the forum of consultation respectively;
2. Invites the Political Committee to monitor the development of WEU's enlargement;
3. Invites the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration to examine in detail the conse-
quences of enlargement for the Assembly's budget and premises;
4. Invites the Presidential Committee to co'ordinate the activities of the Political Committee, the
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration and the Committee on Rules of Procedure and
Privileges in this matter, so as to ensure that appropriate reports and recommendations can be put to
the Assembly no later than its December 1993 meeting.
l9th April 1993 (See Document 1360).
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APPENDIX II
wRrTrEN QUESTTON 300
put to the Council by Mr. Goerens
Countries that become associate members
of WEU will be invited to take part in all the
activities of WEU and to contribute to the
organisation's budget. Does this include the
Assembly's budget? Will they take part in the
drafting and adoption of the annual report of the
Council? Will their delegations to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
benefit from Article IX of the treaty? Does the
Council consider that the definition of the status
of associate member or observer in WEU is
covered by Article XI of the treaty and that, con-
sequently, it is for the Council alone to
determine the nature of such status or that it is
covered by Article VIII, paragraph 2, which
would allow the Assembly to draw the conse-
quences of decisions taken by the Council where
it is concerned?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on 4th Novcmfur 1992
1. According to Part III of the Petersberg
Declaration " on relations between WEU and
the other European member states of the
European Union or the Atlantic Alliance ",
" European member states of the Atlantic
Alliance which are not member states of the
European Union and which have accepted the
invitation to become associate members of
WEU, although not being parties to the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, may participate fully in
the meetings of the WEU Council 
- 
without
prejudice to the provisions laid down in Article
VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty 
- 
of its
working groups and of the subsidiary bodies ",
subject to a number of provisions. These provi-
sions include the following: " they [the associate
membersl will be asked to make a financial con-
tribution to the organisation's budgets ". The
precise modalities of this provision will have to
be specified by the Council in the dialogue with
the states concerned.
2. As regards the drafting and adoption of
the Council's annual report, the modified
Brussels Treaty clearly states that a Council
created by the High Contracting Parties (Article
VIII, paragraph l)'shall make an annual report
on its activities... " (Article lX). h is pointed out
that Part III of the Petersberg Declaration spec-
iJied that neither associate members nor
obsemers are parties to the modiJied Brussels
Treaty.
3. It should be recalled that Article IX of the
modified Brussels Treaty states: " The Council
of Western European Union shall make an
annual report on its activities and in particular
concerning the control of armaments to an
Assembly composed of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe ". Part III of
the Petersberg Declaration specifies that asso-
ciate members and observers are not parties to
the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence it appears
that only the representatives of the " Brussels
Treaty Powers " (i.e. full member states of
Western European Union) to the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe could befull members of the WEU parliamentary
Assembly.
4. According to Article XI of the modified
Brussels Treaty, " the High Contracting Parties
may, by agreement, invite any other state to
accede to the present treaty on conditions to be
agreed between them and the state so invited.
Any state so invited may become a party to the
treaty by depositing an instrument of accession
with the Belgian Government ". As specified in
Part III of the Petersberg Declaration, neither
associate members nor observers are parties to
the modified Brussels Treaty. Hence associate
membership and observer status are not covered
by Article IX or Article VIII of the modified
Brussels Treaty. The definition of a status of
associate state or observer state cannot therefore
be considered as creating a subsidiary body
within the meaning of Article VIII, paragraph 2
of the modified Brussels Treaty.
The invititations extended by WEU to
other member states of the European Union and
other European member states of the Atlantic
Alliance reflect the preamble of the modified
Brussels Treaty which states: " [The High Con-
tracting Parties,] resolved:... To promote the
unity and to encourage the progressive inte-
gration of Europe; to associate progressively in
the pursuance of these aims other states inspired
by the same ideals and animated by the like
determination... ".
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Amendments I and 2 29th November 
1993
Revision ond interprctation of the Rulcs of Prucedure: enbrgemnt of WEU
I. Creation of an associate member stotas
AMENDMENTS I and 2t
tabled by Mrs. Baameld-Schlaman atd othen
l. At the end of paragraph I.2 of the draft decision, insert 'without voting rights in plenary
sessions ".
2. In paragraph II.2 of the draft decision, leave out * and have' and insert * without ".
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Pdcriaux, Martinez, Tummers, de Puig, Guirado, Roman, Cuco,
Sanchez, Zapatero
l. See 8th sitting, 30th November 1993 (amendments agreed to).
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Document 1391 8th November 1993
Refision and interpraafion of the Rulcs of Procedure:
enlargement of WEU
II. Accession of Greece
REPORT 
'
submitted on fuhalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges2
hy Mr. Fenartni, Yice-Chairman and Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr DecrsroN
on the revision of Rules 1,9, 15 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure
Expr-eNarony MEtuoneNourra
submitted by Mr. Ferrarini, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur
l. General
2. Changes to be made to the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly
l. Adopted unanimously by the ommittee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman) ; MM. Amaral, Ferrarini (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs. Aguiar, MM.
Battistuzzi, Bolinaga (Alternate: Grau I Buldu), Mrs. Brasseur, MM. Couveinhes, Cuco, Deniau, Dicks, Lord Finsbery (Alternate:
Godman), MM. Hughes, Junghanns, [r Jeune, van der Maelen, Mignon, Ottenbourgh, Sainz Garcia (Alternate: Mrs. Sanchez de
Miguel), Scheer, von Schmude, Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Mr. Stoffelen, Mrs. Terborg, MM. Trabacchini, Visibelli.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Decision
on the revision ol Rules 1, 9, 15 and 10 of the Rulcs of Procedurc
The Assembly,
Drcrors
I. To revise Rules 1,9, 15 and 40 of the Rules of Procedure as follows:
l. Rule I
In paragraph 2, after " Germany: 18 ", insert * Greece: 7 " .
2. Rule 9
In paragraph l, leave out * eight " and insert " nine'.
3. Rule 15
In paragraph 2, after " Belgium ", insert * Greece ".
4. Rule 40
In paragraph 2,
- after " The first and second of the permanent committees shall be composed of ", leave out
" thirty-four " and insert * thirty-seven ";
- 
after 'Germany 5 ", insert " Greece 3 ";
- 
after * The third, fourth, fifth and sixth permanent committees shall be composed of ', leave
out 'twenty-six " and insert * twenty-eight ";
- 
after * Germany 4 ", insert * Greece 2".
il. To include the changes in paragraphs l, 2, 3 and 4 of the present decision in the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Assembly the day the accession of the Hellenic Republic comes into force.
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Erplanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Mr. Ferrarini, Yice-Chairman and Rapporteur)
1. Gcnerul
l. According to Article IX of the modified
Brussels Treaty:
'The Council of Western European
Union shall make an annual report on its
activities and in particular concerning the
control of armaments to an Assembly
composed of representatives of the
Brussels Treaty powers to the Consul-
tative Assembly of the Council of
Europe. "
This provision implies that, as soon as the pro-
tocol of accession comes into force, i.e. once the
last notification of ratification has been
received, Greece's parliamentary delegation to
the Council of Europe will takes its rightful
place in the WEU Assembly. Consequently, the
Rules of Procedure of the Assembly have to be
revised to allow members of that delegation,
when the time comes, to benefit fully from all
the prerogatives of members of the Assembly.
2. The protocol of accession of the Hellenic
Republic to WEU was signed at the meeting of
the Council held in Rome on 20th November
t992.
3. Following the signing of the Maastricht
Treaty on lOth December 1991, on 30th June
1992 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany, then Chairman-
in-Office of the WEU Council, sent an invi-
tation to the Hellenic Republic to hold negotia-
tions to determine the conditions for its possible
accession to the modified Brussels Treaty. These
negotiations, which conformed with Article XI
of the constituent act of WEU, led to a positive
conclusion resulting in the signing of the pro-
tocol of accession in Rome on 2fth November
1992.
4. According to Article XII of the treaty, the
said protocol comes into force on the date of the
deposit with the Belgian Government of the last
notification of ratification by signatory states of
the protocol in accordance with appropriate
national procedure.
5. The signing ofthe protocol ofaccession of
the Hellenic Republic to WEU leads to signatory
governments starting the procedure for ratifying
the said protocol. The accession of Greece and
its date depend on a decision by the constitu-
tionally competent bodies of the countries con-
cerned. Consequently, although it is not at
present possible to foresee the exact date of the
accession of the Hellenic Republic to WEU, the
Assembly must provide for it to take place.
6. When Greece becomes a full member of
WEU, it will have the same rights and obliga-
tions as the other modified Brussels Treaty
powers. This fact determines the changes to be
made to the Rules of Procedure of the WEU
Assembly.
7. The members of the Greek Delegation to
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe will be the representatives of the Greek
Parliament to the Assembly; as such, they will
have the same rights as the representatives of
other modified Brussels Treaty powers in
accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, the
Charter and the Rules of Procedure of our
Assembly. The Greek language will become the
eighth oflicial language of the WEU Assembly.
The question whether the Rules of Procedure of
the Assembly should be revised to limit the
number of official languages is not linked with
the accession of Greece. The Assembly may
have to raise the matter when it believes this
useful, but the case of the Greek language must
not be dealt with differently from that of the
official languages of other member countries.
8. The seven members and seven substitutes
forming Greece's Delegation to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe will
take their seats in the chamber on the same basis
as the representatives of the other modified
Brussels Treaty powers. They will be able to par-
ticipate fully in the work of the Assembly and its
committees, where it will be possible for them to
be elected as chairmen or rapporteurs.
9. The changes to be made to the Rules of
Procedure of the Assembly therefore rule out
any point of discussion or interpretation. They
stem directly from the protocol of accession of
Greece to the modified Brussels Treaty and the
Rules of Procedure of the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe. They are of
the same nature as those made to the Rules of
Procedure of the WEU Assembly when Portugal
and Spain acceded to the modified Brussels
Treaty.
2. Chaages to be mode
to the Rulos of Procedure
of the Assembly
10. Rule I of the Rules of Procedure will
therefore be revised by the insertion of " Greece:
7 ", this being the number of Greek representa-
tives to the Assembly of the Council of Europe.
The change in the composition of the Assembly
will necessarily mean a change in the compo-
sition of its Bureau and committees. The spirit
underlying the provisions of Rule 9 concerning
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the Bureau of the Assembly is to allow each
member country to designate a candidate for the
Bureau.
ll. Hence Rule 9, paragraph l, necessarily
has to be revised to read:
" The Bureau of the Assembly shall
consist of the President and nine Vice-
Presidents. "
12. Similarly, the provisions of Rule 40 con-
cerning the appointment of committees have to
be changed to allow the new delegation to be
represented in each of the six standing com-
mittees in proportion to the number of its
members. The provisions of Rule l5 concerning
the Standing Committee have to be changed in
accordance with the same principle.
13. Since Greece has the same number of
representatives as Belgium, the Netherlands and
Portugal, it will therefore have three seats in the
first and second permanent committees and two
in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth.
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Document 1392 8th November 1993
Retision and interpretation of the Rules of Procedure:
enlargement of WEU
III. Creation of an obsemer status, a Wrmanent
obsemer or gaest member status
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Committet oil Rules of Procedure and Privileges 2
by Mr. Ferrarini, Yice-Chairman aad Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr Drcrsror.r
on the creation of a status of permanent observer
ExpLeuntony MEuoneNoul,r
submitted by Mr. Ferrarini, Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Thompson (Chairman) ; MM. Amaral, Ferrarini (Vice-Chairmen); Mrs. Agaiar, MM.
Battistuzzi, Bolinaga (Alternate: Grau I Buldu), Mrs. Brasseur, MM. Couveinhes, Cuco, Deniau, Dicks, lord Finsberg (Alternate:
Godman), MM. Hughes, Junghanns, k Jeune, van der Maelen, Mignon, Ottenbourgh, Sainz Garcia (Alternate: Mrs. Sanchez de
Miquel), Scheer, von Schmude, Mrs. Soutendijk van Appeldoorn, Mr. Stolfelen, Mrs. Terbory, MM. Trabacchini, Visibelli.
N.B. Ifte names of those taking prt in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Decision
on the creatioa ol a statas of permanent observer
The Assembly,
(il In application of its Order 85;(ii) Considering that the declaration of member states of Western European Union, made at the
forty-sixth meeting of the European Council held in Maastricht on 9th and lfth December 1991, and
the declaration on WEU observers, issued at the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers held in
Rome on 2fth November 1992,led to the Assembly wishing to make the invitation to parliamentary
observers from states that have become observers in WEU a permanent arrangement;(iii) Noting the creation of the WEU Forum of Consultation and the fact that countries participating
in that forum are now permanent interlocutors in WEU,
Drclors
l. To create a status of "permanent observer" in the WEU Assembly for representatives of
observer countries in WEU and countries participating in the WEU Forum of Consultation;
2. To this end, to redraft Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure as follows:
" On the proposal of the Presidential Committee, the Assembly may admit representatives of
parliaments of non-member states of WEU as observers. Its decision may be of a permanent
nature, in which case observers from the states concerned shall assume the title of 'permanent
observers'. These observers shall sit in the chamber but not be entitled to vote. They may speak
with the authorisation of the President of the Assembly. "
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Explanatory Memorandum
(wbmitted by Mr. Fermriai, Yicc-Chairman aad Rapporteu)
l. Your Rapporteur does not propose to
include among the aims he has set himself the
creation of a wide range of juridical statuses for
participants in the activities of the Assembly as
this would make the exercise of the presidency
extremely difficult.
2. The decision to create a status of observer
in WEU stemmed from the refusal of two
member states of the Euro,pean community to
accede to the modified Brussels Treaty, although
they wished to take part in the process of devel-
oping European integration in foreign and joint
security policy as defined in the Maastricht
Treaty. There has been no agreement between
those countries and the member countries of
WEU on the nature of their participation in the
activities of WEU in general and of its Assembly
in particular but simply a declaration by the
WEU Council inviting them to take part in
some of its activities, without making such par-
ticipation a right. The only right granted by the
Council to a state having the status of observer
in WEU concerns Denmark. The purpose is to
ensure that the transfer to WEU of institutions
to which it belongs does not reduce the rights
and responsibilities of Denmark vis-i-vis such
institutions. This provision obviously has in
mind the Independent European Programme
Group whose transfer to WEU has, in the
meantime, effectively been decided by the gov-
ernments concerned.
3. Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure pro-
vides for the admission, as observers, of repre-
sentatives of parliaments of non-member states
of WEU. Your Rapporteur considers that the
status of permanent observer is simply an
extension of the application of that rule to dele-
gations from parliaments of observer countries
in WEU, so that members of such delegations
benefit on a perrnanent basis from the preroga-
tives granted to observers under Rule 17.
4. Rule 17 reads as follows:
" On the proposal of the Presidential
Committee, the Assembly may admit
representatives of parliaments of non-
member states of WEU as observers. Its
decision may be of a permanent nature, in
which case observers from the states con-
cerned shall assume the title of 'per-
manent observers'. These observers shall
sit in the chamber but not be entitled to
vote. They may speak with the
authorisation of the President of the
Assembly. "
This allows the Assembly to decide, in con-
formity with the provisions of its Rules of Pro-
cedure, to give a perrnanent nature to the invi-
tation that it sends to representatives of parlia-
ments of observer countries in WEU and the
nine Central European countries meeting in the
framework of the Forum of Consultation, as it
decided when adopting Order 85.
5. Since the observer countries in WEU have
decided not to follow up the proposal made to
them to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty
and thus become members of WEU, there seems
to be no question of granting representatives of
their parliaments the right to vote in the WEU
Assembly. Nor, in present circumstances, can
this right be granted to representatives ofparlia-
ments of countries participating in the WEU
forum since this forum does not exercise the
responsibilities assigned to the WEU Council in
the modified Brussels Treaty.
6. It should be recalled that Rule 42, para-
graph 7, of the Rules of Procedure allows com-
mittees to invite observers whenever they feel
this to be desirable. It is therefore for the com-
mittees to decide, when this is considered useful,
to invite to their meetings representatives of the
parliaments of observer countries in WEU or
countries participating in the WEU forum.
There can obviously be no question of giving
such observers the right to vote if they are not
entitled to do so at sessions of the Assembly
since the r6le of the committees is to prepare
documents for submission to vote by the
Assembly.
7. Moreover, your Rapporteur's proposal
allows the Assembly to suspend or revoke the
attribution of permanent observer status to the
delegation of any country which no longer fulfils
the conditions necessary for its participation in
the work of the Assembly either following a
decision by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe to suspend or exclude it or
because of a policy pursued by those countries
which no longer corresponds to the aims
assigned to WEU in the modified Brussels
Treaty.
8. To create a status of " permanent ob-
server " in the Assembly, it therefore suffices to
add a sentence to Rule 17 and the conditions
governing such a status may be specified in a
decision of the Assembly without being included
in its Rules of Procedure.
9. To take into account the fact that
observer countries are members of the European
Community and signatories of the Maastricht
t69
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Treaty and hence destined to become members
of WEU, the Assembly might therefore decide to
invite the two countries concerned to appoint a
parliamentary delegation with the same number
of members as their delegation to the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. For
their part, the countries participating in the
WEU Forum of Consultation might be asked to
appoint two-member delegations. If, subse-
quently, these provisions were to be deemed
inappropriate, they might be modified at any
time by the Assembly or by the bodies
empowered to replace it, i.e. the Standing Com-
mittee or the Presidential Committee.
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Document 1393 8th November 1993
The development of a European space-based
obsemation system - Part II
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Technological and Aerospace Committee2
by Mr. Yalkix, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnarr RrcouurNoeuoN
on the development of a European space-based observation system - Part II
ExpLeNnronv MruonaNout t
submitted by Mr. Yalleix, Rapporteur
I. Introduction
II. Activities of the WEU Council
(i) The Torrej6n satellite centre
(iil Study management team - feasibility study on the creation of a
European space-based observation system
III. Strategic importance of developing a European space-based obser-
vation system
(i) what is at stake?
(iy' Europe's industrial capabilities
(iii) The expedience of extra-European participation in space co-operation
IY. Conclusions
APPENDICES
I. WEUSC experimental phase
II. System overview
III. System implementation
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lopez Henares (Chairman) ; MM. Lenzer, BoQergu (Alternate fo1 Mr. Palacios) (Vice-
Ctrairmen); \iM. Atkinson, Biefnot, Mrs. Blunck, MM. Bt hm, bosco, Curto, Davis, De Paoli,-Dimmer, Gonardo,Mrs. Guirado
Perez, Mfi. Guzzetti (Alternate: Paire), Jeambrun, k Grand, Litherland (Alternate: Cunlilfe), Menzel, Pogas Santos, Roget,
Sarens (Alternate: Monrth\, Sir Donald Thompson, MM. Tummers, Valleix, Verbeek.
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Draft Recommendation
o n t hc deu e toP me at 
o"Irr;, !;:*fhsq7c* tasea
The Assembly,
(il Welcoming the inauguration of the Torrej6n satellite centre and the start of the experimental
stage of its activities;
Qi) Considering, nevertheless, that this is a first step towards the final goal of implementing aEuropean space-based observation system which would contribute to the maintenance oflnternational
peace and security;
6il Satisfied that the memorandum of understanding between WEU and the French, Italian and
Spanish Governments has been signed concerning the supply of Helios space images to the satellite
centre;(iv) Welcoming the work done by the industrial consortium, i.e. the feasibility studies of the main
system and the follow-up and analysis of this work achieved by the study management team;
(v) 
- 
Regretting that the Council has not taken into account Recommendation 523 of the Assembly
with particular regard to the invitation to inform the Assembly regularly:
" (a) about each stage of the entry into service of the satellite centre, its organogram and the
progress of the feasibility studies;
(b) abofi criteria governing the choice of space industries to equip the centre and establish the
observation system;"
(!i) 
- 
Regretting t!.qt the software used for the equipment of the centre is not of European origin, that,
furthermore,.it is diflicult to obtain more sophisticated versions of the software that would a[6w'oper-
ational activities and, finally, that this software is not suitable for receiving Helios images;(vii) Believing,moreover, that the feasibility study confirms that the system is viable and corresponds
to the specifications given;
(yiit) Strongly regretting that the ad hoc Sub-Group on Space, at its meeting on 27th October 1993,
objected to the budgetary provisions regarding the activitiei of the study management team and of the
industrial consortium in 1994;(ix) Believing that this decision in fact runs counter to the pursuit of the work of the team and of the
consortium;(x) 
.Considering-further that co-operation in space matters with the CIS countries can be of verygreat interest for the two parties concerned and offer reciprocal advantages;(xi) Taking account of the fact that the aim of this co-operation would be to seek to use the technical
and human resources of these countries for peaceful and preventive purposes;
(x.ii). Considering tha! the European Space Agency has shown that it was prepared to provide tech-
nical assistance for WEU's programmes and activities in the framework ofto-bperation between the
two organisations,
RrcouurNos rHAT tnr CouNcrr-
l. Inform the Assembly of the criteria leading to its choice of equipment for the Torrej6n satellite
centre;
2. ^ Keep the Assembly. informed of the steps it expects to take to ensure compatibility between thesoftware now in service with that to be introduced, in particular when the Helios syste- i6 operational;
1. - Take-appropriate decisions to avoid the slowing-down or paralysis of activities planned in 1994for the study management team and the industrial c-onsortium;
4. Foster co-operation with the CIS countries in space matters to the advantage of the parties con-
cerned with the main aim of using for peaceful and preventive purposes the tEchnical ind human
resources of these countries;
5. Contact the European Space Agency without delay in order to promote close co-operation
between the two organisations in space matters.
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Erplanatory Memorandum
(sabmitted by Mr. Yalleb" Rqporteur)
I. Intrduction
l. This report deals with a highly topical
political issue. The security problems that have
arisen in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the
Mediterranean region have made the creation of
a space-based observation system for both mil-
itary and civil purposes, that makes optimum
use of existing resources, a matter of the utmost
urgency. This is the way fonrard for Europe
towards independence in an area ofthe greatest
importance to its security.
2. The time has come for WEU to adopt a
realistic and ambitious programme and to rein-
force its contribution to the European ideal,
demonstrating clearly the available opportun-
ities for the integration that is the goal of the
organisation.
3. Progress made over the last eighteen
months has been very substantial - of that there
can be no doubt. However considerable effort is
still required and the most diffrcult stages are
those which still lie ahead.
4. The Council has contributed very little by
way of information to this report and that nec-
essary for informing public opinion and
obtaining popular support has been practically
non-existant. This represents an attempt to cir-
cumvent the inalienable right of parliamentary
representatives and the public at large to be kept
informed and a failure to obtain their backing
for government decisions which will profoundly
affect the future of Europe.
5. The Assembly hopes that in future infor-
mation released by the Council pertaining to the
subject matter of the present report will be suffi-
cient to enable the former to offer wholehearted
support for the successful conclusion of a pro-
gramme of interest to each and every one of us.
II. Aaivities of the WEU Council
(i) The Toneih satellite centre
6. The Torrej6n satellite centre was oflicially
inaugurated by the Defence Minister of Spain
and by the WEU Secretary-General on 28th
April 1993 in a ceremony also attended by the
President of the Assembly, the Chairman of the
Spanish Delegation and the Chairman of the
Technological and Aerospace Committee.
7. According to the Director of the centre, at
the time of the inauguration, 600/o of the staff
from seven of the member countries had already
been recruited and present estimates were that
all the staff would have taken up their posts by
next September or October.
8. On 27rh April 1993, before the inaugu-
ration of the satellite centre, the Spanish and
French Defence Ministers, the Italian Ambas-
sador in Spain and the WEU Secretary-General
had signed a memorandum of understanding for
supplying WEU with space images.
9. According to the communiqu6 from the
Spanish Ministry of Defence, this memorandum
authorised the release of images obtained by the
Helios satellite to the WEU satellite centre in
Torrej6n for processing, thus allowing it to have
adequate specific items for the accomplishment
of its tasks, such as monitoring disarmament
treaties, crisis-management and following
problems connected with the environment.
10. Indeed, at the June l99l session of our
Assembly, the French Minister of Defence, then
Mr. Joxe, spoke in the following terms:
* As you know, France, Spain and Italy
are involved in the Helios programme in
which the objective is to have a first
observation satellite in orbit in 1993. In
the WEU context, we hope that at the
next ministerial meeting it will be decided
to set up a centre for interpreting satellite
images to which Helios could con-
tribute. "
11. It is well known that Helios is a Franco-
Italian-spanish programme using optical obser-
vation satellites for military purposes (in fact,
this will be the first European military obser-
vation satellite). The launching of the first sat-
ellite of this type is to be in September 1994,
with a life expectation of four to five years.
12. The signing of this agreement was an
important qualitative step for the future evo-
lution of the centre and in this respect mention
should be made of Mr. van Eekelen's comments
in his speech at the satellite centre inauguration
ceremony:
"...In its experimental phase, the centre
will train analysts in the interpretation of
satellite imagery. This will be done using
data available from commercial sources
such as Spot, Landsat and ERS. The aim
will be to achieve a certain amount of
integration by pooling knowledge and
standardising working procedures. The
work of the centre will be assessed
towards the end of the three-year period
and its future development then
reviewed.
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Subsequently, the centre could become
more operational particularly for crisis-
monitoring and verification by using data
from satellites with better resolution such
as Helios 
- 
due to be launched in 1994. In
this context, a memorandum of under-
standing has been drawn up under which
the Helios partners (France, Italy and
Spain) would make data available to the
WEU satellite centre. It was signed only
yesterday, on the very eve of the centre's
inauguration. This data could then be
analysed by the image-interpreters trained
in the centre, and the results passed back
to national capitals. In its ultimate phase,
the centre could be responsible for oper-
ating WEU'S autonomous satellite obser-
vation capability, currently the subject of
medium- and long-term studies. "
The political questions raised by these aflirma-
tions being reserved for the next chapter, consid-
eration will now be given to the installation of
equipment in the centre.
13. To this end, tenders were submitted by
two consortia, one of which was led by
Adrospatiale and the other by Marcol (which
became Cray Systems Ltd. on lst January 1993)
which finally obtained the contract. The tender
of the consortium led by A6rospatiale was for
equipment and software intended mainly for the
processing and use of images.
14. The Falcon consortium (led by Marcol)
proposed supplying equipment intended mainly
to train image-interpreters but offering few oper-
ational possibilities. In view of its mainly
didactic characteristics, this tender was the
lowest and the criterion of cost induced the
Council to opt for the latter tender.
15. This choice is worthy of closer exami-
nation. First, the software chosen is American.
Second, according to information available to
your rapporteur, the equipment is not capable of
handling images from Helios. Finally, it is
apparently difficult for the Americans to supply
more sophisticated versions of the software
which might allow operational activities to be
pursued.
16. In Part I of the present report (Document
1304), one can read that:
* Without knowing the result of the exami-
nation of national tenders, it seems quite
right for the Council to give priority to
European space industries with a view to
enhancing their efficiency and competi-
tiveness, which have increased with time,
particularly through European Space
Agency programmes. This policy is also,
and perhaps more, justified in areas which
are still the weak points of European
industry, i.e. the development of data-
processing and interpretation, which is the
main vocation of the Torrej6n centre. "
17. The decision reached by the Council,
apparently based on economic criteria, tempts
your rapporteur to raise a number of questions:
over and above economic criteria, are there
other more profound reasons for justifying this
decision? Does the Council not believe that the
decision adopted makes the satellite centre
nothing more than a European school for image-
interpretation which would divert it from its
operational task ofa service for European head-
quarters? What response can the Council give to
the considerations put forward in the flrrst part
of this report?
18. Clearly, as the abovementioned document
noted, it will be necessary to overcome much
uncertainty and many difliculties if this under-
taking is to be crowned with success; our com-
mittee and the Assembly must continue to
afford it their full support and also be vigilant
lest it be diverted from its due goals.
19. One must also add that it will be nec-
essary to take the appropriate measures for the
centre to be in a position to process and classify
Helios images, hence the need to adapt the
centre and provide adequate financing; these
measures are justified by the technical character-
istics of the images received and by the degree of
secrecy required by the supplier countries.
20. The centre's equipnent was being
delivered in three stages, the last being expected
at the end of the year. According to information
given by its Director, Mr. Blaydes, during the
Eucosat symposium in Paris last June, the centre
had started training image-interpreters and had
also undertaken experimental tasking for a
number of organisations.
21. Mr. Blaydes speciflred that the centre's
missions were, frrst, to show the applications of
space imagery for treaty verification, crisis-
monitoring and environmental monitoring;
second, to train a nucleus of analysts for inter-
preting images and developing computer tech-
niques applied to the interpretation of images;
finally,'we have the r6le to supply initial opera-
tional image-interpretation products under these
missions back to our users ".
22. Still according to its Director, the users of
the centre would first be the Council and its
organisations, second, the member states to
assist in their decision-making processes as part
of their involvement with WEU and third, the
centre should satisfy the requirements of the
member states themselves. Finally, other
organisations such as the CSCE, the United
Nations or similar institutions might also be
users ofthe centre * ifthat is considered appro
priate by the Council ".
23. Mr. Blaydes believed that by the end of
the experimental phase, users should be able to
understand the benefits they could derive from
the centre, which would help them to support
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the decisions necessary concerning its future. He
believed its tasks were, therefore, in conformity
with the missions assigned to it and would
finally lead to its use in a fully-operational
manner.
24. It is clear that progress made so far and
the fact that it is possible to speak of the
Torrej6n satellite centre as a tangible reality are
important milestones in the development of a
European capability for monitoring the earth
from space; apart from negative judgments that
may be made regarding certain aspects of its
first steps, the fact remains that the centre now
exists and for its future development it will be
able to count on the full support of our
Assembly provided its comments are taken into
account.
(ii) Stady mailagement team - feasibility study
on thc crcolion of a Earupean space-based
obsenatbn system
25. The feasibility study for the main system
was finally accorded to the only group sub-
mitting a tender, a consortium composed of
almost 30 European firms, led by the German
firm Dornier, of the DASA group. This feasi-
bility study was conducted in two phases, the
first from May to December 1992 and the
second from March to November 1993. The
results of this second phase are to be communi-
cated on 2nd December 1993.
26. The results of the first phase of the study
were presented in Rome in December 1992.ln
addition to following the progress of this phase
and making a continuous assessment throughoutits duration, the study management team
ensured final verification of the study and sub-
mitted a series of questions and requests for
details to the consortium which were answered
after due analysis.
27. In February 1993 the study management
team held a meeting with the Space Group at
which analysis and the results of the first phase
were agreed and the start of the second phase
decided.
28. The aims of the first phase were to
identify preliminary concepts of the system and
various programme options and evaluate pos-
sible solutions; an inventory also had to be
drawn up of all desirable options for the
system.
29. According to this study, the elements of
the system are as follows:
l. The space sector defined as all the sat-
ellites in orbit belonging to the system.
This sector includes:
- 
nominal satellites, operating in low
orbit. This category includes two
optical satellites and two synthetic
aperture radar satellites;
- two small satellites operating at very
low altitude as complements to the
nominal satellites. These small satel-
lites (also of the optical and SAR
type) have a resolution and lifetime
inferior to that of the nominal satel-
lites but they allow a greater number
of images to be taken each day
across a predetermined area. The
number of these small satellites will
depend on their lifetime, the tasks
they will be given and their availa-
bility.
- 
two relay satellites in geostationary
orbit for transmitting images taken
by various sensors and for tracking,
telemetry and command of the low-
orbit satellites;
The study specifies that two satellites of each
type are necessary (except for the small satel-
lites) for meeting requirements; if this number is
reduced, the system could be used only for mon-
itoring a single crisis area with far less satis-
factory results whereas a g;reater number would
improve the operational capabilities of the
system but obviously at greater cos|
2. The gound sector includes ground-
based means and installations nec-
essary for command and use of the
system as follows:
- 
a processing, archiving and interpre-
tation centre;
- 
a system control centre;
- 
a central station with tracking,
telemetry and command for the data
relay satellites and through their
intermediary that of the other satel-
lites. It seems evident from the oper-
ational point of view that these three
installations must be located close to
each other;
- 
two stations possibly at high latitude
for transmitting data and tracking,
telemetry and command functions
and which, when using data relay
satellites, would be used as auxiliary
stations of the main one or as main
stations in the event of direct trans-
mission;
- 
means of communication capable of
connecting all the installations,
transmitting data and receiving
requests for data from oflicial
authorities.
30. It is clear that the operational aspects of
the system are the most important since they
have the greatest repercussions on its complexity
and consequently its cost. The operational speci-
fications of the system are set out in the doc-
ument on the mission and requirements relating
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to the payload which was drawn up at the end of
1991 by a group of experts mandated by the
ad-hoc Sub-Group on Space Questions.
31. Regarding the tasks of monitoring disarm-
ament treaties, the time between passes may be
some three days, which certainly facilitates the
use of the system, particularly if account is taken
ofthe fact that priority areas are located in very
specific places.
32. Crisis-monitoring, however, calls for
passes at least every 24 hours, which are not
confined to a specific area but anywhere in the
world. There are many other solutions for
obtaining access within the specified
time-limits. While maintaining the nominal sat-
ellites in orbit, one solution is to gather the
greatest possible number of images of the area
by means of sensors and using the most appro-
priate resolution mode for this operation.
33. Another solution is to place optical and/or
SAR satellites above the crisis area in lower
orbit. This possibility allows other satellites to
pursue their monitoring or supervisory tasks in
other areas, although reducing their input. Fur-
thermore, a change in orbit is costly in terms of
fuel and considerably reduces the lifetime of the
satellite. Finally, it is also possible to resort to
small satellites with the speciflrc purpose of mon-
itoring one or several crises.
34. Mention should also be made of an opera-
tional problem of prime importance: whether or
not to use data relay satellites. Not to use them
would mean installing stations for the control
and transmission of images at high geographical
latitudes, which would make it necessary to
install efficient communications with the pro-
cessing, archiving and interpretation installation
and the system operations centre;the difficulties
of such communications could be solved only by
using a communications satellite.
35. Phase I of the feasibility study finally
allowed WEU to see the various solutions for
developing a space-based observation system.
Phase 2, which, as already mentioned, is to be
concluded at the beginning of December, has
been devoted to closer study of the solutions
adopted and cost-assessment.
36. Two other contracts are also under way.
The first covers special studies, the need for
which became evident in the course of the feasi-
bility study and is being conducted with the par-
ticipation of the industries composing the con-
sortium. The second is concerned with image
simulation studies and has been passed with
various European research institutes. The simu-
lation of panchromatic images is achieved with
DLR, ONERA, NLR and IDS and thermal
infrared with NLR, INTA and CELAR-
ONERA.
37. The results of this work will be available
in December 1993 and January 1994 respec-
tively; the first phase of the study will thus be
completed. In April 1994, the study man-
agement team will present a complete review of
the results of the feasibility study of the indus-
trial consortium and of the special studies and
benefit assessment studies concerning the simu-
lation of images we have just mentioned.
38. The study management team and the
industrial consortium have already submitted to
the WEU Council a programme of work with a
budget for 1994. In both cases, planning is on
the assumption that the WEU Council of Min-
isters will decide next year to start an earth
observation programme. This decision will have
to indicate a preference for one of the solutions
proposed in the feasibility study.
39. In this case, a special study will be made
of the preferred solution, i.e. phase A will be
started and continued throughout 1994. This
phase will allow both the space and ground
sector to be studied, including the operation of
the system and the interim system. According to
the industrial consortium, tlre budget for this
phase would be 15 million ecus. Phase A is also
intended to fill out the cost estimates of subse-
quent phases: phase B, a detailed definition of
the system and relative specifications; phases
ClD, development, integration and testing;
phases E and F, implementation and oper-
ation.
40. A crucial stage is being started in the elab-
oration of the system, during which the deci-
sions to be adopted will have immediate and
fundamental repercussions on the r6le and
position of Europe in the world and conse-
quences of exceptional importance for world
security. Special attention will be paid to this in
the following chapters.
III. Strutegic importancc of developing
a European space-basd obsenation system
(i) Whot is at stde?
41. Two of the main challenges facing Europe
in the immediate future: guaranteeing military
security and the provision of a large-scale sat-
ellite service backed by a wide-ranging network
will be met by the creation of a single integrated
system, capable at one and the same time of pro-
viding a service for military purposes and infor-
mation for civil use within a European infor-
mation network spanning the entire continent.
42. The first such challenge 
- 
guaranteeing
military security 
- 
has become the more urgent
following the problems that have recently arisen
in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the Mediter-
ranean region.
43. The second is linked to the development
of the world market in satellite services and
t76
DOCUMENT 1393
technologies. Taking a realistic view of the situ-
ation, it is obvious that countries which do not,in the near future, develop the ability to
innovate and integrate further will remain tech-
nologically dependent.
44. It is now time for WEU to adopt a real-
istic and confident attitude towards a more
sophisticated concept of its contribution to the
European ideal through more positive devel-
opment of opportunities for integration 
- 
such
integration being the organisation's principal
objective.
45. At the present time and bearing in mind
WEU's current activities, principally in the
course of this year, a possibility might be a
mixed integrated system capable of carrying out
military observation by satellite (anti-missile
surveillance, for example) as well as civil opera-
tions: computerised land surveys by sector (agri-
culture, natural resources, infrastructure net-
works etc.) supplemented by facilities for
detecting objects and a network for processing
all types of information for civil, public or
private use throughout Europe.
46. The challenge therefore is to integrate mil-
itary and civil aims in order to achieve optimum
use of existing resour@s, which would not be suf-
ficient to create independent systems. In point of
fact, resources made available from national
budgets and by European institutions are inade-
quate for building simultaneously two technologi-
cally advanced observation systems 
- 
the one for
military, the other for civil purposes.
47. It will therefore be necessary to find ways
and means of bringing together the at present
dispersed financial contributions of WEU
member countries, in order to overcome this dif-
ficulty.
48. There is a need to move rapidly from the
drawing-board to translating ideas into practice
in order to establish WEU's contribution both to
its own military mission and to a technological
achievement which will contribute to a stronger,
more integrated and more competitive Europe,
as compared with other world powers.
(ii) Europe's indastrial capabilities
49. From the 1970s and more especially the
1980s, Europe regarded space as a fundamental
area for research and industrial development.
Today Europe occupies an intermediate position
between the American space industries on the
one hand and the Japanese on the other.
50. The European space industry's initial
development was largely in the telecommunica-
tions sector. It then extended into earth obser-
vation. Over the last few years, European
nations have made substantial investment in
space, mainly through the programmes of the
European Space Agency, but also through addi-
tional initiatives at national level. Thus Europe
has achieved outstanding ability in the indus-
trial and technological spheres.
51. Europe has concentrated its efforts on the
following areas:
- 
satellite launch systems
- 
satellite telecommunications systems
- 
meteorological and earth observation
satellite systems.
52. A whole series of programmes have
therefore been started and are operating very
successfully:
- 
Ariane (launch system)
- 
Eutelsat (satellite telecommunications
system)
- 
Meteosat (meteorological satellite
system)
- 
SPOT (French earth observation sat-
ellite)
- 
ERS I (first European remote sensing
satellite)
53. Mention should also be made of a scien-tific 150 infrared observation programme
which, although not used for earth observation,
demonstrates European expertise in this tech-
nology.
54. Europe is a major partner in international
space programmes. It occupies a first rank
position on the international satellite-launch
market with more than a 50% market share and
already has a 2590 share in the telecommunica-
tions satellite sector. Europe is also rapidly
expanding its position in the sector of earth
observation. It is recalled that this is a relatively
new sector.
55. The Ariane programme demonstrates
Europe's capabilities in launchers. Ariane 5 is
currently under development and is scheduled
to become operational by end 1995. Earth obser-
vation programmes, and especially the SPOT
and ERS programmes, are of particular interest
to the present report. SPOT is a French pro-
gramme undertaken in co-operation with
Belgium and Sweden and operational since
1986. The programme includes full ground facil-
ities, as does ERS, which is the first European
Space Agency satellite for monitoring the earth
from a polar orbit.
56. Other programmes for the near future are
already underway. These include the Artemis
programme, approved by the European Space
Agency, for an experimental data transmission
satellite. The first generation DRS will provide
eflicient telecommunications services to the
various parts of the European space infra-
structure. It is anticipated that the DRS will
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come into service at the end of the current
decade at the same time as ESA's polar
platform.
57. A further programme 
- 
Envisat 
- 
is cur-
rently under consideration. This will provide
continuous cover for observation programmes
which started with ERS-I and were continued
with ERS-2. Envisat will be used for observation
and study of the terrestrial environment, espe-
cially climatic change, and for meteorology.
58. Finally, in the military space sector, the
initiatives taken have been principally national
or in certain cases bi- or trilateral. Only the
United Kingdom has a military space communi-
cations system, with its own network of satellites
(Skynet). France has developed the Syracuse
system, with a military communications payload
on the Telecom civil satellite system. Spain has
also launched its own programme, Hispasat,
whose satellites catry a military communica-
tions payload and Italy, too, is proceeding with
its own military communications programme by
satellite (Sicral).
59. For earth observation, the first European
military satellite, Helios, is the result of
co-operation between France, Italy and Spain. It
should be emphasised that the operational
advantages Helios offers Europe will be much
greater than the necessary investment, which
itself is far lower than the amount the United
States has allocated to this sector.
60. The space budgets ofthe European coun-
tries in relation to GNP and compared with the
American space budget are extremely modest, a
factor which is bound to have a major influence
on their industrial development.
61. Additionally, the space industry has pene-
trated world markets with fair success. As stated
previously, Europe is a front-runner in launch
systems, largely due to a coherent policy which
aims to attain a high level of international com-
petitiveness. However the satellite industry has
not yet achieved this goal, no doubt for a lack of
a real strategy for industrial co-operation at
European level and due to fragmentation of
national markets which has led to the relevant
industrial facilities being dispersed with the con-
sequent reduction in competitiveness.
62. In any event, Europe has succeeded in
developing a first-ranking space industry -
located moreover throughout the continent. The
economic diffrculties now experienced by the
industry the world over are also affecting
Europe. However the European space industry is
the spearhead for the rest of Europe's industry;it is highly competitive and has the necessary
expertise in all the technologies required for the
operation of a European space observation
system.
ftO fhc c.ryedicruy of extra-Eurupeaa participation
ia space a-operltion
63. Europe must give consideration to the
problem of extra-European participation in
space co'operation; quite apart from such
co-operation with the world's $eatest power, the
United States, Europe must give careful thought
to the space industry in countries of the former
Soviet Union.
64. There is little need to point out that the
space industries in such countries, especially in
Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, are of prime
importance because of their know-how and
achievements to date, despite the problems cur-
rently facing them because of their domestic
economic situation.
65. Europe would undoubtedly derive both
technological and financial benefit from
co-operation with those countries. Other factors
that could render such co-operation even more
productive also have to be taken into account:
firstly, virtually all Soviet scientific and indus-
trial activity and particularly in relation to space
was directed towards armaments production
and had, in any event, a military dimension -
hence the existence of a substantial number of
highly-qualified experts and of systems capable
of making a valuable contribution from a
financial point of view to the development of a
space-based observation system.
66. Moreover the disarmament process and
the economic difficulties of converting the
armaments industry of these countries to civil
uses have produced a situation of extreme inse-
curity for such experts who fear for the loss of
their jobs.
67. Additionally, the need to avoid the spread
of technologies for the production of highly
offensive weapons or weapons of mass destruction
makes it necessary to examine the desirability of
exploiting such technological and human
resourcesi for peaceful and deterrent purposes.
68. The opportunity presents itself for a
major European contribution to the process of
converting the former Soviet armaments
industry to civil ends and turning the former
Soviet Union towards a market economy
through mutually beneficial co-operation which,
beyond all doubt, would have both economic
and technological advantages for Europe.
IY. Conclusions
69. First of all your rapporteur is gratified
that the Torrej6n Satellite Centre has been inau-
gurated and has already embarked upon the pro-
gramme planned for the experimental phase.
Having said this, we should not lightly dismiss
concerns that the software selected for the centre
is not of European manufacture 
- 
contrary to
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the wish expressed in Document 1204 to which
reference has already been made several times.
70. These concerns are the more pressing
given that it would appear that the American
manufacturer is having problems about sup-
plying more sophisticated versions of the
software and furthermore the equipment
installed is hardly operational and has no facility
for processing Helios images. As regards the fea-
sibility study, careful note must be taken of the
opinion of the study management team con-
firming the feasibility of the system, in
accordance with the given specifications, in both
its provisional and final configurations.
71. Moreover, it should be noted that in
France, the prime mover in the project for the
creation and development of a European space-
based observation system, it has been noted that
the centre, its management and the study man-
agement team have all been awarded to coun-
tries or individuals without taking into account
France's leading r6le in the programme or the
size of the French contribution to the
organisation's budget. .
72. Additionally, according to information
available to your rapporteur, a meeting was held
in Paris on 27th October last of the WEU Coun-
cil's ad-hoc Sub-group on Space and the study
management team. The purpose of this meeting
was inter aliato plan activites in 1994, in view
of the fact that industry participation in the
second phase ends in December 1993 or at the
latest in January 1994 once the study man-
agement team has completed its assessment.
73. The latter envisages a series of activities
for both the industrial consortium and outside
consultants within a budget of 8 million ecus.
74. Because of certain objections to the
budget and pending a ministerial decision due
around May 1994, the programme runs a very
serious risk of being closed down altogether, or,
at the very least of a postponement of certain
deadJines which are already very diffrcult to
meet; the hard-won efforts of the organisation
might thus be reduced to the creation of a
training and data-interpretation centre, which,
although important in its own right, is never-
theless only the first stage of an ambitious and
realistic programme which, in any event, is vital
for the security of the continent of Europe and
its independence.
75. The committee and the Assembly should
therefore give urgent consideration to initiatives
which might help overcome the obstacles, uncer-
tainties and difficulties now besetting this
undertaking.
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Draft Recommendation
on thc evolution of odwrced technologt ia
the Commonweahh of ladependent States (CIS)
and the conscqueaces for Europe
The Assembly,
(t) Noting the process of change now taking place in the republics of the CIS, in particular in the
economic, industrial and technological sectors;
(iil 
. 
Noting that, while some problems have already been solved, a great many difficulties still
remaln;
(iit) Noting that stability inside these countries depends largely on bringing up to date industrial and
commercial structures and adapting them to the criteria of a market economy;(iv) Noting the particular importance of help from the West with advanced technology in CIS coun-
tries;(v) Taking into account the variety of initiatives which have proved to be successful and those other
international programmes now being carried out or planned;(vi) Believing it is possible and desirable to improve and develop western assistance and
co-operation in all these areas;
(vii) Noting a number of further ways in which these areas can benefit from the West;
(viifl Noting the obvious mutual advantages which arise between the West and CIS countries over
advanced technology;(ix) Noting that the START I Treaty has not yet been ratified by the Parliament of Ukraine which
has retained nuclear weapons systems on its territory;(x) Noting that Kazakhstan and Ukraine have not yet acceded to the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty,
RrcoprurNns rHAT rnr CouNcrr-
l. Ask member governments to strengthen further their contacts with the member states of the CIS.
This should be done not only at bilateral and multilateral level but also at regional and plant level
where direct guidance can be given;
2. Urge the creation of a European data centre. At present, initiatives and endeavours often overlap
and, even when they do not, the exchange of information is not as well-managed as it should be;
3. Encourage co-operation with the republics of the CIS in advanced technology within the context
of Cocom rules;
4. Call upon Ukraine to ratify the START I Treaty and both Kazakhstan and Ukraine to accede to
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
5. Invite member governments to give their full backing to the International Centre for Science and
Technology. It would be short-sighted to do otherwise, since the aim of this body is to prevent the
growth of technologies of widespread destruction.
184
DOCUMENT 1394
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Lord Duadu, Rapprteur)
I. Introduction
l. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the
end of 1991 left its successor states with major
problems. Ironically, these sprang from the
break-up of the communist system and from the
end to East-West confrontation. Then, the
former state had to be dismantled and the old
order replaced by new social, economic and
political structures. The implications were
numerous and the responses virtually unpre-
meditated, let alone unrehearsed. Such chal-
lenges included how to destroy nuclear and con-
ventional weapons in accordance with the
relevant international agreements, the definition
of future nuclear policy, the prevention of the
proliferation of nuclear know-how, the con-
version of the powerful defence industry to civil
production, the future of the space industry, the
transformation of a bureaucratic, centralised
economy under state control into a market
economy, social difliculties stemming from the
repatriation of hundreds of thousands of sol-
diers from Central and Eastern Europe and the
sharp reduction in armed forces. Against this
background should be added financial diffi-
culties, not least the external debt itselfand the
fact that no clear military doctrine was in place
to give guidance. These are just some of the
urgent matters which still have to be tackled by
the successor states of the former Soviet
Union.
2. In these circumstances, the West has to do
everything it can to promote political stability
and to reduce the risk of civil war which is
threatened by the desire of the new CIS coun-
tries to revise their frontiers.
3. Advanced industry was set up in those
countries mainly to nourish East-West rivalry.
Now, however, and in the interest of political
stability, it is up to the West to encourage this
industry to enter the world market.
4. Enormous potential has been developed
by the former Soviet Union in advanced tech-
nology. In particular, the West should pay
attention to the military and aerospace sector
currently distributed over Russia, Ukraine and
Kazakhstan.
5. In an article in the NATO Review for
February L993, Mr. Kozyrev, Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Russia, said that " western
firms will also have to allow Russia her place in
world markets for high technologies, aerospace
equipment and even military equipment, that is,
in those areas where Russian enterprises can
manufacture world-class products. Russia, for
her part, will improve conditions for foreign
businessmen and will also co-operate in ensuring
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction. We are
trying to make sure that weapons exported by us
do not upset existing balances anywhere in the
world and are only acquired by stable
partners ".
6. According to Mr. Kozyrev, " the most
important areas for co-operation [between
Russia and the Westl are monitoring the non-
proliferation of destabilising technologies, anna-
ments reduction and disarmament, regulating
the arms trade, and assisting the conversion of
defence industries ".
7. With these remarks, the Minister for
Foreign Affairs recognises the area of shared
problems whose solution is of equal interest to
Russia, her neighbours and to Western Europe.
II. The economic and political
situation ia the CIS
8. At present, setbacks emanate both from
poor economic performance itself and from
political infighting at the centre. Thus while we
find a sharp fall in industrial production, high
rates of inflation and as yet poor prospects of
integration within world markets, we have also
seen the paralysis or slowing down of economic
reform due to constitutional disputes between
the executive and the legislative. This process
has been exacerbated by the absence of precise
government programmes and by internal
struggles whether between reformers and conser-
vatives or nationalists and pragmatists (where
relations between the new states and Russia are
concerned). Worse still, it has even been exacer-
bated by nationalist conflicts themselves which
are either latent or already in progress.
9. Nevertheless, in spite of many obstacles
encountered and if haltingly, reforms have still
continued and steps towards a market economy
had been taken and endured by a population,
sorely tested by the crisis, and in the face of
major changes watching anxiously and with little
confidence in the future.
10. Compared to the economic problems, the
political ones are no less complex. The internal
situation in Russia, the principal successor state
of the Soviet Union, is still uncertain. Yet now
that a firm date has been set for parliamentary
elections it is to be hoped that after December
1993 when these take place the process of
reform will be expedited.
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I l. Russia has replaced the Soviet Union in
international organisations and notably so in the
United Nations Security Council. It acts also as
successor to the Soviet Union in the treaty com-
mitments entered into by the latter. Never-
theless, Russia's position on the world stage is
still not clearly defined, which omission is the
fault of both East and West.
12. Like the other CIS states, Russia has
developed relations with the Atlantic Alliance
within the framework of the North Atlantic
Co-operation Council. She is trying to forge
links with the West, although the ways and
means of doing so have not yet been clarified.
13. At the beginning of 1993 Russia signed
the START II Treaty with the United States.
However, this will not come into force until the
START I Treaty is ratiflred by all successor states
which still have nuclear weapons on their ter-
ritory. Belarus signed the START I Treaty on
4th February 1993 and has undertaken to ratify
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The
attitude of Ukraine, which has delayed the
process of ratifying the START I Treaty until
the end of 1993, will be decisive. Ukraine, which
has 176 intercontinental strategic missiles on
her territory, has asked the West for security
guarantees as compensation for becoming a non-
nuclear country.
14. There is also the need to monitor the
former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This comprises
27 000 nuclear warheads, the vast majority of
which are in Russia but some of which are in
Ukraine (about I 500), Kazakhstan (l 200) and
Belarus (80).
15. Circumstances still prevent the aforemen-
tioned countries from implementing the agree-
ments signed in Alma-Ata in December 1991.
These were intended to destroy nucledi weapons
deployed outside Russia.
16. And efforts so far to strengthen political,
economic and security co-operation within the
CIS have been only partly successful. The
January 1993 Minsk Charter has been signed by
seven members of the CIS: Ukraine, Moldova
and Turkmenistan have not subscribed to it.
17. In the military sphere, only six countries
endorsed a document on the status of the
Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS,
while Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkme-
nistan abstained. Ukraine and Moldova, in par-
ticular, are against the idea of close military
co-operation within the CIS.
18. There are also profound differences
between Russia and Ukraine over Soviet stra-
tegic nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian
territory. While Russia considers these systems
to be Russian property, Ukraine believes that
those on her territory belong to it.
19. Ukraine insists that while the operational
command of the strategic forces should be
assigned to a joint CIS mandate, nevertheless
she will keep control on her soil of the weapons
themselves. Other disputed issues include
supply of gas and oil from Russia, the status of
the Black Sea fleet and the question of Russian
military bases on Ukrainian ground.
20. While, on the one hand, Russia and
Kazakhstan consented in February 1993 to a
policy of joint defence for their two countries,
the ministers of defence of the CIS have not
managed to agree on joint CIS armed forces.
Russia claims to be the only successor to the
Soviet Union and thus argues the right to
control Soviet nuclear forces.
21. Nor, in the interest of keeping or restoring
peace has much progress been made with the
establishment of a joint mechanism for coping
with the ethnic conflicts which are rife on CIS
territory. Ukraine has turned down President
Yeltsin's request for a United Nations mandate
to allow Russia to act as guarantor of stability on
the territory of the former Soviet Union.
22. At present, several former Soviet
republics appear to want to return to Russian
control. This attitude may be born of a sense of
realism and is possibly reflected by the recent
pragmatic arrangement between Russia,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Armenia
and Belarus to safeguard the rouble zone. An
economic union between those countries is
planned in the short term, although Russia
would like to impose upon her associates a series
of conditions. One quarter of the total inflation
in Russia is caused by her subsidies to these
countries. Hence her desire to save this cost.
23. In another respect there have been pro-
posals to go back to how things used to be in the
Soviet Union. These are in favour of turning the
CIS interparliamentary assembly into a sort of
European Parliament with limited powers.
24. Be that as it may, and given the separatist
movements within Russia herself, such aims
could well serve the purpose of maintaining
Russian unity.
III. Internatiotal, economic
and linancial ossistane to the CIS
25. From the first moment of change in the
former Soviet Union, western countries became
fully aware of the need to work out a type of
long-term Marshall plan in order to provide
strong backing for this process and to create a
firm economic and financial basis.
26. In the last three years, and in addition to
bilateral measures at government level, interna-
tional organisations have therefore set up a
whole series of programmes. However, a
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number of factors militate against the success of
their schemes. The extreme inefficiency of the
old Soviet production and distribution system is
still in evidence and as yet there is hardly any
awareness of how best to make and sell goods.
Nevertheless, while some manufacturing and
marketing practices will take a long time to
develop, many parts of the CIS worKorce are
already highly skilled and able.
27. Not surprising, therefore, given the per-
sonal dramas and social unrest which increasing
unemployment has caused, much hostility is
now levelled against the new economic and
social system post communism.
28. Where western initiatives are concerned
there is the constant danger of duplication and
overlapping. So far, there has been very little
co-ordination among parties and agencies who
are there, or profess to be there, to help. Until it
becomes better known which bodies to contact
in the former Soviet Union for which purposes,
then efforts will continue to be dissipated.
Improved methods both for exchanging infor-
mation and for agreeing co-ordinated actions are
also much overdue.
29. To these ends, the G7 could well give a
lead in promoting a more intelligent and simpler
way of exchanging information. The member
countries of the CIS should also play their part
by making contacts and objectives more easily
attainable.
30. There is a strong case for creating a data
centre and more attention should be given to the
task of breaking down these suspicions and jeal-
ousies of various institutions, firms or countries
which are often reluctant to offer complete data
systems which might have been used to good
purpose by others.
31. The conversion of military industry to
civilian purposes, a few examples of which
already exist, is of course a high priority. Gen-
erally, there is little purpose in disbursement by
the G7 or anyone else to ftrms, or little purpose
in attempting to privatise these firms until they
have first been made profitable. In other words,
privatisation is not a solution in itself if in the
first place procedures have not been brought up
today in order to turn loss into profit.
(i) OECD projects
32. The OECD Centre for Co-operation with
the European Economies in Transition has
drawn up a programme of work divided into two
sections according to the source offinance. The
first is financed by all member countries and the
second supplements the first and may be paid
for by member countries on a voluntary basis.
33. The core programme of technical
assistance to new independent states of the
former Soviet Union sets out a total of 28 activ-
ities in 1993 spread over five sectors. In
some cases, these activities are conducted in
co-operation with the United Nations, the
World Bank, the EBRD, the PHARE pro-
gramme of the European Community and other
international organisations.
34. The five areas of activity are the fol-
lowing:
(/ Development of an institutional and ajuridical framework to stimulate a
market economy, in particular a legal
infrastructure for firms, reform of the
accounting system, foreign invest-
ment, anti-monopoly legislation and,
at the request of the Russian author-
ities, the organisation ofa process for
revising technological and scientific
policy.
(1il Restructuring the enterprise sector in
three ways: enterprise reform and
privatisation, labour market and
social policy implications and defence
industry conversion.
Work was begun in 1992 aimed at
devising an economic strategy which
combines structural, microeconomic
and regional policies- to facilitate the
conversron ofthe defence industry by
giving priority to regions with a
high concentration of defence-related
industries. Emphasis is to be given to
issues concerning civilian use oftech-
nological potential, infrastructure
investment and local employment cre-
ation.
An important component of this
activity is to improve the ability of
local communities to manage military
conversion and restructuring bY
developing local initiatives to support
military enterprises undergoing con-
version and also to stimualte alter-
native employment through the cre-
ation of small and medium-sized
businesses. The activities are being
carried out in three different phases.
During the first phase, a fact-finding
mission prepares a report selecting
two communities whose local author-
ities have shown an active interest in
organising the project with assistance
from the OECD. At the end of the
second phase, a detailed report will be
issued and delivered to the commu-
nities for discussion. The third phase
will involve guidance from OECD on
the implementation of the report's
recommendations.
(iii) Developing reliable and relevant sta-
tistics for the functioning of a market
economy.
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(iv/ Nuclear safety and the environment.
Activities in this sector include the
participation of experts from Russia
and Ukraine in the relevant activities
of the Committee on the Safety of
Nuclear Installations and closer col-
laboration between the authorities
responsible for nuclear security.
Advisory activities in environmental
matters are also planned.
(u/ This area of co-operation deals with
agriculture and trade and with the
monitoring of overall economic and
policy developments.
35. The modular programme is more or less
the same as the core programme just described.
The only difference, as already said, is in the
method of financing. Among the planned activ-
ities, mention should be made of those dealing
with scientific, technological and industrial indi-
cators. This work, which will be conducted in
co-operation with the Centre for Scientific and
Statistical Research of the Russian Federation,
will help Federation authorities to work out
international statistics standards in scientific
and technological areas and to establish a
reliable data base for receiving and transmitting
such statistics.
(it Thc European Community's
TACIS progra,mme
36. At the European summit meeting in
Rome in 1990, the European Council adopted a
programme of technical assistance to the then
Soviet Union amounting to 400 million ecus in
1991, 425 million ecus in 1992, rising to 510
million ecus this year.
37. The purpose of this programme is to help
a market economy to work. The guidelines forl99l set five priorities: energy, transport,
financial services, training for public and private
management and the distribution of food
products. Consideration is also being given to
setting up an international nuclear science centre.
38. These programmes, some of which will be
regional, i.e. between states, will be imple-
mented on a decentralised basis. They cover all
the republics of the CIS and Georgia, but not the
Baltic states, since they are among the countries
covered by the PHARE programme for those of
Central and Eastern Europe.
39. As from 1992, the military industrial
sector was also considered as a priority sector.
Guidance studies should lead to all the defence
industries being converted into those producing
equipment for. the energy.sector. If this nec.
essary conversion 
- 
which is a source of indus-
trial and social problems 
- 
is to make maximum
use of existing capabilities, help should be
directed to the following: advice regarding the
range of products, financing market research,
feasibility studies, new training for personnel
and assistance in the search for factories capable
of quickly producing agricultural machinery,
medical equipment, means of transport and
machine tools.
40. The TACIS programme represents a larye
percentage of the technical assistance which the
West grants the former Soviet Union. According
to the European Commission, the breakdown is
as follows:
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41. TACIS has been accused of being slow to
launch its activities. However, the disbandment
of the Soviet Union has made it necessary to
renegotiate many of the planned programmes
with the successor states. Furthermore, other
factors have come into play: nationalist and
communist feeling in oertain circles in the CIS
countries has sometimes depicted foreign aid as
a Trojan horse for a pernicious invasion by the
West, detrimental to the pride of citizens of a
Soviet Union which used to be powerful. Thus
while there is not much interest in the concept of
aid, sometimes it is even refused or boycotted.
42. This is one of the reasons why western
help is not received with open arms. The other
reasons have been touched upon earlier. It has
been far from easy to promote a new outlook
towards society and the economy. Then there is
the political instability and the administrative
chaos.
43. The lack of coordination between the
various programmes and the different
organisations has also already been mentioned.
And it hardly looks good to those who are sup
posed to receive. Not least obviously is dupli-
cation a waste of resources. It has already been
noted that the TACIS programme should make
its bureaucratic procedures much simpler. Here
some small improvements have already
occurred. Nevertheless, the TACIS programme
in terms of speed and effect could do worse than
to model itself on the rather better methods and
practices of bilateral progrummes.
(iii) the EDRI)
(European Bank lor Recoastruction aad Development)
44. The EBRD, so far a mixture between a
business and a development bank, is one of
several such organisations, of which the World
Bank is another example, and has a capital of
l0 000 million ecus. It carries out two different
tasks, firstly funding with its own resources (its
capital plus the loans it can obtain) and secondly
technical assistance financed through bilateral
or multilateral aid.
45. The EBRD only comes in to finance
projects above 5 million ecus. So far, after
figures in October 1992 the EBRD has sup
ported progEmmes for a total of 620 million
ecus. If co-financing by various associate
members is included, we find that over 2 billion
ecus have already been invested.
46. According to the International Monetary
Fund, external funds coming to Russia for 1992
were estimated at $23 billion, a level to be main-
tained in 1993.
47. For the conversion of military industry,
the EBRD wants to provide backing for viable
long-term programmes launched by small and
medium-sized businesses.
48. Connecting to the earlier theme of the
desired avoidance of double-handling, some
progress could come from a comparative
analysis of existing programmes. Therefore the
result of those carried out by the OECD, by the
European Community TACIS programme and
by the EBRD should be compared with one
another. This method of investigation from the
answers it gave could then help the bodies con-
cerned to avoid certain mistakes and to build
upon some of their better practices.
(iv) Thc Group of Sevea
49. At the meeting held in Tokyo last July, the
G7 decided to give Russia $3 billion for privat-
ising industry. Spread over l8 months, this sum
is sub-divided as follows: 500 million for tech-
nical assistance and promoting investment by
G7 countries, one billion for export credits, one
further billion from the World Bank and other
international institutions for credit will be used
to restructure state firms and, finally, 500
million, also from the World Bank, will be used
to modernise the structures of Russian firms.
50. This fund will be looked after by a super-
visory group to ensure that it will be used to
good purpose but details regarding the creation
and the composition of the group were not made
public at the meeting.
51. The group will also channel further help
to Russia and in particular will ensure that
Moscow respects the conditions imposed by the
western countries in exchange for their help.
52. The President of Russia, Mr. Yeltsin, con-
sidered that the privatisation assistance fund'
might not be enough. He insisted particularly on
the removal of discriminatory barriers on
Russian products (such barriers exist in the
United States for some 300 Russian products)
and launched an appeal to promote trade.
53. Funds were awarded to Russia in July by
G7 ministers, and they added to a previous
amount which had been sent in April.
54. The other aspect of the problem tackled in
Tokyo was the modernisation of nuclear plants
on the territory of the former Soviet Union and
in the countries of the ex-Soviet bloc. This is an
area in which the European Community has
made a special effort: 400 million ecus is the
amount attributed to the programme in force
which is to be prolonged until the end of 1994.
The West is complaining about a lack of collabo-
ration from the Russian authorities in this
matter. So far, Russia has kept to herself the
plans of nuclear plants in Russia and also of
those in other states of the CIS. Moscow has
undertaken to solve this problem.
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55. Apart from the European Community's
own financial contribution concerning nuclear
security in the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, there are other interventions with the
same goal at bilateral and multilateral level.
These are supported by countries of the G7,
other European countries, Nordic countries, the
European Community and the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
IY. The military-industrial complex
and advanced technology in the CIS countries
56. The former Soviet Union had built the
largest military-industrial complex in the world.
According to recent CIA studies, the Soviet
defence industry had some 3 to 5 000 pro-
duction units estimated to employ between 7
and l0 million people, other sources quoting as
many as 12 million. These installations include
l50large terminal assembly plants, some l2 000
factories producing spare parts and equipment
and about 1 500 test, research and development
establishments.
57. This enormous complex is spread through-
out the territory of the former Soviet Union,
sometimes in accordance with strategic criteria
and elsewhere depending on the proximity of
raw materials, specialised manpower or aux-
iliary industries. Some installations were set up
in order to bring people to live in those areas
whereas others are the result of pressure from
local or regional leaders. Transport costs have
never prevented a decision to locate in a certain
area.
58. At present, all the member states of the
CIS except for Russia are extremely dependent
upon each other for the production of anna-
ments. This situation urges each state to assess
its own production capability; should the CIS
prove to be a political and economically-viable
community, there would be close cmperation
between the republics. Since this decentralised
approach seems to be the best way to exploit
production structures, western countries should
promote the launching of such a policy in the
various republics.
59. The Russian Federation has about 1Wo of
the military-industrial complex, Ukraine some
100/o and Kazakhstan, Azerbaljan and Belarus
2o/o each.
60. The committee responsible for military-
industrial questions, the VPK, had adopted a
structure (which included 8 ministers with
responsibilities in these matters) whose main
purpose was to make sure that the army was
properly equipped and the military-industrial
complex made civilian goods (mainly electrical
household appliances) of which it sometimes
had a monopoly.
61. After the coup d'6tat in 1991, in the CIS
states and particularly in Russia the ministers
for the various sectors were regrouped into a
large Ministry of Industry; afterwards, because
of the complexity of the system and the inertia
inherited from the past, a committee for indus-
trial defence sectors was formed; it covered eight
main sectors of activity: aeronautics, naval ship-
building, munitions and specialised chemical
products, the missile and spaoe industry,
ground-based armaments, telecommunications,
electronics and radio-electronics. These eight
sectors co-habit with other departments with
horizontal functions, for instance the
department of science, data-processing or
external economic relations.
62. The policy behind the industrial defence
is to leave a hard core which may well not be
privatised but which nevertheless would
conform to market principles and thus should
manage to meet targets for making arms. It
would contract with the state and its technology
would be at least as good as that of the West, the
aerospace sector being of particular impor-
tance.
63. This being so, the former military-
industrial complex was faced with a totally new
situation and a completely different system. In
the next chapter we can look at the central
problems faced by the military-industrial
complex, which are also those which the title of
this report highlights.
(i) Pwbhns of coavcaing tb cotventianal armaments
industry to civil pdaaioa
64. In 1990, our committee addressed the
question of conversion in the Soviet military
sector (Tummers report, Document 1249). The
conclusions then reached are still very pertinent.
The conversion of the Soviet defence industry
started at the beginning of the eighties. When
Gorbachev took over, three main arguments
were used: economic (only the military-
industrial complex is in a position to supply the
market with consumer products); diplomatic(the USSR advocates peaceful solutions for
international conflicts) and technological (the
military-industrial base must be improved).
65. In March 1992, Russia brought in a new
law. This enabled funds released from military
reductions to be spent on civilian targets. This
programme encountered enonnous difficulties.
On the one hand, the cost, according to Russian
estimates, could attain 150 billion roubles, not
counting inflation which might make this figure
multiply. The programme covers approximately
70% of the military-industrial complex and is to
last three to four years.
66. And when this programme was carried
out there was a large social cost to pay. Oppo-
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nents within the country are asking for it to be
slowed down until the main economic reforms
are completed and, whatever happens, they wish
salaries to be protected and those who lose theirjobs to be compensated. The return of Mr.
Gadar to the government clearly heralds a new
impetus to conversion.
67. Be that as it may, it should be noted thatpafi of the military-industrial complex has
deteriorated to the point of collapse, the Russian
potential in spite of its immense resources
is limited and part of the military-industrial
complex will have to be closed down: this failure
will be a diflicult pill for Russian pride to
swallow, particularly in an area which is a
symbol of prestige for the country.
68. So far, about 400 firms and 200 research
institutes have taken part in the first stage of
conversion. All these bodies encountered diffr-
culties hitherto unknown (it should be recalled
that at the time the cost factor was of no impor-
tance): reduction of armaments needed, concept
of balanced budgets, investment for converting
equipment, etc. All these factors affected the
cost of final products which in general were not
so good as those in the West and which then
came to a depressed domestic market which
could not absorb them.
69. The conversion of military industry for
civil purposes will only work in Russia throughjoint venture which in advance has managed to
identify a market for its products. For that
reason, it organised in Birmingham from 24thto
2TthMay 1993 an industrial exhibition entitled
" Conversion 1993 " in order to demonstrate the
progress made. As yet it is too soon, however, to
give definite results from this.
70. Insufficient funding both at home and
abroad causes conversion to suffer. Even the
Russian Government gives a high priority to it.
71. Firms are now being hit by a fall in
demand for military equipment not offset by
increased civil production. Thus, firms and gov-
ernments are starting to see arms exports as
some contribution towards their financial diffi-
culties.
(ii) Arms exports as a meuts of liaancing convenion?
72. Arms exports, first Soviet and then
Russian as from 1992, have fallen spectacularly
in recent years. Exports of more than $21 billion
in 1982 fell to $17.8 billion in 1987 and in 1992
the figure was only $1.8 billion. In comparison,
United States exports rose from $12.7 billion in
1982 to $33 billion in 1992.
73. State orders also fell sharply 
- 
in 1992,
compared with the previous year, orders fell by
halfin the production sector and in research and
development 
- 
which of course has made the sit-
uation much worse.
74. This is partly due to the internal eco
nomic situation but it is also influenced by
outside factors such as the loss of the market of
countries formerly members of the communist
bloc which are now facing serious economic
problems and international d6tente.
75. Consequently, Russia's share of the market
is now being taken over mainly by western coun-
tries just when it has the greatest need for
foreign currency and at a time when its military-
industrial complex would be best placed for
earning such currency.
76. The Russian Government therefore has to
decide: either it shows its political will to impose
strict controls on the arms trade or it gives in to
arms exports in order to help the conversion of
the defence industry. Many leaders and pressure
groups have followed the latter course, con-
vinced that if the Russians fail to export the
Americans will only do so instead.
77. As an example, a few comparative prices
of Russian and American military equipment
are quoted below:
American
equipment
Average price
$ million
Russian
equipment
Average price
$ million
Abrams
tank ..,
F-18 ...
F-16 ...
5.2
45
40
T-80 tank
T-72 tank
Sukhol 27
MiG-29
3
1.7
30
24
78. Today, the three main clients for Russian
defence equipment are, in order of importance,
China, India and Iran which account for two
thirds of total exports of this type. 70o/o of the
equipment of the Indian army is Russian as a
result of a treaty of co-operation dating back to
197 t.
79. Part of the sales mentioned above are
exchanged for food and consumer goods. This is
the case for India. Recently, Russia sold
Malaysia 18 MiG-29s and part of the payment
will be made by barter. Russian arms exports to
south-east Asia have now started to increase.
80. The Russian administration has three
oflicial organisations empowered to manage
arms exports:
- 
Oboroneksport, successor to the Min-
istry of External Relations, which
deals with exports of new military
equipment;
- 
Spetsvneshteknika, which replaced the
former technical administration and is
an export-import body for advanced
military technology, and
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- 
the co-operation directorate, which
manages sales to former CMEA coun-
tries.
81. The military and technological co-oper-
ation administration defines guidelines and tries
to avoid overlapping.
82. There are also independent bodies which
represent defence industry interests, the best-
known being the Russian union of industrialists
and contractors, under Mr. Volsky, and the
industrial firms defence league, run by Mr.
Shulunov, which promotes a national industrial
policy.
83. Certain military or civilian industrial
leaders have used the privatisation law to sell
military technology and items abroad. This
caused a ban on any commercial activity by mil-
itary leaders. The Soviet leadership - which is
against exporting defence equipment as a means
of financing the modernisation of the country or
as a means of preserving the national defence
capability 
- 
believes that it is hardly possible to
control the final destination of arms exports
and, furthennore, that nothing good can come
out of the uncontrolled privatisation of military
industries.
(iii) Naclear disarmament
84. The introduction of controls over Soviet
nuclear armaments helps a great deal relations
within the CIS and also outwards between the
CIS and each of its composite states and the
West.
85. About 90% of the Soviet Union's strategic
nuclear arsenal is in Russia, roughly 5.50/o in
Ukraine and 40lo in Kazakhstan, the remainder
being in Belarus.
86. Belarus has signed and ratified the non-
proliferation treaty and the START I Treaty
which was signed in July 1991 between the
United States and the USSR. Under this treaty,
Belarus must deliver to Russia all her strategic
missiles for destruction within seven years.
Ratification of the START I Treaty was not
endorsed by the parliamentary opposition. It
should be noted that the Belarussian Parliament
was elected in 1990 under an electoral system
which allowed former communists to retain
more than 800/o of the seats. The nationalist-
inclined opposition wanted Belarus to retain her
nuclear weapons in order to participate on an
equal footing in the process of disarmament and
thus obtain additional advantages.
87. Kazakhstan, for her part, signed and rat-
ified the START I Treaty; it did not subscribe to
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Kazakhstan
maintains excellent relations with Russia and
her President, Mr. Nazarbaiev, is a keen sup-
porter of integration in the CIS and of the devel-
opment of that grouping.
88. Ukraine has not signed the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, nor has it ratified the
START I Treaty. Ukraine's position on this has
been unclear in recent months, mainly because
of the internal political situation and differences
of views between President Kravchuk and the
parliament.
89. After the bilateral summit meeting
between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk on
3rd September 1993, Ukraine announced that
under the protocol adopted at that meeting it
would hand over to Moscow all the nuclear mis-
siles stationed on Ukrainian territory. Subse-
quently, the Ukrainian authorities have been
prepared to transfer to Russia 130 SS-l9s and
their 780 nuclear warheads, but have not wished
to relinquish 46 SS-24s and their 460 nuclear
warheads which they wish to retain in Ukraine.
The agreement provided for the transfer of all
nuclear weapons to Russi4 in exchange for
which the latter would suppty Ukrainian power
plants with nuclear fuel.
90. Difficulties raised in parliament over rati-
fication of this agreement have led President
Kravchuk to think about calling early elections.
Mr. Kravchuk has pointed out that Ukraine has
already started dismantling part of its arsenal.
He believed Ukraine had already dismantled
some 120 nuclear warheads of the 20 oldest
SS-19 strategic missiles.
91. Fear of its great Russian neighbour, use of
the nuclear arsenal as a means of negotiating
and pressure from the most nationalist sectors
explain Ukraine's dilitory tactics.
92. Russia, for her part, is concerned that
Ukraine does not respect the agreements
adopted in the CIS framework making Russia
the only nuclear state among the successor states
of the USSR, nor the Lisbon protocol annexed
to the START I Treaty under which Ukraine
undertook to subscribe to the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty.
93. Finally, Russia is firmly behind main-
taining the ban on nuclear tests: she argues that
these tests encourage other countries (in particular
Ukraine) to join the club of nuclear countries.
(iv) Crcation of the In errutional Centre
for Scieace and Technologt
94. In order to prevent scientists of the
ex-Soviet Union from selling their knowledge
and experience to other countries and in par-
ticular to those in less stable areas, a movement
has been started to create an international foun-
dation allowing these scientists to redirect their
work towards civil applications. Thus, on
15th April 1992, the Council of Ministers of
Research, meeting in Luxembourg, released the
sum of 100 million ecus to create this foun-
dation. The United States, Russia and Germany
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have also launched an identical programme and
the Commission of the European Communities
has decided to start an institution which would
correspond to the two programmes: the Interna-
tional Centre for Science and Technology,
whose founder members are represented on the
Council of Administration. Its main goals are
to offer scientists the chance of using their
knowledge for peaceful purposes, contributing
to the evolution towards a market economy and
promoting the integration of CIS scientists in
the international community.
95. The International Centre for Science and
Technology is based in Moscow and, although it
has not yet begun its activities, financing is
already a problem because it has not yet been
finally approved. How this programme develops
should therefore be watched in view of the great
importance of carrying it out. A close eye will
also need to be kept on the ability of Russia and
more particularly Ukraine to create an effrcient
system for monitoring exports of sensitive mil-
itary equipment and technology linked with
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
(v) The acrospace iadustry
96. The most important sectors in which
Russia has inherited and retained advanced
technological capabilities are the civil and mil-
itary space sector, aeronautics and the devel-
opment of missiles. The recent organisation of
activities such as the Mosaeroshow in Moscow
and the presence of Russian advanced tech-
nology in other international aeronautical and
armaments meetings such as Farnborough, Abu
Dhabi or Defendory 92 in Athens, have proved
that Russian technology covers practically all
these areas and is both a new and serious com-
petitor and also a possible partner for the
United States and Europe.
97. At Minsk in l99l and Tashkent h 1992,
most of the CIS republics reached agreements to
pursue the Soviet space programme using
existing space centres and other infrastructure.
For Russia, the main inheritor of Soviet space
infrastructure, it is vital to co-ordinate its space
activities with those of the other CIS countries
and in particular with Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
Baikonur (now rebaptised Tyuratam) , which
was the main centre for the Soviet Union's space
launchers, is now in Kazakhstan and the Zenith
launcher is now produced in Ukraine. The Rus-
sians have their Plessetsk launching centre in
their own territory some 800 km from Moscow,
but since Baikonur is the only centre from which
Russia launches unarmed geostationary satel-
lites and from which the Zenith and Energya
space vehicles can be launched, any idea of
transferring Russia's main launching activities
from Baikonur to Plessetsk would cost too much
and be too complex to administer.
98. In February 1992, Russia set up its own
space agency (the RKA) to handle aeronautical
and space policy and to gain a place in the inter-
national market in this field. Ukraine and
Kazakhstan have also created their own space
agency.
99. The Tashkent Agreements signed in May
1992 by the CIS member republics, with the
exception of Moldova, encouraged a joint space
infrastructure for the exploration and use of
outer space in the interests of economy, science
and international co.operation and thus the
present infrastructure was set up thanks to the
combined efforts of the member states of the
CIS.
100. And these agreements recognise that the
installations situated in Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Ukraine belong to those states and that the
inter-state Space Council will be responsible for
co-ordinating the use of all their infrastruc-
tures.
l0l. Much of the former Soviet aerospace
industry is today located in Russia, as has
already been said. It is estimated that this sector
employs about 600 000 persons. The production
of the various constituent items of a programme
is organised through what is called an industrial
sector composed of various research oflices
grouped around NPO (scientific-producer asso-
ciation) and the factories.
102. In practice, the Russian aerospace indus-
try builds satellites for reconnaissance and mon-
itoring, telecommunications, meteorological
observation, military navigation, launchers such
as Proton, Energya and Zenith, a Buran shuttle,
space exploration probes, manned capsules and
the Mir station.
103. Inmarsat was Russia's first western client:
this is a consortium of 64 national firms based
in London and which exploits mobile telecom-
munications satellites. The contract with
Inmarsat will allow the Russian Proton launcher
to place the Inmarsat satellite in orbit. Links
have also been established between Intelsat, an
organisation which operates ordinary telephone
communications satellites, and the Soviet space
industry which is proposing to launch western
satellites at a cost some 5090 less than normal
costs in the West. These are just a few examples
of the Russian aerospace potential and its pos-
sible sales on the western market. More will be
said about this in the following chapter.
104. Regarding Russia's space prospects, perhapsit is worthwhile reproducing here an extract
from the European Space Report:
" The Russian Space Agency (RKA), in
conjunction with the Russian Academy
of Sciences and several ministries, has
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developed a plan ofthe state's space pro-
gramme for the years 1993-2000.
Lack of funding has spurred Russian tech-
nology leaders into uncovering ways of
achieving goals critical to the progress of
the Russian space campaign. The space
programme, according to the RKA, needs
60-80 billion roubles each year, without
accounting for inflation. In 1992, the
branch received about 51 billion roubles,
and in 1993 the budget will be the same.
This figure should amount to 0.22-0.270/o
of the total 1993 federal budget. The most
important civilian space programmes to
receive government funding in 1993 are,
in order of value: manned space flight
(16%), space research (14.690), launching
systems (12.40/0), remote sensing (12.20/o),
space communication (l l. l%).
The remainder of the budget will go to the
improvement of space technology and the
development of spaceJaunch complexes.
Russian space activities will be energeti-
cally aimed towards perfecting its existing
communications and television broad-
casting systems. Satellite communica-
tions, which are nearly six times cheaper
than cable or radio relays, will be
modernised by exchanging the Horizon
system for the Express system, whose
capacity is 4-5 times higher. This endeav-
our will begin in 1994. Planned for
between 1994 and 1996 is the activation
of the new Arkos and Mayak systems,
which will be able to support up to 2 000
mobile telephone channels.
To develop navigation and geodesy,
Russia plans to modify the already-
existing Glonass system in 1994-1997.
The l3-satellite afiay, similar to the
American GSP-Navstar, determines the
co-ordinates of mobile objects on any
point on earth with an accuracy of 30 m
on position, 45 m in altitude and speeds
of 15 cm per second.
Expeditions to Mars will be made for sci-
entific space exploration, and will feature
wide international co-operation. In 1994,
a study from orbit is planned, in 1996 the
placing of a small Mars lander on the
surface is planned and in 1998-2001 the
Russian progxamme plans to deliver soil
samples from the surface of Mars and
Phobos to earth. Over twenty countries
will participate in the exploration projects.
To follow in the wake of the Buran
grounding, Russian scientists are now
focusing extensively on vehicles smaller
than the former 3Gtonne payload
" Siberian Snowstorm ". Payload range of
nine tonnes is targeted for the new vessels.
The Buran technolory, far from being
wasted, is being applied to envisioned
hypersonic plane programmes.
In 1993, two piloted launches and about
four launches of Progress cargo ships are
planned, and approximately the same
number of launches are slated for the fol-
lowing years. AIso planned are flights of
Russian cosmonauts aboard the Mir
complex. In November of 1993, an expe-
dition to Mir is scheduled to last 18
months.
RKA's Koptev stated that the Agency's
intention in the coming years is to enter
the international market of commercial
launching systems and to have 12-14
launchings a yeat, which could bring in
$ 200 million annually. "
105. Finally, in the military sector, Russia has
strengthened her space activities in the hope
that existing capabilities in the key areas of this
sector can be kept at the operational level
reached before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the first three months of 1993, Russia placed
twelve military satellites in orbit.
106. Furthermore, Russia has an operational
tactical defence system of antiballistic missiles
around Moscow which was revealed for the first
time at the Mosaeroshow in 1992 and which has
been sold to the United Arab Emirates. The tech-
nical abilities of the CIS and of Russia in par-
ticular are naturally not confined to the aero-
space sector but also apply to conventional
armaments. Exports of this tlpe of armaments, in
particular to countries of the third world, raise
problems owing to the restrictions imposed by
the Missile Technology Control Rdgime (MTCR)
which Russia has not joined but intends to sub-
scribe to in the future in accordance with a
decision announced by President Yeltsin.
Y. The place oeupicd by CIS
advanced technology in the worW
lO7. Due to the high level of staff training, the
CIS countries have both the means and consid-
erable potential in advanced technology. It is
also clear that these countries seek their place in
the world economy and, as was said at the
beginning of this report, they do not intend to
confine themselves to supplying raw materials.
108. The enormous difliculties caused by
moving into a market economy, the political
uncertainty and the multiplicity of power
centres are among the factors which are delaying
the achievement of the aims described above but
this will not prevent them from being achieved
in the medium or long term.
109. It is therefore for the western world to
ensure that the place occupied by the CIS coun-
tries in advanced technology at world level is not
t94
DOCUMENT 1394
at the expense ofwestern interests but, insofar as
possible, in harmony with them, thus safe-
guarding the legitimate interests of both sides.
(i) Co-operatim or competition?
I10. For various reasons, the West must co-
operate with the CIS countries. First, because
without western assistance these countries might
lose part of the extraordinary potential at their
disposal or turn to other sources, which is not
particularly desirable. Then, owing to the
present position of the rouble and the cost of
manpower in those countries, their prices defy
competition. The price of the Proton launcher
which is 100 times less than Ariane is now a
classical example.
l1l. From the industrial, economic and polit-
ical point of view, co-operation meets with
problems not always easy to solve. World
market conditions are not propitious for invest-
ment and even less in CIS countries where
political parameters are still partly unknown and
where the transition to a market economy is still
a very complex process. Moreover, it is not
always easy for western firms to decide exactly
what a business partner there would do.
ll2. Co-operation must therefore be based on
solid foundations of knowledge, understanding
and pragrnatism and supported by specific pro-
grammes which are more easily accessible and
consequently have better chances of success.
(ii) Co-operution btvecn the Uaited States
and the CIS in advanced technology
l13. Recently, just when the peace agreement
was being signed between the PLO and Israel,
Russia and the United States, represented
respectively by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
and Vice-President Gore, signed an agreement
on space co-operation which will have wide-
spread repercussions on space activities through-
out the world.
Ll4. This agreement is mainly concerned with
manned space flights but also it authorises
Russia to compete with western firms for large
launching rockets (it can send up to eight com-
munication satellites into geostationary orbit
and 2l satellites into low orbit). Furthermore,
the agreement prevents Russia from exporting
missile technology and paves the way for thejoint preparation of programmes for missions on
other planets.
ll5. The purpose of this concord is to main-
tain the supremacy of the two countries in low
earth orbit and in outer space while partially
preserving the trade interests of western firms
and, at the same time, preventing other coun-
tries from developing space vehicles.
116. The difference between American space
technology and that of Russia brings a further
problem. American space technology is based on
detailed study at the planning stage, docu-
mentary backing at each production stage and a
very extensive test programme, all of which add
considerably to the cost. Conversely, the
Russian approach is to merge the production
and testing stages with actual flight tests which
speeds up the start of programmes, lowers the
cost and allows considerable experience to be
gained in operations in orbit. This method obvi-
ously worked in the Soviet Union but the pre-
vailing political mood in the successor countries
of the USSR will not allow much change now.
Be that as it may, these differences make it all
the harder to carry out the agreements.
ll7. Three stages are planned: first, up to
1995 NASA will carry out a series of missions
with its space launcher (the Russian launcher,
Buran, will perhaps not be used unless it is put
through very costly development tests) to
the Mir station. For this, NASA will spend
$100 million which is the amount necessary for
maintaining in operation for three years the
Baikonur base in Kazakhstan.
I I 8. The second stage (up to 1997) includes the
launching of a Russian space station which will
form the nucleus to which the United States will
add a series of modules. This stage will probably
involve the transfer of the Houston mission
headquarters to Kaliningrad, which may arouse
some opposition in the United States Con-
gress.
I 19. The third stage sees the completion of the
space station with the addition of the American
manned modules, Japanese and European
modules and a Canadian manipulation arm. No
specific timetable is laid down for that but it is
expected to be concluded by about 2004.
120. These agreements, which still have to
be ratified by the American Congress, will
have considerable repercussions on other pro.
grammes such as the international Freedom
station programme for which the budget is at
present being readjusted by the United States
administration.
l2l. Moreover, the American-Russian agree-
ment may offer Europe a chance in this age of
budgetary reductions. The deferment until2004
of linking the European Columbus module with
the international space station reduces the
amount of investment necessary in the next few
years; the agreement cannot however stipulate
that the associated members, Europe, Canada
and Japan, will pay to keep up and use the space
station before they have been " moored " to
the station and start using jointly the means
made available. The participation of associate
members might then be in the form of services
offered or tasks attributed to them in the corre-
sponding modules.
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122. The agreement is important because it
governs commercial launchings from CIS coun-
tries: this problem affects particularly western
countries in view of the large number of
launches in the CIS countries, the theoretical
cost of which is insignificant (costs having been
amortised under the communist r6gime) and
whose sale price is thus a net profit recuperated
in foreign currency.
123. These rules try to avoid the collapse of
the western launcher market, thus protecting
American interests and in their wake Europe's
Arianespace which at present makes 60Yo of
world commercial launchings. There, the a$ee-
ment, which limits the total of Russian
launchings, is of benefit to Arianespace which,
so far at least, is not subject to a quota for con-
tracts in the West.
124. To balance the signing of this agreement,
Russia agreed to cancel part of its contract with
lndia for the sale of missile components so as to
exclude any possibility of nuclear technology
transfer. This contract, amounting to some
$350 million, irritated the United States Gov-
ernment which had threatened Russia with sanc-
tions: it considered that this transaction had pro
vided the Indian Government with the technology
necessary for producing ballistic missiles.
125. The agreements concluded between the
Russians on the one hand and Lockheed and
Motorola on the other, which will be examined
later, constitute most probably a major risk for
Arianespace. A decree signed by the Russian
Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin, on 16th
December 1992, opens the door for his country's
co-operation with the two American firms. The
text of this decree, which is particularly inter-
esting, is as follows:
" l. Entrusts to the M.V. Khrunichev
mechanical construction factory, on the
basis of ballistic strategic rockets pro-
duced by that factory and destined to be
destroyed in the framework of the pro-
gramme for the reduction of strategic
armaments, the production of commercial
space vehicle launchers;
2. Asks the Ministry of Defence of Russia
to present to the government, jointly
with the Russian space agency and the
military-industrial department of the
Committee of the Federation of Russia,
proposals concerning the building of a
launching-pad at the Plessetsk launching
centre for launching commercial space
vehicles by launchers manufactured in the
Khrunichev factory on the basis of bal-
listic strategic rockets;
3. Authorises the Khrunichev factory:
- 
to conclude with the American Moto-
rola firm a contract for launching
three commercial communications sat-
ellites of the Iridium system by
Proton;
- 
to spend, in the Iridium programme,
$40 million from the foreign currency
obtained in the framework of its
launching by Proton;
- 
to create with the American Lockheed
firm a joint venture for marketing oper-
ations for space services in the interna-
tional market;
4. Instructs the Russian Ministry of Tele-
communications, the Russian Defence
Ministry, the Russian Space Agency to
work out jointly with the Khrunichev
factory and taking account of the fre-
quencies attributed, arrangements for the
use of the Iridium system for the tele-
phone and other requirements of Russia
and of its industry;
5. Considers that the financing of the
work planned by this decree is covered by
the Khrunichev factory from its own
resources and the resources of Russian
and foreign investors. "
126. This significant and precise text clearly
illustrates the degree of co-operation now
being started between the United States and
Russia.
(iii) Prospeus for cuoperation
btween the CIS atd Europe
ia odvaaced techaolagt
127. The conference of European ministers for
space questions meeting in Munich in l99l and
in Grenada (Spain) in 1992 expressed the wish
of Europeans to encourage oGoperation in this
area with the CIS and particularly with Russia.
These meetings are proof of Europe's interest in
further co-operation, particularly in advanced
technology, with the member countries of the
CIS.
128. In November 1992, the European Space
Agency adopted a resolution on co-operation in
space matters with the Russian Federation. This
resolution invited the Director-General to nego-
tiate and submit to the Council the practical
procedures for the co-operation activities for the
period 1993-1995 so that they may be included
in the cooperation agreement between ESA and
the Russian Space Agency (RKA) as well as in
contracts with Russian industrial or research
centres.
129. Apart from ceoperation which is of great
interest, a whole series of firms or industrial
gxoups, with or without the backing of govern-
mental authorities in their own countries, have
taken steps towards cooperation agreements,
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joint ventures, marketing agreements or other
agreements with firms and public and private
bodies in the countries of the CIS.
130. The ways and means of co-operation must
necessarily take account of the needs of all
parties. What the industries of the CIS can offer
in the main is technology and they need, above
all, investment, financial support, equipment,
restructuring assistance, industrial agreements
and commercial backing.
I 31. The agreements reached between the Aer-
ospace group and the Russian aeronautical and
space industry are an important example of
industrial co-operation between Europe and
Russia.
132. Mention must first be made of the joint
programme to build the heavy transport heli-
copter MIL MI-38 which is already at a very
advanced stage. Before the end ofthe year, it is
planned to start a joint venture to produce and
market this l4-tonne aircraft for civil purposes
to transport up to 30 passengers and to be
available within the next three or four years.
Another programme under study is for a light
helicopter built in co-operation between Euro-
copter and the Russian Kamov firm.
133. There is also a whole range of projects at
different stages of development such as the pro-
tocol of agreement with Tupolev on the various
aspects of aeronautical industrial co-operation
which would not compete with Airbus: for
instance, the building of a 100-seat aircraft on
the basis of the T-334 in the framework of the
ATR consortium taking into account relations
between DASA and Fokker. It is also planned to
sign a contract with Tupolev to manufacture
certain spare parts in titanium for Airbus and to
supply Russian titanium (Russia is the main
producer in the world) for French industry.
Other studies are being pursued with lliuchin for
a commercial version of the four-engined civil
transport Il-96M and with Yakovlev to produce
under licence and to market a regional transport
aircraft based on the ATR-42 or 72 for the CIS
market.
134. Tupolev and Iliuchin have discussed a
600 to 800 seat civil transport aircraft: Adro-
spatiale favours Russian industry participating
in this international programme in association
with DASA, BAE, CASA and Boeing. Another
area to be opened for co-operation between
A6rospatiale and Russia is that of small
launchers although at the time of writing no
final result has been recorded.
135. The example of A6rospatiale is not the only
one of importance in European co-operation
with the CIS, but it illustrates clearly enough the
immense scope of co-operation in specific viable
programmes and also the fact that co-operation
can but be of mutual benefit.
(iv) The future of Cocom
136. The Russian Federation is trying to form
close ties with the member countries of Cocom
in order to fight the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in the world. In the specific framework
of the principles established by Cocom, Russia
has said she is prepared to create an effective
system for monitoring the export of sensitive
items and weaponry.
137. To this end, she has talked more to
members of Cocom. In April 1992, a presi-
dential decree laid the foundations for a new
system for monitoring exports. At the beginning
of this year, Russia presented a letter of intent
together with five lists of equipment subject to
control:
- 
a national list of material liable to be
used for building nuclear missiles. This
list, drawn from the MTCR (Missile
Technology Control R6gime) should
cover all items on the Cocom atomic
energy and munitions list;
- 
a list based on that of the group of
nuclear suppliers, the group of states
parties to the NPT which drew up a list
of materials, products and technologies
to which should be applied the nuclear
guarantees of the International Atomic
Energy Agency when exported to coun-
tries not members of the NPT and not
possessing nuclear weapons;
- 
a list of chemical weapons drawn up
from recommendations of the Aus-
tralian Group (an informal group which
includes OECD countries) but not
including equipmenq
- 
a list covering toxins, biological agents
and chemical weapons;
- 
a fifth list drawn up with a view to
co-ordinating and adapting the lists
developed by Cocom. It is further spec-
ified that this list will be amended to
include all the dual-use products on
Cocom's industrial list.
138. Furthermore, the letter of intent describes
procedure for granting export licences and also
the administrative services concerned at inter-
ministerial level.
139. Nevertheless, for negotiation to be suc-
cessful, the Russian regions must also have
appropriate monitoring systems. Nor does the
risk of diversion to proscribed countries thereby
disappear and the fears nourished by members
of Cocom take on a political dimension.
l4O. According to Russia's unilateral decla-
ration to which your rapporteur has referred, the
principle of reciprocity is not observed by all the
members of Cocom. Moreover, countries with a
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system for monitoring dual-use items and tech-
nologies will be privileged insofar as they will be
able to obtain and sell technology more quickly.
And there can be no co-ordinated response at
the Cocom level since its members have their
own export policies: the system developed is not
compulsory; it should be recalled that Cocom,
founded in 1949 on the initiative of the United
States, is based on no treaty nor intergovern-
mental agreement and hence it has no juridical
existence, international status or official seat.
l4l. There is a sine qua non condition for reci-
procity to be applied by both sides: Russia
should first accept Cocom rules strictly and uni-
laterally. In this respect, the member countries
of Cocom are proposing bilateral assistance.
142. A conference on the dialogue between the
United States and the newly-independent states
on export controls was held at Airlie House.
This conference revealed an ambivalent attitude
towards the slow evolution of Cocom. In par-
ticular, as a way out of the bilateral negotiations
with the American Government, Russia referred
to the possibility of changing Cocom into a mul-
tilateral organisation for monitoring exports in
the service of non-proliferation. It would seem
that the tasks attributed to Cocom and other
international groupings have come to nought
and these bodies should give way to a new
authority responsible for co-operation in this
field with the countries of the CIS and Central
and Eastern Europe.
YL Conclusions
143. The first consideration to be noted is that
it was not possible to visit Ukraine and Russia
due to the special situation in these two coun-
tries.
144. Second, it seems clear that the complexity
and extent of most of the problems dealt with
have made it impossible to examine many of
them in sufficient detail. In other words, certain
chapters and sub-chapters ofthe report would be
worthy of a report in themselves and some of the
questions raised in this document might and
should be the subject ofcloser consideration by
our committee, examples being nuclear disarm-
ament, future nuclear energy policy, the pre-
vention of nuclear proliferation, prospects of
East-West co-operation (when a more detailed
study is made) or even the future control of
exports of sensitive items and weaponry.
145. It has already been said that the West, and
Europe in particular, should remain particularly
vigilant in order to guarantee political stability
in the member countries of the CIS; to help sta-
bility, it is fundamental to co-operate with these
countries in the sector of advanced technology
which is of immense importance and interest for
the West and in which co-operation can prove to
be of considerable mutual benefit.
t46. It is first necessary to realise what a
special political and economic situation is now
prevalent in the CIS countries, to ensure that
any technical and financial assistance and any
co-operation programme first has to overcome
the difliculties of all kinds arising in these coun-
tries as has been noted and emphasised in pre-
vious chapters of this report.
147. Apart from these contingencies, there is
a clear lack of machinery for promoting the
exchange of information, avoiding overlapping
and knowing who the various western organ-
isations should contact regarding their pro-
grammes in the CIS countries. It is then nec-
essary to insist again on the need for a data
centre for the purposes explained although it
should not be necessary to create complex struc-
tures which might augment the problems rather
than avoid them.
148. The creation of this centre for co-
ordination and the exchange of information
should be the result of affrrmed political deter-
mination by both the western countries and the
CIS countries if the obstacle of resistance and
egoism is to be overcome.
149. Again, it should be emphasised that apart
from the major difliculties being experienced in
the military-industrial complex of the CIS, par-
ticularly in the most advanced sectors of the aer-
ospace industry, their capabilities and techno-
logical potential are immense.
150. Furthermore, Europe needs these technol-
ogies which might be more costly on other
markets and in other cases inaccessible, for
instance, if it had to produce them itself. Europe
will also have to decide whether it is better to be
associated with or in competition with the coun-
tries of the CIS.
151. Clearly Europe must encourage close and
mutually-beneficial co-operation with the CIS.
This co-operation cannot nor should be con-
fined to marginal or secondary areas and, one
way or another, if Europe does not take part,
such co-operation will be pursued by other
countries and very probably at the expense of
Europe's interests. Your rapporteur is thinking
mainly of the aerospace sector which is of
capital importance and of particular concern to
our committee and the Assernbly.
152. Co-operation in nuclear matters men-
tioned on several occasions to which our com-
mittee should devote much of its future work is
worthy of very special attention.
153. Ratification of the START I Treaty, acces-
sion to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the
moratorium on nuclear tests, transfers of tech-
nology and know-how and their control are
areas providing ample scope for European
co-operation.
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3
lst December 1993
The evolution of advanced technologt in the Commonweolth of
Independent States (CIS) and the consequenca for Europe
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 3r
tabled by Lord Dundee
l. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (ix) and insert: 'Welcoming
the recent ratification of the START I Treaty by the parliament of Ukraine ".
2. Leave out paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, and insert:'Call upon Ukraine and
Kazakhstan to accede to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. "
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " within the context of Cocom
rules " and insert " to promote transparency in the transfer of equipment for civilian and military
use ".
Signed: Lord Dundee
l. See l2th sitting, 2nd December 1993 (amendments agreed to).
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I*ssons drawn from the Yugoslav contliu
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Sir Russell lohnston, Rapporteur
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on lessons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict
ExpLnNntony MeuoneNouu
submitted by Sir Russell Johnston, Rapporteur
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VII. Sanctions
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(a) State of affairs in preparing for the peace-keeping r6les of NATO
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2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); LlI[l. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-
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(e) What are the chances?
(/ Peace-keeping in the independent republics of the former
Soviet Union(ii) Peace-keeping in the nine Central European states
(fl Conclusions
IX. What about peace-making?
ApprNox
Assembly Document A/WEU/DG (93) 2l of l9th August 1993: letters from
H.E. Mr. Dimitris Macris, Greek Ambassador to France, to Sir Dudley Smith,
President of the WEU Assembly, and information on Greece's position
regarding the United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Monte-
negro
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Draft Recommendation
on lassons drawa lrom the Yugoslo conflia
The Assembly,
O Noting that all the efforts of the international community to solve the conflict in former Yugo-
slavia have failed;(iil Noting that the conflict in former Yugoslavia has shown clearly that in future there will be no
possibility for EC member states to act independently in matters concerning peace and stability on the
European continent;(iii) Convinced that Europe will have to develop an independent capability to act in defence of its
own specific security interests, while recognising the continuing vital contribution of the United States
to European defence;(iv) Considering that the EC, having realised that it had to give up its original mistaken objective of
keeping former Yugoslavia together in a federative structure, has not yet managed to identify a clear
political strategy towards the Balkans;(v) Noting that similarly international organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the United Nations
and even powerful countries like the United States have been unable to identify a clear and effective
political strategy towards the Balkans;(vi) Noting that a peace agreement coming to grips with all conflicts in the region is the only viable
way to deal with the dissolution of former Yugoslavia;
(vii) Noting that in conflict-prevention apart from diplomatic and economic action, consideration
must also be given to the possibility of preventive military presence througfu the deployment of peace-
keeping forces;
(viii) Considering that the seemingly hurried restructuring of armed forces in WEU member states in
recent yeani may have to be reviewed in the light of Europe's inability to provide forces for long-term
peace-keeping operations in its area of responsibility;(ix) Recognising at the same time that political will is naturally the first requirement for any oper-
ation involving military forces;(x) Noting that any peace agreement for the region must include rigorous provision for arms control,
the reduction of armed forces and adequate enforcement provisions;(xt) Considering that the EC's regrettable difficulty in identifying its aims clearly has caused much
fatal hesitation and many changes in its policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia;
(xit) Noting that foreign and security policy are of little avail if they are not complemented by a
defence policy;
(xiiil Noting with satisfaction the creation of the Eurocorps and stressing the need for a European
rapid action force;
(xiv) Noting that, within Europe, recognition of new states requires a new approach which includes
due appraisal of its security and the nature of the collective commitment to its integrity;(m) Noting that recognition of a new state cannot be an end in itself and that the new state's ability
to meet the criteria for recognition and the responsibilities resulting from this recognition must conse-
quently be examined in depth;
(mt) Noting that the problems created by large movements of refugees clearly show that it is in the
interests of European countries to have an agreed reception policy and, more important, to find a
means of averting the conflicts which cause such movements,
RrcounarNos rHAT rHr CouNcrr-
1. Consider the establishment of a European rapid action force to which the member countries of
WEU should make commitments including greater integration of training and equipment;
2. Implement the chapter of the Maastricht Treaty concerned with the joint foreign and security
policy of the European Union as soon as possible, determine the r6le of WEU and set out terms for
better integration of the foreign and defence policies of Europe;
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3. Further develop the military contingency planning capability of the WEU Planning Cell, while at
the same time including the widening of its intelligence access and powers of initiation;
4. Clearly identify threats to Europe's security and suggest preventive action at diplomatic, eco
nomic and military levels in part to provide practical assistance to the transition process in new
democracies in order to avoid a reversion to past policies;
5. Emphasise to Greece the interest of its recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia in the period prior to its accession to WEU;
6. Re-examine the respective tasks and r6les of the United States and its European allies in the
maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures to
ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack of
appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;
7. Provide the UNPROFOR command with the ways and means it is seeking to ensure compliance
with all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;
8. Suggest to the appropriate authorities that they should intensify low-level flights over Bosnia,
particularly Sarajevo, as an effective deterrent to the repeated shelling of the civilian population, which
results in daily slaughter.
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I. Intruduction
l. The savage war in former Yugoslavia has
profoundly shaken many convictions about
peace and security in post-cold war Europe. A
conflict in the centre of Europe with hundreds of
thousands killed, both military and civilians,
and even larger numbers tortured, persecuted
and expelled from their houses and lands, an
important part of the existing habitat and eco-
nomic infrastructure devasted and the majority
of the region's cultural heritage deliberately
destroyed seemed unthinkable. Yet it happened.
None of the serious efforts made by the CSCE,
the European Community, or the United
Nations, has been effective enough to prevent
the bloodshed and devastation which, after
more than two years of fighting, have become
commonplace in the daily news reports.
2. Could a war and all its consequences have
been prevented? Has the international com-
munity, and in particular the European Com-
munity, failed to take the appropriate action?
Many questions have been asked and just as
many proposals have been made by politicians
and political commentators.
3. If in the present report the crisis in former
Yugoslavia is again subject to discussion, the
main objective is not to point out who was at
fault. Indeed, fatal mistakes and misjudgments
have been made and many of those who are, or
were, involved in mediation efforts or negotia-
tions are the first to recognise this.
4. Why did Europe make it clear that it
would abstain from the use of force? Was there
a fundamental reason to stick to the principle
of respecting existing borders, even if these
had been internal borders within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia? Why were sanctions
and other decisions meant to curb aggression or
violence not enforced at an earlier stage?
5. One purpose of this report is to do some
soul-searching which might help to establish a
framework for policies and procedures which
might prevent future similar crises. It may also
help to further dispel some of the illusions about
a new world order and the altruistic
co-operation of all civilised nations in main-
taining such an order.
II. Action tolrcn by the EC
6. One feature of the war in former Yugo-
slavia is widespread violence and atrocity. Mass
media have diffused images of unparalled sav-
Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Russell lohnstoa, Rapponear)
agery into the living-rooms of hundreds of mil-
lions of Western Europeans, many of whom had
spent their holidays on the beaches of the very
country where all this is happening.
7. No wonder, therefore, that in both public
and parliamentary debates in all Western
European countries there was an almost general
appeal for governments to 'do something " in
order to stop the killing.
8. In fact the governments did something, in
particular through the EC. Cease-fire agree-
ments were brokered, EC observers were sent to
the area of conflict, a peace conference was
established, the conflicting parties were almost
dragged to the negotiation table, and economic
and arms embargoes were imposed. At a later
stage, the United Nations was called upon,
which not only resulted in an endless number of
United Nations Security Council resolutions but
also in the peace-keeping forces being sent to
Croatia, humanitarian aid being facilitated in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the presence of a moni-
toring force in Macedonia and the enforcement
of sanctions imposed.
9. It should also be noted that the EC
managed to hammer out a common European
policy which may have been the best one pos-
sible at that moment. However, it clearly had
the flaws of a consensus policy and make-shift
solutions which had been prepared not long
before and after thorough examination of all the
issues involved. This policy has not solved the
conflict nor has it prevented the killing, but until
now it has contained the conflict within the
borders of former Yugoslavia. The different
parties apparently had such a remarkable
stamina in mutual butchery that none of the
classic peaceful means enumerated in Chapters
VI and VII of the United Nations Charter has
been enough to stop the conflict. Can one
reproach the EC 
- 
which was mentally not pre-
pared to face the display of violence and sav-
agery which came to the surface at an early stage
- 
of not having made provision for rapid mil-
itary action, which then might still have nipped
the conflict in the bud, leaving room for negotia-
tions between different parties on an equal
footing? The specific issue of the use of force or
the credible threat to do so will be discussed
later in the present report.
10. What were the most obvious short-
comings in the EC's efforts to draft and
implement a common policy?
11. The EC could have prepared itself better
for a possible conflict in Yugoslavia. Nobody
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can reasonably argue that in the EC's member
states there was a lack of information about
political developments in Yugoslavia.
12. During the cold war, Yugoslavia was gen-
erally considered to be the most open of all
European communist states. The end of the cold
war did not suddenly cut off this steady flow of
information, but rather increased the possibil-
ities of assessing the situation. Neighbouring
countries, including in particular Hungary
which was increasingly worried about the
position of the Hungarian minority in the
Republic of Serbia, actively informed EC
member states about what could happen in
Yugoslavia.
13. It seems, however, that many have turned
a blind eye to some of the developments after
Tito's death and their possible consequences
and especially the rise of nationalism, in which
many leading Serb intellectuals and former dis-
sidents have played an important r6le. Among
them are well-known people like Mihajlo
Markovic, Dobrica Cosic, Matija Beckovic and
Vojislav Seselj, to name just a few. As early as
1987, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences
prepared a memorandum, outlining a " national
programme " which made a paranoid case for
Serbian nationalism based on historic " injus-
tices " done to Serbs, especially to those living in
Kosovo.
14. It is only logical that their nationalist
thinking finally gave birth to oflicial party policy
as contained in a document which was made
public by the Serbian socialist party on l5th July
1991 stating that: * the regions in Croatia with a
Serbian majority must establish an autonomous
region of Yugoslavia ", and that " arguments are
no longer sufficient to defend the interests of the
Serbian people... Serbia needs a real military
force, highly motivated ". Concerning the Alba-
nians, it was said that " according to interna-
tional criteria, separatist aspirations of ethnic
minorities cannot be tolerated ".
15. Since Milosevic came to power in Serbia
in 1987, Serbia's government has conducted a
consistent nationalist policy including the vio-
lation of the autonomous status of both Kosovo
and Vojvodina and political repression of
minorities.
16. Apparently there has been a lack of antici-
pation and forward planning, if not in national
foreign ministries, then certainly in the
European political co-operation framework.
17. Until the middle of 1991, when both
Slovenia's and Croatia's secession were accom-
plished facts, the EC had been supporting
federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic's policy
of national conciliation and economic recovery.
18. It has been argued that all the energy of
Europe's diplomatic chanelleries was concen-
trated on the approaching collapse ofthe Soviet
Union and on the Gulf war and its aftermath.
This is a point in case, but still it is astonishing
that so little attention was paid to the indica-
tions which foreboded the first major armed
conflict on European territory since the second
world war.
19. Iq understandably, the EC has the
ambition to play a r6le as the most influential
and powerful moderator on the European
political scene, it wi[ have to create the condi-
tions to enable it to do so. A prerequisite is more
intensive co-operation in exchanging intelli-
gence between all members.
20. At the same time, the EC must analyse
and define its strategic interests. Only then will
it be able to establish the principles and guide-
lines which should be the basis of a consistent
foreign and security policy, with member states
committed to its implementation with all nec-
essary means at their disposal. Another apparent
handicap in the EC's nascent foreign and
security policy procedures is the collective
decision-making machinery in the European
Council, where consensus is considered vital for
a common strategy. It appears to be difficult to
decide on a common security policy if there is
no authority within the EC or elsewhere, which
leads the way. Especially in security matters,
most, if not all, EC countries were used to
waiting for the United States to tell them what
to do. The crisis in Yugoslavia introduced an
ambiguous situation in that on the one hand the
EC was eager to demonstrate its ability to
handle a security crisis in Europe, while on the
other hand it was looking over its shoulder to see
what the United States would say or do, more or
less subconsciously expecting that Big Brother
would rush in if things really turned nasty. The
EC quickly learned, however, that the United
States is no longer prepared to exert its lead-
ership if it believes there is no threat to its own
national interests.
21. Should this lead to the conclusion that the
EC needs a new leader, a primus inter pares,
who tells the other members what to do if
Europe's security is threatened? Not necessarily,
but if the EC wishes to be able to react rapidly
and adequately under such circumstances, it
may have to consider procedures where member
states wishing to act should be allowed to do so
under the aegis of the EC, if there is sufficient
support among the member states. This would
mean that foreign and security policy decisions
could not be blocked by one single or perhaps
two member states. On the other hand, it should
be clear that no member state could be forced to
participate in EC foreign policy action or to
provide military forces for such action without
first reaching agreement on the matters con-
cerned.
22. While it is possible to imagine such
opt-out procedures during the early stages of
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building a European foreign and security policy,
there can be no question of them in situations
covered by the modified Brussels Treaty with
the compulsory obligation of Article V.
23. The crisis in former Yugoslavia has made
it clear that situations in which a single member
state of the EC or WEU is prepared to act in
order to solve a conflict in Europe outside the
territory of the EC must be excluded. EC and
WEU member states are far too interdependent
to claim that they can or will act without the
others.
24. Much has been said about the lack of
forces and the possibility of co-ordinating mil-
itary operations. These problems of a practical
nature can be solved provided there is a political
will, the first requirement for any operation
involving the use of military force with all the
inherent risks.
25. It should be noted in this framework that
in NATO, there is a growing consensus over the
need for a close link between NATO and the
European defence identity, in particular WEU.
The ideas put forward include the suggestion
discussed by NATO's defence ministers at their
recent meeting at Travemtinde on 2lst October
1993 that, in the event of a specifically
European operation by WEU, NATO should
place its technical and logistical assets at WEU's
disposal.
26. The major lesson of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia is that the EC has reached a point of
no return in the development of a common
foreign and security policy. Member states are
aware that they have a common responsibility
for peace and stability in Europe. They will have
to act accordingly.
III. Tlre EC's policy in the confliu
in former Yugoslavia aad the position
of Germany and Greece
27. With the actual decision-making process
in the EC, any European foreign and security
policy has to take into account the attitudes and
opinions of each member state. It is well known
that this does not always facilitate the estab-
lishment of a very energetic policy. [n particular
Germany and Greece (surprised to find them-
selves together!) are often accused of having
stood in the way of a reasonable and balanced
EC policy in former Yugoslavia. Are these accu-
sations justified? It would seem useful to have a
closer look at the attitude of each country.
28. First Germany. As is known, the EC has
been reluctant to recognise the Republics of Slo-
venia and Croatia too soon and many have
pointed a finger at Germany for forcing the EC
into early recognition. Today, however, there
are few experts who would assert that
Germany's attitude on this issue caused war in
former Yugoslavia. There were several argu-
ments in favour of early recognition. First of all,
it should be observed that the EC's hesitation to
recognise the newly-independent republics had
an increasingly adverse effect on efforts to
restore peace, since it only reinforced the Serb
leadership's expectation thal the international
community would accept a Greater Serbia
policy of force under the guise of preserving the
Yugoslavian state as a community of nations
and peoples. Indeed, in the autumn of 1991,
with war raging in Croatia, it became clear to
most EC members that Serbia was using the
peace negotiations as a shield to continue the
war and that recognition of the new republics
could be a means of legitimately halting
aggression.
29. Opponents of the early recognition of Slo-
venia and Croatia argued that it would deprive
Lord Carrington of the leverage to find an
overall political solution. In fact, Lord
Carrington had no leverage at all since the inter-
national community repeatedly affirmed that it
would not consider military intervention in
order to contain Serbian aggression against
Croatia. As a consequence,Iord Carrington had
no means of bringing pressure to bear on the
non-serbian parties to reach an agreement with
Serbia on granting regional autonomy to Serbs
in Croatia. It was the German Government that
persuaded Croatia to change its constitution in
this respect. It should be noted therefore that
Germany has positively tried to help promote
the best possible solution through active
diplomacy.
30. Germany has also been accused of letting
other EC member states send land forces to
former Yugoslavia for peace-keeping and
humanitarian aid, tasks which Germany itself
could not perform for different reasons. Here
too, Western Europeans should show some
indulgence.
31. Recent history was a first valid reason for
not sending German land forces as peace-
keepers in a conflict between Serbs and Croats.
It is also very hard to object to other constitu-
tional impediments to the involvement of
German armed forces in military operations in
former Yugoslavia. Indeed, it should not be for-
gotten that after the second world war the allied
countries took pains to re-educate and transform
the population of Germany to become a peace-
loving, if not pacifist, people. The same coun-
tries should not be surprised at the success of
their efforts. Of course, there may be good
reason to adapt Germany's attitude to the
entirely different situation in the world today,
but this can be safely left to the Germans to
decide, knowing that they are concerned with
the position of their country in Europe and its
image in the world.
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32. The position of Greece has been and still
is a more complicated factor in the formulation
of a European policy towards former Yugoslavia
and its now independent republics.
33. First, Greece has from the beginning
taken a negative view regarding recognition of
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Greece has used its veto to block the EC's recog-
nition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia as an independent state, notwithstanding
the fact that in January 1992 a committee of
legal experts under the chairmanship of Mr.
Badinter concluded that Macedonia met all the
conditions for recognition by the EC.
34. The reasons for Greece's attitude are
almost too well-known to be repeated here, but
in essence, Greece has expressed fears that a new
independent Republic of Macedonia may
become a threat to peace in that region, alleging
that in its constitution of 17th November 1991
there are references to the possibility of
changing existing borders and intervening in the
internal affairs of neighbouring states on the
pretext of issues concerning the status and the
rights of alleged minorities.
35. Moreover, Greece asserts that it has a
monopoly on the name of Macedonia which, it
argues, " has been Greek for 3 000 years ".
Neither had Macedonia the right to adopt the
Star of Vergina as its coat of arms because it is a
Greek symbol which was found on Philip of
Macedon's tomb near Salomila.
36. In April 1993, the United Nations
Security Council adopted a resolution which
cleared the way for the admission of Macedonia,
to be referred to provisionally as the " former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ", to the
United Nations. The questions of both the name
and the flag of the new state were left to be
settled under the auspices of the international
mediators in the Balkans, then Cyrus R. Vance
and Lord Owen.
37. Second, Greece has never been able
entirely to dispel charges of connivance in viola-
tions of the embargo on Serbia and Monte-
negro.
38. After the last June 1993 session of the
Assembly of WEU, the Greek Ambassador to
France, H. E. Mr. Dimitris Macris, wrote to the
President of the Assembly to inform him of
Greece's position regarding the United Nations
Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Mon-
tenegro (see Appendix). Since then, however,
new charges have been made, as mentioned in
Chapter Y on sanctions.
39. The return to power of Pasok, under the
leadership of Andreas Papandreou, after the last
parliamentary elections in Greece may have
serious implications for the situation in the
Balkans.
40. In April 1993, Andreas Papandreou, then
still the Pasok opposition leader, publicly
declared that the embargo was an injustice done
to one party in the conflict in former Yugo-
slavia, saying 'Greece must not betray Serbia,
its long-time friend.' 
'
41. He was elected on a nationalist pro-
gramme promising resistance to the " Turkish
threat ", envisaging Greece allied with Serbia
against Turkey. He also assured his compatriots
of an * even tougher' policy towards the
FYROM.
42. On 15th October, Prime Minister Papan-
dreou announced that Greece would pull out of
the United Nations-sponsored negotiations with
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
over its name.
43. With Greece due to assume the rotating
EC presidency on lst January 1994, this does
not augur very well for a European Balkan
policy.
44. What must be done? An important part of
the agitation and rhetoric of Greek politicians
over Macedonia serves their personal and
domestic political objectives. Strong nationalist
attitudes still pay off well in Greek politics. But
the rhetoric may not always be well understood
abroad and it may even worry other member
states of the EC if it is accompanied by action
running counter to European interests.
45. Greece has its own specific and justified
security interests in the region to which the
other EC member states should pay due
attention. However, a reasonable examination
and debate of these interests may be hindered if
Greece continues to confuse priorities in its
domestic and foreign policy.
46. It must know that being a member of a
security alliance includes both rights and obliga-
tions. For more than forty years, NATO has
been able to shelter Greece from the possible
threat of the Warsaw Pact. There is no reason to
even think that it would not be prepared to
protect Greece against new post-cold war
threats.
47. As is known, a protocol of accession to
WEU was signed with Greece on 20th
November 1992. There is no doubt that Greek
accession to WEU fits into the logic of decisions
taken in Maastricht in 1991 as regards the devel-
opment of a European common foreign and
security policy and of a genuine European
security and defence identity.
48. Article Y of the modified Brussels Treaty
obliges member states to afford * all the military
and other aid and assistance in their power... if
l. AFP, 29th April 1993.
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any of the high contracting parties should be the
object of an armed attack in Europe ". As said
earlier in a report on the enlargement of WEU 2,
Greek membership should enhance the mutual
coherence and security which is the objective of
the WEU alliance and not be a source of addi-
tional risks. The accession protocol with Greece
should therefore not be ratified before Greece
has satisfactorily solved its existing dispute with
FYROM.
IY. The Unitd States'attitude
49. It is no doubt a significant feature of the
conflict in former Yugoslavia that the United
States did not participate in any diplomatic
effort to find a solution to the conflict during the
early phase lasting up to April 1992, when war
broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
50. For the first time since the second world
war, the United States did not take the lead in
handling a European security crisis. Why did
that happen and should it be interpreted as a
changing of the guard, with the EC taking over
from the United States?
51. Before rushing into easy conclusions,
certain specific developments should be taken
into consideration.
52. Two connected reasons for United States
reluctance to act were that it was thought that
even though a break-up of Yugoslavia could
have repercussions on political stability in
Central and Eastern Europe, no American
interest was directly at stake.
53. On the other hand, according to the
Americans, the European Community was
apparently best placed to conduct negotiations
preventing a dissolution of the Yugoslav fede-
ration.
54. It should also be noted that United States
diplomacy was fully involved in the Gulf crisis
and its aftermath, in the Middle East peace con-
ference and in arms reduction negotiations with
an increasingly unstable Soviet Union, each of
these matters being considered issues of far
greater importance.
55. The 1992 presidential election campaign
was approaching rapidly and it was clear that
according to an overwhelming majority of the
United States electorate, the Bush adminis-
tration had paid far too much attention to
foreign policy and too little attention to internal
matters and the ever-increasing budget deficit.
Involvement in any foreign policy adventure
without a guaranteed chance of success was
therefore excluded.
56. Moreover, while the political leadership
saw little chance for successful mediation, the
military were by no means eager to send troops
into what is generally considered to be the notor-
iously hazardous Yugoslav environment. Lastly,
the United States administration was aware of
the EC's desire to demonstrate its ability in
solving a European security problem. Although
at times a persistent nostalgia for world lead-
ership can be discerned, the United States
administration supports the idea of greater inte-
gration for Europe, which could be a reliable
partner in building and maintaining peace and
in defending common interests.
57. As for the United States administration's
political opinion on what should be done, there
was no doubt that it agreed with the United
Kingdom and France that Yugoslavia's terri-
torial integrity should be maintained insofar as
possible. The disintegsation of Yugoslavia was
considered to be a dangerous precedent for the
whole region, where many other nationalist con-
flicts or crises were surfacing.
58. However, when a break-up of Yugoslavia
appeared inevitable in the autumn of 1991, with
heavy fighting quickly spreading over parts of
Croatia, the United States agreed to the impo-
sition of sanctions. Yet, throughout 1992, when
the whole political scene was absorbed by the
presidential election campaign, it avoided any
direct involvement.
59. Only after President Clinton's inaugu-
ration did the United States offer to become
'actively and directly engaged " in peace efforts
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It made a series of pro-
posals and nominated Reginald Bartholomew as
a special envoy to the international peace talks
on former Yugoslavia.
60. As already known, the results of this
direct engagement have not led to a significant
breakthrough in the peace process.
61. Notwithstanding much criticism of the
EC's inability to solve the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, the United States has agreed to the
Western European approach that a peace plan
cannot be implemented before it has been
accepted by all parties.
62. In September 1993, President Clinton, the
United States Secretary of State, the national
security advisor and the United States per-
manent representative to the United Nations
explained their view of United States foreign
policy. The President's message was that the
United States would use its unique position " to
expand and strengthen the world's community
of market-based democracies ". He also said that
" the United States plans to remain engaged and
to lead ".
63. Altogether, however, the view presented
was not very clear and left many doubts about
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the scope of United States determination to
become involved in crises. A new definition of
United States national interests in the post-cold
war era has not yet been established and recent
events in Somalia and Haiti seem to confirm the
suggestion of a political commentator 3 that a
new kind of containment policy is being
developed, in which the United States only
intervenes in crises that are containable, man-
ageable, cheap and close-ended, except in the
event of mortal threats to American security.
64. After the Washington agreement on thejoint action plan for containing the war in
Bosnia, the United States Secretary of State said
that " Beyond the Congress and outside the(Washington) Beltway " he felt " real support
from the American people " for the govern-
ment's policy. He was aware that some critics
said that the United States had not lived up to
its responsibility, but went on to say that:
" In this kind of situation, a humanitarian
crisis a long way from home, in the
middle of another continent, I think that
our actions here are proportionate to what
our responsibilities are.
We can't do it all. We have to measure
our ability to act in the interests of the
United States, but to save our power for
those situations which threaten our
deepest national interest, at the same time
doing all we can where there's humani-
tarian concern. 'a
65. These guidelines were confirmed in the
Secretary of State address on 2fth September
1993, meant to clarify the new administration's
approach to world affairs, when he stated:
" The central purpose of our foreign
policy is to ensure the security of our
nation and to ensure its economic pros-
perity as well, and to promote democratic
values. The United States must maintain
its military strength and reinvigorate its
economy so we can retain the option to
act alone when that is best for us. "
Later he added that:
" We should not ignore the value of
working with other nations. " s
66. The message given here is clear. Europe
should shoulder its own responsibilities and be
prepared to take care of its own security
interests if they do not coincide with those of the
United States.
67. There is a strong feeling that the United
States leadership is interested mainly in main-
3. Thomas L. Friedman, International Herald Tribune,
2nd-3rd October 1993.
4. lnternational Herald Tribune, 27thIU.{'ay 1993.
5. International Herald Tribune, 30th September 1993.
taining good relations and a strategic part-
nership with Russia, while leaving it to Europe
to solve problems in Central and Eastern
Europe. This minimalist approach would seem
to be neither in the interest of Western Europe
nor that of the United states. what is needed is
co-ordination, if not close co-operation, between
the United States and Western Europe in
helping Central and Eastern European countries,
including Russia and Ukraine, to develop their
economies and democratic institutions as the
best guarantee against conflicts and insecurity.
68. In his recent address to the United
Nations General Assembly, President Clinton
enumerated four important conditions for
United Nations peace-keeping operations,
stating that the United Nations should assess
peace-keeping proposals carefully to determineif there is a genuine threat to international
peace, what the objectives would be, at what
point the peace-keepers would be removed and
what the cost would be.
69. Earlier, the United States permanent rep-
resentative to the United Nations had stated
that the United States would insist on answers
to fundamental questions before undertaking
new obligations in a United Nations peace-
keeping operation. Among these questions
would be the following:
- 
Does the proposed peace-keeping
mission have clear objectives and can
its scope be clearly defined?
- 
Is a cease-fire in place and have the
parties agreed to a United Nations
presence?
- 
Are the financial and human resources
available to accomplish the mission?
- 
Can an " end point " to United Nations
participation be identified? 6
70. After clashes between United States
peace-keeping soldiers and followers of the
Somali warlord, General Mohammed Farrah
Aidid, causing the death of 12 United States sol-
diers, President Clinton stated that he wanted to
bring home all American forces before 3lst
March 1994. The President made it clear that it
was not the United States' job to rebuild
Somalia's society or even to create a political
process that would allow Somalia's clans to live
and work in peace " 7.
71. In Haili on llth October, a crowd of
several hundred armed demonstrators managed
to prevent the disembarkment of a small con-
tingent of United States soldiers who had come
to Port-au-Prince to join a United Nations
assistance mission sent to help in the
re-establishment of democracy on the island.
6. International Herald Tribune, 24th September 1993.
7. International Herald Tribune, gth-lfth October 1993.
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72. Events in Somalia and also in Haili have
made it clear that even the United States is
going to be ever more reluctant to commit
troops for peace-making, or even peace-keeping,
in regional and local conflicts when there are no
guarantees of success and when there is not a
direct and more or less self-evident threat to
vital national interests.
73. The Clinton administration has until now
favoured a multilateral approach to world
affairs. This means that American power is
being placed at the service of the world com-
munity on the grounds that the United Nations
will use it only for purposes approved by broad
international consensus and in conformity with
international law. This attitude can only be wel-
comed.
74. At the same time, however, there is still
some ambiguity in the implementation of this
policy. While the United States is willing to
work in the framework of the United Nations
and other multilateral organisations, it does so
only on the assumption that it can play the
leading r6le, both politically and militarily, and
thus it wishes to have the command of any mil-
itary operation in which its troops are involved.
This means that it always asks its partners to
occupy a position which it would not be pre-
pared to occupy itself. Another ambiguity which
has only recently become more evident is that it
still has the natural and instinctive habit of a
superpower, inclined to tackle problems with a
show of military force, while it backs offas soon
as it encounters serious resistance, for fear of
criticism at home in case of casualties.
75. This can lead to a paradoxical situation
where United States soldiers are not sent on a
mission to create a secure environment for the
population in a conflict, but rather to have a
secure situation created for themselves.
76. On the other hand, it should be admitted
that, for understandable reasons, the United
States has not yet defined accurately the full
range of its national interests in the post-cold
war world, which makes it difficult always to
take the right decision about where and when to
intervene and also to foresee the consequences
of such intervention.
77. In these circumstances, what should be
Europe's attitude? As regards the reappraisal of
the United States foreign policy it must be
patient, maybe even indulgent. Europe is not in
a position to dictate to the United States what
its vital national interests should be, nor is
anybody else in the world.
78. On the other hand, Europe cannot wait to
identify its own vital and strategic interests until
the United States has made up its mind. It must
act now and prepare for a future where, on the
European continent, it will most probably have
to defend on its own certain vital and strategic
interests which it may no longer share with the
United States and which it therefore will have to
handle under the benevolent eye, but without
the active participation of, the United States.
Y. Minority rights in Europe and the
recogttition of new stata
79. Although it is generally admitted that
minority rights are presumably the most
explosive issue in post-cold war Europe, it is
extremely diflicult to find an adequate general
solution acceptable to all the parties concerned.
The conflict in former Yugoslavia has clearly
revealed what can happen if minorities and
majorities do not know where to draw the line.
It has also shown that the EC had no ready
response to the question of what to do when an
ethnic, religious or other minority does not
accept living in a state ruled by a different
majority but claims the right to self-determi-
nation, including the adjustment of existing
frontiers 
- 
goals that it is prepared to seek by the
use of force.
80. It appears that since the beginning ofthe
conflict, Western Europe has desperately tried to
respect the principles of the Helsinki Final Act,
as later specified and confirmed in the 1990
Charter of Paris in order to prevent the collapse
of a system of values and lofty principles. This
system not only confirmed the status quo in
Europe as it emerged from the cold war, it
should also, in the opinion of the EC, guarantee
peace and security in Europe for the future.
81. In the following paragraphs, a succinct
review will first be given of Western European
activities in the issues of minorities and the rec-
ognition of new states. The review will be fol-
lowed by concluding remarks with an indication
of the possible road to take.
(a) Gaideliaes fior the rccogrtitbn of new states
ia Eastera EuruN ud tlte Soviet Union
82. When the EC member states gradually
came to the conclusion that they had to accept
the collapse of former Yugoslavia, they
developed, not without difficulty, a common
position concerning recognition of the republics
of former Yugoslavia. The EC's foreign min-
isters, meeting in Brussels on l6th December
1991, agreed on a compromise consisting of the
following elements:
- 
on 23rd December 1991, Yugoslav
republics wishing to be recognised
should make this known to the EC
foreign ministers, indicating their will-
ingness to meet the conditions set out
in the EC's * Guidelines for the recog-
nition of new states in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union ";
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- 
following their requests, the Badinter
Arbitration Committee should verify if
these states indeed meet the conditions
enumerated in the above guidelines;
- 
based on the Badinter Arbitration
Committee's advice, the Twelve would
take a decision on recognition on 15th
Jamtary 1992.
83. In the " Guidelines for the recognition of
new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union ", the Twelve mentioned the following
conditions for recognition:
* 
- 
respect for the provisions of the Charter
of the United Nations and the commit-
ments subscribed to in the Final Act of
Helsinki and in the Charter of Paris,
especially with regard to the rule of law,
democracy and human rights;
- 
guarantees for the rights of ethnic and
national $oups and minorities in
accordance with the commitments sub-
scribed to in the framework of the
CSCE;
- 
respect for the inviolability of all fron-
tiers which can only be changed by
peaceful means and by common
agreement;
- 
acceptance of all relevant commitments
with regard to disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation as well as to
security and regional stability;
- 
commitment to settle by agreement,
including, where appropriate, by
recourse to arbitration, all questions
concerning state succession and
regional disputes. "
84. Among other things, they also declared:
" The European Community and its
member states will not recognise entities
which are the result of aggression. They
would take account ofthe effects ofrecog-
nition on neighbouring states. "
(b) The Bodiater Arbitrution Committee
85. When, on 27th August 1991, the Com-
munity and its member states in an extraor-
dinary meeting of the foreign ministers con-
vened a peace conference on Yugoslavia, it also
created an Arbitration Committee, chaired by
Mr. Robert Badinter. This Arbitration Com-
mittee produced a number of opinions, at the
request both of Lord Carrington, President of
the Peace Conference and of the EC Council of
Ministers, to which reference was made under
section (a) in this chapter.
86. It also produced two opinions at the
request of the Serbian Republic, which used the
conference as an intermediary. These Serbian
requests concerned the right ofthe Serbian pop-
ulation in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to
self-determination and the delimitation of
internal borders.
87. The right of peoples to self-determination
is vaguely defined in Article I of the United
Nations Charter. Indeed, the Charter did not
provide a definition of the word " peoples ', nor
did it lay down rules as to how this right is to be
exercised.
88. The Arbitration Committee appeared to
link the rights of minorities to the rights of
peoples. As a consequence, the notion of
" people " is no longer homogeneous and should
not be seen as encompassing the whole popu-
lation of any state. Within one state, various
ethnic, religious or linguistic communities may
exist. According to the committee's opinion
number 2, each of these communities would
have the right to see its identity recognised and
to benefit " from all the human rights and fun-
damental freedoms recognised in international
law, including, where appropriate, the right to
choose their national identity ".
89. The committee also noted that Article I of
the two 1966 International Convenants on
Human Rights establishes that " the principle of
the right to self-determination serves to safe-
guard human rights ", signifying that * by virtue
of this right, each human entity might indicate
his or her belonging to the community (...) of his
or her choice.'
90. The committee then suggested that the
states concerned might accord to Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, if they so
desired, the nationality of their choice. These
persons, declaring themselves Serbs, could
retain certain civil and political rights in the ter-
ritories of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia,
without thereby questioning the sovereignty of
the state. Rights of minorities can therefore be
respected without this having to result in a
break-up of an existing state. This could lead to
a distinction between * nationality' and " citi-
zenship " similar to what is set out in the Treaty
on European Union.
91. Furthermore, the Arbitration Committee
attached great importance to the principle of
respect for frontiers existing at the moment of
independence and recalled in its opinion
number 2 that, whatever the circumstances,
* the right to self-determination must not
involve changes to existing frontiers ". On the
other hand, according to the committee, states
may modify their frontiers by mutual
agreement.
92. This conclusion of the committee does
not leave much room for a flexible policy. What
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should be done if a minority refuses to remain in
the state of its citizenship if this state, while
according it full minority rights, refuses to
change its frontiers by mutual agreement? Can
such a minority be denied its right to self-
determination if it wishes to be part of a neigh-
bouring state? Can this minority be condemned
to remain in the state of its citizenship because
of the principle of inviolability of frontiers?
Would mass migration be the only solution if no
mutual agreement to change frontiers can be
reached between the two neighbouring states?
(c) The Balladur plan
93. Conscious of the acuteness of the problem
of minorities in Europe and of the difficulties of
the international community, including the EC,
to implement the principles to which it had
committed itself, the French Government, at the
European Council meeting in Copenhagen on
22nd June 1993, presented a pact on stability in
Europe, also called the Balladur plan.
94. France argues that this would offer the
Central and Eastern European countries wishing
to move closer to the EC a framework in which
they could, between themselves and on a prag-
matic basis, settle those problems which are con-
sidered to be potential sources of instability. The
ultimate goal would be the signing of a pact
embracing all the bilateral agreements thereby
concluded.
95. It is proposed that the preparatory con-
ference for the pact will do more than solemnly
confirm the inviolability of borders in Europe. It
should also prepare the signing of agreements of
good neighbourliness which are based in par-
ticular on the respect of minority rights in cases
where violation of those rights could lead to
international entanglements.
96. As regards the rights of minorities, the
proposal argues that existing texts on this
subject have gradually developed from indi-
vidual rights of people belonging to minorities
towards recognition of their collective character
and their close links with security problems.
97. The CSCE High Commissioner should be
asked to prepare a report on the collective rights
of minorities. Following this, the preparatory
conference for the pact should ask the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe to conclude
mutual agreements which, on a case-by-case
basis, contain solutions for their minority
problems.
98. Preventive procedures should be estab-
lished in order to avoid violation of minority
rights resulting in security problems. The r6le
and power of the CSCE High Commissioner
should be re-evaluated and he might be given a
more active r6le as a mediator.
99. The preparatory conference should also
examine possible accompanying measures to
promote stability. It could, in particular:
- 
examine the possibility for WEU to
admit, as associate members, signatory
states of a European pact whose
accession to the European Union is
envisaged and developing military
cooperation with them, in particular in
the field of peace-keeping;
- 
promote military cooperation between
Central and Eastern Europe, the Twelve,
NATO and WEU;
- 
propose concrete measures to reinforce
CSCE institutions.
100. Apart from countries from Northern,
Central and Eastern Europe, the list of partici-
pating countries should also include the United
States, Canada, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine,
Moldova and the Baltic states.
l0l. At the European summit meeting in
Copenhagen, it was decided to integrate the
Balladur proposal, now called the European sta-
bility pact, into joint action in common foreign
and security policy. On 4th October 1993, a
highJevel working group presented an interim
report to the EC foreign ministers in which
problems relating to the application of the basic
principles of the pact, in particular, respect of
existing borders and of minority rights, were
examined. The interim report also contained the
first results of an information procedure in the
countries interested in the pact. Ministers then
decided to adopt a timeframe for action, in par-
ticular as regards informal consultations with
the countries interested, priority being given to
those countries which are candidates for the
European Union via the European agreements.
lO2. The full text of the modified proposals for
a European stability pact was not yet available
at the time of drafting this report, but it has been
established that no violation will be allowed of
the principle of respect for existing borders. The
pact will furthermore have a political rather
than a legal character, although the underlying
bilateral agreements should have a legal char-
acter. Security guarantees will not be included in
the pact and no sanctions are envisaged. In
general, the pact should be another element of a
European framework of preventive diplomacy.
103. At the special summit meeting in Brussels
on 29th October, it was decided that within the
framework of the gradual development of a
common foreign and security policy, one of the
priorities for common action should be to
promote stability, reinforce the democratic
process and develop regional co-operation in
Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it
was stated that a stability pact, intended to solve
the problem of minorities and to reinforce the
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inviolability of frontiers, would be an essential
part of this common action.
104. A summit meeting organised by the
Council of Europe in Vienna on 8th October
has, however, again shown how difficult it is for
European states to speak with one voice when
rights of national minorities are concerned. In
their final communiqud, the heads of state and
government, " aware that the protection of
national minorities is an essential element of
stability and democratic security " in Europe,
invite European states to establish conditions
allowing the people concerned * to develop their
culture, while preserving their religion, tradi-
tions and customs'. On the other hand, there
was no agreement to establish a definition of the
notion of 'national minorities ", in particular
because of French and British resistance. No
mention was made of collective rights of minor-
ities, an essential issue for many citizens in
Central and Eastern Europe, but at the same
time an issue on which the opinions of various
governments in Western Europe still largely
diverge. Because of these differences of view, the
summit meeting called for the drafting of a pro-
tocol to complete the Council of Europe's Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. This task, however, is
limited to the cultural field, in that it is
envisaged to protect " individual rights " (which
corresponds to the French and British views)
" particularly for persons belonging to national
minorities " (which corresponds to German,
Austrian and Hungarian concerns). Fur-
thermore, the Council of Europe's Committee of
Ministers asked to draft a framework con-
vention defining principles which member states
should respect to guarantee the protection of
" national minorities ". This convention should
not be compulsory, nor should it allow for the
development of jurisprudence.
(d) hnctusion
105. Understandably, the conflict in former
Yugoslavia has produced haunting fears of
further similar conflicts in Central and Eastern
Europe. It must therefore be a top priority of the
EC's nascent common foreign and security
policy to develop a distinct and unambiguous
position as regards the issues of self-determi-
nation, minority rights and the inviolability or
not ofborders. In doing so, it should be realised
that the unimpaired application of each of these
principles may be incompatible.
106. Furthermore, it may be too idealistic to
assume that minorities and nations which,
under communist rule, have suffered political
suppression and cultural oppression will be pre-
pared to accept the EC's reasoning regarding
European citizenship and the relative unimpor-
tance of national borders in a unifying Europe.
Western European states indeed have taken
many years to settle their borders and start the
process of unification moving under far more
favourable conditions of government.
107. Since the beginning of the conflict in
former Yugoslavia, the EC has been obliged to
do some intensive back-pedalling on the appli-
cation of principles which it had enunciated in
the beginning, partly or perhaps even mainly
because it lacked the political will to enforce
application of these principles with military
means. There is justified doubt over the
question whether it will be prepared to do so in
the future.
108. It would, therefore, make sense to take a
more flexible stance towards the application of
such principles. The establishment of a
European Court of Conciliation and Arbi-
tration, as proposed by Robert Badinter 8, could
create the necessary conditions for dealing with
disputes on minority rights and frontiers in a
more conciliatory atmosphere than through
armed force and United Nations Security
Council resolutions.
109. At the same time, the establishment of a
European stability pact 
- 
of which only the
outline is known at the moment 
- 
could oblige
Central and Eastern European states to consider
minority problems in a larger framework of
European security than, as is now often the case,
in a purely national perspective. A system where
directly tangible economic advantages would be
granted to those nations to conclude compre-
hensive agreements on good neighbourliness
could be a strong incentive for civilised and con-
ciliatory behaviour.
I 10. It should, however, be noted that any
European stability pact should take Russian
interests into account. Even if Russia does not
belong to the the group of countries having the
intention of joining the EC, it cannot be
excluded from a European agreement which
envisages a solution to minority problems.
YI. Inviobbility of borders
111. Since the initial phase of the conflict, the
EC has insisted on the principle that borders
could not be changed by force. In a declaration
adopted at the opening ofThe Hague peace con-
ference on 7th September 1991, it was stated
that internal borders could not be changed by
force. Meeting in Bonn on l9th November
1991, the WEU Council of Ministers " recalled
and confirmed the repeated statements by EC
foreign ministers that under no circumstances
will territorial changes brought about by force be
recognised ". It seems difficult to speak more
boldly!
ll2. As quoted in Chapter V, one of the condi-
tions for the recognition of new states in Europe,
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as agreed by EC foreign ministers on l6th
December 1991, was acceptance of the inviola-
bility of frontiers which could be changed only
through peaceful means and by common
agreement.
ll3. After a meeting with Secretary of State,
Warren Christopher, in Luxembourg e, the EC
said in a statement that the Vance-Owen plan
had * no feasible alternative " and " remained
the centrepiece of EC strategy ".
lL4. On l9th June 1992, the WEU Council
* recalled that territorial gains or changes
brought about by violence are unacceptable and
will not be recognised by the international com-
munity'.
I 15. At the London conference on 26th-27th
August 1992, it was again repeated that a
political settlement of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia was to include respect for the
integrity of present frontiers unless changed by
mutual ag;reement.
116. The Vance-Owen plan, as presented on
2nd January 1993 at the Geneva peace con-
ference, which provided for a reorganisation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 provinces, was con-
sidered by many as a major infringement of the
principle of inviolability of frontiers, because it
tacitly endorsed territorial gains obtained by
force.
lL7. As already known, the rejection by
Bosnian Serbs of the Vance-Owen plan in May
1993 later resulted in acceptance by the United
States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and
Spain of a joint action plan for Bosnia which
" temporarily', it was said, accepted territorial
gains made by force. The plan called for the cre-
ation of six ' safe areas " r0 for Muslim civilians
on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and for
the use of United States air power to protect
United Nations peace-keepers in those areas. It
was made clear, however, that the United States
would not come to the rescue of the safe areas
themselves, should they be attacked by Serbs,
nor would they contribute troops to the peace-
keeping effort on the ground.
ll8. It was said that the primary goal was no
longer to roll back territorial gains, but " to
contain and stabilise the situation and to put the
brakes on the killing' "
I19. On the other hand, many agreed with the
United States Republican Senator, Bob Dole,
who said that the plan amounted to " writing off
Bosnia as a state by ratifying the status quo on
the ground ".
9. International Herald Tribune, May 1993.
10. These areas, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Znpa,Twla, Sarajevo
and Bihac, were identified in earlier Security Council resolu-
tions.
ll. International Herald Tribune,22nd-23rd May 1993.
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120. Immediately after the adoption of thejoint action plan, both the United States and
European governments tried to neutralise crit-
icism that they had in fact accepted territorial
gains obtained by force. In Washington, the
White House said that the plan showed that the
West was'refusing to accept territorial gains in
Bosnia (obtained) by aggression12. In London,
the Foreign Ministry stated:'We do our utmost
to get the Bosnian Serbs to roll back their occu-
pation', and * We do not accept that aggression
be rewarded " 13.
lzl. The French Foreign Minister, Alain
Jupp6, denied that the action plan was in any
way a de facto recognition of Serbian conquests,
saying * Our aim is clear: to obtain withdrawal
from areas which have been occupied by force
and to implement the Vance-Owen plan " ra.
122. No sooner had the action plan been
adopted after weeks of diplomatic negotiations
than the western allies, sadly enough, again dem-
onstrated their main weakness: lack of resolve.
123. Meeting in Brussels on 25th and 26th
May 1993, they could not reach a consensus on
how the plan would be carried out, how many
troops would be required to protect the safe
areas and which countries would contribute the
additional forces. Of course, difficult questions
were involved such as how to co-ordinate
ground protection with air protection, how to fit
that in with the enforcement of a no-fly zone
and which command arrangements should be
established.
124. Many EC and NATO member states com-
plained about not having been consulted on the
plan, others hesitated about sending more
troops. The United States President had ruled
out the deployment of United States ground
forces and rules of engagement had yet to be
established, requiring a change in the rules gov-
erning the use of force by United States peace-
keeping troops.
125. All ministers agreed that no plans could
be drawn up before a United Nations Security
Council resolution was passed defining the safe
area proposal15.
126. Again, precious time was lost because of
western reluctance and hesitation to act deci-
sively.
127. And still, Thorvald Stoltenberg stated that
the option of using military force to end the con-
flict had not been abandoned by the interna-
tional community, though other means to
achieve peace would first be pursued.
12. Le Monde, 25th May 1993.
13. International Herald Tribune, 25th May 1993.
14. Lr Monde, 25th May 1993.
15. International Herald Tribune and Financial Times, 25th,
26th and 27th May 1993.
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128. Les Aspin, the United States Defence Sec-
retary, was quoted as having stated after the
Brussels meeting: " Working together is a new
element, the Serbs cannot any longer rely on
divisions between Russians, Europeans and
Americans meaning no action. " 16 One wonders
whether this was meant to be a serious
statement. Needless to say, fresh Serbian forces
were sent into the battle for Gorazde, one of the
" safe areas ", while Sarajevo was heavily
shelled, causing suspension of the humanitarian
airlift and the continuation of attacks on aid
convoys. r7
129. Following the uncertainty over the imple-
mentation of the joint action plan, the EC Com-
missioner for external political relations, Hans
van den Broek, insisted that EC leaders should
urgently meet to discuss concrete steps,
including military action. He also criticised thejoint action plan which he considered incom-
patible with the implementation of the
Vance-Owen plan and lacking any chance to be
effective in the short or even long term.18
130. The United Kingdom Prime Minister,
John Major, however, left little doubt over allied
intentions when he said the next day that the
allied powers were willing to tighten sanctions
and increase diplomatic pressure, but were not
prepared to fight a full-scale war. He said
" people are not prepared to put 200 000 troops
in Bosnia to force them (the Serbs) back by
armed force, but we will maintain diplomatic
pressure and we will not accept the land gained
by force ". re This is an acute reminder of the
strong diplomatic pressure which allowed Hitler
to invade parts of Czechoslovakia and Poland in
1938 and 1939.
l3l. At a Franco-German summit on 2nd June
1993, both President Mitterrand and the Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl again insisted that a set-
tlement must * guarantee the territorial integrity
and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina ". 20
132. Meeting in Athens on l0th June 1993 in
the North Atlantic Council, NATO's foreign
ministers supported " the establishment of safe
areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the protection
of the civilian population as defined in United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 824 and
836 ".
133. It then offered NATO's " protective
airpower in case of attack against UNPROFOR
in the performance of its overall mandate, if it
so requests " and asked NATO's military
authorities " to proceed rapidly with detailed
planning for the air support ".
16. International Herald Tribune, 27th May 1993.
17. International Herald Tribune, 3rd June 1993.
18. Financial Times, 28th May 1993 and Le Monde, 29th
May 1993.
19. International Herald Tribune, 29th May 1993.
20. Financial Times, 3rd June 1993.
134. Again, ministers confirmed that * The
establishment of safe areas is a temporary
measure leading towards a negotiated settlement
based on the principles of the Vance-Owen plan
which guarantee the full sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina ".
135. Not until 30th June 1993 did the NATO
Permanent Council in Brussels receive a
detailed report from the Chairman of the Mil-
itary Committee on the planning for air support,
including rules of engagement. It was decided to
send the plans to the capitals of NATO's
member states for approval. Some elements of
the plans were to be examined by the United
Nations.
136. After approval of the plans by the
16 member states, on 9th July 1993 the NATO
Permanent Council authorised SACEUR to start
the procedure for deployment of member states'
fighter aircraft to implement the decision on air
support for UNPROFOR in its protection
mandate for the six safe areas.
137. It should be noted that at that time, the
7 500 troops required for implementing the safe
areas plan on the ground, and for whom the air
support was being planned, were not yet
available.
138. Finally, on 9th August 1993, the North
Atlantic Council approved the operational
options for air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but it immediately made it clear that the air
strikes foreseen were * limited to the support of
humanitarian relief, and must not be interpreted
as a decision to intervene militarily in the con-
flict ". A first NATO air support exercise in a
safe area was carried out on l8th August.
139. Still, NATO's decision was immediately
followed by an exchange of statements between
the UNPROFOR Commander in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the United States which did
not contribute to the credibility of earlier
threats.
140. Only a few days later, on 2fth August
1993, a compromise peace plan for Bosnia-
Herzegovina was presented by Lord Owen and
Thorvald Stoltenberg, leaving the MuslimJed
Bosnian government with about 300/o of the ter-
ritory, the Bosnian Serbs with 52Vo or more and
the Croats with 17% or more, in fact dividing
the republic into three different ethnic states.
l4l. One cannot deny that whatever European
governments say, an immeasurable discrepancy
can be noted between their theory and their
practice.
142. Even if the maintenance of existing
borders were to remain a fundamental goal,
other options including the change of borders
through peaceful negotiations and mutual
agreement must be kept open and may have to
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be pursued actively in order to prevent conflict.
At the same time, it should be noted that most
of the minority problems, with the possible
exception of those in Macedonia and Kosovo,
cannot be solved by changing borders. In all
other cases, border changes with the aim of cre-
ating ethnically pure states would have to be
accompanied by mass migrations.
143. On the other hand, a change ofborders in
Kosovo would have immediate consequences
for relations between Albania and FYROM and
raise tension in all neighbouring countries. If
borders are to be changed within Europe, there
must be accompanying security guarantees from
their godfathers. The example of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, where a new state was recognised,
after which it was neither protected nor allowed
to defend itself with appropriate means should
never be repeated.
144. Often, any proposal for changing bordersis dismissed with the argument that such
changes would open a Pandora's box in the
whole of Europe. Is not Pandora's box already
wide open with the international community's
de facto acceptance ofchanging borders by force
and ethnic cleansing?
145. The current policy is inconsistent. Terri-
torial changes may have to be accepted and
perhaps actively pursued if that can help to
prevent an armed conflict, but the new terri-
torial relations should always be backed by an
agreed security framework with satisfactory
security guarantees. The recent history of the
Saar shows clearly that territories can change
country by peaceful means.
YII. Sanctions
146. Sanctions as envisaged in Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter will in future no
doubt remain one of the main peaceful instru-
ments for carrying into effect Security Council
decisions. On the other hand, sanctions will
have little effect if there are no measures to
enforce them.
147. [n the Yugoslav crisis, sanctions were
imposed at a very early stage, beginning with an
arms embargo in September 1991, followed by
trade sanctions and an oil embargo later that
year. However, it was only in July 1992 that the
first measures were taken to police the sanctions
by means of a combined WEU-NATO air and
sea operation in the Adriatic and even at that
stage it had no authority to stop vessels sus-
pected of breaking sanctions. A fully-effective
system for controlling and enforcing the
embargo on the Danube came into effect only in
June 1993, almost two years after the imposition
of sanctions. Only then was a memorandum of
understanding signed between WEU and Bul-
garia, Romania and Hungary allowing WEU to
establish a co-ordination and support centre in
Calafat (Romania) and control centres in
Mohacs (Hungary) and Ruse (Bulgaria), while a
total of about 300 policemen and customs
offrcers and 12 patrol boats were sent in to
provide assistance in the embargo enfor-
cement.
148. Notwithstanding the extraordinary delays
in the embargo enforcement, there can be little
doubt that the economy of Serbia-Montenegro
has been seriously affected by the embargo. In
1992, there was a 5690 decline in real wages.
Gross national product is forecast to drop by
about 300,/o in 1993 to around $8 billion.
According to official figures, the monthly
inflation rate reached 205.40/o in May.
149. Still, not even all EC members are deter-
mined to implement the sanctions. Greece has
never been able to dispel charyes that it violated
the embargo and there are many incidents giving
proof of its mischievous behaviour.
150. On 8th December 1992,EC foreign min-
isters criticised Greece for allowing Greek com-
panies to violate United Nations sanctions by
shipping oil to Serbia, while at the same time
withholding oil from Macedonia, officially
called FYROM. Greece later resumed oil sup-
plies to FYROM, but in September 1993, it was
said that Greece had threatened to cut off all oil
supplies to FYROM unless half the supply, or
more than 80 000 tons monthly, was sent to
Serbia.2r
l5l. Also, FYROM cannot claim to have a
clean record concerning the embargo either.
According to UNPROFOR, which monitors the
border between FYROM and Serbia, about
4 000 trucks, including those carrying oil
products, construction materials and spare parts
for heavy machinery, made the crossing in both
directions every week.22 Only very recently, in
October 1993, it was reported that the gov-
ernment of FYROM, encouraged by the United
States, had finally decided to apply in practice
the United Nations Security Council Resolution
820 on the embargo against Serbia and
Montenegro.23 It is said that freight transport
between the two states has come to a standstill
except for lorries with authorisation from the
United Nations sanctions committee. Even
tanker lorries are now systematically being
stopped and sent back. The government claims
that the sanctions cost the Macedonian economy
more than $1.2 billion in 1992 and $1.8 billionin 1993. Some financial compensation may be
provided. The EC had promised 100 million
ecus in December 1992, but actual payment of
this sum was delayed. The economic loss for
21. Financial Times, 3lst August 1993.
22. k Monde, l3th October 1993.
23. Le Monde, l3th October 1993.
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FYROM caused by the embargo enforcement
during the last three months of 1993 is esti-
mated at $1.8 billion, a sum which might be
compensated by the United States or by the
postponement of the country's external debt.
152. It is suggested in Skopje that the United
States could send more troops to FYROM to
reinforce the 325 United States troops already
deployed in that country, while the air force base
ofKrivovalek has been put at the disposal ofthe
United States.
153. Other neighbouring countries are trying to
implement the embargo by all the means at their
disposal, but they are all complaining of heavy
economic losses for which no compensation has
been provided. Greece claims a loss of over $2.5
billion, Hungary a loss of over $500 million
and Romania and Bulgaria have given figures
of between $l and 3 billion. Recently, the
Bulgarian Prime Minister, Ljuben Berov,
addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, estimated the economic loss
to his country caused by the United Nations
embargoes against Iraq and against Serbia and
Montenegro at more than $6 billion. He said
that, until then, Bulgaria had received no com-
pensation whatever * except pats on the back
by way of consolation ". The former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia claims a decline of
500/o in its GNP, which has not been
compensated.2a
154. Even if some of these figures may be
rouglr estimates and exaggerated, it cannot be
denied that economies which are involved in a
painful process of change towards a market-
oriented economy do not have enough reservesto face additional problems. A reasonable
system may have to be worked out for the inter-
national community to compensate countries
which are hit most severely by an embargo
against an important neighbouring trade
partner, as happened during the Gulf war.
155. Another important problem connected
with sanctions is that it is the population of the
country envisaged that suffers the most. Of
course, the reasoning behind the imposition of
sanctions is that a population, disgruntled by
food shortages, rampant inflation, unem-
ployment and other devastating effects, will
revolt against its leaders and choose a new gov-
ernment which should change the country's
policy. The trouble here is that sanctions are
always imposed upon nations with an autocratic
government which has a firm gnp on the popu-
lation and where a real opposition does not
exist. The second world war has shown that even
more severe measures, such as the bombing of
cities, does not make such r6gimes change
course.
156. In conclusion, it should be said that sanc-
tions remain an essential instrument as backing
for diplomatic arguments. But it is also vital for
them to be enforced from the very beginning
and for possible negative consequences for
neighbouring countries to be taken into account.
Compensatory measures may have to be con-
sidered.
YIII. Peoce-leeping or peace-making
157. After the events of 1989, when security
relations in Europe started to change, the
member states of both NATO and WEU under-
stood that they had to adapt their strategic
concept and armed forces. Action was taken,
and after thorough preparation, a NATO
summit meeting was held in Rome in December
l99l where a transformed NATO was presented
to the world.
158. Indeed, it is only two years ago, on
7th-8th November 1991, that the heads of state
and government of NATO's member states
agreed in Rome on the alliance's new strategic
concept, yet it now seems ages ago. At that time,
the Soviet Union still existed, but rightly the
Rome declaration stated that " the threat of a
simultaneous full-scale attack on all NATO's
European fronts has effectively been removed
and no longer provides the focus for allied
strategy ".
159. On the other hand, it was stated that
Soviet conventional and nuclear capabilities had
to be taken into account if stability and security
in Europe were to be preserved.
160. In conclusion, it was therefore said that:
* Even in a non-adversarial and co-
operative relationship, Soviet military
capability and build-up potential still con-
stitute the most significant factor of which
the alliance has to take account in main-
taining the strategic balance in Europe. "
16l. This was a good reason to maintain
NATO's nuclear and conventional forces, be it
in slightly reduced size, in order to guarantee
and protect the territorial integrity of the
member states.
162. But new threats and risks were emerging,
even if their importance and magnitude were
not yet clearly visible, and the Rome declaration
referred to them as follows:
* On the other hand, there is a greater risk
of different crises arising, which could
develop quickly and would require a rapid
response, but they are likely to be of a
lesser magnitude. "
163. The risk of a *different crisis" had
already materialised in former Yugoslavia.24. Le Monde, 2nd October 1993.
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Indeed, it was still of a " lesser magnitude ", but
it was developing quickly and required a rapid
response.
164. On 27th October 1991, the Croatian
Foreign Minister, Ivonimir Separovic, wrote a
letter to EC foreig;n ministers informing them
that since the beginning ofJuly 5 000 people had
been killed in Croatia. At that time, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross estimated
that more than 280 000 people had left their
homes during the period of fighting. Both
figures have been dwarfed by what has hap
pened since.
165. In the Rome declaration, apart from the
alliance's task * to deter and defend against any
threat of aggression against the territory of any
NATO member state ", one of the other three
fundamental security tasks was formulated as
follows:
" To provide one of the indispensable
foundations for a stable security envi-
ronment in Europe, based on the growth
of democratic institutions and com-
mitment to the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes, in which no country would be able
to intimidate or coerce any European
nation or to impose hegemony through
the threat or use of force. "
166. Apparently, it was thought that NATO
could play an eminent r6le as a coherent and
effective political organisation, when, regarding
the management of crises and conflict pre-
vention, it was stated that:
'In the new political and strategic envi-
ronment in Europe, the success of the alli-
ance's policy of preserving peace and pre-
venting war depends even more than in
the past on the effectiveness ofpreventive
diplomacy and successful management of
crises affecting the security of its
members. "
and further that:
'The success of alliance policy will
require a coherent approach determinedby the alliance's political authorities
choosing and co-ordinating appropriate
crisis-management measures as required
from a range of political and other mea-
sures, including those in the military
field. "
167. With a touch of realism, ministers
recognised that NATO might not be able to do
this alone. They therefore added:
* The potential of dialogue and
co-operation within all of Europe must be
fully developed in order to help defuse
crises and to prevent conflicts since the
allies' security is inseparably linked to
that of all other states in Europe. To this
end, the allies will support the rOle of the
CSCE process and its institutions. Other
bodies including the European Com-
munity, Western European Union and
United Nations may also have an
important r6le to play."
168. In the chapter * Missions of alliance mil-
itary forces ", the classic r6le of armed forces
was confirmed:
* The primary r6le of alliance military
forces, to guarantee the security and terri-
torial integrity of member states, remains
unchanged. "
'In peace " it followed on " the r6le of
allied military forces is to guard against
risks to the security of alliance members;
to contribute towards the maintenance of
stability and balance in Europe; and to
ensure that peace is preserved. "
169. Finally, it was established that:
* Allies could, further, be called upon to
contribute to global stability and peace by
providing forces for United Nations mis-
sions. "
170. Few people would have then dared to
predict that within one year this phrase was
going to play an all-important r0le in debates
among allies over the possible r6le of military
forces in former Yugoslavia.
l7l. One could argue that, in Rome, NATO
had not yet completely transformed itself into
the perfect security organisation for the coming
decades, but that would be unfair. Develop-
ments are following in too-rapid succession to
expect more than what was achieved in Rome
after thorough and serious preparations.
172. Even so, the Rome declaration provides a
fairly complete catalogue of tasks and missions
of the alliance and its military forces, which
should have allowed it to act effectively when it
became clear that the crisis in Yugoslavia was
turning into a savage war.
173. Certainly, no satisfactory solution has yet
been found to the question whether NATO as
such could operate out-of-area, but it should be
noted that this did not prevent militarily suc-
cessful operations in the Gulf war, where a
number of NATO member states co-operated
with others to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi
invaders. Even if it was not a NATO operation,
NATO assets, NATO procedures and NATO
experience contributed to its success.
174. Meeting in Oslo on 4th June 1992, the
North Atlantic Council made it known that it
was prepared 'to support, on a case-by-case
basis in accordance with (its) own procedures,
peace-keeping activities under the responsibility
of the CSCE, including by making available
alliance resources and expertise ".
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175. Later, on lgth June 1992 (the crisis in
Yugoslavia had meanwhile resulted in over
100 000 people killed and 2 500 000 refugees)
the WEU Council issued the Petersberg decla-
ration which included new decisions on the
strengthening of WEU's operational r6le. Here,
WEU member states declared that they were
" prepared to make available military units from
the whole spectrum of their conventional armed
forces for military tasks conducted under the
authority of WEU. "
176. Furthermore, it was stated that:
" Apart from contributing to the common
defence in accordance with Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty and Article V of
the modified Brussels Treaty respectively,
military units of WEU member states,
acting under the authority of WEU, could
be employed for:
- 
humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- 
peace-keeping tasks;
- 
tasks of combat forces in crisis man-
agement, including Peace-making.
177. On the occasion of the Helsinki CSCE
summit meeting on 8th-lfth July 1992, foreign
ministers of both NATO and WEU decided that
their troops would, on a case-by-case basis, be
available for peace-keeping activities under the
responsibility of the CSCE.
178. Later, at their ministerial North Atlantic
Council meeting in Brussels on 17th December
1992, ministers decided to further strengthen
alliance co-ordination in peace-keeping and to
develop practical measures to enhance the alli-
ance's contribution in this area. Ministers
declared that they were ready " to share experi-
ences in peace-keeping with (their) co-operation
partners and other CSCE participating states,
and to join them as required in supporting
CSCE peace-keeping operations ".
179. They also confirrred the preparedness of
the alliance to " support, on a case-by-case basis
and in accordance with our own procedures,
peace-keeping operations under the authority of
the United Nations Security Council6D?
180. In the statement issued at the meeting of
the North Atlantic Co-operation Council(NACC) on lSth December 1992, it was said
that the countries participating in NACC would
" exchange experience and expertise on peace-
keeping and related matters " and that they
would " continue (their) consultations leading to
co-operation on this subject in conformity with
the work plan ".
(a) State of alfain in prepadng lor the peace'kceping rdlcs
oI NATO and WEU
181. Even if a framework of good intentions
and availability has been created in the North
Atlantic Council's political decisions and state-
ments, oflicials at NATO headquarters note that
the alliance does not yet have a detailed set of
principles and policies for peace-keeping. One
issue at stake is the implications for defence
planning and security, if the same assets may be
used for different purposes. These are certainly
subjects which should be addressed at the forth-
coming NATO summit meeting in January
1994.
182. It is clear, however, that NATO's primary
r6le will remain the security of its members. If
NATO is to assume peace-keeping r6les, it does
not intend to be at the beck and call of the whole
world, nor will it act on its own responsibility.
On the other hand, NATO righAy argues that it
has unique capabilities to offer for peace-
keeping, such as an airborne early warning
system, command, control and communica-
tions, multinational forces, interoperability,
well-trained troops with more than half of its
member states having extensive peace-keeping
experience, a unique scale and degree of read-
iness and planning capability.
183. On l8th December 1992, the NACC
decided to establish an ad-hoc group on
co-operation in peace-keeping with the aim of
developing a common understanding of the
political principles of and the tools for peace-
keeping, and to share experience and thereby
develop common practical approaches and
co-operation in support of peace-keeping under
the responsibility of the United Nations or the
CSCE.
184. The ad-hoc group drafted principles
which were agreed by the permanent North
Atlantic Council and its co-operation partners
on 15th March 1993. This document, notwith-
standing NATO's own assertion that it is still
lacking - detailed principles and policies for
peace-keeping, contains what is ostensibly an
almost exhaustive compilation of definitions,
general principles, criteria and operational prin-
ciples, guidelines, measures and elements.
185. As regards co-operation to prepare for
possible CSCE peace-keeping operations, a total
bf 4l nations have now subscribed to this initi-
ative, including all the NACC member states as
well as Sweden, Finland and Austria. Represen-
tatives from both the CSCE and the United
Nations have been invited. At this stage, an
operational planning group does not yet exist,
but there is an ambitious co-operation pro-
gramme, including such issues as training,
logistics, national planning and also technical
and doctrinal questions.
186. According to WEU's Secretary-General,
the operational oryanisation of WEU is still in a
preliminary phase. An inventory of forces
answerable to WEU is now being prepared.
These forces are mainly to be deployed for
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humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks. The
Defence Representatives Group is preparing
general rules and procedural guidelines for rela-
tions between these forces and WEU. Mean-
while, WEU takes the view that the involvement
of the United States in Europe's security is
vitally important.
187. Therefore, in any situation where
Europe's security is under threat, the prelim-
inary question should be whether the United
States is prepared to be involved in operations
to counter the threat. If the United States agrees
to be involved, a NATO operation can take
place. If on the other hand the United States
does not want to be involved, then WEU and the
EC can act on their own. Depending on the
requirements for the operation, WEU could
then be self-reliant or play the leading r6le.
There is a growing consensus that in such cir-
cumstances, NATO should make resources and
assets available to WEU, such as the NATO
AWACS and other infrastructure, a matter that
was again discussed recently by NATO's defence
ministers at Travemiinde on 20th-2lst October
1993. As the Secretary-General, Mr. van
Eekelen, said, there is a growing feeling that
Europeans will have to learn to take the main
responsibility for handling problems which they
can no longer expect Americans to solve for
them. In that case, it would be only logical that
NATO should be ready to help Europe, also if it
is deploying a WEU force to handle a regional
crisis, by lending its assets which are lacking in
WEU's operational organisation, such as real-
time intelligence, integrated command and
control and airlift. Meanwhile, WEU should
give serious consideration to how it can become
self-reliant in some respects, such as airlift and
satellite reconnaissance.
O) NATO ond WEA operations in lormer Yagoslavia
188. With the abovementioned statements in
mind, it is interesting if not revealing to note
what NATO and WEU are actually doing to
promote or keep peace in former Yugoslavia.
189. Actual activities are the following:
(/ Implementing decisions taken by
foreign ministers in Helsinki on lOth
July 1992: both a NATO and a WEU
naval force are enforcing compliance
with the United Nations Security
Council resolutions concerning the
United Nations economic embargo
on Serbia and Montenegro and the
arms embargo against all the
republics of former Yugoslavia. For
this operation, detailed co-ordination
arrangements have been worked out
between NATO and WEU military
offrcials, including co-ordination of
areas of responsibility, methods of
operation, communications, air sur-
veillance, support and oil supply.
(ii) ln a joint action with Romania, Bul-
garia and Hungary, WEU is enforcing
the embargo against Serbia and Mon-
tenegro on the Danube.
(rfl UNPROFOR is using elements from
NATO's NORTHAG command forits operational headquarters in
Kiseljalc.
(iv/ Following a North Atlantic Council
decision of 8th April 1992, NATO is
enforcing the no-fly zone over
Bosnia-Herzegovina as imposed by
the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 816.
(v) On 9th August 1993, the North
Atlantic Council approved the
" operational options for air strikes in
Bosnia-Heruegovina ", enabling air
support for humanitarian relief.
190. Why did NATO not do more? At NATO
headquarters, a number of arguments are beingput forward which have prevented the
deployment of peace-keeping forces.
l9l. The first argument is that a massive oper-
ation with NATO deploying ground troops for
peace-keeping is considered by many as a major
test of NATO's capability as a security
organisation. Any failure to pass this test, so it is
said, would mean the end of NATO. As a conse-
quence, great caution is being taken in making
the most thorot,gh preparations, including
painstaking negotiations over the mandate for
such an operation and the duration of the com-
mitment, all needed to establish a proper
planning programme. Further, it is said that a
clear political objective, which is a main con-
dition for any military operation to be suc-
cessful, is still lacking. No clarity has yet been
obtained over who will be responsible for the
cost of a massive peace-keeping operation,
which NATO is estimating at $8.25 billion a
year. The United Nations, it is said at NATO,
should allow its member states to consider their
contribution to such operations as payment in
kind.
192. There are also indications that some of
NATO's member states have problems in pro-
viding troops for the simple reason that, with so
many different United Nations operations going
on, they do not have enough resources in troops.
Some member states even feel that they may
have to revise their armed forces restructuring
programme if United Nations peace-keeping isto require continuous large scale commit-
ments.
193. Following a request from NATO'S Per-
manent Council on 15th September 1993, the
organisation's military authorities have started
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preliminary contingency planning for possible
implementation by NATO of the military
aspects of a United Nations peace-keeping plan
which would come into force if the different
parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
sign a peace agreement and the United Nations
turns to NATO for support for the plan's imple-
mentation. The planning envisages a force of
50 000 men, half of whom should be provided
by the United States. It should be noted that
many important issues still have to be settled.
The military believe that the political objectives
and rules of engagement must be established
clearly before the start of any intervention.
Some NATO members such as France, the
United Kingdom and Canada, would prefer to
see major United Nations involvement in the
command and control of any peace-keeping
mission, while the United States is in favour of a
NATO command, dominated by the United
States military, in any peace-keeping operation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Most, if not all, member
states want to send troops for only a limited
period.
194. Finally, it is observed that it has been
extremely diflicult to reach a consensus among
NATO's member states on all the different
issues relating to a peaceJ<eeping operation as
now envisaged, although this is essential for any
NATO operation on the territory of former
Yugoslavia.
195. WEU, it should be recognised, has not
done much more than NATO, but the embargo-
enforcing operations in the Adriatic and on the
Danube are successful.
196. Asked why WEU did not do more, the
Secretary-General, Mr. van Eekelen, pointed out
that WEU's operational organisation is only in
its infancy and that there were no resources to
do much more. He noted that WEU has now
become one of the players in security matters,
but the United Nations has taken the lead, pro-
viding legitimacy for all operations. The United
Nations has now asked NATO to provide peace-
keeping forces in the event of a peace agreement
between the parties to tlre conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina implementing the Owen-Stol-
tenberg plan. In that framework, WEU may be
asked to participate in the rotation of forces in
the long term. WEU is now drawing up a plan to
solve the practical problems for the EC's admin-
istration of Mostar. The WEU Planning Cell is
examining the possibility of establishing a WEU
police force in Mostar and the re-establishment
of public, in particular medical, services in the
city.
(c) The futare ofpeace-hcepitg in formcr Yugoslavia
197. Iord Owen and Mr. Stoltenberg, when
visiting NATO on 22nd September 1993, said
that the peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-
Herzegovina should be accomplished by a
credible force, more powerful than the lightly
armed United Nations peace-keeping force
deployed in Bosnia for a humanitarian
mlssron.
198. NATO's Secretary-General, Manfred
Wtirner, has made it clear that NATO will not
and cannot enforce a peace plan if the United
States does not participate in the peace-keeping
forces. He believes that the United States
administration is still willing to provide troops
for an operation under NATO command, but on
the other hand, he thinks that after the casualties
among United States forces in Somalia and the
failed effort to land United States peace-keepers
in Haili, the administration might have trouble
in securing the agreement of the United States
Congress and Senate.
199. Indeed, after the rejection by the Bosnian
Parliament, at the end September 1993, of the
last Owen Stoltenberg peace plan, the chances
for a peace-keeping force seem rather remote. In
fact, one political commentator was most
probably right when he bluntly said that the
Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the peace plan
was greeted with thinly-disguised relief in
Europe as well as in the United States.
200. The most recent pirouette in Europe's
ballet of hesitations over military operations in
former Yugoslavia was again illustrative of a
general attitude of long standing.
201. On 25th October 1993, President
Frangois Mitterrand stated on French television:
"A major demonstration must be'made... In
November a humanitarian path will have to be
forced towards Sarajevo ".
202. At the EC's summit meeting in Brussels
on 29th October 1993, however, President
Mitterrand told the heads of government that he
had not been understood correctly and that the
question was not one of using force in this oper-
ation. Later that day, the summit meeting
decided to use all appropriate means for
ensuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance
and not, as proposed by France, * all the means
available for ensuring " which would have
included the United Nations authorisation to
use force and NATO's offer for aerial protection
of the uNPRoFoR.2s
203. As matters now stand, many have started
to consider former Yugoslavia as a specific case
where none of the CSCE principles, nor of its
conflict prevention procedures, nor the United
Nations Charter's procedures set out in Chapters
VI and VII can be successful and where all allied
American and European ideas and proposals for
22r
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peace-keeping and peace-making are doomed to
fail. They think it is a hornet's nest where a mil-
itary operation to keep peace or enforce a peace
agreement could easily deteriorate into combat
operations with inevitable casualties. Not one
organisation or country has been able to provide
a solution or bring the conflicting parties to
reason. Those who have not tried yet are afraid
of losing their credibility once they become
involved. These could be reasons why western
governments have tacitly abandoned Yugoslavia
to itself, decided to let the conflict follow its
natural course while hoping that a stage of pure
fatigue will be reached when the only real option
left for all parties will be to stumble or drag
themselves to the negotiation table where lord
Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg will hold their
hands to sign the ultimate peace plan.
204. What remains in former Yugoslavia?
205. If Western Europe and the United States
have almost given up hope of keeping or
securing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there still
remains Croatia, Kosovo, Sandjak and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(FYROM).
206. In Croatia, the situation is volatile. The
United Nations peace-keeping force is not
implementing its oflicial mandate which is to
keep both sides behind their previous confron-
tation line, secure the cease-fire agreement and
put Serbian heavy arms in storage. Recently, the
Commander-in-Chief of UNPROFOR warned
that Serbs and Croats are again on the brink of
war.
207. In Kosovo, the civil, human and national
rights of two million Albanians who form 92Vo
of the Kosovo population, have been abrogated
by Serbia in 1989. Under the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution, Kosovo had wide powers of
self-rule as an autonomous province of the
republic of Serbia. Iocal Albanians were given
control over most aspects of public life. This all
came to an end when President Milosevic of
Serbia revoked Kosovo's autonomy, dissolved
the regional parliament and made the region an
integal part of Serbia. Martial law has now been
imposed. Education in the Albanian language
has been suspended. More than half of the Alba-
nians have been summarily dismissed from theirjobs and nearly 300 000 Albanians have been
forced to flee Kosovo. Serbian military units
surround most of Kosovo's major cities and
towns with their artillery guns ready to target.
Serbian paramilitary forces are harassing and
intimidating the Albanian population under the
inspiring leadership of Zeljko Raznjatovic, also
called Arkan, wanted for murder and other
crimes by several Western European countries.
In a report, released by Amnesty International
on l2th October, it is said that tension is still
growing in Kosovo where a dangerous mixture
of ethnic tension, rage and years of abuse in
silence is fermenting. 26
208. It has been suggested that the Serbs
should start to discuss limited restoration of
autonomy for Kosovo, but the Albanians are no
longer interested in such a solution. They are
demanding an independent Kosovo. It is gen-
erally believed that the dispute over Kosovo can
easily turn into a war, maybe even with the
active participation of Albanians living in neigh-
bouring countries such as Albania and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(FYROM). Some suggest that even Albania,
FYROM, Bulgaria, Greece and perhaps Turkey
may become involved in the fighting. One has to
hope that this will not happen, but it cannot be
excluded completely.
209. Nevertheless, the situation is suffrciently
threatening to require immediate and decisive
action by the international community with
Europe in the lead.
210. It has been argued that nothing can be
done in Kosovo, because it is an internal dispute
on Serbian territory, which would preclude
foreign intervention. It should be noted,
however, that the actual situation in Kosovo
fully justifies international action in accordance
with Chapters VI and YII of the United Nations
Charter since it is unequivocally a dispute * the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and
security', as mentioned in Article 33 of the
Charter.
2ll. Application of all different actions enu-
merated in the abovementioned chapters of
the United Nations Charter, including the
deployment of peace-keeping forces, would
therefore be fully legitimate.
212. In the former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia (FYROM), the situation is not much
better. It has declared its independence and has
been admitted as a member of the United
Nations, but its oflicial name, challenged by
Greece, is still being negotiated with Greece in
talks sponsored by the United Nations. The new
Greek Prime Minister, Andreas Papandreou,
has however announced that Greece will pull
out of these talks.
213. On l2th October 1993, Belgium oflicially
recognised FYROM as a sovereign and inde-
pendent state. The Greek Ministry for Foreign
Alfairs immediately issued a protest, stating that
the * Greek partners in the EC should seriously
consider Athens' views " on the 'Macedonian
question " and should respect * the principle of
solidarity " in the EC.
214. With a total population ,
million, FYROM has a number
of just over 2
' of minorities,
222
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the most important of which are the approxi-
mately 400 000 Albanians living in the area
adjacent to Kosovo and Albania, 90 000 Turks
and 50 000 Serbs. In particular, the Albanians,
who are participating in the present gov-
ernment, may cause problems in the future.
They have been proposing the creation of an
autonomous Albanian region and also the
federalisation of FYROM.
215. At the moment, within the framework of
UNPROFOR, a Nordic battalion and a United
States contingent of 315 troops are deployed
along the Macedonian-Serbian border in order
to prevent the armed conflict in former Yugo-
slavia spilling over into FYROM.
(d) Peue-keepiag in EumN otd other possible aruas
ol conflict
216. While there is little prospect of extending
peace-keeping operations in former Yugoslavia,
rightly or wrongly, might there be other disputes
or armed conflicts in Europe where the western
alliance, whether in the NATO or WEU
framework, would be prepared to intervene mil-
itarily at an early stage under the authority of
the United Nations or the CSCE in order to
keep or enforce peace while such action was still
possible with an appropriate display of force and
without the risk of heavy casualties?
217. An increasing number of ministerial and
other meetings in all existing security
organisations are being devoted to the many dif-
ferent aspects ofpeace-keeping. This creates the
impression that huge forces are being prepared
for operations in all the regions in Europe and in
other continents where conflicts are raging or
where fragile cease-fires or peace agreements
have to be monitored. Is that really true?
218. Let us first look more closely at the cata-
logue of other areas of conflict and hotbeds of
tension in Europe or at Europe's border which
are, or recently were, on special offer for peace-
keeping and peace-making. A valuable catalogue
can be found in the statements issued at the
meetings of the North Atlantic Co-operation
Council (NACC) which keeps an annotated
record of conflicts in its member states.
2L9. The last NACC statement issued in
Athens on llth June 1993 mentions the fol-
lowing conflicts where arms had been or were
being used and where, theoretically, the
deployment of peace-keeping forces may be
required.
(i) NagornoKarabakh
220. NACC stated that the CSCE conference in
Minsk offers the best chance for a lasting
solution, it supports United Nations Security
Council Resolution 822 and calls for the imme-
diate cessation of hostilities and for the with-
drawal of all occupying forces from recently-
occupied districts of Azerbaijan. At the
moment, there is little hope that the conflict will
be solved soon and fighting continues. In a dec-
laration in Paris on 15th October 1993, the
Prime Minister of Nagorno-Karabakh, Robert
Kotcharian, declared that his country would
continue to fight for its rights until it obtained
satisfaction on all the issues involved.
221. Russian hardliners are backing the Arme-
nians in their fight for control of Nagorno-
Karabakh and independent witnesses have
reported Russian logistical support, but there islittle evidence of any direct Russian
involvement. On the other hand, Russia is
worried about possible fundamentalist influence
in mainly Muslim Azerbaijan. The armed forces
of Azerbaijan have been soundly defeated and
the current talks are the best chance for peace.
The new Azeri government appears to be ready
to relinquish Nagorno-Karabakh in all but
name, but much depends on Armenian
acceptance of the need to withdraw from other
parts of Azerbaijan.
(ii) Georgia
222. NACC appealed to the parties concernedto respect an effective cease-fire in the
Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georyia
and refrain from all actions which could com-
plicate a constructive dialogue and the
achievement of a durable settlement. It also
believed that it was important to pursue a full
settlement of Georgian-Ossetian relations in the
zone of conflict of Georgia.
223. What has happened since that statement
was issued? In September 1993, Abkhaz forces
backed by Russian troops and volunteers from
the North Caucasus, all in possession of large
quantities of modern and sophisticated military
equipment, launched a surprise attack on
Sukhumi, the last remaining Georyian strongholdin Abkhazia, violating a Russian-brokered
cease-fire agreement signed on 28th July last.
224. On 4th October, the Abkhaz Defence
Minister announced that all remaining pockets
of Georgian resistance had been liquidated, and
that Abkhaz troops were in complete control of
the region. There were reports of ethnic
cleansing and of more than one hundred
thousand refugees.
225. Meanwhile, troops loyal to Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, President Shevardnadze's rival
and predecessor, occupied a number of strategic
towns in the west of Georgia, and were con-
tinuing with their offensive. Mr. Gamsakhurdia
has declared that Georgia will be cleansed of
Eduard Shevardnadze's supporters, adding that
he would resume his * lawful presidency " by
" all possible means ".27
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226. Until recently, Russian assistance to the
Abkhazians was matched by an absence of
support for Georgia. With an economy which
has almost ground to a complete standstill and
moving towards dismemberment, Georgia is
indeed close to collapse as a functioning state.
The Georyian army has virtually disintegrated
and can no longer fight on its own.
227 . Under these circumstances, on l Sth
October 1993 Eduard Shevardnadze made an
urgent appeal to the governments of Russia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan to send the necessary
military contingents to guarantee the normal
function of vital arteries from the Black Sea to
Tbilisi.
228. Since then, covert Russian military
assistance has turned the tide and it is reported
that rebel forces are now retreating.28 The
Russian assistance, although publicly denied in
Moscow, came only after Mr. Shevardnadzehad
decided that Georgia should join the Common-
wealth of Independent States.
229. In two other troubled areas on Georgian
territory, there is still no guarantee of lasting
peace.
230. South Ossetia, an autonomous region,
after repeated outbursts ofviolence during 1991,
declared its independence on 2lst December of
that same year, and confirmed an earlier reso-
lution on unification with Russia. Fighting con-
tinued and President Shevardnadze accused
Russia of exacerbating the situation by helping
the South Ossetians with troops and equipment.
Meanwhile, the speaker of the Russian par-
liament accused Georgia of the " genocide of the
South Ossetian people ". According to a
cease-fire agreement concluded in June 1992,
Russia would withdraw its military units from
the region while a monitoring committee would
oversee the peace.
231- In the autonomous region of Adjaria, a
comparative peace has been observed althoughit is distrustful of the central Georgian Gov-
ernment. The lack of a common border with
Russia, however, offers few prospects for a suc-
cessful independence movement.
232. It is argued that Georgia is of minimal
strategic importance to the West and Russia can
be left to deal with security problems in that
region.
233. The only way to stop the continuing vio-
lence would be to introduce buffer forces from
outside. Both politically and militarily, these can
only be Russian forces. The United States, sup-
ported by Germany, indeed excludes any such
action other than that taken by the Russians.
The oflicial view of the Russian Government on
how the conflict should be solved is unclear and
contradictory statements are being issued.2e
234. AII this is happening in a country where
the President is a former Soviet foreign min-
ister, well respected in the West as the
co-architect of glasnost and of a number of
important arms control agreements. Moreover,
Georgia is a member state of the United
Nations, CSCE and NACC. There is no clarity
over its CIS membership. Where else are
western alliance troops going to intervene for
the sake of peace and democracy if not in
Georyia?
(iii) Tajikistan
235. NACC urged the parties involved in the
continuing political and armed confrontation to
settle their differences through dialogue and
work together for the peaceful and democratic
development in their country. It supported the
efforts of the international community in this
regard.
236. Last year, a power struggle developed into
an all-out civil war which left at least 20 000
people killed and more than half a million
forced to flee their homes. The real figures are
not known and some suggested that between
30 000 and 50 000 were killed. The present gov-
ernment, headed by Imoli Rakhmonov, con-
sidered to be a hardJine communist, has annihi-
lated the opposition.
237. With the West's tacit agreement, Russia is
maintaining an armed force of more then 20 000
in support of the present government and with
the primary mission of keeping fighters,
weapons and drugs from entering Afghanistan.
Fighting at Tajikistan's southern border is
reported almost daily. Both Russia and the West
claim that the present situation is preferable to
what they see as the alternative; a government
under the influence of radical Islamic elements
from abroad.
238. Still, the conflict in Tajikistan is not
between different ethnic groups, nor between
communism and Islamic fundamentalism, but
rather a struggle for political power between dif-
ferent clans.
(iv) Moldova
239. NACC welcomed the stabilisation of the
situation in the left bank Dniestr region of
Moldova following the agreement reached on
2lst July 1992. A permanent settlement was
considered essential. It supported the early and
complete withdrawal of foreign troops from
Moldova in the context of appropriate bilateral
agxeements without additional linkage to other
rssues.
28. International Herald Tribune, 28th October 1993.
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240. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians have
been the main supporters of the proclamation of
the Trans Dniestr republic, followed by a mil-
itary campaign to take control of their republic.
On 2lst July 1992, a peace agreement was
signed, giving the Trans Dniestr region special
status and the right to self-determination should
Moldova unite with Romania. Russian,
Moldovan and Trans Dniestr peace-keeping
troops began enforcing a cease-fire and talks
began on the withdrawal of Russian forces
already in the region. In both Moldova and
Romania, there is concern over the continuing
presence in Moldova of the Russian l4th Army
under Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebedev,
who considers it his main job to support the
Trans Dniestr republic against Moldova. This is
the more worrying since the General has openly
declared " Theoretically we are under the orders
of the commander-in-chief of ground forces in
Moscow. In practice, we take decisions here. " 30
It should be noted that in future, the existence of
an offrcially independent republic of Trans
Dniestr would immediately be challenged by
Ukraine.
241. Despite the volatile situation in Moldova,it is extremely unlikely, if not completely
excluded, that NATO or WEU peace-keeping
forces will be sent to that region, when Russian
forces are doing the job which they deem nec-
essary in their own or their country's interest.
(v) Other regional disputes
242. The NACC catalogue further mentions
the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Baltic
states, which has since almost been accom-
plished and the need to conclude, without delay,
the appropriate bilateral agreements in each
case.
243. Finally, it welcomes all practical steps
leading to the solution of existing differences
between Russia and Ukraine including those
related to the Black Sea fleet and nuclear issues.
It is widely recognised that both states have a
common interest in solving their differences
through negotiations, even if recently-concluded
agreements were in the air again after a few
days, as has been the case before.
244. Still, relations between Russia and
Ukraine have not been stablilised. Apart from
the many economic disputes, there are disputes
over the Black Sea fleet and strategic nuclear
weapons.
245. Repeatedly, summit talks between
Ukraine's President konid Kravchuk and Rus-
sia's President Boris Yeltsin resulted in a set-
tlement over the status of the Black Sea fleet
which appeared to be void within days. Agree-
ments in Dagomys in June 1992 to split the
fleet, in Yalta in August 1992 to place the fleet
under the joint command of both presidents and
in Moscow in June 1993 to split the fleet on a
50-50 basis, with joint use of Sebastopol were
never implemented.
246. At a recent summit meeting in Massandra
on 3rd September, it was decided that Ukraine
would give up its entitlement to half the 300
vessel fleet in exchange for which Russia would
write off Ukraine's debts to it for oil, gas and
electricity, estimated at $2.5 billion. A joint
Ukrainian-Russian Commission has been set up
for more detailed discussion, but there is little
chance of the Massandra agreement being
implemented after the Ukrainian Government
was heavily criticised over the compromise.
247. Behind the dispute over the Black Sea
fleet is the most explosive problem of control of
Sebastopol, its Crimean headquarters and the
Crimea itself which, with its majority Russian
population, was given to Ukraine in 1954.
248. With its 176 strategic missiles and I 656
nuclear weapons, Ukraine is the third largest
nuclear power in the world. President Kravchuk
has obliged his country to accede to the l99l
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and
to become a non-nuclear power according to the
1992 Lisbon protocol, but Ukraine has not yet
ratified or implemented these agrcements.
Ukraine is now trying to use its nuclear weapons
as bargaining chips to obtain economic aid and
security guarantees from the West. It is claiming
$2.5 billion for dismantling its nuclear weapons.
In October 1993, President Kravchuk declared
that Ukraine should keep its 46 modern SS-24
missiles as a means of pressure. 3r
249. This concludes the list of hotspots men-
tioned by NACC. What is left?
(vi) Central Europe
250. In Central Europe, important Polish and
Hungarian minorities live in neighbouring coun-
tries. Poland has succeeded in concluding agrce-
ments on good neighbourliness and co-operation
with Belarus and Ukraine, where there are
600 000 and 500 000 Poles living respectively. It
is negotiating an agreement with Lithuania,
where there are 350 000 Poles. Apparently,
negotiations are not easy but there are good
reasons to be optimistic. All in all, there is little
reason to consider Poland as a country where
peace-keeping forces will have to be deployed.
251. Hungary is facing a more complicated sit-
uation. The 3 million ethnic Hungarians living
outside Hungary in neighbouring countries form
the largest single minority in Central Europe.
The Hungarian Government has advocated sub-
30. The Economist, 28th August 1993.
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stantial local autonomy for these Hungarians. In
1992, the Hungarian Defence Minister, Lajos
Fur, declared in an interview that his country's
security policies took into account Hungarians
living outside its borders. Since then, Prime
Minister, Jozsef Antall, has taken pains not to
further deteriorate relations with neighbouring
countries and, in general, the situation is now
more positive. Most worrying is the position ofthe 350 000 Hungarians still living in
Vojvodina, a formerly autonomous region in
Serbia, which was deprived of this statute in
1989. The Hungarian Government considers the
presence in Vojvodina of paramilitary Serbian
forces without proper political control to be a
risk for the Hungarian minority.
252. The adoption of the common action planin Washington is a matter of concern for
Hungary, which could only conclude that the
international community has accepted
Milosevic's policy of ethnic cleansing and
changing borders by force. The Serbian Gov-
ernment has said that, since the beginning of the
conflict, 300 000 Serbian refugees from Bosnia
and Croatia have settled in Vojvodina, thus
increasing the Serbian part of the population
from 600/o to 8090.
253. There are many signs of growing discrimi-
nation against Hungarians in Vojvodina. Many
are dismissed from their jobs, the use of the
Hungarian language in courts has been restricted
and on lst July last a law on higher education
was passed by the Serbian Parliament according
to which secondary teacher training for Hun-
garian teachers was eliminated. This, together
with a climate of growing intimidation may lead
to a silent and non-violent but determined
process of ethnic cleansing, causing Hungarians
to leave Vojvodina for lack of reliable future
prospects.
254. The Hungarian Government has drawn
these developments to the attention of the inter-
national community without obtaining any pos-
itive response. In Hungary, it is thought that the
lack of response from the international com-
munity might lead other countries with Hun-
garian minorities to follow the Serbian
example.
255. More than 500 000 ethnic Hungarians
live in the Republic of Slovakia, where they rep-
resent about I l9o of the population, concen-
trated mostly in a region along Slovakia's
southern border.
256. During the most difficult phase of the
dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the
Gabcikovo dam on the Danube, it was feared
that there might be negative repercussions on
the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, but since
then both countries agreed on 5th April 1993 to
take this dispute to the international court ofjustice in The Hague, following mediation by
the European Commission. They also agreed to
hold regular meetings at the level of Prime Min-
isters on other bilateral isures, including the
treatment of the Hungarian minority in Sle
vakia.
257. The Hungarian minority of 1.7 million
living in Romania has been a continuing source
of tension between the two neighbouring coun-
tries since the downfall of communism. Last
September, however, the Hungarian Foreign
Minister, Gezra Jeszenszky, paid an offrcial visit
to Romania, meeting his Romanian counterpart
Teodor Melescanu in order to prepare a bilateral
treaty including the issues of minority treatment
and stability of borders. Romania's imminent
membership of the Council of Europe, achieved
on 28th September 1993, and Mr. Melescanu's
pragmatic vision have played an important rdle
in the improvement of relations between the two
countries and a satisfactory solution of the main
outstanding questions is expected.
258. After fierce debates in parliament, the
bilateral treaty between Hungary and Ukraine
has been ratified. In this treaty, both countries
have agreed to respect each other's territorial
integrity, confirming that they have no terri-
torial claims. They have also committed them-
selves to ensure that minority rights will be
respected and that their ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic and religious identities are preserved.
(e) What are the clunccs?
259. What must be the conclusion of this suc-
cinct review of possible conflicts and candidate
regions or countries, where peace-keeping forces
may have to be deployed?
(i) Peace-keeping in the independent republics of
the former Soviet Union
260. Almost without exception, these republics
are facing instability, ethnic strife or other forms
of internal conflict. Even if protests were made
when some time ago Russia claimed exclusive
rights for peace-making in the states which for-
merly belonged to the Soviet Union, neither the
United States, nor any Western European or
even Central European country would even
think of intervening in one of these countries in
order to keep, restore or enforce peace.
261. In his recent address to the United Nations
General Assembly, the Russian Foreigrr Minister,
Andrei Kozyrev, asked for endorsement and
funding for Russian intervention in former Soviet
republics. Among other things, he said: 'Con-
scious of its particular responsibility for main-
taining peace, Russia has made peac+keeping and
the protection of human rightC particularly those
of national minorities, key priorities of its foreigr
policy, first of all in the territory of the former
Soviet lJnion.'32
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262. Russia, for many reasons, is extremely
sensitive over any possibility of outside
involvement in the security affairs of former
Soviet republics.
263. In their reaction to this proposal,
American officials declared that the Clinton
administration in no way conceded special
Russian rights on that country's borders. This
may be true, but on the other hand, recent docu-
ments and statements by United States adminis-
tration officials demonstrate that, in practice,
the United States will be extremely reluctant to
intervene actively on the territory of the former
Soviet Union. As regards peace-keeping on the
territory of the former Soviet Union, the fol-
lowing points have been stressed:
- 
The United States does not seek to
intercede in or formally mediate con-
flicts in the former Soviet Union. It is
ready to help diplomatically if all
parties to a conflict so wish.
- The United States will not act on its
own, but concentrate on co-operation
in international organisations like the
United Nations and CSCE.
- 
The United States has no intention of
becoming involved in conflicts within
the Russian Federation, nor of inter-
vening in domestic Russian politics.
- 
The United States will not make aid
conditional upon its judgment of Rus-
sia's policy and behaviour towards
other newly independent states. 33
(ii) Peace-keeping in the nine Central European
states
264. It is highly unlikely that any peace-
keeping operation will have to be concluded on
their territory. Each of them is a member of
CSCE and NACC. This in itself is not a guar-
antee that they will not embark on the use of
force to solve disputes. On the other hand, most
of them are now members of the Council of
Europe which feels very strongly about
democracy, the right of minorities and, in
general, about the rule of law. None of these
states would like to be expelled from the Council
of Europe because of misbehaviour and it is,
therefore, clearly understood that they will do
everything to be considered as civilised and
well-respected nations. States which are not
members have applied for membership and they
will no doubt do everything possible to meet the
Council of Europe's conditions. Moreover, all
these states hope to be admitted sooner or later
to the EC with which some have and others will
conclude association agreements. In this
framework, they have already become partners
in WEU's Forum of Consultation.
(J) Conclusion
265. As demonstrated in this chapter, since the
end of the cold war and increasingly so after the
beginning of the conflict in former Yugoslavia,
extensive debates over peace-keeping and peace-
enforcing have started in all international
organisations dealing with peace and security.
Many summit meetings of heads of state and
government, ministerial meetings and countless
meetings of officials are devoted to this subject.
Documents full of definitions, principles, cri-
teria and guidelines have been drafted and
agreed to. Whenever a specific action is con-
sidered, many more meetings are devoted to
drafting political objectives, mandates and rules
of engagement. Of course, it would be irrespon-
sible to deploy armed forces in peace-keeping
operations without thorough preparation and
common agreement on all these essential ele-
ments.
266. But increasingly, one cannot avoid the
impression that these endless preparations and
negotiations, leading to postponement and can-
cellation of operations, are part of an ingenious
web of tergiversations allowing in particular
Western European governments to avoid
tackling the basic question: are Western
European democracies prepared to commit their
armed forces to peace-keeping operations if
there is a genuine risk of them being drawn into
combat with the likelihood of casualties?
267. If governments think that Europe's
democracies cannot sustain casualties in their
armed forces when not operating in defence of
national or allied territory or in defence oftheir
vital economic interests, they should consider
the consequences and draw their conclusions.
268. One consequence may be that no peace-
keeping operation with the participation of
Western European forces will be possible
without the deployment of a massive superiority
in troops and equipment.
269. Another consequence may be that any
successful terrorist or combat action against
such peace-keeping forces causing a significant
number of casualties, or even the credible threat
of such action, can cause the withdrawal of
peace-keepers and cancellation of the whole
operation. In practice, this could lead to a situ-
ation where large parts of the world will be aban-
doned to their fate.
270. The classic argument for armed forces
mainly consisting of conscripts has always been
that this largely contributes to the creation ofa
national consensus on all matters concerning
national defence or the defence of a nation's
vital interests. If, as many are claiming, defence
of national or allied territory is replaced by
peace-keeping in regions outside the national or
allied territory as the main activity of armed
forces, the basic reason for conscription is not33. International Herald Tribune, 6th and 3fth August 1993.
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just losing its value, it is also becoming an
obstacle to allowing armed forces to perform
their new tasks. Western European governments
may have to abandon their conscript armed
forces and concentrate on the creation of
entirely professional armies, which are better
prepared to be deployed and do the jobs for
which they have been hired and well trained.
Some governments have already reached this
decision, others will have to follow. Opponents
of professionalisation often argue that such
armed forces are not cheaper, they are perhaps
even more expensive. But what is the use of
large budgets for maintaining conscript armed
forces ifthey are no use for priority tasks set out
in all recent strategic concepts?
271. If Western European states are not ready
to take the necessary decisions in order to have
armed forces at their disposal, constituting a
credible threat or deterrence to anyone consid-
ering the use of armed force to obtain political
objectives, they will have to lower their voices
and take a more moderate stand in European
and world security affairs than their ambitions,
as set out in the Maastrict Treaty, might
suggest.
272. They may still be able to defend their own
territory, but they will have to abandon the idea
of wielding influence in those parts of Europe
where violence and the aggtessive use of force
are still considered to be part of a nation's legit-
imate instruments of action.
273. At the same time, and irrespective of their
views on the use of armed forces, Western
European nations must pay far more attentionto the stabilisation of newly-democratic
European states. Democratic elections and the
establishment of a free-market economy are not
enough. The stability of a state also depends onthe existence of democratically-organised
political parties, trade unions, employers' fede-
rations and the rich pattern of various
organisations and associations constituting the
system ofchecks and balances which is essential
for the survival of modern western democracies.
This complicated system can be developed only
gradually, but in the long run it is the best guar-
antee of protection against extremism, natio-
nalist adventures and chaos.
IX. What about peace-making?
274. If proper peace-keeping operations are
causing so much discussion and hesitation, what
then are the prospects for peace-making? Almost
from the start of the armed conflict in former
Yugoslavia, there has been an on-going debate
over the question whether there was a need for
peace-making, which has been defined as
* armed intervention in a state, even against the
wishes of the government of that state, to
prevent widespread death or suffering amongst
the population ".
275. In theory, the United Nations Charter
provides for armed intervention if " all appro-
priate diplomatic and other peaceful means
have failed ". Quite clearly, such armed inter-
vention can be authorised only by the interna-
tional authority with the right to do so, the
United Nations Security Council. Any armed
intervention aimed at peace-making, however,
must meet a number of conditions.
276. First, there must be a political objective.
This can range from the objective to stop the
killing or ethnic cleansing to the restoration of
pre-existing borders or even democratic institu-
tions. It should be noticed that armed inter-
vention cannot be terminated before the
political objective has been achieved.
277. Political objectives, therefore, must be
well-defined and specific so that there can be no
misunderstanding over the question of when
and whether the objective has been achieved.
278. As a consequence, vaguely-defined
reasons for armed intervention, which have
been put forward during the conflict in former
Yugoslavia, such as * to put pressure' on one or
more parties in the conflict, or 'to show the
resolve of the governments " are fundamentally
wrong.
279. It should be added that in this conflict the
EC has shown an embarrassing lack of strategic
political obj ectives. Humanitarian intervention
to stop the killing is relatively useless if no satis-
factory solutions can be offered for the funda-
mental problems of self-determination, minority
rights and the changing of borders. On these,
sometimes conflicting, issues the EC apparently
has not yet made up its mind.
280. Second, there must be a reasonable
prospect of success. Here, political leaders will
have to rely upon the advice of the military, who
must be able to tell them what troops and
equipment are required for the military oper-
ation to be successful. Their advice must include
estimates of collateral civilian casualties, col-
lateral damage of civilian installations and of
casualties among their own troops. The inevi-
table question must be addressed: whether the
political constituency is prepared to sustain the
possible considerable loss of human lives and
the financial consequences.
281. Third, the intervention must do more
good or avert more evil than the damage
wrought in the process of intervening.
282. Finally, the interest at stake must be suffi-
ciently important to justify armed intervention
with dl its possible consequences. This is a
crucial question. Notwithstanding public outcry,
moral indignation in itself does not seem to be a
sufficiently sound reason for peace-making.
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283. Altogether, it will not be easy to imagine
any peace-making operation which meets this
concise list of conditions. Recent experience
in Somalia and Haiti can but confirm this
view.
284. The United Nations Secretary General,
presenting his own conclusions at a meeting of
the United Nations Security Council, said that
he does not believe the United Nations to be
capable at present of peace-enforcement opera-
tions. The United Nations r6le, he said, was to
maintain, not to impose, peace. sa
34. The Times, 29th October 1993.
229
DOCUMENT I395 APPENDIX
APPENDIX
Lotters from H.E. Mr. Dimitris Mocris, Greek Ambassador
to France, to Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly,
and information on Gruece's position regarding
United Nations Securtty Council sanc'tions
on Serbia and Montenegro
Lctten from Mr. Mocris, Grcek Ambassador to France,
to Sir Dudlzy Smith, President of the AssembS
Paris, l4th July 1993
Dear President,
Further to our conversation today, I enclose information on Greece's position regarding the
United Nations Security Council sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro.
I also enclose an annex to this memorandum relating to penal procedures engaged against ships
under Greek flag or belonging to Greeks accused of having broken the embargo as well as foreign
vessels which have been monitored by the appropriate Greek authorities.
I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the efforts of the Greek Government in its
unswerving policy towards respect of the embargo and special cases of violation of the embargo and the
sanctions taken.
Yours sincerely,
Dimitris Mncnrs,
Ambassador
Sir Dudley SuItu,
President of the WEU Assembly
:t
{. {.
Paris, 2fth July 1993
Further to my letter of l4th July 1993 and apart from the matters already mentioned, I wish to
call your attention to the fact that, in the meantime, two further cases have been referred to the Piraeus
Court: those of the ships M/S Khrustanly, flying the Ukrainian flag and chartered by a Dutch company,
and M/S Blue Cloud, belonging to Maltese interests and flying the Maltese flag. They were stopped and
searched in Italy and Croatia respectively. In both cases, the aim of the inquiry is to determine whether
or not those involved were individual or legal entities subject to Greek jurisdiction.
Furthermore, seven lorry drivers were recently taken to court for having attempted to break the
embargo: one of these cases was reported by United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, another by the German authorities and five by the Greek customs. Finally, the
most important fact is that Greece has accepted the proposal by the sanctions coordinator to introduce
a system of pre-shipment verification of the end destination of cargoes of oil and oil derivatives. This
system has been in force since yesterday. For cargoes in transit whose destination is the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the only action will be to notify the SAM post in Skopje so that it
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may carry out verifications on the spot. Appropriate arrangements have already been made to ensure
the maximum effectiveness of this measure. Inter alia, the number of entry points between Greece and
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been reduced from four to two.
Oirnitri, tnto.*,r,
Ambassador
Sir Dudley Sunu,
President of the WEU Assembly
*
rF*
Grece aad United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro
In a series ofrecently-published articles in the international press, Greece has again been accused
of violating the embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. It is therefore essential to examine the
facts more closely.
A. The facts
Since lst Jlune 1992, Greece has complied with United Nations Security Council Reso-
lution 752 of 30th May 1992.lnthe framework of measures aimed at restoring peace in the region, this
resolution imposed a series of sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro.
Almost immediately, articles appeared in the international press describing Greece as the weak
link in the operation and affirming that it was violating the embargo in order, on the one hand, to
minimise its financial losses due to a decline in trade and, on the other hand, to reduce political
damage to traditional Greek-Serb friendship.
This is untrue. On many occasions, Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis asked in his speeches
what proof there was for these aflirmations levelled at the Greek Government. Nevertheless, in order
to meet such defamatory allegations, the Greek Government decided, on 2lst August 1992,to stop all
exports of oil products across its northern frontier with former Yugoslavia. At the time, but not for
long, this decision was very well received by the international press and Greece's European partners.
Indirectly, proof of the effectiveness of this decision was given by the then Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Denko Maleski, who, in a letter addressed
to the United Nations, the EEC and other international organisations, asked that measures be taken to
lift the oil embargo on his country immediately. As from 22nd September 1992, Greece therefore
decided to accept the application of EEC ad hoc regulation 2656192 temporarily lifting the oil
embargo.
This led to a further wave of accusations that the embargo was being violated. This time,
however, Greece was seen to be guilty... of conforming with EEC decisions! In a recent declaration(24th June 1993), the Greek Government spokesman, Mr. Vassilis Magginas, stressed that: 'Those
who criticise us cannot claim to be right in both ways. The Greek Government has scrupulously
applied the sanctions imposed on Serbia. In all the cases reported by observers, the goods transported
came from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It may therefore be wondered what our
country should do. If we do not let the oil through, we are accused of being cruel to that republic. If we
do let it through, we are accused of complicity with the Serbs. In other words, when we apply the
embargo on the former Yugoslav Repubic of Macedonia 
- 
the only country of former Yugoslavia with
which we have a common frontier 
- 
we are accused of smothering it because we do not like the name it
has chosen, and if we give in we become guilty of pro-Serb activities. "
B. Recent affirmations
The important legislative and administrative measures taken by Greece in conformity with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 7 57192, 787192 and 820193 were all and in detail made
available to the sanctions liaison group at its meeting in Vienna on 4th June 1993. These measures
were presented in the form of answers to a questionnaire sent to all member states of the CSCE by
Ambassador Napolitano, the sanctions co-ordinator. It is interesting to underline the fact that only five
countries 
- 
including Greece 
- 
answered his request for information before 4th June 1993. The Greek
answer quotes, inter alia, l-aw 9211967 setting out the penalties for violating presidential decrees on the
application of Security Council resolutions.
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In order to be able to apply the resolutions imposing the contiscation of means of transport and
goods, the Greek Parliament has just passed an amendment to the abovementioned Law 92/1967
making it possible to seize and conJiscate such means of transport and goods (Law 2145/93, Oflicial
Journal A/88 / 28. 5.9 3).
Penal procedure has already been started against persons violating the sanctions. Ships flying the
Greek flag or belonging to Greeks have been searched and, where appropriate, legal proceedings have
been initiated (cf. appendix).
In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 820193, penalties have been
increased and texts adopted (l-aw 2145193) allowing the confiscation of goods and their means of
transport. Lorry drivers have been accused of violating the embargo:
- 
a driver whose action was reported by United Nations observers stationed in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
- 
a driver who was denounced by the German authorities;
- 
five lorry drivers from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia who were transporting
Serb goods and were denounced by the customs authorities in Thessalonica.
Serb bank accounts were frozen after a series ofcirculars had been sent to the relevant financial
authorities and in agreement with United Nations resolutions banning all financial transactions with
the Yugoslav Federation.
C. An example of libel
On 9th June 1993 and the following days, the Danish press accused the Greek firm Econ Optics
Mechanics of selling gun sights to the belligerents in former Yugoslavia. The sole basis for these acCusa-
tions was aflirmations by Danish businessmen who had visited the firm's premises in Greece. The firm
rejected these accusations and sued the Danish paper Judske Vestkysten.
The relevant authorities at the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs called for an inquiry to held
immediately. For the time being, no proof has been found of any export whatsoever of producis by this
firm to Balkan countries. According to the same Danish paper, the European Commissioner, Mr.
Milan, has refused to give this firm any financial assistance. These statements have not been corrobo-
rated.
!t
tt*
Ships fiying the Grcek flag or belonging to Grechs ,hat haye been accused of violating the embargo
and foreign ships inspected by the rehvant Greek aathorities
Ship Flag Owner Measures taken
Artemis(Thita Volcano)
Thita Triton
Thita Apollo
Maria (Vana) Maio
Dimitrakis
Penelope (East River)
Rosario
Salem VIII
Dniepr II
Bayamo
Greece
Malta
Panama
Greece
Malta
Liberia
St. Vincent
Egvpt
Ukraine
Malta
Greek
Greek
Greek
Greek
Greek
Former Greek
Greek
Egyptian
Ukrainian
Yugoslav
Penal action
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Ditto
Inquiry held; released
for lack of proof; penal
action started on the
basis of new proof
Inquiry held; released
for lack of proof
Hold sealed in accor-
dance with Article 8 of
EEC regulation 990/93
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Amendment I
29th November 1993
Itssons drawn from the Yugoshv contliu
AMENDMENT I I
tabled by Mrs. Baaneld-Schlaman
l. In paragraph (viii)of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out ' seemingly hurried ".
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman
l. See lfth sitting, lst Decernber 1993 (amendment negatived).
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Amendment 2
30th November 1993
I*ssons drawn from the Yugoslav conflict
AMENDMENT 2I
tabW by Mr. Fenarini and Mr. De Declccr
2. In paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out * in the period prior to its
accession to WEU " and insert * in the framework of a wider agreement intended to reduce the tension
in that region'.
Signed: Ferrarini, De Decker
l. See lfth sittin& lst December 1993 (amendment ageed to).
234
Document 1395
Amendment 3
30th November 1993
I*ssons drawn from the Yugosbv conflia
AMENDMENT 3 
'
tabled by Mr. Pdcriaux and others
3. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5.
Signed: Pduiaux, De Decker, Baarveld-Schlaman, de Puig, Brito
l. See lfth sitting lst December 1993 (amendment negatived).
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Amendment 4
30th November 1993
I*ssons drawn from the Yugoslav conllia
AMENDMENT 4 
'
tabled by Mr. Lopez Henares ard otlprs
4. At the end of paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add:
* with the express declaration by all concerned to renounce any expansionist policies and respect
existing borders; "
Signed: Lopez Henares, Atkinson, De Decl<er, Fabra, Grau, Robles Fraga, Rathbone
l. See lfth sitting, lst December 1993 (amendment agreed to).
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An operational organisation for WEU: naval co-operation -
Part One: Adriatic operations
REPORT I
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committeez
by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Spced,
loint Rappofteurs
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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- 
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operations
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submitted by Mr. Marten and Sir Keith Speed, Joint Rapporteurs
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Sharp Guard
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(c) Nations contributing forces
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fd NATO airborne early warning(ft/ Rules of engagement
(r) Achievements
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The question
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1. Adopted in committee by 12 votes to 0 with I abstention.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Baumel (Chairman); MM. De Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Alloncle, Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman, MM. Borderas. Briane, Brito, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis, Dees, Dumont, Fernandes Marques, Ferrarini, Hardy,
Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, l,eccisi, Mrs. Lentz-Cornette, MM. van der Linden, Mannino, Marten, l-ord Newall, MM.
Pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheer, Sir Dudley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso, Vazquez (Altemate; Cuco\,
Zierer.
N.B. Tfte names of lhose talcing part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on an operational organisation for llEU: naval co-operatioa -
Part One: Adriatic operutions
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that the meeting of the WEU Council on 22nd November 1993 and the NATO
summit meeting on l0th January 1994 provide excellent opportunities to establish WEU's position as
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance;(it) Conscious of the efforts made by WEU and NATO to ensure a coherent arrangement for naval
and maritime air operations in the Adriatic;(iii) Welcoming the Atlantic Alliance's willingness to accommodate a WEU presence in the previ-
ously NATO-dedicated headquarters in Naples;
(iv) Much appreciating NATO's readiness to make its infrastructure available to WEU, at least on an
ad hoc basis;(v) Regretting the WEU Council's failure to agree an appropriate budget for WEU's participation in
operation Sharp Guard,
RrcoprueNos rHAT rus CouNcrr-
l. Actively prepare and promote WEU's position as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,
and make this explicit at the forthcoming NATO summit meeting;
2. Negotiate a formal agreement with the North Atlantic Council for WEU's use of NATO infra-
structure as appropriate for specific operations;
3. Urgently make available an adequate working budget for the WEU element on the staff of
COMNAVSOUTH in Naples and for the WEU CONMARFOR at sea in the Adriatic;
4. Review its lines of communication with those involved under the aegis of WEU in the command
and control of specific operations, notably in the Adriatic area and restructure links between itself and
such subsidiary bodies, giving clear mandates and specific terms of reference to all concerned;
5. Ensure that the rOles of the Planning Cell, of the WEU Military Delegates and the WEU Chiefs
of Defence Staff in relation to those involved in operations on behalf of WEU are clarified, redefining
tasks and responsibilities as a matter of priority;
6. Encourage member states to support Adriatic operations in all ways possible and publicise the
achievements of operation Sharp Guard;
7. Pay tribute to the thousands of men and women from WEU and other alliance nations taking
part in operations in the Adriatic area who, both at sea and ashore, are carrying out an almost thankless
task, often in trying and frustrating conditions and ensure that such breaches of the embargo as are
continuing elsewhere receive additional attention so that the efforts of the sailors of the allied nations
are rendered worthwhile;
8. Explore, with the other member states of the WEU Forum of Consultation with maritime assets,
the possibility of such assets being made available in support of operations in the Adriatic.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(sfimitted by Mr. Martea aad Sir Keith SNel, toint Rapporteun)
I. Introduction
l. In the course of their fact-finding in prep-
aration for the presentation of the report on
" An operational organisation for WEU 
- 
naval
co-operation ", your Rapporteurs have dis-
covered such ramifications to the subject, with
many more fundamental principles at stake than
were initially apparent, that they have decided
to present the report in two parts rather than
seek to postpone discrrssion to a future
sesslon.
2. Certain aspects of the specific naval oper-
ations in the Adriatic require immediate
attention and therefore this first part deals with
the maritime task in hand. Part Two will deal
with the wider issues involved and elaborate
further on the structures and links required for
the future conduct by WEU of naval operations
in general.
II. Previous reconmendations
3. During the Assembly's plenary session, in
June 1993, the following r€commendations were
unanimously adopted:
" Recommendation 543
The Assembly,
(/ Recalling Recommendations 506, 512,
519, 525,530 and 531 and in particular
the recommendations to:
(a) Prepare a resolution to be tabled by
WEU members of the United Nations
Security Council to reinforce the
present embargo at least to the level of
that enforced against Iraq in l990l9l
and in particular to take account of
the problem of cargo in transit and
also of the complications of the
Danube Convention and to publish
evidence at an early stage of any sig-
nificant breach of the embargo;
(D,) Fulfrl its pledge for WEU member
states to 'offer expertise, technical
assistance and equipment to the gov-
ernments of Danube riparian states to
prevent the use of the river Danube
for the purpose of circumventing or
breaking the sanctions imposed by
United Nations Security Council Res-
olutions 713 and'157" and in par-
ticular respond to Romania's request
for assistance;
(c) ln conjunction with the NATO
authorities, rationalise naval and mar-
itime air operations in the Adriatic
area to form composite and cost-
effective forces;
(iy' Pleased that WEU has signed memo-
randa of understanding with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania on helping police
the Danube and that such operations are
already producing a deterrent effect on
possible sanction breakers;
(ril Pleased that WEU and NATO have
agreed a composite force for Adriatic
operations (operation Sharp Guard) with
a joint command in Naples;
(ivl Pleased that all member countries are
in one way or another fully supporting
UN-mandated operations in the Adriatic,
on the Danube, or in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia or Slovenia and considering such
action already a symbol of European will-
ingness to co-operate in the field of
security;
(/ Pleased that the Greek Government
has more actively encouraged the appli-
cation of UN-mandated sanctions;
(vr/ Considering that the memoranda of
understanding signed with Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania are a tangible sign
of the good and practical relations pre-
vailing in the WEU Forum of Consul-
tation;
(vifl Welcoming the recent contacts
between WEU and both Russia and the
Ukraine over the application of the UN
embargo;
(viii) Convinced that the Council should
initiate a specific exercise programme so
that forces now answerable to WEU may
train together on a regular basis at all
levels and further suggesting that the ideal
starting point for such a programme
would be the forthcoming Ardente 93
exercise in ltaly;
(ix) Congratulating the Council and the
Presidency on their initiatives,
RrcouurNos rHAT rsr CouNcrr-
1. Inform the Assembly of the terms of
the memoranda of understanding signed
with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania and
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in particular make explicit any security
guarantees given to any or all of these
countries;
2. Ensure that the longer-term political
implications of WEU's involvement in
operations on the Danube and in the
Adriatic are fully studied and appre-
ciated;
3. Explore with the Greek authorities
ways of helping them ensure complete and
visible compliance with all UN sanctions
even to the extent of asking member states
to second customs and/or police oflicers
to help with the task;
4. Encourage the Russian authorities to
give practical expression to their offer to
help ensure that all embargos are fully
respected on the border between Serbia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina;
5. Develop the liaison established with
the Ukranian authorities with a view to
signing a possible memorandum of under-
standing for WEU to provide technical
assistance to the Ukraine so that UN
sanctions may be seen to be fully
respected;
6. Urge the UN to implement a compen-
sation scheme to reimburse at least in part
those countries such as Greece, Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania, which have suf-
fered considerable financial loss as a
result of embargo enforcement;
7. Publish full details of the nationality,
identity and characteristics of all vessels
found breaking the embargo in the
Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of
United Nations resolutions. "
4. The Council's reply to these recommenda-
tions reads as follows:
'1. The Council will consider the possi-
bilities of informing the Assembly of the
terms of the memoranda of under-
standing.
The memoranda of understanding contain
no security guarantees. The Council
would however reiterate the terms of the
last subparagraph of paragraph 4 of the
communiqud of the meeting of the WEU
Forum of Consultation at Ministerial
level, held in Rome on 20th May 1993:
" Moreover, Ministers underlined the
importance of containing the current con-
flict and agreed that, were any country to
suffer from aggressive action as a conse-
quence of their support for UN-mandated
operations, this would be a matter of
direct concern to the international com-
munity ".
2. The Council is fully aware of the need
to study and appreciate the " longer-term
political implications of WEU's in-
volvement in operations on the Danube
and in the Adriatic ".
3. The Council reiterates that the
embargo is the responsibility of the
United Nations Security Council. WEU's
assistance to the Danube riparian states
was sought by those countries. In this
context, the Council is not planning * to
explore with the Greek authorities ways of
helping them ensurc complete and visible
compliance with all UN sanctions even to
the extent of asking member states to
second customs and/or police ollicers to
help with the task ".
4. The Council takes due note of the
Assembly's proposal. Member states' gov-
ernments have been unstinting in their
encouragement, both within the UN
Security Council and in their bilateral
relations with the Government of the
Russian Federation.
5. The Council attaches the utmost
importance to compliance with United
Nations sanctions. The main aim of the
contacts established with Ukraine was to
consider supplying equipment to help the
Ukrainian authorities implement the
embargo. There were no plans, however,
to ask WEU to co-ordinate a technical
assistance operation to this end.
6. This problem comes under the sole
responsibility of the member states as
members of the UN.
7. The Council notes the Assembly's wish
that * full details of the nationality,
identity and characteristics of all vessels
found breaking the embargo in the
Adriatic and on the Danube in defiance of
United Nations' resolutions " be pub-
lished. The embargo was imposed by the
United Nations and it is they who are
co-ordinating the economic sanctions
imposed on 30th May and l6th
November 1992. The Sanctions Com-
mittee holds all the information on viola-
tions. The Council possesses no more
than fragmentary information regarding
the embargo in the Adriatic.
The Council is studying the possibilities
of declassifying the data in its possession
regarding the embaryo in the Adriatic and
on the Danube. In this event, such declas-
sified data will be communicated to the
Assembly.'
5. While the previous recommendations as
such of course encompassed WEU initiatives
both on the Danube and in the Adriatic and the
present report deals in particular only with the
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Adriatic (the Danube operations being currently
the subject of other fact-finding missions) your
Rapporteurs wish to bring various particular
aspects of the Council's reply to the notice of
members.
6. In general terms the Assembly may con-
gratulate itselfon continuing a tradition ofpro-
viding political impulse to the WEU Council
and there are signs in the Council's reply to Rec-
ommendation 543 (and, also encouragingly, in
its reply to Recommendation 542 on United
Nations operations 
- 
interaction with WEU) of
the beginnings of a true dialogue. In particular
your Rapporteurs hope that the Council will
make up its mind before too long on " the possi-
bilities of informing the Assembly of the terms
of the memoranda of understanding " and on
* the possibilities of declassifying the data in its
possession regarding the embargo in the
Adriatic ".
7. In passing it is worth mentioning that
excellent progress is being made in terms of
co-operation between WEU nations for a new
generation of exercises, pioneered by the
French-sponsored exercise Farfadet in June
1992. Ardente'94 sponsored by Italy (with
major participation from France and Spain and,
to a lesser degree, from Greece, the Netherlands,
Turkey and the United Kingdom) was held
during the week of 25th October in Tuscany.
Like Farfadet, Ardente took as its theme the
evacuation of nationals from a war-torn area,
including the creation of a corridor for humani-
tarian relief 
- 
highly topical in another context
also.
8. Such exercises, held increasingly in the
WEU context, are the shape of the future and
your Rapporteurs are pleased that similar exer-
cises are planned for 1994 (Transmontana under
Spanish auspices and a command post exercise
Purple Nova in the United Kingdom with full
participation by the WEU Planning Cell) and in
1995 (in France). The naval aspects of these
exercises will be emphasised in Part Two of the
present report.
III. Slnrp Guard
9. Meanwhile naval operations continue in
the Adriatic under the name of Sharp Guard and
stemming from a WEU initiative taken in the
wings of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE meeting.
(a) Hisnry
10. In July 1992, forces operating under WEU
and NATO, working in strict co-ordination,
began monitoring in the Adriatic sea the com-
pliance of resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council against former Yugoslavia
(operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigi-
lance). On 22nd November 1992 both opera-
tions were amplified in scope to include the
enforcement of relevant UN resolutions (opera-
tions Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence).
ll. On 8th June 1993 the Councils of WEU
and NATO, at a joint session, reviewed the
embargo operations and approved a combined
concept of operations for the implementation of
UN Resolution 820, which strengthened the
existing embargoes against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This
concept included a single command and control
arrangement for the combined operation Sharp
Guard under the authority of the Councils of
both organisations.
12. The operation began on l5th June 1993.
(b) Mission
13. To conduct operations to monitor and
enforce compliance with UN sanctions in
accordance with UN Security Council Resolu-
tions (UNSCR) 713, 757,787 and 820. Com-
bined Task Force 440, in particular, prevents all
unauthorised shipping from entering the terri-
torial waters of the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
(c) Nations contributiag forces
14. Nations contributing forces at present are:
Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, United States. Nineteen
vessels are participating and some l2 000 sailors
arc at sea or on shore in the area.
(d) Organisatioa
15. The overall operational control is dele-
gated to Admiral Carlo Alberto Vandini, Italian
Navy, as Commander, Combined Task Force
440 (CCTF 440). He is assisted by Rear Admiral
Gianfranco Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy
CCTF 440. Admiral Vandini is the Commander
of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. As
CCTF 440, his staff has been complemented by
a WEU staff element.
16. Surface ships operate under two opera-
tional combined task groups (CTG) at sea to
conduct operations in the Adriatic sea. A third
task group has responsibility for ships con-
ducting training or port visits. Operational
responsibilities rotate among the task group
commanders on approximately a monthly basis.
At the time of writing, the two operational CTG
commanders are a British Commodore and an
Italian Captain. The third task group is com-
manded by a Canadian Commodore.
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17. Maritime patrol aircraft operate under
operational command of CCTF 440 through the
Commander of Combined Task Force 431, a US
Rear Admiral.
(e) Fighter aircmfr
18. Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft
are available to support operation Sharp Guard
from their home base at Gioia del Colle. These
aircraft can contribute to the defence of ships
from attacks from surface ships. Other aircraft
from allied forces operating in the area also con-
tribute to this support.
(0 Madfinc patrol aircruft
19. Continuous maritime air patrol support
to the naval forces of CTF 440 is provided with
assets from nine NATO nations: Canada(CP-140 'Aurora "), France (Atlantique),
Germany (Atlantic), Italy (Atlantic), the Nether-
lands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain (P-3B),
United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States
(P-3C).
20. The above aircraft operate from the
airbases at Sigonella (Sicily) and Elmas (Sar-
dinia), in Italy.
(g) NATO airborae carly waruing
21. Four E-3A and three E-3D from NATO's
airborne early warning force (NAEWF) are sup-
porting operation Sharp Guard, as well as
NATO operation Deny Flight, from their home
base at Geilenkirchen, Germany, and fonvard
operating bases at Aviano and Trapani, Italy,
and Preveza, Greece. The E-3A aircraft are
flown by multinational crews provided by
eleven NATO nations (Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Nonvay, Portugal, Turkey and the United
States). The NAEWF E-3D Component, com-
prised of aircraft from the United Kingdom's
Number 8 Squadron are also participating in the
mission. These aircraft operate from their home
base at Royal Air Force Station Waddington,
United Kingdom, as well as Aviano and
Trapani, Italy. French E-3F aircraft operating
from the French air base in Avord and Italian
air base at Trapani under the auspices of the
WEU are also participating.
22. Worthy of note in this context is the read-
iness of both Austria and Hungary to give
effective support to such operations.
(h) Rulcs ofengagement
23. In their previous report, your Rapporteurs
drew attention to the dangers of inadequate or
varying rules of engagement. However, in spite
of the fact that two participating nations have
not adopted exactly the common WEUA'{ATO
rules of engagement, the situation now appears
satisfactory to the extent that ships of the
nations concerned are unlikely to be deployed
into sensitive areas.
(i) Achicvcmcnts
24. During operation Sharp Guard, 6157
merchant vessels have been challenged. Of
them, 728 have been halted and inspected, or
diverted to a port for inspection.
25. As a result of the co-ordinated efforts of
the forces which have operated under WEU and
NATO, I 032 merchant vessels were halted and
boarded 
- 
or diverted to a port for inspection -
from 22nd November 1992 to l5th June 1993,
when operation Sharp Guard began. During the
same period 12 367 merchant vessels were chal-
lenged. Therefore, an overall total of 18 524
ships have been challenged so far, with I 760
inspected or diverted.
26. Since the UN Security Council
strengthened the embargo against Serbia and
Montenegro with Resolution 820, in April 1993,
no ship has been able to break the embargo.
IY. Political parynse and practical reality
27. It might be surmised from the above that
the composite arrangements described represent
the achievement of a political aim, namely the
bringing together of the Atlantic Alliance(NATO) and its European pillar (WEU), thus
giving substance to intergovernmental declara-
tions at Maastricht and on the Petersberg'.
28. While such co-operation is certainly
apparent between NATO and WEU, there are
nevertheless various gtrey areas which must be
elucidated and problems which must be resolved
as a matter of urgency. In political terms the
greatest imperative for such action is of course
the forthcoming NATO summit meeting
scheduled for l0th January in Brussels. Even if
this summit meeting achieves little by way of
the much-heralded * enlargement' of NATO it
should at least lead to the consecration of WEU
as the European pillar of NATO and lay the
formal foundation for a new (and lasting) rela-
tionship between the two organisations. Such a
development is necessary for two main reasons:
(a) to outline the ground rules for
co'operation so that those working
within the organisations know what is
expected of them and;
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(b) to present a united front in spite of the
inevitable carping and often derog-
atory comments of those who findit difficult to accept NATO/WEU
accommodation. For accommodation
there has been, especially as the result
of a very understanding approach by
the senior commanders involved on
the spot.
29. Your Rapporteurs have been struck by the
rearguard action of some of those in authority
but obviously remote from the ateal. " we cannot
possibly allow WEU ships to operate close to the
Montenegrin coast because of the missile
danger " (when, in fact, all ships are fully inte-
grated into one or other of the key areas
depending on an individual ship's capability
rather than on whether it is * WEU
CONMARFOR'" " STANAVFORMED '' OT
* STANAVFORLANT " and also on when the
task group commanders rotate from area to area
on a five week cycle 
- 
when the President of the
Assembly visited the Adriatic in October he
embarked in the STANAVFORMED ship which
was the flagship for the WEU Commander) or
" Admiral X is very competent to conduct the
operation 
- 
not so certain about Admiral Y "(when the only difference between the two
Admirals was that one had a NATO hat and the
other did not 
- 
they even share the same nation-
ality!). Fortunately, as time goes on, such com-
ments are dying out in the face of the obvious
complementarity and sheer professionalism of
all concerned, in practical terms.
30. Your Rapporteurs wish to pay special
tribute to the individual efforts of the particular
officers concerned with command of operationsin zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and
Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces
Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). Their
patient pragmatism in working out command
and control arrangments is admirable.
31. In practical terms COMNAVSOUTH's
staffhas been reinforced by an Italian 2-star flag
offrcer, a Spanish l-star flag officer, two Cap-
tains, one French and one German, and an
Italian Commander 
- 
the WEU " naval
element ". The senior Italian Captain at sea as
one of the three Task Group Commanders
(wearing a " WEU hat ") has French and Spanish
offrcers as planners on board his flag ship.
32. The Italian navy has made available sig-
nificant logistic support (both people and
material) which has been greatly appreciated.
33. In practical terms the WEU naval element
has been absorbed into the COMNAVSOUTH
process for decision making, planning, etc., etc.,
and there can be no quarrel with the result: an
eflicient, well-conducted embargo operation
which to date has dealt with nearly 19 000 mer-
chant marine vessels.
Y. The question
34. Your Rapporteurs have tried to put these
operations into perspective. Do the ends justify
the means? Not so much in terms of whether or
not the embargo operation continues or is the
best possible way to try and bring pressure on
Serbia as rather, in parochial terms, whether or
not WEU really needs to be present to help
apply the said sanctions.
35. Quite apart from the Assembly's own
stance on the matter (calling for the application
of stringent sanctions from the very beginning 2)
we must examine the performance of the WEU
Council which in its collective and consensual
wisdom decided to take action in this way. And
here lies the nub ofthis present report and its set
of recommendations, for in your Rapporteurs'
opinion, not enough has been done to give prac-
tical substance to the Council's political deci-
sions.
YI. Problem areas
36. While WEU is now in a totally different
operational mode today compared with five or
six years ago, we need to ensure that arrange-
ments are both efficient and cost-effective. We
must be certain that terms of reference are clear,
for example, and a whole range of problem areas
tackled as a matter of urgency.
37. For instance:
(a) all WEU member countries should be
seen to be contributing both in prac-
tical and material terms to helping run
operations which have been decided
unanimously 
- 
although such is not
presently the case in the Adriatic it
may be that * Country X " is present
on the Danube 
- 
greater publicity is
necessary to bring such facts to the
attention of the public at large;
(D/ costs must be shared on a more equi-
table footing. The present principle
that those contributing the largest con-
tingents should be expected also to
make the largest financial contri-
bution is simplistic in the extreme;
(c) a formal ag;reement with NATO must
be drawn up to deal with such matters
as the use of infrastructures. NATO
has made a large number of friendly
gestures to WEU in current circum-
stances, but on a purely ad hoc basis.It must be made clear exactly who
pays for what, for example, and the
2. Recommendation
4th December 1991.
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WEU element should be given its own
budget to deal with daily necessities.
But a fundamental matter of principle
is at stake here, for if WEU so much as
buys one item of kit to help ensure
that current operations are effective is
that not one step on the slippery slope
towards duplication? The matter must
be resolved sooner rather than later;
(d) formal links have to be established
between the WEU element in Naples,
the WEU Council in Brussels, the
Planning Cell, the Satellite Centre, but
especially with the Chiefs of Defence
Staff Committee and the WEU Mil-
itary Delegates Committee. There is a
pressing need to define relationships
within the organisation as well as
without;
(e) practical as well as formal links are
also vital: a travel budget obviously
has to be decided to allow WEU per-
sonnel in Naples to visit the various
relevant authorities concerned by
Adriatic operations: communication
equipment is also urgently required,
as is a computer-assisted planning
system. None of these items in them-
selves are expensive and indeed the
whole cost has been estimated at less
than that incurred by firing one " shot
across the bows " at sea!
YII. ProYisional conclusion
38. This report will be considered by col-
leagues in committee at the beginning of
November and, if accepted, debated in the
Assembly's plenary session scheduled for the
end of the month. Between these two rendez
vous the WEU Ministerial Council will meet on
22nd November in Luxembourg. Your
Rapporteurs trust that appropriate decisions on
these practical matters will then be forthcoming
and thus allow revised recommendations to be
presented, as necessary, at the plenary session.
WEU would then be in some strength in pre-
senting a common European position for the
NATO summit meeting on lfth January 1994.
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ANI.IEXES
l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
I. Intmduction
During the first half of 1993, the work of
the WEU Council 
- 
based on the mandates con-
tained in the Ministerial Declarations of
Petersberg and Rome 
- 
has continued unabated.
The preparation of the ordinary Ministerial
meeting held on l9th May last in Rome demon-
strated that the Permanent Council, now backed
up by the Council Working Group and served by
the Secretariat and Planning Cell, is playing its
full part as the organisation's central body for
deliberation and decision-making. The new
mandates referred to in the communiquds issued
after the Rome Ministerial Council are evidence
of the undeniable progress made so far in imple-
menting a substantive and coherent work pro-
12th November 1993
First part ofthe thirty-ninth annual reportl
of the Council to the Assembly
(lst January to 30th June 1993)
. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
II. Activities of the Council
III. Activities of the Special Working Group (SWG)
IV. Activities of the Defence Representatives Group (DRG)
V. Verification Experts and Open Skies Experts Groups
VI. Activities of the Mediterranean Group
VII. Activities of the Space Group
YIII. Activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG)(" at 13 ")
IX. Activities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments (ACA)
X. Activities of the WEU Institute for Security Studies
XI. Administrative questions
XII. Activities of the Public Administration Committee (PAC)
Minutes of the 83lst meeting of the Council of Western European
Union, held on Tuesday l9th January 1993
Declaration on implementation of United Nations sanctions on
former Yugoslavia 
- 
Council of Ministers, Luxembourg, 5th April
l 993
Communiqud of the Council of Ministers, Rome, l9th May 1993
Communiqud of the WEU Forum of Consultation at Ministerial
level, Rome, 2fth May 1993
Press release issued after the joint session of the North Atlantic
Council and the Council of Western European Union held in Brussels
on 8th June 1993.
gramme which aims 
- 
step by step 
- 
to give the
European construction process its vital defence
dimension by strengthening the political dia-
logue on all aspects of European security.
The transfer of the Council and
Secretariat-General from london to Brussels in
January 1993 can be seen as havingbrought to a
close the WEU reactivation process launched in
Rome in October 1984 in a way which was notjust symbolic. With its enlargement to a new full
member, to three associate members and two
observers, WEU is now truly able in all respects
to promote the European defence identity and to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance. Pending completion of the enlarge-
ment ratification process, all the states con-
l. This document was received at the Office of the Clerk on l2th November 1993 and is distributed in the form in which it was
received from the Secretariat-General.
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cerned are taking part as active observers in the
work and discussions of the Council. Those
meetings of the Permanent Council devoted to
the structural adaptation of the Ministerial
bodies to the new r0le given to the Council since
the beginning of the year have benefitted greatly
from their contributions.
The visit by the President of the
Romanian Republic on lTth February, followed
on 5th March by that of the President of the
Italian Republic provided political confirmation
that the decision to transfer WEU was the right
one and were also concrete evidence that its dual
r6le as the defence component of the future
European Union and as a means to strengthen
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance had
been recognised. Both at the level of the Council
Working Groups and at that of the Secretariat,
working links may be forged as required with the
European institutions and the organs of the
Atlantic Alliance in Brussels, having due regard
to the principles of transparency, complemen-
tarity and reciprocity. These links will assume
even greater importance in the months to come
as preparations are made for the forthcoming
alliance summit and as the Maastricht Treaty
ratification process is brought to a conclusion.
The ongoing efforts by WEU member
states to help find a solution to the conflict
tearing apart former Yugoslavia and to help ease
the suffering of the population undoubtedly
raised WEU's political profile, principally
through the operations to implement the United
Nations Security Council embargo in the
Adriatic and on the Danube. At a joint session
of the WEU Council and the North Atlantic
Council on 8th June in Brussels, a combined
concept of operations for the two organisations
in the Adriatic in implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 820 was
approved. The assistance given by WEU to the
three Danube riparian states to implement the
sanctions r6gime decided by the United Nations
is also a tangible and credible contribution to
the implementation of the decisions of the inter-
national community.
The ltalian Presidency of the WEU
Council successfully put the finishing touches to
the organisation's institutional development,
thereby laying the foundations for the gradual
strengthening of its operational r6le, a r6le that
may be exercised independently, within the
context of the Atlantic Alliance, and in imple-
mentation of mandates from the European
Union, the CSCE or the United Nations.
Finally, the Permanent Council's new rOle
in Brussels makes it both more desirable and
much easier to develop a dialogue with the
WEU parliamentary Assembly. The first very
positive step in this direction was taken on lst
March 1993, when a meeting took place with the
Assembly's Presidential Committee at the Palais
d'Egmont. Others will follow. There is no
shortage of topics which will generate fruitful
interaction between the Council and the
Assembly in implementation of the Petersberg
agenda, an agenda underpinned by the Rome
declarations and communiques.
II. Activities of the Council
The ceremony to inaugurate the WEU
Council in Brussels took place on 19th January
1993 at the Palais d'Egmont. It brought together
the former Permanent Representatives in
London and their successors in Brussels. The
Presidency of the European Communities was
represented by the Danish Ambassador, accom-
panied by H.E. Mr. Pierre Champenois, Head
of the Secretariat of European Political Co-
operation. H.E. Mr. Manfred Wiirner, Secretary-
General of NATO, represented the Atlantic
Alliance.
Apart from those meetings where circum-
stances dictated that a specific subject be
addressed, the Council's agendas have con-
tinued to contain an item devoted to the report
on working group meetings and an item on
'topical questions ".
The Permanent Council has paid par-
ticular attention to the work of preparing draft
decisions for submission to the Ministerial
Council and to their implementation once
adopted. The Council has been kept directly
informed of the activities of the WEU Institute
for Security Studies, of the establishment of the
Satellite Centre in Torrej6n, and of the activities
of the Planning Cell. It continued to acknow-
ledge the vital importance of the institutional
dialogue with the Assembly, and followed with
great interest the debates of the first part of the
thirty-ninth ordinary session. I-astly, the Council
took a number of administrative and budgetary
decisions, as appropriate, on the basis of opi-
nions submitted by the Budget and Organisation
Committee.
(i) Topiul qutbu
(a) Situation in former Yugoslavia
The Danish Representative, on behalf of
the Presidency of the Twelve, regularly briefed
the Permanent Council on the activities and
d6marches pursued by the European Com-
munity with the aim of reaching a peaceful
solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia.
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments in former Yugoslavia, its
discussions focusing on the arrangements for
implementing the Danube embargo, partici-
pation of the WEU fleet in the Adriatic embargo,
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and the possible involvement of WEU in imple-
menting the Vance/Owen peace plan. The activ-
ities of the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia, the
Contingency Planning Group, Experts Groups
and the Planning Cell all centred on these three
questions.
Their activities led to the convening of an
extraordinary meeting of the Council of Min-
isters on 5th April in Luxembourg, at which it
was decided to offer support to Bulgaria,
Hungary and Romania by organising a police
and customs operation on the Danube to help
enforce the United Nations-mandated embargo.
The signing of the memoranda of under-
standing negotiated with the riparian countries
took place at the meeting of the WEU Forum of
Consultation held at Ministerial level in Rome
on 20th May 1993.
This operation to assist with the imple-
mentation of the Danube embargo formally got
under way on l8th June. WEU member states
have sent a total of some 300 specialised offi-
cials and a substantial amount of equipment,
including l1 fast patrol boats.
The Permanent Council has also closely
followed the conduct of the operations in the
Adriatic to strengthen the embargo measures
(operation Sharp Fence followed by operation
Sharp Guard). The early months of 1993 were
marked by the finalisation of a document on the
availability of ships and aircraft with a view to
ensuring the rotation of WEU and NATO fleets
between the southern and northern zones in the
Adriatic. Following the Security Council's
adoption of Resolution 820, WEU and NATO
studied means of enhancing the effectiveness of
these embargo enforcement operations. At the
initiative of the Italian Presidency, a meeting of
WEU naval experts was convened to this end in
Rome on lOth May 1993.
After several weeks of intensive work,
WEU and NATO military staff jointly formu-
lated a " combined concept of operation " for
the implementation of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 820. At a joint session of
the North Atlantic Council and the Council
of Western European Union on 8th June 1993,
this * combined concept of operation " was
approved. It provides for a single command and
control arrangement for joint NATO and WEU
operations under the authority of the Councils
of the two organisations, the key mechanisms of
which are described in the press release issued
after the joint meeting. This text of this press
release is annexed to this report.
Lastly, the Council addressed the prac-
tical arrangements for the possible implemen-
tation of the Vance/Owen peace plan so as to be
in a position to respond to requests from the
member states pursuant to specific United
Nations mandates. The report by the Contin-
gency Planning Group on a safe haven around
Sarajevo was forwarded to the United Nations
and NATO Secretariats and to the Danish Presi-
dency of the European Community. The
Planning Cell pursued and intensified its work
on this question in concert with the NATO and
SHAPE authorities.
As part of the mandate under which Min-
isters, at their l9th May meeting in Rome,
tasked the Permanent Council to study the pos-
sibility for WEU to co-ordinate the rotation of
the contingents deployed by member states in
the framework of UNPROFOR and the possible
participation of WEU member states in the pro-
tection of the safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
the Council asked the Ad Hoc Group to define
the practical arrangements and mechanisms
which would enable their forces deployed in
former Yugoslavia to be maintained at a con-
stant level.
As to the mandate to examine the rOle
WEU might play in the context of the imple-
mentation of the Vance/Owen peace plan in
co-ordination with NATO, the Permanent
Council called on the Ad Hoc Group and the
Planning Cell to evaluate the validity of existing
plans.
(b) Relations with the counties of Central
Europe
On 20th April at WEU headquarters in
Brussels, the second meeting of the Forum of
Consultation at Ambassadorial level took place.
The main aim of this meeting was to present
WEU's current activities, describe its growing
r6le and to identify more concrete forms of
co-operation. The ensuing discussions centred
on the development of relations between WEU
and its consultation partners, the situation in
former Yugoslavia and the topics which Min-
isters might discuss in Rome.
The meeting of the Forum of Consul-
tation at Ministerial level took place in the
Italian capital on 20th May, the day after the
ordinary Ministerial meeting. In the course of
their discussions, Ministers put forward a
number of proposals for developing relations
between WEU and its consultation partners.
They mentioned in particular, the establishment
of closer contacts with WEU working groups
and the initiation of contacts between members
of the armed forces.
Ministers took the following decisions:
- 
The term " WEU Forum of Consul-
tation " would now be used for Minis-
terial meetings.
- 
The nine countries of Central Europe
participating in the Forum of Consul-
tation would be referred to as * consul-
tation partners ".
lr
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- 
The setting up in Brussels of a Coun-
sellors' Group composed of senior rep
resentatives from the delegations ofthe
WEU countries and the Embassy Coun-
sellors of the consultation partners.
This group, which would meet at least
three or four times a yea\ would hold
more detailed exchanges of view and
prepare the Forum of Consultation
meetings.
In particular, Ministers stressed the value
ofan exchange ofviews on peace-keeping, which
might be the subject of a seminar at which the
relevant experiences of the WEU countries and
their Central European partners could be com-
pared. They welcomed the signing of memo-
randa of understanding between WEU and,
respectively, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
which enabled an operation to assist in the
implementation of the Danube embargo to go
ahead. This operation was the first positive
example of practical co-operation within the
Forum of Consultation framework.
Apart from the President of the
Romanian Republic whom the Council received
in restricted session on lTth February 1993, a
number of government representatives from the
states of Central Europe paid courtesy calls to
the WEU headquarters: on l2th February, Mr.
Jundzis, the Latvian Defence Minister; on 9th
March, Mr. Ljuben Berov, Bulgarian Prime
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Krzyzstof Skubiszewski, Polish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Josef Zieleniec, Czech
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Institute for Security Studies con-
tinued to play an important r6le in WEU's con-
tacts with the countries of Central Europe both
by organising seminars and by welcoming study-
award holders.
Still under the heading of topical ques-
tions, the Council also monitored the work
being done within the Atlantic Alliance and the
CSCE.
During the early months of the period
under review, the Permanent Council also
exchanged views on the progress of operations
in Somalia in which several member states had
participated under United Nations auspices.
(ii) Actiyities of the intcryotenmeatal bodies
(a) Council Working Groups
At each of its meetings, the Council took
note of the results of its working groups' activ-
ities since the previous meeting. The summary
records were discussed as necessary.
(b) WEU Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
The Institute's Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted
his presence. The lnstitute's quarterly reports to
the Council provided an opportunity for
exchanges of view on the current work of the
ISS.
(c) WEU Satellite Centre
The Centre's Director attended all those
Council meetings where the agenda warranted
his presence. He briefed the Council on the
start-up and development of the Centre's activ-
ities.
III. Activities of the Special Wo*ing Group
Given its new r6le in Brussels, the
Council has thought fit to redirect the activities
of the Special Working Group (SWG) by askingit to analyse specific problems of European
security in a longer-term perspective. At its
meetings in February and April, the group's
work was structured along these lines and
focused on two topics. Firstly, the r6le of WEU
in peace-keeping, the starting point for which
was an initial contribution from the Italian Pres-
idency. After reworking, this document was sub-
mitted to the Ministerial Council as a contri-
bution to its discussions in Rome. Secondly, the
evolving American initiatives for a system of
global protection and defence against missiles in
Europe. Discussions centred on the assessment
of the risks which Europe mlght face and the
implications for Europeans of the American
thinking on this matter. The group noted with
great interest the content of the contributions
made at the Assembly's seminar in Rome on
20th and 2lst April and the conclusions of that
semmar.
The group also addressed the problem of
present and future relations between WEU and
those countries wishing to join the European
Community and the development of institu-
tional relations between WEU and the future
European Union once the Maastricht Treaty
had been ratified.
IY. Activities of the Defence
Representativu Group
In accordance with the mandate given to
it by the Permanent Council, the Defence Rep
resentatives Group (DRG) finalised a document
on the organisation and functioning of WEU in
times of crisis. On the basis of approved texts,
this document sets out the fundamental political
principles to be applied and describes the r6le in
times of crisis of the various bodies coming
under the Council. It was approved by WEU
Chiefs of Defence Staffat their meetingon22nd
April and noted by the Council of Ministers on
19th May.
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The group also prepared a working doc-
ument on the functions of Military Delegates
which has been approved by the Chiefs of
Defence Staff and the Permanent Council. This
document gives a general description of the r6le
of Military Delegates vis.d-vis the Permanent
Council and the Planning Cell both in normal
times and in times of crisis.
The group helped formulate the initial
directives for the Planning Cell. It also provided
input to a debate on the Cell's planning tasks
with a view to their approval by the CHODS. It
also carried out an initial examination of the
basic principles of a WEU exercise policy.
The group continued to consider the
implications for European security of the mil-
itary changes taking place in the former Soviet
Union. A preliminary analysis revealed a
growing fragmentation of the armed forces
which affected their operational capability,
notably as regards large-scale offensive action.
This work was enshrined in a report of which
the Ministers took note.
The other specific tasks carried out by the
group were as follows:
- 
preparation of the agenda for the
meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff on
22nd Apil 1993:'
- 
definition of the practical arrangements
for transferring IEPG and Eurogroup
functions to WEU;
- 
definition of the communications
requirements of the Secretariat and
Planning Cell;
- 
initial examination of European re-
quirements as regards strategic mobility;
- 
consideration of the follow-up to be
given to the Ministerial Council of
19th May 1993 concerning forces answer-
able to WEU. In their communiqud,
Ministers " mandated the Permanent
Council to reach timely conclusions
and to present a progress report to the
next Ministerial meeting on the forces
answerable to WEU, in particular for
the conduct of humanitarian and peace-
keeping operations ". Accordingly, the
Permanent Council instructed the
Planning Cell and the group to
co-operate over the implementation of
this mandate and to report back.
In the same communiqud, Ministers
" requested the Permanent Council to arrange
discussions at the earliest with representatives of
the nations participating in these offers in order
to define the relations between WEU and these
multinational formations as' forces answerable
to WEU"'. The Permanent Council asked the
DRG to carry out this work. The multinational
formations in question are the European Corps,
the Multinational Division (Central) and
the United KingdomA.{etherlands amphibious
force.
Transfer to WEU of certain Eurogroup activ-
ities
At its meeting, on l9th May 1993, the
WEU Council of Ministers approved the transfer
of information activities and EUROCOM to
WEU. [t also took note of the discussions in
progress on the transfer of EUROLOG and
EUROLONGTERM. This transfer was ap-
proved by Eurogroup Ministers at their meeting
on 24th May 1993.
Discussions are continuing in order to
clarify the new operational alrangements for the
information activities and EUROCOM and also
to reach an agreement on the transfer of
EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM.
Y. Yerification Experts
and Open Skies Experts Groups
l. The Verification Experts continued their
work on active and passive inspections in imple-
mentation of the CFE Treaty and also their
work on the opening of national inspection
teams. They drew up a programme of activities
for the first year of the reduction period as
regards multinational inspection teams, the
composition of which was the subject of detailed
discussion. A number of technical problems
relating to the implementation of the CFE
Treaty and of the 1992 Vienna Document were
also discussed.
2. The Open Skies Experts Group drew up a
preliminary set of operating rules for a pool of
observation systems. Third countries, including
Russia, have been invited to take part in the
arrangements agreed within WEU.
The group Fegq, to sludy the practical
consequences arising from the formation of a
WEU group of states parties under article III, 2,
of the Open Skies Treaty.
YI. Activities of the Med,iterranean Group
The Mediterranean Group held two
meetings, in February and April 1993, at each of
which it informally exchanged views on various
topical questions including developments in
Albania, Algeria and Cyprus.
The initial informal contacts made in
London by the Council Presidency and Secre-
tariat with the Embassies of Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia with the view to the gradual estab-
lishment of a dialogue with the Maghreb coun-
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tries were renewed in Brussels during the month
of March with the Embassies of the same coun-
tries and with the Embassy of Mauritania. In
each case, the Presidency and Secretariat were
warmly received. These contacts provided an
opportunity to give a comprehensive briefing on
WEU's activities and to present the seven prin-
ciples defined by the group for a dialogue with
the Mediterranean countries.
The Council of Ministers decided in
Rome to increase the dialogue between the
Maghreb countries and the WEU and asked the
representative of the WEU Presidency and the
Secretary-General to propose to the Brussels
Ambassadors of the Maghreb countries the prin-
ciple of periodic meetings on a twice yearly
basis, in order to pursue the dialogue in greater
depth by means of two-way information and an
exchange of views, especially on the principles
likely to contribute to a resolution of security
questions in the Mediterranean.
On the subject of former Yugoslavia, the
group envisaged a thematic approach to the
security problems in the Balkans.
YII. Auivities of the Spoce Group t
O The group's meetings were mainly
devoted to following progress with the setting-up
of the Satellite Centre on the site and in the
building provided by the Spanish Government
at the Torrej6n airbase near Madrid. The for-
malities concerning the taking of possession by
WEU had been completed. The group heard
reports by the Director of the Satellite Centre on
its recent activities. A draft Concept of Use of
the Satellite Centre was also formulated at these
meetings.
The official inauguration of the Satellite
Centre took place on 28th April. Following the
ceremony, the Ministers present and representa-
tives of the Permanent Council and of the WEU
parliamentary Assembly visited the building and
were shown simulations of the Centre's future
operation.
The contract for the supply of technical
equipment was signed on 5th January 1993 with
the MARCOLIed consortium (now known as
" Cray Systems "). The reception of the initial
operating equipment took place as planned at
the beginning of April. A second delivery was
scheduled for July 1993, the remainder to be
supplied between now and January 1994.
The training of photo-interpreters began
in May, would continue throughout 1993 and
should be complete shortly after the supply of
the last batch of equipment in 1994. During this
period, the Centre would also be able to carry
out those tasks given to it on an experimental
basis, which would help in the formulation and
implementation of internal operating proce-
dures.
Since the signing of the Helios memo-
randum of understanding between WEU and the
Defence Ministries of France, Italy and Spain on
27th April 1993, the Centre is making prepara-
tions to interpret Helios imagery.(it) The group took stock of the progress of
the Main System Feasibility Study, Phase I of
which was carried out by an industrial con-
sortium led by Dasa/Dornier.
Work on the second part of the study
began on 4th March 1993 and would proceed in
accordance with the agreed timetable. The con-
sortium would present the results to the Study
Management Team between now and December
1993. The SMT would make a final assessment
of the work and fonuard its conclusions to dele-
gations early in 1994, after which Ministers
would be asked to reach a decision on the
various options.
The group also discussed the performance
of the special studies and the operational
assessment studies. Finally, the group exchanged
views on other possibilities for space co-
operation.
YIII. Aaivities of the Western European
Armaments Group (WEAG) (" at 13 ")
Late in 1992 (at the Ministerial meeting
in Bonn on 4th December), it was decided, on
the basis of six key principles approved by both
IEPG Ministers and the WEU Council, to
transfer the functions of the Independent
European Programme Group (IEPG) to WEU.
Up to that time, the Assembly had been kept
informed of IEPG activities through an annual
information letter fonrarded by the Secretary-
General.
The last such information letter was
issued on l8th December 1992. Following the
Bonn decision, it is now felt that the proper
place for the report on activities of the former
IEPG within the framework of WEU is in the
annual report by the Council to the Assembly.
The first half of 1993 has been marked by
the practical implementation of the Bonn
decision. A meeting of the Defence Ministers of
the 13 member countries was held in Rome on
l9th May before the WEU Ministerial Council.
During that meeting, a number of practical
arrangements for the transfer were approved. In
particular, it was decided that the body respon-
sible for armaments co-operation under WEU
auspices should from now on be called the
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" Western European Armaments Group "
(WEAG).
As a result, the following is a report on
WEAG activities during the first half of 1993.
It should also be pointed out that, on lst
January 1993, Denmark took over the Chair-
manship of WEAG from Belgium for a period of
two years.
Transfer of IEPG functions to WEU
The thirteen Defence Ministers who met
in Rome on l9th May approved the report
drawn up by the National Armaments Directors
(NADs) bn the practical aspects of the transfer.
Besides the change of name, they agreed on
various points, including the following:
- 
that future meetings of Defence Min-
isters, scheduled to take place at least
once a year, would be held at the
location of, and coordinated with, meet-
ings of the WEU Ministerial Council;
- 
that the Chairmanship would continue
to be held by each ofthe thirteen coun-
tries in turn;
- 
that NADs meetings would continue to
be held at approximately six-monthly
intervals, normally in the WEU build-
ing in Brussels. These meetings would
be the operational level for armaments
co-operation within WEAG;
- 
that the functions of the former IEPG's
Permanent Secretariat would be trans-
ferred from Lisbon to Brussels in the
first half of 1994;
- 
that the relations with NATO on arma-
ments co-operation would be developedin accordance with the PrinciPles
adopted in Petersberg for dealings
between WEU and NATO'
In addition, it should be noted that the
WEU Permanent Council, meeting on 27th
April 1993, also decided to reinforce the Secre-
tariat by agreeing to the temporary secondment
of a French engineer to act as a provisional focal
point on armaments matters pendin-g the actual
iransfer of the Lisbon Secretariat's functions to
Brussels.
Cunent activities
At their meeting in Elsinore on 25th
March 1993, the National Armaments Directors
tasked an ad hoc study group to examine the
possible r6le of a European Armaments Agency
as envisaged in the Maastricht Declaration. A
first report is to be presented in the autumn.
The normal activities of the three Panels
of the former IEPG are continuing; a full report
on these 1993 activities will be included in the
second part of the Council's Thirty-Ninth
Annual Report to the Assembly.
IX. Activities of the Agency for the Control
of Armaments (ACA)
The Agency for the Control of Armaments
continued iis residual tasks regarding the
limitation of atomic, biological and chemical
weapons, at a level of activity corresponding to
that obtaining at the time of the 1984 Rome
Declaration and in accordance with the proce-
dures approved uP to that time.
For this first halfofthe 38th year ofcon-
trols carried out within the WEU framework,
the legal sources used to justify the levels and
control procedures were unchanged. The num-
ber of agreed inspections on the non-production
of chemical weapons would be the same in 1993
as in previous yeani (four in 1990, 1991 and
L992)indwould take place in the second half of
the year.
The activities of the Geneva disarmament
conference culminated in January this year in
the signing by 130 states of a convention
banning chemical weapons; it is to enter into
force in early 1995.
X. Aaivitits of the WEU Institute
for Secudty Studies
A study group on the security problems in
the Baltics was held at the Institute on l5th
January 1993. A seminar on coping with crises
in Europe took place on 2lst-22nd January. A
seminar on the Southern dimension of European
security: the Mediterranean area and the
European security identity was organised jointly
with the Istituto Affari Internazionali and the
Centro Militare di Studi Strategici in Rome on
5th-6th March. A seminar on the future options
for the European defence market took place in
Paris on 29th-30th April. A small working group
on Russia was convened on 7th May 1993. A
seminar on European security after Maastricht:
what r6le for our countries? was organised in
Baden with the Austrian Foreign Affairs
Institute on lfth-l2th June.
Several visiting research fellows (from
France, Germany and ltaly) spent some time at
the Institute. A number of study awards were
made to Central Europeans for periods of study
in Western European institutes.
Nicole Gnesotto, Ren6 van Beveren and
Juan de Luis, the remaining three research
fellows present since the Institute's inception,
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left the Institute on 3fth June 1993 at the end of
their three-year contracts.
Chaillot Paper No. 6, Military co-operation:
what structures for the future? by Rend van
Beveren, was published in January. Chaillot
Paper No. 7, on Hungary and its neighbours, by
George Schiipflin, was published in May and
Chaillot Paper No. 8, The special Franco-
German security relationship in the 1990s by
Peter Schmidt, was published in June. The Insti-
tute's second major publication, the fruit of ajoint project with the RAND Corporation and
entitled " Towards a New Partnership:
US-European relations in the post-cold war
era ", was edited by Nanette Gantz and John
Roper and published in March. The Quarterly
Newsletter was also published in March.
XI. Administrative questions
During the flrrst half of the year, the
Council Working Group concerned itself with
the selection of a contractor to carry out
building alterations to the meeting rooms of the
Council and its working groups and the Secre-
tariat oflices at the Rue de la Rdgence premises.
The Council approved the choice of the firm
Jones Lang Wootton to carry out this work,
which began in June and is scheduled to be com-
pleted by September.
XII. Auivities of the htblic Administation
Committee (PAC)
The Public Administration Committee(PAC) met at the WEU Council's headquarters
building on 25th March 1993. The meeting pro-
vided an opportunity to carry forward the dis-
cussions on the future of the committee and of
its informal activities which are aimed at facili-
tating the regular exchange of information on
public administration questions in the WEU
member countries.
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ANNEX I
Minutes of the E3lst meaing of thc Council of
Westera European (Jnion held at 4 p,m. on Tuesday, 19th January 199i
at the Palais d'Egmont, Brussels
(with the former lordoa Permawnt Rcprv;scntotives)
Following are the full texts of the inter-
ventions made by each speaker:
1. Decbrotion by H.E Da W.F. vu Eehelen,
WEa SecraW-Geaeml
May I welcome you to this ceremonial
inaugural session of the Council of Western
European Union. I should like to start by
expressing our gratitude to the Belgian Gov-
ernment for its keen interest in WEU's estab-
lishment in the capital of Belgium. I was particu-
larly honoured by His Majesty the King of the
Belgians granting ffi€, as WEU Secretary-
General, a long audience in his palace in
Brussels, at which His Majesty displayed a keen
awareness of the importance of WEU's arrival in
Brussels.
I also see it as an excellent portent that the
Belgian authorities have been so good as to
allow WEU to hold its first few meetings in the
impressive setting of the Palais d'Egmont, which
has witnessed so many advances along the road
to European integration.
This morning, we had our first meeting of
the 'Brussels' Council attended by new per-
manent representatives, their deputies and mil-
itary delegates. This afternoon we have the
honour and pleasure to have with us many of the
former permanent representatives to the
'London i Council. This occasion symbolises
the transfer of responsibilities and demonstrates
that the WEU Council is indeed organised " so
as to be able to exercise its functions continu-
ously " as laid down by Article VIII of our mod-
ified Brussels Treaty.
I would also like to extend a wann
welcome to this ceremonial Council session
to the Secretary-General of NATO, Manfred
Wiirner, as well as the representatives of the EC
presidency.
In a certain sense, WEU has now returned
to Brussels, since it was nearly 45 years ago that
the Brussels Treaty was signed between Britain,
France and the Benelux countries. Our return to
Brussels marks the end of WEU's period of reac-
tivation that began with the 1984 Rome decla-
ration. Between 1984 and 1992, WEU has
adapted its structures in line with the dramatic
changes which have taken place in European
security over recent years. WEU now comprises,
in addition to the Council, Secretariat-General
and parliamentary Assembly, an Institute for
Security Studies, a Satellite Centre and more
recently a Planning Cell. With the transfer of the
Council and Secretariat to Brussels, WEU's
period of institutional innovation is now
drawing to a close.
1993 will, I believe, see WEU consoli-
dating its structures. Today we have four'active
observer' and two 'observer' countries around
our Council table, but during the course of the
coming year, with the reactivation of the pro-
tocol of accession, Greece will become a full
member and lceland, Norway and Turkey will
become associate members; Denmark and
Ireland will remain observers. WEU will also
begin to take up the arms co-operation functions
of the Independent European Programme
Group as well as certain Eurogroup functions.
We will also wish to consolidate our relations
with our 
- 
now nine 
- 
Central European
partners in the Forum of Consultation.
Most importantly, however, 1993 should
be the time when WEU concentrates on dealing
with the real substance of European security and
defence. The post-cold war world expects
Europe to play its full part in helping to prevent
or resolve crises or conflicts both within and
beyond its borders. The tragic conflict in former
Yugoslavia has led the international security
institutions 
- 
including WEU 
- 
to examine the
specific contributions each can bring to alleviate
the suffering of the peoples and bring peace to
the region.
For WEU, two substantive tasks in par-
ticular will require our attention in L993.
Firstly, WEU should enhance its means to for-
mulate common European defence policy as the
natural complement to the common foreign and
security policy being developed by the Twelve.
This should ensure a clear European voice is
heard across the spectrum of foreign, economic,
security and defence policy thus demonstrating
that WEU is the defence component of the
European Union. WEU should also start to
enhance the European contribution to the
process of consultation in the Atlantic Alliance.
With all the European allies around WEU's
table, I hope that we will begin to see an
effective European pillar in a genuine twin-pillar
alliance.
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Secondly, WEU's operational capabilities
must now take shape. With a fully operational
Planning Cell in April of this year, WEU will be
in a position to prepare contingency plans for
the exercise and employment of military units
under WEU auspices for the three types of mis-
sions defined in the Petersberg declaration:
humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping tasks;
tasks of combat forces in crisis-management,
including peace-keeping. In this way, we, as
Europeans, will be able to back up our policy
positions with appropriate actions whenever this
ls necessary.
May I finish by expressing the organi-
sation's gratitude to the representatives of the
'London' Council, who have done so much to
put WEU where it is today. I am convinced that
together we 
- 
the new Council here in Brussels 
-
can build on the solid foundations laid over the
past years.
May I now give the floor to the represent-
ative of the WEU presidency?
2. Declamtioa by E.E Mn F. Migliotinl on bchalf of
the Presidency olthc WEa Council in lanba
It is with geatest satisfaction that the
Italian presidency looks at the event of today,
opening a new phase in the revitalisation of
WEU. Italy has always believed that the transfer
of the Council to Brussels was essentid if this
organisation really had to play the r6le and
fulfil the functions envisaged in Maastricht,
Petersberg and Rome. Therefore we find it par-
ticularly gratifying that, as a result of the efforts
deployed by many sides for a number of years
to promote a consensus among partners, this
objective could be reached under Italian presi-
dency. Indeed this was, together with
enlargement, one of the main objectives that the
Italian presidency had included in its pro
gramme at the moment of its inception.
I would like to join the Secretary-General
in thanking, on behalf of the presidency, the
Belgian Government. I would also like to
welcome the Secretary-General of NATO and
the representative of the presidency of the
European Community to this meeting of the
new WEU Council. Their presence among us
today on this symbolic occasion testifies the
common willingness to proceed together and in
full harmony and co-operation in the building of
a new, and more solid, European security archi-
tecture also in the wake of enlargement.
I also wish to express the feeling of the
deepest gratitude to the permanent representa-
tives of the old Council who have not spared any
effort and have worked so successfully in the
past, including the most recent past, for the
development of this organisation and for the
strengthening of its r6le.
This transfer of course has to be seen in
conjunction with the underlying political final-
ities that made it worth pursuing.
It is the Maastricht design, envisaging the
construction of a European Union including a
security and defence dimension and the devel-
opment of WEU as the defence component of
the European Union and as the means to
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance, which made the transfer an urgent
necessity. The realisation of that design and the
evolutionary pr@ess leading to the review
envisaged for 1996 will give the greatest sense of
purpose to our work in Brussels.
The activities of the new Council in
Brussels will certainly contribute to a clearer
perception ofthe issues related to the European
integration in the field of security and
defence.
In this framework the development of a
common foreign and security policy by the
Twelve opens the possibility and creates the
need for a more intense co-ordination and for a
wider convergence of reflections and initiatives
within WEU. At the same time our organisation
will contribute to giving concrete implemen-
tation to the principles of complementarity,
co-ordination and transparency with respect to
NATO.
The political objectives are to harmonise
developments in NATO and in WEU in line
with the new situation emerying in Europe, to
enhance the stabilising functions of both institu-
tions and avoid damaging competition. It is first
of all in the field of peace-keeping and conflict-
prevention that this must be achieved.
On the more specific politico-military
plane, we need to promote the construction ofthe European security-defence dimension
without jeopardising the effectiveness of the
existing NATO mechanisms and structures.
What we now face is a work of in-depth
reflection and at the same time of concrete con-
struction, related to the security and defence
dimension of Europe and to the increasing r6le
that WEU 
- 
in co-ordination with NATO 
- 
is
expected to play for the enhancement of
European security interests and for the strength-
ening of stability in our continent.
The creation of forces available to WEU
is, in this context, an essential question, which
has very complex political and military aspects.
In this field we can already count on a set of
agreed guidelines. We need to proceed further
and arrive at conclusions in line with the central
finalities which have been identified: the availa-
bility of forces capable of effectively fulfilling
the missions envisaged for them; a full consider-
ation of the security interests of all partners in
various geographical sectorc; appropriate contri-
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butions by all partners to the WEU forces; and
the maintenance of the effectiveness of NATO
integrated forces.
Naturally all this also related to the pos-
sible r6le that WEU will be capable of playing in
crisis-management and peace-keeping.
The Council guidance, in the view of the
Italian presidency, will have to be based on a
political philosophy including a concept for
dealing with crises in Europe and in areas of
European interest, and criteria for co-ordination
and complementarity with NATO.
In the immediate future, we have to deal
with the special case of the Yugoslav crisis
which will be extremely important as a pre-
cedent for determining the WEU r6le for main-
taining stability in Europe. The Italian presi-
dency feels that a significant WEU visibility in
dealing with that crisi has been established. It
has to be maintained if we really wish to safe-
guard the prestige of this organisation and its
potential in the new security architecture.
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
remains so dramatically dangerous as to require
a credible and tangible expression of European
will to influence the developments of the crisis
and to promote the conditions for a solution.
Thus the Council will really have to be
involved in intense and substantive work in the
very near future.
The Italian presidency is committed to
making any possible effort in its second semester
to facilitate an effective work of the new
Council, and its success in the fulfilment of its
high responsibilities.
I would like to conclude by reiterating
Italy's conviction that the flrnalities set at Maas-
tricht and Petersberg are of fundamental impor-
tance for the future of Europe and must be
pursued and timely achieved. The Italian Dele-
gation wishes a very fruitful work in the months
io come in such endeavours to the delegations of
all partners, associate members and observers.
3. Decluation by H.E Mn l, De xlryt,
on bcMf of thc Belgian Govennunt
The Belgian representative welcomed the
participants on behalf of his government. He
said that H.E. Mr. W. Claes, Foreign Minister,
and Mr. L. Delcroix, Defence Minister, would
make a statement at the reception that they
would be offering after this Council, in the
presence of their guests and the press (see texts
of declarations in annex).
He added that Belgium, as the host
country, saw it as its duty to promote contact
between WEU and its partners in the alliance
and the European Community.
4. Decbration by H.E, Mr. G. Attolico,
oa bchalf of the formu l{EU Council ia Inndoa
I have the honour to take the floor in the
name of the 'old' Council based in London,
having held so far the capacity of representative
of the Italian presidency to Western European
Union. My country has always attached a great
importance to our organisation, and is currently
deploying every effort to meet the targets which
have been set for it. Personally, I have always
considered my position as permanent represent-
ative to WEU as an important and qualifying
part of my activity in Iondon. I know that my
colleagues share my opinion.
We, members of the 'old' Permanent
Council of Western European Union, have been
working hard in the last period to enable our
organisation to start a new phase in its life.
That is why we are very pleased to have
come from London today for a " handover of
powers " to our successors. This ceremony
crowns a period of profound changes in the
structure and r6le of Western European
Union.
So far, membership of the Permanent
Council has always been held by ambassadors of
member states to the Court of St. James and a
senior offrcial from the Foreign and Common-
wealth Offrce as representative of the United
Kingdom. This body, (and I quote Article YIII
6f the Brussels Treaty) has been created to " con-
sider matters concerning the execution of the
Brussels Treaty " and has been organised " as to
be able to exercise its functions continu-
ously ".
Its meetings have in fact taken place regu-
larly in London for the last 37 yearc. Meetings of
many subsidiaries bodies, in which our deputies,
as well as experts from our capitals have partici-
pated, have also taken place in London more
and more frequently.
But the day of the inception of a new
phase has come. Today the new Permanent
Council, whose members reside now in Brussels,
meets for the first time, and takes up the new
responsibilities deriving from the enhanced rOle
of Western European Union.
The very fact that we have now successors
to whom we hand over our tasks counts as a sig-
nificant achievement to us. It crowns a long
span of time during which the Council based in
London has aimed at progressively more ambi-
tious aims.
Many of the achievements of Western
European Union, either reached by the
Permanent Council itself, or to which the
Permanent Council has contributed signifi-
cantly, spring to mind easily.
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Let me just mention:
- 
the implementation of the Brussels
Treaty and its protocols, which has led,
amongst others, to the establishment of
a small but very skilful permanent
structure, without which WEU would
not be what it is today;
- 
the substantive work over many years
carried out by the Armaments Control
Agency and the Standing Armaments
Committee, under the aegis of the
Council;
- 
the consultation on a range of East-
West, European security and other
issues, as a precursor to European
political co-operation and also to the
enlargement of the originary six-
member European Community;
- 
the preparation of the Rome decla-
ration of October 1984, revitalising
WEU and bringing together foreign and
defence ministers and their staff, this
being a unique example of fully inte-
grated politico'military structure;
- 
the work on the Hague platform of
October 1987, outlining the strategic
philosophy of the organisation;
- 
the enlargement to Portugal and
Spain;
- 
the creation of the Institute for Security
Studies;
- 
the creation of the Satellite Centre;
- 
the establishment of a Planning Cell.
Further steps forward have been made
even more recently. Let me just recall that the
transfer to Brussels has been carried out per-
fectly according to the schedule agreed by
member states.
Let me mention also the enlargement to
Greece as a new full member, to Nonvay,
Turkey and Iceland as associate members, and
Denmark and Ireland as observers. Let me
mention also the establishment of the Forum of
Consultation with our partners of Central
Europe, which is intended to take into account
the needs of a fast-changing Europe.
I cannot forget the relations with the
Assembly of Western European Union, to which
the Council has always attached the greatest
importance, the Assembly being the expression
of the public opinions of our countries.
On this occasion, we are proud to hand
over to our successors a developing, well-run
organisation. Our deep thanks for this are also
due to the Secretariat, to the past Secretary-
Generals and to the current one, whose work in
assisting and guiding the organisation has
always been invaluable. Our deep thanks also to
the United Kingdom Government as the former
host nation and to the Belgian Government for
the r6le it has accepted as the new host.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is the last act
we perform in our capacities of permanent rep-
resentatives to Western European Union, which
has been for all of us an important and
rewarding experience.
We take leave from Western European
Union. As in all leaves, there is a touch of mel-
ancholy in it. We turn a page in our lives. But we
also know that the new permanent representa-
tives, the Secretary-General, Dr. van Eekelen,
and all the staff that have followed the
organisation to Brussels will enable Western
European Union to face adequately its new
responsibilities.
As far as I am concerned, I can assure that
the Italian Government will continue to play
fully the r6le deriving from his holding the Pres-
idency of the organisation until the end of June
1993.
I wish you all every success, in this final
span of the Italian Presidency and in the years to
come.
5. Delamba of H. E Mn M. lAdrae4
Secrdary-Gercral of NATO
First of all, Mr. Chairman, let me thank
you for the invitation to join this distinguished
assembly where I recognise with pleasure some
familiar ambassadorial faces. This is an
important day, not only for WEU but also for
NATO. It is needless to say how much we
welcome you at Brussels in the spirit of what I
said at your meeting in Rome. We are entering a
fundamentally new phase in the almost 44-year
old relationship between the alliance and
WEU.
In a few days time, NATO and WEU offi-
cials, under Wim van Eekelen and my chair-
manship, will be meeting in Brussels to start
closer and more concrete co-operation.
This is only a beginning. Much remains to
be done. Every day brings its challenges. In a few
hours' time the EC ultimatum to the Bosnian
Serbs will expire. This is just one example of the
kind of dangers we face.
In a world of instability, uncertainty and
numerous crises, it is imperative that we share
our expertise and avoid duplication. There is
sufficient work for both our organisations. Ourpriorities are clear: crisis-prevention, peace-
keeping and projecting stability in Central and
Eastern Europe. Let us be absolutely clear about
one thing: the importance of both our
organisations as well as the value of our
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co-operation will be assessed not according to
our rhetoric but according to our deeds.
To achieve them, we should now concen-
trate on the hard realities of today. Let me
emphasise them as follows.
First of all, the NATO-WEU relationship.
As we all know, the resources of allied countries
are limited and armed forces are being cut and
restructured. To operate meaningfully in a crisis,
NATO and WEU should consult in our Council
how to handle a crisis. Our future relationship
should aim for a pragmatic division of labour
that makes the best use of our political military
potential. Co-ordination and co-operation
between NATO and WEU is essential to our
future credibility, both political and military.
Second, the credibility of the European
pillar will determine the nature of the North
American commitment to European security in
the future. A substantial and durable com-
mitment of the United States to uphold peace
and stability in Europe will depend ever more
on the will of the European allies to maximise
and intensify their contribution.
There is a direct relationship between the
credibility of the European contribution and the
robustness of the transatlantic security part-
nership. It remains the consensus of all our
member nations that strengthening WEU must
be conducted in close association with the
alliance.
Last but not least, this new phase of the
NATO-WEU relationship stands little chance of
success unless we ensure that the very compli-
cated issues involved are understood by our par-
liaments and, above all, our public opinions. An
energetic information campaign is urgently
needed.
Let me now close by expressing my conf,r-
dence in the future. We have already made con-
siderable progress in developing the architecture
of interlocking institutions. The coming of WEU
to Brussels bodes well for the future.
6. Dcclaration by H.E. Mn O, Biening,
on behalf of the European Community Presideacy
It gives me, indeed, great pleasure to
speak as representative of the EC Presidency at
this ceremonial meeting of the WEU Council
after the seat of the organisation has been
moved to Brussels. This meeting as well as the
recent Ministerial Council in Rome are indeed
important events in the history of our
organisation. WEU has come of age. It has
acquired a new member, associate members and
observers. WEU will have new tasks.
The implementation of the Maastricht
Treaty and related agreements will add yet
another assignment to Western European
Union. As an integral part of the development of
the European Union it will be asked to elaborate
and implement decisions and actions of the
Union which have defence implications. That is
a challenging task which will demand hard
labour, insight and flexibility from the
organisation and not least from its secretariat, as
well as a thorough understanding of the complex
set of agreements that constitute the basis of the
European Union. I wish you, Mr. Secretary-
General, and your collaborators the best of luck
in fulfilling this task.
WEU will have many r6les to play. In
relation to the European Union, to NATO and
as an independent security organisation in a
changing and turbulent Europe. These many
r6les make it reasonable to expect that the
organisation will occupy a pivotal position
between different fora of European integration
and co-operation, as well as groups of countries
engaged in the construction of a new European
security order. The catchwords should be trans-
parency and complementarity. I am convinced
that the fact that the organisation is now
installed in a most impressive building 
- 
which
was formerly, as I understand, a bank 
- 
will not
make it a closed " fortress Europe ".
Representing the Presidency of the
European Community I should like especially to
underline the task ahead of laying the foun-
dation for a close and efficient co-operation
between the EC and WEU as foreseen in the
Maastricht Treaty. We must in a joint effort try
to find the most efficient channels of communi-
cation between WEU and the EC Presidency as
well as the Common Foreign and Security Policy
set-up as a whole. In this process we should be
sensitive to the cultures and decision-making
procedures of the respective organisations.
Mr. Chairman, one concluding word.
In fulfilling its assignments vis-i-vis the
European Union and the North Atlantic
Alliance and at the same time providing a forum
for co-operation in the field of security with our
Eastern neighbours, the goal of Western
European Union must invariably be how it can
best contribute to peace and stability in the new
Europe in a spirit of openness, consultation and
co-ordination.
7. Dedaratioa of H.E. Mr. LH. Mevik,
Pennatent Repruseatative of the Kiagdom of Norway
It is indeed a pleasure to join you in your
work. WEU is playing an increasingly important
r6le in matters of security and defence policies.
This meeting marks the beginning of a new
phase in that respecU the fact that WEU is now
established in Brussels will facilitate the inter-
action with NATO and the European Com-
munity. The work of WEU will now also involve
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all European allies 
- 
albeit in different capac-
ities. This will improve our ability to secure
transparency and complementarity between
WEU and the alliance 
- 
and to avoid compe-
tition with regard to resources in the vital field
of defence and security.
In sum, today's meeting marks a signif-
icant step in the adaptation of European institu-
tions to the new realities we are facing.
My government welcomes this devel-
opment. As an associate member we pledge our
full participation in the activities of WEU on the
basis of the document signed in Rome on 20th
November last year.
WEU is called upon to play the important
r6le as the European pillar of the alliance and
the defence component of the Community. It is
in the interest of my country to reinforce the
European pillar, while remaining firmly
attached to the vitality ofthe transatlantic ties.
Today the European Community plays a
major r6le in the promotion of co-operation and
prosperity in Europe. NATO is the main con-
tributor to military stability, a r6le which
remains essential, and WEU is called upon to
play an important defence policy r6le, com-
patible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. I
believe that co-operation within the framework
of WEU will strengthen Europe and the Atlantic
Alliance.
It is a process to which we will continue to
give our full support as we now take up our new
r6le within this organisation.
8, Decbration by H.E Mn YiUbim Keskit,
Peraunent Rqtuentatite of Turhoy
I would like to take this opportunity to
express my government's satisfaction that
Turkey is attending this meeting as an active
observer. It will be doing so very shortly as an
associate member, pending its full membership
status.
You are all aware of the importance that
Turkey attaches to its relations with Western
Europe. From the very start, my country has
taken its place among all European institutions
either as founder member or as full or associate
member, demonstrating the close historic,
political, economic and military links between
my country and the countries of Western
Europe. In this context, Turkey's active partici-
pation in the work of WEU is a further step
fonvard, in line with its commitment to Europe
and its foreign policy.
My country hopes to be part of the new
process of European construction, in which
WEU will be helping to create appropriate new
instruments for its defence and security.
It is our wish to work for a future of peace
and prosperity for Europe, a wish that is sin-
cerely shared by all the member states of this
organisation.
9. Debmion by H.E. Mr. S.E. Guanlorgsson,
Pcrmaneat Rcpruscntatbe of lcelard
We from the Icelandic side join others in
congratulating you and Western European
Union on the establishment of the Council and
Secretariat in Brussels and its new premises here
in the centre of Europe. My authorities warmly
welcome this move. This important step, based
on the decisions taken by WEU in Maastricht
1991, will facilitate the strengthening of WEU's
r6le.
We wish to recall that Western European
Union also took other decisions in Maastricht,
i.e. to develop WEU as the means to strengthen
the European pillar of the North Atlantic
Alliance and to establish close working links
between the two organisations. Considerable
progress has already been made in achieving
these objectives. The negotiations on the asso-
ciate membership of other European-NATO
member states have been successfully concluded
and the institutional links between the
organisations are being developed.
However, much more needs to be done to
achieve the aims set out in the Maastricht Decla-
ration of WEU. The establishment of the WEU
Council and Secretariat in Brussels is an
important contribution in this respect and will
facilitate closer co-operation with NATO.
Mr. Chairman, at this important juncture
in European security, the Icelandic authorities
look forward to a fruitful assocation with WEU
in ensuring enhanced European cooperation in
security and defence affairs.
10. Declaration by H.E. Mr. C. Eliopoulos,
Pernutuat Rcptwntoive ol Grwc
It is with great satisfaction that I speak at
this solemn session of the joint Council of
Western European Union.
In expressing its pleasure at participating
in WEU, Greece aflirms its resolve to make a
decisive contribution to the determination of a
European identity in the fields of security and
defence and in the broader process ofEuropean
integration.
On this occasion, I should like to thank
the Belgian Government for its warm welcome
and for all the arrangements it has made to host
the seat of our organisation.
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11. Declaration b HE. Mr. Delcruir"
Minisur of Dafene of Belgium
. 
A mon tour, je.voudrais saluer la prdsence
parmi nous ce soir du Lieutenant-G6n6ral
CALTABIANO et de toute l'6quipe de la Cellule
de planification qui travaille i Bruxelles depuis
quelque temps d6jn. Je leur souhaite ainsi qu'i
tous les militaires qui rejoindront bientOt la rue
de la R6gence une bonne installation dans notre
capitale et un travail agrdable et fructueux au
sein de IUEO dans le cadre que vient de ddcrire
mon colldgue des affaires 6trang0res.
Since December 1991 the Europe's
" defence identity " continues to develop. In
Maastricht the nine member states of our
organisation declared their intention of devel-
oping WEU. In Helsinki we decided to organise
the naval operations in the Adriatic, in Rome we
decided about enlargement. The member states
of the Eurogroup and the IEPG agreed to
transfer their functions to WEU.
I am convinced that all these arrange-
ments for a new security architecture in Western
Europe will reinforce WEU's r0le and place and
in the European Community and in the North
Atlantic Alliance.
The move of the Council and the Secre-
tariat to Brussels is a first step in this direction
and will facilitate the following practical steps
you envisage vis-d-vis both organisations.
Dans les mois d venir, il faudra encore
progresser dans de nombreux domaines, notam-
ment ceux qui concernent les liens avec I'OTAN.
La coopdration dans le domaine des armements
et la planification de circonstances.
Il faudra aussi renforcer nos relations avec
les futurs membres de la Communaut6
europdenne. Les pays d'Europe centrale et du
Maghreb sans ndgliger nos partenaires trans-
atlantiques.
Il faudra enfin tenir compte des initiatives
et proposition de nos chefs d'6tat-major en
rapport avec la Cellule de planification et le
renforcement du r6le de I'UEO.
Je terminerai en vous souhaitant, i vous
M. van Eekelen ainsi qu'i tous vos colla-
borateurs, au nom de mon colldgue des affaires
dtrangdres et en mon nom personnel, une
excellente int6gration i Bruxelles et
dnormdment de satisfaction dans la tdche
importante qui est la v6tre.
12. Dcclaratioa by H,E. Mr. W. Clacs,
Mhister for Foruign Affairs of Belgium
C'est tout prds d'ici, au Palais des
Acad6mies, que fut sign6, le l7 mars 1948, aprds
une courte ndgociation, le Traitd de Bruxelles
qui devait donner naissance e IUEO.
Pourquoi i Bruxelles ? Comme le souligne
dans ses mdmoires mon illustre prdd6cesseur de
l'6poque, Paul-Henri Spaak, 
-la proposition de
tenir la conf6rence des cinq Etats dans une des
capitales du Bdndlux a 6t6 faite par la France et
la Grande-Bretagne et elle avait une valeur
symbolique: elle marquait leur accord sur
I'option exprim6e dans leur mdmorandum
commun par ces trois petits pays: celle d'aller
plus loin qu'une simple Alliance militaire de
type traditionnel fond6e sur
d'accords bilat6raux pour crder
un faisceau
une v6ritable
Communaut€ entre les signataires du Traitd
projet6.
Ce fut Ie premier Trait6 europ6en de
l'aprds-guerre.
Depuis lors, les circonstances ont voulu
que ce soit i Bruxelles que s'installe I'Alliance
atlantique et que se d6veloppe la Communautd
europ6enne, deux Organisations qui 6taient en
genne dans I'accord du Palais des Acad6mies.
Aussi, l'installation de I'UEO i Bruxelles
signifie-t-elle plus pour moi qu'une simple
occasion de faciliter des contacts interinsti-
tutionnels. J'y vois aussi la volont6 de retrouver,
enfin, aprls tant d'ann6es de tdtonnements, la
symbiose qu'avaient voulue les pdres de
I'Europe entre sa dimension 6conomique et
politique et sa dimension de d6fense.
A lot of work is still to be done to have
WEU become the defence component of the
European Union and at the same time the
European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.
The WEU Council and your Secretariat,
Mr. van Eekelen, will be faced with many chal-
lenges. You will have to start your new activity
in a diflicult context: the European Union is not
there yet to give the necessary impulse to your
organisation. In the Atlantic Alliance there is
now much good will to accept the European
security identity but a lot of imagination will be
needed because there was never an effective
concretisation in NATO of the European pillar
advocated since decades by Americans as well as
by Europeans.
But the present security environment in
Europe is probably your most diflicult chal-
lenge: it is so uncertain and dangerous that there
will not be much time left for institutional
debates or bureaucratic disputes.
Nous avons voulu, mon colldgue Delcroix
et moi-m0me, rdunir autour du Conseil UEO, e
I'occasion de sa premidre rdunion bruxelloise,
des reprdsentants des diverses institutions avec
lesquelles IUEO sera en contact dans notre
capitale.
Je remercie vivement de leur pr6sence le
prdsident de la Commission Jacques Delors et le
Secrdtaire g6n6ral de I'OTAN Manfred Wtirner,
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le Secr6taire g6n6ral du Conseil des Commu-
nautds M. Ersbtill et toutes les personnalit6s qui
ont bien voulu nous rejoindre pour cet
6v6nement.
Je voudrais aussi remercier vivement les
membres du Conseil de I'UEO i Iondres qui
sont venus saluer ici leurs successeurs. Votre
action pendant ces dernidres ann6es, messieurs
les Ambassadeurs, a contribud substantiellementi la revitalisation progressive de I'UEO. Vous
devez sans doute 6prouver une certaine tristessei ne pas pouvoir parachever votre euvre. Vos
successeurs ont maintenant pris le relais. Je suis
convaincu qu'ils poursuivront avec autant
d'assiduite que vous-m0mes ce travail et qu'ils
pourront bdn6ficier pour cela de vos exp6riences
et vos conseils.
Je voudrais enfin saisir cette occasion
pour fdliciter la Pr6sidence italienne de I'UEO
qui s'est acquittde remarquablement des deux
t0ches principales qui lui ont 6t6 d6volues: celle
de conclure la ndgociation d'€largissement et
d'association; celle de mener I'action op6ra-
tionnelle de I'UEO dans la crise yougoslave.
Je cdde maintenant la parole i mon
colldgue de la ddfense Leo Delcroix qui voudrait
dgalement vous adresser quelques mots.
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ANNEX 2
Declaration on implementation of United Nations sanctions
on former Yugoslavia
Council of Ministerc, Luxemboarg, Sth April 1993
l. The WEU Council of Ministers held an
extraordinary meeting, following on their dis-
cussions in Rome in November 1992, to discuss
this crucial phase of the situation in former
Yugoslavia and in particular the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Representatives of Bul-
garia, Hungary and Romania, the CSCE Presi-
dency, the CSCE sanctions co'ordinator and the
EC Commission attended, as observers, this
meeting which was devoted to sanctions imple-
mentation on the Danube. Representatives of
the EC Presidency and Secretary-General of
NATO also attended as observers.
2. With a view to supporting the efforts of
the European Community, the United Nations
and the International Conference on former
Yugoslavia at this decisive stage of the negotia-
tions aiming at the acceptance of the
Vance-Owen peace plan by all parties in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ministers reaffirmed their deter-
mination to contribute significantly to the
implementation of the provisions of the United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 787,757
and 713 and of the measures contained in those
resolutions.
3. Ministers welcomed the efforts of the
riparian states to meet their obligations under
the abovementioned United Nations Security
Council resolutions but noted with concern that,
despite these efforts, sanctions enforcement on
the Danube still required strengthening.
4. WEU ministers therefore offered their
concrete support to the riparian states by means
of the organisation of a police and customs oper-
ation on the Danube to which WEU countries
would contribute appropriate resources. This
offer is based on three guiding principles 
- 
that
the operation will be:
- 
based on relevant United Nations
Security Council resolutions, in par-
ticular Resolution 787 of l6th
November 1992, in connection with
Resolutions 713 and 757;
- 
an extension of efforts already being
deployed by the CSCE and the
European Community and its member
states;
- 
in support ofthe riparian states respon-
sible for adopting the requisite mea-
sures to ensure compliance with the
embargo on the Danube.
5. WEU ministers welcomed the support
given by the CSCE to the WEU plan and looked
forward to the effective co-ordination of the EC,
CSCE and WEU efforts to enforce United
Nations Security Council resolutions.
6. The organisation of the police and
customs operation offered by WEU would be
based on a system of co-ordinated control areas
upstream and downstream ofthe Serbian border
with the aim of ensuring the effective implemen-
tation of the embargo on the Danube. This
would involve joint teams of police and customs
oflicers from WEU countries and the riparian
states operating from fast patrol boats to carry
out additional controls in support of those of the
riparian states.
7. The WEU Council of Ministers welcomed
the support given by the riparian states and
looked forward to further consultations on this
issue. They hoped that the police and customs
operation could start as soon as possible in order
to ensure the full implementation of the relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions
and thus to make a positive contribution to
reaching a solution to the crisis in former Yugo-
slavia, in full complementarity with the peace
process which is being pursued in other fora.
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1. The WEU Council of Ministers today
held its first regular meeting since the decisions
taken in Rome on 2fth November 1992 to
enlarge WEU, and since the transfer of the WEU
Council and Secretariat to Brussels. In addition
to the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the nine
existing member states, Ministers of the future
member state Greece, of the future associate
member states lceland, Nonray and Turkey and
of the observers Denmark and Ireland, partici-
pated in this meeting. Ministers welcomed the
progress made over the last six months in
strengthening the r6le of WEU and discussed
what further steps could be taken. Ministers also
held detailed exchanges on the situation in
former Yugoslavia and on the contribution
WEU was making to the search for a peaceful
settlement.
WEU and the European security environment
2. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to
develop the r6le of WEU as the defence com-
ponent of the European Union and as the means
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic
Alliance based on the declarations agreed at
Maastricht and Petersberg. Ministers took note
with satisfaction of the progxess achieved in this
regard.
Ministers warmly welcomed the result of
the Danish referendum the day before relating
to the Treaty on European Union.
3. The severe crisis in former Yugoslavia
powerfully demonstrates the need for interna-
tional organisations in the security field to act
closely together in order to channel the political
will of their member states to seek effective
means for conflict-prevention, crisis-manage-
ment and peace-keeping. Given the enhanced
r6le of the United Nations and the importance
of developing co-operation within the CSCE,
WEU Ministers reaflirmed their preparedness to
support, on a case by case basis and in
accordance with WEU procedures, the effective
implementation of confl ict-prevention and crisis
management measures including peace-keeping
activities of these organisations and co-opera-
tive efforts with other states. They stressed the
need to maintain armed forces at a level of effec-
tiveness to cope with the requirements of
common defence and the tasks defined by the
Petersberg declaration of WEU.
ANNEX 3
Communiqud of tlu Council of Miaisten
Romc,, I%h May 199i
Former Yugoslavia
4. Ministers held a detailed discussion on
the extremely serious situation in former Yugo-
slavia and in particular in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Condemning the continuing failure of the
Bosnian Serbs to accept the Yance-Owen peace
plan, and stressing that the referendum which
took place last weekend in Bosnia-Herzegovina
had no legal value and therefore its result was
irrelevant, Ministers reiterated their full support
for an early implementation of the Vance-Owen
peace plan and for all the measures envisaged by
the European Community and its member states
and the international community to bring about
a political solution to the ongoing conflict and to
ensure the physical and political survival ofthe
Muslim people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Ministers, noting that no option, military
or other, was excluded, agreed to keep up the
pressure, in co-operation with the United States,
Russia and the other interested parties, on
Serbia and Montenegro and the Bosnian Serbsin order to make the latter accept the
Vance-Owen peace plan and stop immediately
their attacks and their policy of ethnic
cleansing.
Ministers condemned the recent military
attacks against Muslim civilians by Bosnian
Croat Forces and supported the European Com-
munity and its member states' stern warning to
Croatia on possible reactions if their attitude
was maintained. They expressed the hope that
the Mostar meetings would bring hostilities to
an end.
Ministers also recalled the Yugoslav
authorities' earlier declarations on international
monitors along the Serbian Montenegrin/Bosnian-
Herzegovinian border, and expressed the view
that President Milosevic's willingness to
intemrpt all assistance to the Bosnian Serbs with
the exclusion of humanitarian aid should be put
to the test, by providing evidence of his com-
mitment.
5. Ministers mandated the Permanent
Council:
- 
following the WEU planning under-
taken on Sarajevo Safe Haven which
was submitted to the United Nations,
to arrange for a study to be carried out
on the establishment of different safe
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areas referred to in United Nations
Security Council Resolution 824, as
well as Mostar and other possible
areas,
- 
to examine the r6le that WEU might
play in the context of the implemen-
tation of the Vance-Owen peace plan,
in co-ordination with NATO,
- 
to study the possibility for WEU to
co.ordinate the rotation of the contin-
gents deployed by its member states in
the framework of UNPROFOR and the
possible participation of WEU member
states in the protection of the above-
mentioned safe areas under a mandate
of the United Nations.
6. Ministers agreed that the strengthening of
the United Nations sanctions through strict
implementation of the relevant Security Council
resolutions and in particular United Nations
Security Council Resolution 820 should con-
tinue to be one of the responses of the interna-
tional community to Bosnian Serb intransi-
gence. Ministers highlighted the two contri-
butions which WEU was making in this
respect:
- 
Since July 1992, WEU ships and air-
craft have been conducting, first
embargo monitoring, and subsequently
embargo enforcement operations in the
Adriatic in close co-ordination with
NATO. With the adoption of United
Nations Security Council Resolution
820, WEU and NATO discussed ways
of increasing the effectiveness of these
embargo enforcement operations.
- 
The offer made at their meeting in Lux-
embourg on 5th April to assist the
efforts of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania in implementing the embargo
on the Danube in accordance with the
provisions of the relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions
was now being put into effect. Ministers
expressed their appreciation for the
cooperation shown by the Govern-
ments of Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania in establishing this joint initi-
ative, of a civilian character, which
would be conducted in close co-
ordination with the efforts of other
organisations notably the EC and CSCE
and in liaison with the sanctions
assistance missions in the area. They
welcomed the agreement of the riparian
states to the deployment of advance
teams, now in place, in order to prepare
the rapid implementation of the initi-
ative. Ministers expressed their appre-
ciation for the efforts undertaken by the
Presidency and agreed that Italy would
assure co-ordination on the ground.
Relations with other countries
7. Ministers looked forward to their meeting
the following day with their colleagues from the
partner countries of Central Europe in the
Forum of Consultation in order to intensify dia-
logue, consultation and co-operation and to
discuss security issues of common concern.
8. Ministers agreed on the importance for
WEU, as its rOle is strengthened, to develop its
relations with other countries.
They welcomed the accession negotiations
between the European Community and certain
EFTA countries and were prepared, should the
countries concerned so wish, to establish in the
interim period prior to accession appropriate
contacts with Austria, Finland and Sweden for
information on the r6le of WEU in this
context.
Ministers, stressing the importance of sta-
bility and security in the Mediterranean basin to
WEU member states, agreed to develop further
the dialogue initiated with Maghreb countries.
Given the increased importance of
WEU's rOle, Ministers also requested the Presi-
dency and Secretariat to continue to ensure
information was given on WEU's activities to
other interested countries.
Strengthening WEU's rOle
9. Ministers welcomed the fruitful working
links which had been established in Brussels
between the Defence Representatives Group,
the Military Delegates and the Planning Cell.
This had enabled the Planning Cell to start work
on a flrrm foundation, and had also led to the
establishment of principles for the organisation
and functioning of WEU in times of crisis. They
also welcomed the valuable contribution made
by the WEU CHODs at their meeting in Rome
on22nd April 1993, the first such meeting to be
attended by future members and associate
members of WEU. On the basis of earlier
studies and following the recommendations of
the CHODs, Ministers agreed that the planning
cell should advance studies with a view to
enhancing European air-maritime co-operation
- 
as a follow-up to the Franco/Italian/Spanish
proposal 
- 
and develop those relating to capabil-
ities for strategic mobility.
10. The WEU Council of Ministers took note
of the report of the Defence Representatives
Group and mandated the Permanent Council to
reach timely conclusions and to present a
progxess report to the next ministerial meeting
on the forces answerable to WEU, in particular
for the conduct of humanitarian and peace-
keeping operations. Ministers noted with satis-
faction that all member states were now pro-
ceeding to designate which of their military
units and headquarters they were prepared to
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make available to WEU for various possible
tasks. These should include rapidly deployable
air, naval and ground forces and headquarters
from which WEU operations could be com-
manded.
11. Ministers welcomed the following decla-
ration by the French, German and Belgian Min-
isters on the European corps:
" The states participating in the European
corps recall the terms of the Franco-
German memorandum of 30th November
1992, of which the Council has taken
note, to the effect that they consider that
the European Corps forms part of units
designated as 'forces answerable to
' WEIJ'".
12. Ministers also welcomed a statement by
Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the Federal Republic of Germany that the
units they are prepared to make available for
military tasks under WEU auspices will include
the following multinational formations as part
of the 'forces answerable to WEU':
- 
the Multinational Division (Central),
consisting of Belgian, British, Dutch
and German units;
- 
the United Kingdom/Netherlands
amphibious force.
13. Ministers requested the Permanent
Council to arrange discussions at the earliest
with representatives of the nations participating
in these offers in order to define the relations
between WEU and these multinational forma-
tions as 'forces answerable to WEU'.
Ministers agreed that the competent fora
of WEU should develop a number of general
rules and procedural guidelines applicable to all
forces answerable to WEU.
14. Ministers welcomed the progress which
had been made in setting up the WEU satellite
centre. In particular they noted with satisfaction
the signature on lst December 1992 of the
agreement between Spain and the WEU
regarding the concession of the site and the
building in Torrej6n, the delivery of the initial
equipment, the signature of the Helios memo-
randum of understanding and the official inau-
guration on 28th April 1993. Ministers also
noted that phase 2 of the main system feasibility
study into an autonomous European space-
based observation capability had now been
launched, and looked forward to receiving an
evaluation of the costed options following the
conclusion of the study at the end of 1993.
15. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of
WEU's activities with regard to the implemen-
tation of arms control and disarmament agree-
ments, in particular the CFE and Open Skies
Treaties. On WEU co'operation on open skies,
Ministers noted the preliminary set of rules for
the operation of a pool of observation systems,
prepared by the working Broup, which aimed at
making the most cost-effective use of national
resources. They agreed that an approach should
be made to third parties with a view to assessing
their interest in participating in the pool. Min-
isters underlined the need for continued
co-operation between member states on the veri-
Iication of the CFE Treaty.
16. Ministers agreed to the transfer from
EUROGROUP to WEU of its publicity activ-
ities and the functions of EUROCOM. They
noted that discussions were continuing on the
transfer of the functions of EUROLOG and
EUROLONGTER}{.
Armaments co-operation
l7 . The Defence Ministers of the 13 nations
of the former IEPG met this morning for the
first time since the IEPG functions were trans-
ferred to the WEU. They reaflirmed the six key
principles on which co-operation on armaments
matters should be based and in particular that
all decisions on these matters within the WEU
framework should be taken by the 13 nations.
They agreed on a number of organisational
aspects of the transfer, which were subsequently
adopted formally by the Council at 13.
18. Defence Ministers will meet at least once
a year, before a WEU Council meeting, to
oversee the activities of the armaments
co-operations forum, which will henceforth be
known as the Western European Armaments
Group (WEAG). The chairmanship will con-
tinue to rotate among the 13 nations. The
meetings of the National Armaments Directors,
who will continue to report to Defence Min-
isters, will remain the operational core of the
WEAG. Ministers agreed to relocate to Brussels
the functions of the Permanent Secretariat of the
former IEPG. Ministers agreed to build on the
links between the former IEPG and NATO by
applying to armaments cmperation within the
WEU framework the practical measures agreed
in Petersberg for developirg relations between
WEU and NATO. Ministers noted the decision
by NADs to task a study group to examine
the possible r6le of a European armaments
agency.
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l. Foreign and Defence Ministers of Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slo-
vakia met in Rome on 20th May 1993 with the
WEU Council of Ministers. Following the deci-
sions taken at their meeting in Rome on 20th
November 1992, in addition to the Foreign and
Defence Ministers of the nine existing WEU
member states, Ministers of the future member
state Greece, of the future associate member
states Iceland, Norway and Turkey and of the
observers Denmark and Ireland participated in
this meeting. This was the first Ministerial
meeting since the adoption in Bonn on l9th
June 1992 of measures to strengthen the rela-
tions and structure the dialogue, consultation
and co-operation between WEU and the states
of Central Europe.
2. Recognising the importance of their
exchanges of views, the Ministers of WEU coun-
tries and those of WEU's consultation partners
of Central Europe agreed henceforth to extend
the term * WEU Forum of Consultation " to
their annual meetings, a term already applied to
the meetings at ambassadorial level which take
place at least twice a year.
3. Particular emphasis in the discussions was
placed on the situation in former Yugoslavia.
Ministers condemned the continuing failure of
the Bosnian Serb authorities to accept the Vance-
Owen peace plan and welcomed that part of the
communiqud of the WEU Ministerial Council
agreed the day before concerning former Yugo-
slavia. In their discussions Ministers reviewed
WEU's contributions to the efforts of the whole
international community to bring peace to this
region.
4. WEU Ministers informed their consul-
tation partners of the WEU operation to enforce
the embargo in the Adriatic undertaken in close
co-ordination with NATO.
Ministers welcomed the WEU initiative
on the Danube to assist and co-operate with Bul-
gaia, Hungary and Romania, in the strict
implementation of the sanctions provided for in
United Nations Security Council Resolutions
820, 787, 757 and 713. They welcomed the sig-
nature of three memoranda of understanding in
Rome to this effect.
Ministers stressed that the Danube
mission, which was of a civilian character, repre-
sented a concrete example of co-operation
ANNEX 4
Communiqud of the meeting of the WEU Forum
of Consultatian at Ministerial level
Romc,2&h May 1993
between WEU and certain of its consultation
partners. They reaffrrmed the importance of
that co-operation and their resolve to continue
their joint efforts thus contributing to the search
for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Moreover,
Ministers underlined the importance of con-
taining the current conflict and agreed that, were
any country to suffer from aggressive action as a
consequence of their support for United
Nations-mandated operations, this would be a
matter of direct concern to the international
community.
5. Ministers held a detailed discussion on
the development of relations between WEU and
its consultation partners and on the current
European security environment and its chal-
lenges. They reaffirmed the importance of inten-
sifying these relations as a valuable contribution
to the emergence of a more stable and peaceful
order in Europe based on partnership and
co-operation.
6. Concerning the early, orderly and com-
plete withdrawal of foreign troops from the terri-
tories of the Baltic states in full accordance with
international law, Ministers reaflirmed their
support for the full and unconditional imple-
mentation of the relevant provisions of the Hel-
sinki summit document of 1992 and the conclu-
sions of the CSCE Stockholm Council.
7. Ministers recognised the important r6le
accorded to WEU by the decisions taken in
Maastricht and at Petersberg and welcomed the
decisions taken at Rome in November 1992 to
enlarge WEU. Ministers agreed that the political
dialogue within the Forum of Consultation
should contribute towards gaining a clearer per-
ception of the rOle of WEU in the development
of the security and defence policy of the future
European Union and should provide a
framework in which security and defence issues
of common concern could be discussed so as to
be able to take account of each others' views in
wider fora without duplicating the co-operation
in the Atlantic framework. The development of
WEU's relations with its consultation partners
would continue to reflect increasingly close rela-
tions between the countries of Central Europe
and the future European Union and its member
states with the aim of extending the area of sta-
bility and security in Europe.
8. Ministers welcomed the gradual devel-
opment of WEU's operational capabilities
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including the establishment of the Planning Cell
and agreed to explore and promote the possibil-
ities for co-operation between WEU and its con-
sultation partners in particular in the fields of
conflict-prevention, crisis-management, peace-
keeping and the implementation of the CFE and
Open Skies Treaties.
In particular Ministers stressed the value
of an exchange of views on peace-keeping.
Whilst taking care to avoid any duplication, this
might be the subject of a seminar at which
experiences of peace-keeping in practical terms
could be compared.
9. Ministers expressed their satisfaction with
the growing dialogue in the Forum of Consul-
tation thanks to the meetings which had taken
place at ambassadorial level in London on l4th
October 1992 and in Brussels on 20th April
1993. They encouraged their representatives in
Brussels to enhance the regular exchanges of
documents and information on matters of
common concern in the security and defence
field. To facilitate this, Ministers agreed on the
setting up of a Counsellors Group in Brussels
composed of senior representatives in the dele-
gations of the WEU countries and the Embassy
Counsellors of the consultation partners. This
group, which would meet at least three or four
times a year, would hold more detailed
exchanges of view and prepare the meetings of
the Forum of Consultation.
10. Ministers welcomed the close co-
operation developing between the WEU
Institute and the corresponding bodies in
WEU's Central European partner countries. In
particular they expressed their appreciation for
the Institute's programme of scholarships for
young researchers from Central Europe and
agreed that the programme should be gradually
enlarged over the next three years.
I l. They further welcomed the increased con-
tacts between the WEU Assembly and the par-
liaments of the consultation partners.
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ANNEX 5
Press relcap issued after the joint sasion of the North Atlantic Council
and the Council of WEU held in Brussels on &th lano 1993
1. A joint session of the North Atlantic
Council and the Council of Western European
Union was held today, 8th June 1993. This
session completed the thorough review, under-
taken in tnelight of recent developments, of the
embargo opeiations in the Adriatic which
NATO and WEU have been conducting in strict
coordination since July 1992. The Councils
approved the combined NATO/WEU concept of
operations for the implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 820 in the
Adriatic. This includes a single command and
control affangement for combined NATOAilEU
operations (Sharp Guard) under the authority of
the Councils of both organisations.
2. Operational control of the combined
NATO/WEU Task Force (CTF) for embargo
operations in the Adriatic has been delegated
through SACEUR to Commander Allied Naval
Forcei Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH).
Acting on behalf of the North Atlantic Alliance
and Western European Union, he will exercise
operational control over a combined task force
and conduct operations to monitor and enforce
compliance with United Nations sanctions in
accoidance with United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 713,757,787 and 820. The
combined task force will, in particular, aim at
preventing all unauthorised sh_ipping_ from
entering ihe territorial waters of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Monte-
negro).
3. Arrangements to ensure the eflicient
conduct of unified operations have been put in
place. Implementation of the joint NATOAIrEU
-operationi 
will start immediately. Practical mea-
sures to ensure close co-operation among the rel-
evant NATO and WEU bodies have been put
into effect and further joint sessions of the
North Atlantic Council and the Council of
Western European Union witl be convened if
necessary to issue additional political guidance
for the operations in the Adriatic.
4. The combined operation will give con-
crete expression to the determination of NATO
and WEU to continue to act together in
co-operation for the effective implementation of
the sanctions decided upon by the United
Nations Security Council and to contribute to a
settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia.
This reflects our commitment to the principles
of transparency and complementarity in pursuit
of our mutual goal of enhanced security through
NATO and WEU.
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I*tter frum the Prcsidcnt of the Assembly
to the Auditor submitting the occounts
for the financial year 1992
7th May 1993
Dear Dr. Zavelberg,
In accordance with Article 14 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU,
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts
for the financial year 1992 in accordance with
the statements attached hereto, which refer to:
l. (a/ Summary of income and expenditure
financial position as at 31st
December 1992 (Appendix I);
(D/ Statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits(Appendix II);
(c/ Contributions (Appendix III);
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV).
As is customary, after being audited these
tables will be signed by the President of the
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the
Accounts of the administrative expendituru of the Assembly
for the financial year 1992
16th November 1993
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly.
2. The statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 314, whereas the final statement of
income and expenditure shows a credit balance
of F 118 248. The difference between these two
figures, i.e. F lL7 934, shows an excess of
receipts over estimates:
FF
- 
Bank interest 160 655
- 
Sundry receipts 32020
- 
Sale of publications 30 389
- 
Contributions 790 699 870
- 
Receipts for 1992
estimated in
the budget
+ ll7 934
3. Excess expenditure under Heads I and V
of the operating budget and Head I of the pen-
sions budget amounting to F 217 790 has been
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Lrrren FRoM THE Pnrsrprrr oF THE AssnMsrv ro rHE Aupnon SUBMITTINc rHE
Accor;Nrs oF rHE AssEMBLy FoR THE FINANCIAL venn 1992 - 7th May 1993
LETTER FRoM rrm, Auonon ro rHe PREsTDENT oF THE AssEMBLy - I 5th November 1993
Rrponr or rgr extrnNlr AuDrroR To rHr Asseunrv oF WESTERN EURoPEAN UNIoN or.t
THE ACcoLrNTs FoR THE FINANcIAL vean 1992 - l5th November 1993
Crnrmrcnre oF THE Auorron FoR THE FINANcTAL yEAR lst JnNuanv ro 3lst DncrMsrn
1992 
- 
l5th November 1993
ApprNprcns
I. Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1992 -
financial position as at 3lst December 1992
II. Statement ofbudget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended credits
for the financial year 1992
III. Contributions to the WEU Assembly budget for 1992
IV. Provident fund 
- 
account for the financial year ended 3lst December
1992
Y. 1992 balance sheet for the United European Left Group
Vl. 1992 balance sheet for the Federated Group of Christian Democrats and
European Democrats
Yll. 1992 balance sheet for the Liberal Group
VIII. 1992 balance sheet for the Socialist Group
922934
805 000
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met by transfers from other heads of the
budget.
4. The statement of contributions for the
financial year 1992 received from the Secretary-
General of WEU, London, is given at Appendix
m.
5. Amounts in the provident fund of the
Assembly stall are incorporated with those of
the other organs of WEU and the joint fund is
administered by the Secretary-General of WEU.
On 31st December 1992, these amounts
stood at F 7 008 216 as shown in Appendix IV.
On that date there remained one loan to a staff
member, amounting to F 383 0@.
On 3lst December 1992 these funds were
held by Montagu Investment Management
Limited in London.
6. Also appended to the accounts of the
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed
to the political goups in accordance with the
directives issued by the Presidential Committee
(document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as follows:
- 
Federated Group of Christian Demo-
crats and European Democrats;
- 
Unified European Left Group;
- 
Liberal Group;
- 
Socialist Group.
These reports will be considered as an
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly;
they give details of the use of credits included in
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of theAssemblY' yours sincerely,
Hartmut Soeu.
President of the Assembly
Dr. Heinz Giinter Z.lwI,srnc
Bundesrechnungshof
Postfach 10 0433
Berliner Str. 5l
D.6OOO FRANKFURT A.M. I.
I*tter from the Auditor
to the Prcsident of the Assembly
15th Nowmbr 1993
Dear President,
I have the honour to enclose the accounts
of the Assembly of Western European Union for
the financial yeff 1992 together with my
opinion and report on these accounts.
Yours sincerely,
Ernst Hnurn
(Vice-President of the Federal Court of
Accounts, for the President of the
Federal Court of Accounts) Auditor
Sir Dudley Srurrrr,
President of the Assembly of
Western European Union
43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson
75116 PARIS
Report of the Exteraal Aaditor of the Assembly of
Western European Union
on the accoants for the finencial yeu 1992
15th Notcnhr 1993
I have audited the accounts of the
Assembly for the financial year 1992 in
accordance with Article l5 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping.
The final statement of income and
expenditure shows a credit balance of F I 18 248
while the statement of budget authorisations,
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a
saving of F 314.
The difference, i.e. F 117934, shows an
excess of receipts over estimates; receipts
amounted to F 922 934 while the corresponding
estimates amounted to F 805 0@.
The saving in the budget may be
summarised as follows:
Total
credits Total;ftei- .*p"noitur. Balance
transfers
FFF
Head III
Expenditure
on
premises and
equipment 1760710 I 760691 19
Head IV
General
adminis-
trative costs 2 178 ll0 2178087 23
Head V
Other
expenditure 2314417
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Permanent
stalf 16 024 318
Head II
Temporary
staff 3 609 640
Head VI
Premises 172224
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions,
allowances
and social
charges 3 591 975
Total 29 651 394
t6024272 46
3 @9 583 57
23t4399
t72224
3 591 824
29 65r 080
l8
l5l
3r4
270
DOCUMENT 1398
The financial situation compared to that
for previous financial years has declined consid-
erably in terms of saving on expenditure, as
shown in the following table. This is due to the
fact that transfers during the financial year 1992
have brought budget heads almost exactly into
line with actual expenditure. It should be noted
that excessive use of this technique could alter
the nature of the budget authorisation; fur-
thermore, it may be diflicult to identify the
movement of funds away from their original
allocation.
Final statement
of income
and expenditure ,Saving onor-srifbd;6., expenditure
of the financial year
1988+ 6591 + 82t79 - 75588
1989 + 105 I 13 + 42793 + 63 140
l99O +720333 +710837 + 9 496
l99l + 514 471 + 41E 488 + 95 983
1992 + 118248 + 314 +ll7 934
Receipts exceeded estimates in the
budgets for two of the four heads concerned:
Bank interest
Sundry receipts
(social security
rcimbursements)
Sale of publications
Contributions 7%
Difference
between
estimates
and income
Estimates Actual receipts
60 000 160 655
10000 32020
35 000 30 389
700 000
805 000
699 870
922934
There is a credit balance under these
various heads of F 1 17 934 (F 95 983 in l99l).
*
t*
Contributions by member states to the
Assembly's budget increased by 7.601o in 1992,
while the total budget (excluding receipts)
increased by 6.601o. The main causes of the
increase in the budget were expenditure on per-
manent staff(Head I) which - taking account of
credits after transfers - rose by 9.870 and in real
expenditure terms by nearly l3Yo.
The rhythm of the payment of contribu-
tions remained unchanged compared with that
for the previous financial year, as, at the end of
the first half of 1992, 5l% of the total annual
contributions had been paid. This matter has
already been raised in the auditor's report for
the financial year 1991 and represents a trend
which might make management of the
Assembly's budget difficult, particularly during
the first months of the financial year.
I
**
Situation of transfers
between heads in 1992
+-
Expenditure on premises
and equipment I 14 965
Part I:
Operating budget
Head I
Permanent staff
Head II
Temporary stalI
Head III
Head IV
General administrative
costs
Head V
Other expenditure
Head VI
Premises
Part II:
Pensions budget
Head I
Pensions, allowances and
social charges
Total
289 166 246718
60 750 2r5 360
t2r 255
t20250 r77 140
205 120 I 15 703
l l6 385
906 636
30 460
906 636
In accordance with Article 6 of the
Financial Regulations (agreement of the WEU
Council by a letter dated 25th October l99l), no
transfers were made from Head I of the oper-
ating budget (Permanent staff) to Heads II to V.
Positive transfers in 1992 amounted to
F 217 790 as compared with F 207 950 in
1991.
Positive transfers showed an increase
under two heads:
Part I Head V 
- 
Other expenditure
Part II Head I 
- 
Pensions budget
Under Part I Head V, the initial estimate
under Sub-Head 27 had to be supplemented by a
credit of F 160000 (Oflicial journeys by
members of the Offrce of the Clerk); Part II(Pensions) received transfers of F116385,
solely to cover expenditure on old age and inva-
lidity pensions.
Expenses for representation (Head V,
Sub-head 25) were less than the previous
financial year.
Initial Estimate
1990 ..... 230000
l99l ..... 260000
1992 ..... 360 000
Final sum
after transler
266020
399 830
326 245
Expenditure under this sub-head stood at
F 326 242 instead of F 399 828 in l99l - a
decrease of 18.4%.
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Having completed this audit, I thank the
Clerk and staff of the Assembly for their val-
uable cooperation in the exercise of my duties
as Auditor.
Ernst Heurn
(Vice-President of the Federal Court
ofAccounts, for the President
of the Federal Court ofAccounts)
Auditor
Certificate of the Auditor
for the financial yearlst lanuary to 31st December 1992
15th November 1993
In application of Article l5 of the
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of
Western European Union, I have examined the
appended financial statements of the Assembly
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture for the financial year 1992.
My examination included verification of
the books and other relevant documents that I
deemed necessary.
As a result of this examinatiotr, Ey
opinion is that these statements faithfully
record the book-keeping operations for the
financial year and that these operations were
in conformity with the budget estimates, the
Financial Regulations, the financial instruc-
tions and other decisions of the legislative
authority, and that they are a correct record of
the financial situation for the year ended 3lst
December 1992.
Ernst Hrurn
(Vice-President of the Federal Court
of Accounts, for the President
of the Federal Court ofAccounts)
Auditor
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APPENDIX I
Summary of income and expenditure for the linancial year 1992
(in French francs)
Assessments of member states (see Appendix III)
Miscellaneous
(A) Sundry receipts
Bank interest ...
Sundry receipts
Sale of publications ....
(B) Pensions
Contributions (70lo)
Budget credits
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .
Excess of income over expenditure .
Financial position as at 31st December 1992
ASSets
Balance at the bank
Contributions received
Contributions 7Vo
Recoverable taxes
Sums received
Liabilities
Miscellaneous creditors
Sums paid
Excess of income over expenditure .
Sir Dudley Sunu
President of the Assembly
Henri Buncrr.rN
Clerk of the Assembly
28 846 394
160 655
32020
30 389
699 870
922934
29 769 328
29 651 080
F 118248
866 020
l 509 057
L4 280
tt2 273
52 421
F 2554051
823 873
l 6ll 930
l l8 248
2 554 051
Tim RarnsoNr
Chairman of the Committee
on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration
Certilied correct:
Ernst Heurn
(Vice-President of the Federal Court of
Accounts, for the President of thSrfeaera Court of Accounts)
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STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS,
(in
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1992
Hrno I 
- 
PrnuaNexrsrerr
Sub-Head / Basic salaries
Sub-Head 2 Allowances
2.1. Expatriation allowance
2.2. Household allowance
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons
2.4. Rent allowance
2.5. Education allowance
2.6. Allowance for language courses
2.7. Overtime
2.8. Home leave
Sub-Head 3 Social charges
3.1. Social security
3.2. Supplementary insurance
3.3. Provident fund
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of
permanent oflicials
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent oflicials and their families
4.3. Removal expenses
4.4. Installation allowance
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination
ll 110050
tt3 720
530 940
s70 000
60 000
63 000
2 000
5s 000
60 000
562 293
543 000
183 867
lr 000
6s 000
38 000
14 000
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
I
I
i
:
I
i
l
I
t
I
Total of Head I l5 981 870
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Xtl
[o UNUpENDED cREDrrs FoR THE FTNANCIAL yEAR 1992
Jco
+
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
230 900
7 640
4l 835
5 360
3 43t
t0 425
68 395
32 s90
3 3s0
2 000
12985
t0 469
6t 020
6 490
22943
6 69t
9 360
il 340950
103 295
462 545
537 410
56 650
70 640
96 835
47 015
551 824
481 980
189 227
3 43r
4 510
42057
31 309
4 640
l l 340 938
r03 291
462 54t
537 408
56 646
70 636
96 834
47 0t5
55t 822
481 976
r89 226
3 43t
4 510
42056
31 309
4 633
t2
4
4
2
4
4
I
2
4
I
I
289 166 246 7 t8 t6 024 3t8 16 024 272 46
275
DOCUMENT I398
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1992
Hrno II 
- 
fsi,,rp6R{rv 51Arr
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly
6.1. Sittings service
6.2. Interpretation service
6.3. Translation service
6.4. Other services
Sub-Head 7 lnterpretation stafl required for Assembly work between
sesslons
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Oflice of the Clerk
Sub-Head 9 Social charges
9. I . Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters
9.3. Insurance for interpreters
340 000
634 450
921 000
65 000
604 000
s0 000
l0 000
134 040
5 760
Total of Head II 3 764 250
Hreo III 
- 
ExpexprruRE oN pREMIsEs AND EeUIpMENT
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms
Sub-Head l2 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the
Clerk
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of oflice furniture
SuUHead 16 Purchase of reproduction and other oflice equipment
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other
office equipment
540 000
l0 000
587 000
105 000
l5 000
35 000
475 000
Total of Head III t 767 000
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* 
Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
r
I
I
4t 620
19 130
42 100
141 350
I 610
26 390
l 380
l 300
t 230
l 381 620
s92 350
779 650
84 130
602390
23 610
8 620
132 740
4 530
381 619
s92 33s
779 644
84 127
602 383
23 601
8 613
r32 73r
4 530
I
l5
6
3
7
9
7
9
60 750 2t5 360 3 609 640 3 609 583 57
82 345
5 355
4 000
23 26s
93 910
3 690
9 130
t4 525
446090
6 310
669 345
l l0 355
5 870
20 475
4 000
498 265
446 088
6 304
669 34s
l l0 353
s 869
20 472
4 000
498 260
2
6
2
I
3
1 14 965 tzt 255 | 760710 t 760 691 t9
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1992
Hreo IV 
- 
GrNpner ADMrNrsrRATrvE cosrs
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other
offrce supplies
SubHead 20 Printing and publication of documents
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents
Sub-Head 22 Official cars
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges
600 000
287 000
l 50 500
72000
125 000
s00
Total of Head IV 2235 000
Hrao V 
- 
Orxen ExPENDTTURE
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of com-
mittees and rapporteurs
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation
SubHead 26 Committee study missions
Sub-Head 27 Oflicial journeys of members of the Oflice the Clerk
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information
SubHead 30 Expenses for political groups
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere
provided for
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes
210 000
360 000
5 000
s90 000
50 000
445 000
534 000
3 000
28 000
Total of Head V 222s 000
Total 25 973 t20
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Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
t07 570
t2 620
60
87 430
23 660
66 050
707 570
199 570
163 120
48 340
58 950
560
707 566
r99 567
t63 lr2
48 336
58 950
556
4
3
8
4
4
r20 250 177 140 2 178 tto 2 r78 087 23
160 600
29 210
l5 310
69 880
33 7s5
5 000
248
6 820
140 120
326 245
750 600
79 210
444 752
534 000
l8 310
21 180
140 l 19
326242
750 595
79 210
444 7 5t
534 000
l8 304
2L 178
I
3
5
I
6
2
205 120 115 703 2 314 417 2 3r4 399 l8
790 25r 876 176 25 887 195 2s 887 032 t63
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PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budgetfor 1992
A.2. 
- 
Exrnc,onoNARy ExpENDrruRE
Hnno VI 
- 
Pnrursrs
Sub-Head 33 Reorganisation of the building
Sub-Head 33.1 Feasibility study
Sub-Head 33.2 Work on utilities
SubHead 33.3 Prime contractorship
Sub-Head 34 Installation of committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.1 Interpretationequipment
Sub-Head 34.2 Furnishing committee rooms
Sub-Head 34.3 Furnishing corridor
Sub-Head 35 National delegation offices
Sub-Head 35.1 Furniture and other offrce equipment
Sub-Head 35.2 Typewriters
Sub-Head 36 Lounge in the first basement
125 890
46 334
Total of A.2 t72 224
Total of Part I 26 145 344
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Transfers Total aftertransfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
I
l2s 890
46 334
l2s 890
46 334
172224 172224
790 251 876 176 26 059 419 26 059 256 163
28t
DOCUMENT I398
PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budgetfor 1992
Hrno I 
- 
PnusroNs, ALLowANcEs AND socrAl cHARGES
Sub-Head 1
I. I.
1.2.
I ,3,
1.4.
1.5.
2
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
3
Pensions and leaving allowances
Retirement pensions
Invalidity pensions
Survivors' pensions
Orphans' or dependants' pensions
Leaving allowances
Family allowances
Household allowances
Children's and dependants' allowances
Education allowances
Supplementary insurance
Sub-Head
Sub-Head
2762250
399 2s0
58 8s0
133 250
29 450
l6 000
107 000
Total of Head I 3 506 050
Total 29 65t 394
Sir Dudley Surs
President of the Assembly Clerk
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Transfers
+
Total after
transfers
Total
expenditure
Unexpended
credits
70 295
4t 710
50
4 330
140
16 000
14 320
2 832 545
440 960
s8 900
137 580
29 130
92 680
2832 stt
4409r1
58 872
137 551
29 304
92 675
34
49
28
29
6
l l6 385 30 460 359t975 3 591 824 151
906 636 906 636 29 651 394 29 651 080 314
)uncwtN
he Assembly
Tim R.crHsoNE
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Affairs and Administration
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APPENDIX III
Contributbns to the WEU Assembly budget for 1992
F
29 176000
172 224
F
Cancellation of credits A/WEU/BA (93) 2 501 830
1992 budget C-B (91) 17
Brought over from 1991 C-B (92) 7
Sub-total
Nrr Torer
Contributions received for 1992:
3lst January 1992
26th February 1992
3lst March 1992
31st March 1992
30th April 1992
l2th May 1992
l9th June 1992
lSth August 1992
l6th September 1992
7th October 1992
22th December 1992
27th January 1993
Brought over from l99l
Sub-total
Carried over to 1993
Torar PAYMENTs
29 348224
28 846 394
667 t70.66
t 974 210.00
639 964.50
172224.00
3 s47 043.50
2 479 960.00
5 444 411.50
5 819 153.00
3 250 594.00
2 661223.00
668742.N
l 509 056.38
5t4 47t.46
29 348224.00
- 
501 830.00
28 846 394.00
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APPENDIX IV
PROVIDENT FUND
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1992
l.J@9l
Sir Dudley SuIrn
President of the Assembly
Henri BunceuN
Clerk of the Assembly
Tim RerHsoxp
Chairman of the Committee on
Budgetary Alfairs and Administration
in French
Balance brought forward:
Accounts of staff members as at lst January
1992
Contributions of staff members and of the
Assembly of Western European Union
Repayments of loans by staff members
Interest received during the year
F
6 535 440
282 692
108 000
598 692
Withdrawals
Management fees
Accounts of existing staff members as at 3lst
December 1992
Loss on valuation at 31st December 1992
F
20 178
7 008 216
496 430
7 524824 7 524824
EiE
E'z
U
x
Uoo
tdz
-l
t,\o
oo
DOCUMENT I398 APPENDIX V
APPENDIX V
1992 Balance sheet for tlu Unified European Left Group
Surplus at 3lst December 1991
Interest
F
l.
2.
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1992 58 121.00
Liabilitir
Expenditure
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) 2O22L.OO
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) 10 950.00
3. Seminars and meetings ... l0 721.00
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) . 6 g10.00
5. Interpretation costs 5 1g5.00
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) 4 194.00
7. Sundry expenses
II. Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash) .
Total 58 121.00
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
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APPENDIX VI
1992 Balance shea for the Federated Group
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats
Chtistiot lhmocruts
Assas
l. Surplus at 3lst December 1991 (bank accounts, cash).
2. Interest
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1992
Total .
Liobilitics
I. Expenditure
1. Allowance for the Secretariat
2. Estimates for the symposium
3. Representational expenses and travel
Total .
II. Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash) .
Total .
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
Eumpcan Demoorrrs (29 membcn out of 91 Fcd. Gtoup)
Asnts
1. Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash).
2. Interest
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU fot 1992 (29 members) ....
Total .
Liabilirta
Expenditure
1. Secretarial stalf (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
Total .
Surplus at
Total
3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash) .
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
F
47 976.64
t7 4r9.70
141 013.20
206 409.54
39 000.00
80.000.00
51651.20
170 65t.20
35 758.34
206 409.54
F
75 t47.21
3 600.r8
6s 957.80
144 705.19
u.
36 000.00
250.00
30 486.00
66 736.00
7i 969.19
144 705.t9
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APPENDIX VII
1992 Bolonce shm for the Liberal Gruup
Surplus at 3lst December l99l (bank accounts, cash)
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1992
Total
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
l. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings ...
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
7. Sundry expenses
Total .
II. Surplus at 3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)
Total
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
l.
2.
3.
F
6s 020.93
2 419.55
88 654.00
156 094.48
32 840.00
8 400.00
l5 000.00
3 000.00
12200.00
71440.00
84 6s4.48
156 094.48
288
I
{
I
i
APPENDIX VIII DOCUMENT I398
APPENDIX VIII
1992 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group
Surplus at 31st December 1991 (bank accounts, cash).
Interest
Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1992
Total
Liabilities
I. Expenditure
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance)
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ..
3. Seminars and meetings . ..
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) .
5. Interpretation costs
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners)
l.
2.
3.
F
l4l 875.1l
t0 727.90
180 254.00
332 857.01
94 422.00
I 495.00
32 681.20
8 926.00
l4 800 00
l 207.00
t't9 325.8t
332 857.01
7. Sundry
II. Surplus
Total
expenses
at 3lst December 1992 (bank accounts, cash)
Signatures of the Treasurer
and two auditors of the group
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Document 1398 Addendum 16th November 1993
Accounts of the administrwive expenditure of the Assembly
for the financial ymr 1992
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 19921
submitted on behalf
of the Committee on Budgaary Allairs and Administation2
by Mr. Rathbone, Chairman aad Ropporteur
The Assembly,
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1992, together with
the auditor's report, in accordance with Article 17 of the financial regulations,
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his
financial responsibility.
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Rathbone (Chairman); MM. Covi, Redmond (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Alvarez, Antretter,
Biefnot, Branger, Biichler, Curto, Daniel, Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Homs I Ferrct,
Howell (Alternate: Cummings), Jurgens, Maas, Manisco, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gonzalez, MM. Pinto, Pizzo,
Tatarella, Thissen.
N.B. Tre names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Document 1399 16th November 1993
OPINION ON THE BUDGETS OF THE MINISTERHL ORGANS
OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1993 
'
submitted on behalf
of thc Committee on Budgaary Affairs and Administration2
by Mn Bfrchler, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Dnerr RECoMTVGNDATIoN
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union for the
financial year 1993
ExpLnNnronv MsIvIoRANouIu
I. General
II. The budget for transferring the Secretariat-General from London to
Brussels
III. The budget ofthe Secretariat-General for 1993 - Section A
IY. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1993 
- 
Sections B, C and D
V. The budget of the Secretariat-General for 1993 - Section E
YI. The budget of the Institute for Security Studies for 1993
YII. The budget of the WEU Satellite Centre for 1993
MII. Action taken on Assembly Recommendation 521
AppeuorcEs
I. Funding table for transfer expenditure
II. Summary of estimated expenditure and income of the Secretariat-
General for 1993
III. l. Organogam of the Secretariat-General
2. Establishment of the Secretariat-General
IV. WEU budget estimates flor 1993 
- 
Proposed expenditure and
income
Y. Table of establishment of the Institute for Security Studies
VI. Recapitulatory table of estimated exenditure and receipts of the
Institute for Security Studies for 1993
VII. Summary of estimated expenditure and income of the WEU Satellite
Centre for 1993
VIII. Table of establishment of the WEU Satellite Centre
IX. Extract from document AS/Bud (44) 20 * Activities of the Adminis-
tration and staff policy at the Council of Europe h 1992"
X. Assembly Recommendation 521 and reply of the Council
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
2. Members of the committee: Mn Rathbone (Chairman) ; MM. Covi, Redmond (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Alvarez, Antretter,
Biefnot, Branger, Biichler, Curto, Daniel, Dimmer, Mrs. Durrieu, Mr. Eversdijk, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Homs I Ferret,
Howell (Alternate: Cummings), Jurgens, Maas, Manisco, Masson, Meyer zu Bentrup, Mrs. Moreno Gorlzalez, MM. Pinto, Pizzo,
Tatarella, Thissen.
N.B. Tfte names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
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Draft Recommendation
on the badgets ol the ministcrial oryaw of Wcstert Eampcan Unioa
lor thc finarcial ycar I99i
The Assembly,
(il Considering that:
(a) the Council has communicated to the Assembly the budget relating to the transfer of the
Secretariat-General from Iondon to Brussels and the budgets of the ministerial organs for
the financial year 1993;
(b) the installation of the Secretariat-General and the Planning Cell in Brussels was accom-
panied by an increase of eleven in the number of staff of the Secretariat-General and the
creation of three grade B posts in the Planning Cell;
(c) the operating budget of the Planning Cell is included in the budget of the Secretariat-General
as Section E;
(d) the Director of the WEU Planning Cell, unlike the other subsidiary organs, does not have full
responsibility for managing the budget of the Cell;
(e) the Torrej6n Satellite Centre is still in the organisational stage and is not fully opera-
tional;
(J) the Director of the Centre has asked for authorisation to enter into multi-annual expenditure
commitments to complete this organisational stage;
@) the study of financing the pension scheme for permanent staff has not yet been com-
pleted;
(h) the affrliation of permanent staffof the_Paris organs with the French social segurity.system is
proving very expensive, whereas the OECD has already adopted a private sickness insurance
scheme that costs far less and the study conducted by the Council of Europe on the subject at
first sight confirms the interest of this private insurance scheme;
(y' furthermore, such a private insurance scheme has been adopted by the Secretariat-General
for staff in Brussels as it had done for stalf in London,
Rrcouurups rHAT rnr CouNclr,
1. Inform the Assembly of any subsequent changes in the organograms of the WEU ministerial
organs;
2. Ask the WEU Budget and Organisation Committee to examine, in the framework of its responsi-
bilities and as it did for the ministerial organs, the changes to the organogram of the Offrce of the Clerk
of the Assembly proposed in the 1994 budget;
3. Consider the expediency of separating the budget of the Planning Cell from that of the
Secretariat-General and make its Director responsible for managing it;
4. Take every possible step to make the Torrej6n Satellite Centre fully operational and, in this
context, authorise the Director of the Centre to enter into multi-annual expenditure commitments
where necessary;
5. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the study of the financing of the pension scheme;
6. Study the possibility of adopting a private sickness insurance scheme for WEU staffin Paris as it
did for staff in Brussels.
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I. General
l. According to Article VIII (c) of the
Charter of the Assembly, * the Assembly shall
express its views in the form of an opinion or
recommendation on the annual budget of
Western European Union as soon as it has been
communicated ".
2. The present report has been prepared in
application of this provision and relates to the
budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU for
1993 and the special budget by which the
transfer of the seat of the Secretariat-General
from London to Brussels was financed. The
latter budget spans the financial years 1992 and
1993 and, insofar as it refers to requirements
stemming from this transfer, is a link between
the budgets for those two years.
3. The report on the budgets of the minis-
terial organs is usually presented to the
Assembly at the first part-session. This is not the
case for the present report, which is being pre-
sented at the autumn session because of the
Council's delay in sending the relevant docu-
ments to the Assembly.
4. The transfer from London to Brussels
increased the complexity of the activities of the
Council and its Secretariat-General at a time
when post-Maastricht events were not mea-
suring up to the optimistic forecasts about the
implementation of the European Union. How-
ever, the process that should lead to the creation
of that Union not having been called in
question, WEU must adapt its actions to the
new European security context which has been
deeply marked by the Bosnian drama.
5. In this uncertain political context, the
WEU budgets for the current financial year
cannot be considered from the standpoint of
whether the organisation and its means are ade-
quate for the aims to be attained. Your
Rapporteur will therefore conline himself to an
analysis of these budgets that might provide a
basis for reflection for the political bodies.
II. The budga for the tansfer
of the Secrctariat-General
from London to Brussels
6. Document C-B (92) 15 (Annex I) contains
estimated expenditure relating to the transfer of
the Secretariat-General to Brussels, i.e.:
- 
in 1992 BF 101.36 million and
f858 870;
Explanatory Memorandum
(submiued by Mr. Bichh4 Rqprteu)
- 
in 1993: BF 84.10 million and f37 800.
7. These estimates are broken down by cat-
egory. In Chapter A. I, personnel costs are calcu-
lated on the basis of indemnities for loss of job
to be paid to officials who did not wish to move
to Brussels (seven officials with contracts of
indefinite duration and fifteen with fixed-term
contracts). They also take into account removal
expenses, installation allowances and expatri-
ation allowances for staff qualifying for this
because of their transfer to Brussels and also the
cost of keeping four oflicials in London (one
grade A and three grade B) to ensure continuity
of work and to avoid any intemrption in the
administration of the Secretariat-General.
8. Chapter A. II, Travel, contains estimates
for travelling costs to Brussels for staff respon-
sible for finding premises for the new seat, while
expenditure corresponding to the initial man-
agement of the building in the rue de la Rdgence
and to the move from London are set out in
Chapter A. III and the cost of purchasing certain
equipment in Chapter A. IV.
9. Finally, the costs of carrying out work to
adapt the building to meet the necessary security
requirements were included in the transfer
budget. They amount to BF 35.44 million.
10. In the pensions budget, a sum off 283 400
was authorised for the payment of leaving allow-
ances or pensions, whichever was appropriate,
to officials who did not move to Brussels with
the Secretariat-General.
11. It should be pointed out that the instal-
lation of the Secretariat-General raises a twofold
problem connected, on the one hand, with the
termination of the lease on the former seat in
London and, on the other hand, with the
long-term use of the building where the new seat
is located since it would appear that the owner
of the latter has made a proposal to sell it.
Solving these problems will inevitably have
financial implications which do not appear in
the transfer budget. The question might there-
fore have to be tackled when the budgets for
future financial years are examined.
III. The budget of the Secretariat-General
for 199i - Sectioa A
12. The budget of the Secretariat-General for
1993 has five sections, the fourth (space studies)
and the fifth (Planning Cell) having been added
to the three in previous budgets. They should be
examined separately.
293
DOCUMENT 1399
13. Section A is specifically devoted to the
expenditure of the Secretariat-General. Your
Rapporteur has noted that the latter's budget
was examined very closely by the WEU Budget
and Organisation Committee which was able to
recommend that the Council approve it only in
March 1993 after several meetings held between
November 1992 and February 1993. However,
that committee considered it necessary to intro-
duce a procedure for revising budget estimates
at the end of the first half of 1993 (mid-way
review) to allow a subsequent study of these esti-
mates on the basis of experience, particularly
those relating to the creation of new posts.
14. As shown in the recapitulatory table at
Appendix II, the net total of the operating
budget of the Secretariat-General amounts to
BF 259 745090, i.e. a growth rate of 76.8390
compared with 1992. The net grand total (oper-
ating budget plus pensions budget) amounts to
BF 286 610090, i.e. an increase of 68.0690.
15. In view of this increase, the Secretariat-
General gave the following details in document
B (93) 3 Revised, Part II, paragraphs 4, 10, I I
and 12:
" 4. The seat of the Council and of the
Secretariat-General was transferred to
Brussels early in January 1993. The
budget for 1993 has been prepared on the
basis of existing policies, but the move to
Brussels has had a considerable impact
upon its compilation. While all aspects of
the budget have been affected by this to
some degree or other, the principal impact
is upon 'Operating costs'. These are sub-
stantially affected by the very large
increase in costs relating to the new oflice
accommodation when compared with
London. "
* 10. Chapter A.I, Personnel costs
(Secretariat-General), reflects an increase
(see CR (92) 27 and list at Annex C) in the
number of posts on the establishment for
1993. It also includes the one A2 post
which was approved earlier (C-B (92) 12)
to be responsible for the administrative,
budgetary and accounting functions ofthe
Planning Cell.'
" I l. The provision in Chapter II, Travel,
formerly (B (92) 35 and B (93) 3) reflected
higher air fares in Brussels as well as the
Secretary-General's proposal to increase
the 1992 provision for 'other journeys'
by l0Yo in real terms to cover increased
WEU activity. It now reflects the 'across
the board' reduction (BF I 319 000)
made by the Budget Committee at its
150th meeting (BR (92) 7) and a further
reduction made by the Secretariat for
travel to Luxembourg from Brussels by
train only. "
" 12. Chapter A.III, Operating costs, has
increased substantially compared with
1992. This is entirely due to the cost of
renting and running the new building in
Brussels. The increase in Chapter IV,
Capital purchases, is due to the provision
for a new oflicial car for the Secretary-
General although the Budget Committee
may wish to consider the option of a
leasing contract instead. Chapter A-V
contains token sums to cover minor con-
tingencies for adjustments to fire precau-
tions and to possible security improve'
ments which might prove necessary from
experience in the new building in the
course of 1993. These three chapters also
now include the amendments made in
BR (92) 7. "
16. The revision of the organogram has been
done progressively. The latest proposals were
submitted to the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee for the mid-way review on 3fth August
1993.
17. The organog;ram at Appendix III.l
includes these proposals, which have not all
been accepted. Compared with 1992, the 1993
table of establishment, as approved by the
Budget and Org;anisation Committee, shows the
creation of eleven new posts (four grade A, 2
grade B and 5 grade C) and the regrading of a
number of posts in the previous organogram.
The most important changes are due to the
strengthening of the Political Division by the
creation of a Security Policy Section and a
Defence Policy Section and to the separation of
financial tasks from administrative tasks,
entrusted respectively to a Financial Section
under the direct authority of the Deputy Secre-
tary-General and to a series of administrative
services under the authority of the Head of
Administration.
18. The reasons for separating financial tasks
from more specifically administrative tasks 
-
this separation having led to the creation of
three new posts (one grade A and two grade B)
can be understood only in terms of the need to
ensure more effective internal control and as a
response to the principle of incompatibility
between these tasks.
19. Your Rapporteur cannot comment on this
matter but he must point out that the organo-
gram does not reveal all the administrative
tasks. For instance, there is no reference to stalf
administration. One has to refer to the
description of the post of Head of the Adminis-
trative Division, annexed to documentB (92) 37
Addendum, to see that he is also responsible for
this task. Clearly it will be for the relevant
bodies of the Secretariat-General to verifu the
precision of the new organogram and to make
any changes that may be necessary.
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20. It should also be pointed out that, while
the new organogram includes some significant
changes, it was studied in depth by the Budget
and Organisation Committee without the latter
asking, as has been the case in the past, for a
study to be made by outside experts. It has
therefore assumed its responsibilities by acting
within the framework of its institutional compe-
tence. The Assembly can but be gratified and
hope that the same procedure will be followed
when its.proposal for. the reorganisation of its
own services are considered.
21. Finally, it will be seen that the major
changes to the organogram of the Secretariat-
General have only limited implications for the
1993 budget since recruitment for the new posts
has been effected gradually throughout the year.
This will not be so next year as the 1994 budget
will be affected by the implications of the new
posts for the whole year.
IY, The budga of the Secretafiat-General
for 1993 Sections B, C and D
22. Sections B, C and D of the budget of the
Secretariat-General call for no special comment.
The first section sets out the implications of the
Secretariat-General assuming responsibility for
the payment of pensions to retired staff of the
former ministerial organs in Paris. These pen-
sions represent a sum of FF 11 341 346 in the
budget (see Appendix IV), i.e. an increase of 870
compared with the previous year.
23. Section C contains the operating budget
of the Agency for the Control of Armaments
whose seat is still in Paris. The sum of
FF 828 428 (see Appendix IV) covers the salary
of a permanent grade A oflicial with control
duties, the cost of his oflicial journeys and
expenditure on information.
24. Section D includes 2.5 m. ecus(t1754 597) allocated by the Council for the
second stage of the study on medium- and
long-term space co-operation. It should be
pointed out that the first stage of this study was
financed partly by the WEU budget (4.5 m. ecus
or f,3 151 800), expenditure relating to members
ofthe study group being borne by the respective
countries, and that the Council of Ministers, at
its meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992,
decided to carry over to the financial year 1993
outstanding credits (f,l344 974) remaining after
deduction of the cost of the first stage, i.e.[l 806 826.
YI. The budget of the Secrutafiat-General
for 199i Section E
25. In 1993, for the first time, the budget of
the Secretariat-General includes a Section E
showing estimates for operating the Planning
Cell that the Council of Ministers decided to set
up in Petersberg on l9th June 1992 (see
Appendix IV).
26. The Cell, which became operational in
1993, was given an establishment of forty
persons 
- 
thirty-five military and five civilians.
Only three of the latter are covered by WEU's
own budget, the othdrs being financed directly
by their own countries.
27. This being so, the Cell's budget for 1993
provides the sums necessary to pay the salaries
of three oflicials (one grade B4, one grade 83
and one grade 82) and to allow the Cell to
operate during the year. The breakdown is as
follows: BF 6 845 000 under Chapter E. I, Per-
sonnel costs, BF 4 000 000 (of which BF
2000000 are blocked) under Chapter E. II,
Travel, BF 19 796250 under Chapter E. III,
Other operating costs, and BF 285 000 under
Chapter E. IV, Purchases. With particular
regard to Chapter E. III, it is interesting to note
that there is a sum of BF 13237 250 corre-
sponding to the Cell's share in the cost of renting
and managing the building in which it has its
seat.
28. For the mid-way review of 30th August
1993, which also took into account the budget of
the Planning Cell, the Director drew the Budget
and Organisation Committee's attention to the
provisional and approximate nature of estimates
in this budget which have, moreover, proved
insufficient. They were worked out at a time
when neither the tasks nor the working condi-
tions of the Cell were really known and it was
thus impossible to base them on experience.
29. The value of these arguments must not be
disregarded. While recognising that the work of
any organ must be progxammed within the
limits of the budget earmarked for this purpose,
it is once these limits have been fixed that needs
must be assessed so as not to be detrimental to
the essential work of the organ concerned. The
Assembly wishes this criterion to be borne in
mind when the next budget of the Planning Cell
is prepared.
30. The Director of the Planning Cell also
raised the problem of his responsibility for man-
aging the budget of the Cell which seems to be in
the category of a subsidiary organ of WEU
within the meaning of Article VIII of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. In this connection, the
Budget and Organisation Committee, dealing
with this question, gave the following details on
28th June 1993:
* With the exception of Chapter III,
which remains the responsibility of the
Head of Administration, the responsi-
bility and the decision-making of the
Planning Cell budget lay with the Director
of the Planning Cell, who has to comply
with the existing flrnancial regulations,
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remaining within the approved budget.
The r6le of the Secretariat-General con-
sists in the financial control of the exe-
cution of the budget in respecting the
existing regulations, maintaining the bank
accounts and ordering the payments as
well as keeping of the financial records.
Article 6 of the Financial Regulations
would have to be amended accordingly.(ROle of the Director, Planning Cell.)
Finance Section will circulate a pro-
posal. "
31. It is to be hoped that the opinion thus
expressed by the Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee is not considered final and that the condi-
tions for managing the Cell's budget can be
reconsidered in the interest of the service.
l/1. The budga of the Institute
for Security Stadies
32. After two years' work, it was possible to
assess the needs of the Institute for Security
Studies with some degree of accuracy. In pre-
senting the budget for 1993, the Director of the
Institute said the Institute had reached a stage in
its operational development that meant the
resources available to him for 1992 had been
found to be too limited. He had therefore had
to ask for an increase in the staff of the Insti-
tute with the addition of three new posts (one
grade A research fellow as from lst July 1993,
one grade B bookkeeper and another grade B
bilingual shorthand typist at the beginning of the
year), the regrading of a grade B 4 post to B 5
and an increase in estimates for other operating
costs.
33. The WEU Budget and Organisation Com-
mittee did not endorse the proposals concerning
the organogmm of the Institute (see Appendix
V) in which only minor changes were made com-
pared with the previous year.
34. Conversely, an increase of 10.619o was
granted under Chapter II, Travel. The increase
of 10.52% under Chapter III, Other operating
costs, does not take into account the additional
sums granted to the Institute in 1992 for activ-
ities assigned to it in relation to Central and
Eastern European countries.
35. Sums approved under the other chapters
of the budget correspond to the normalisation of
the management of the Institute's affairs.
36. The operating budget of the Institute for
1993 as a whole (see table at Appendix VI)
shows a growth rate of 8.72o/o compared with the
ordinary budget for 1992. Your Rapporteur has
no comment to make on this subject.
YII. The budga of the WEU Satellite Centre
37. When presenting the budgets of the minis-
terial organs of WEU for 1992 to the Assembly
on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary
Affairs and Administration, the Rapporteur said
that the budget of the WEU Satellite Centre was
in the process of being examined by the Council
and that it could be taken into account only
when the next report was presented.
38. The figures for 1992 set out in the table
comparing the 1992 and 1993 budgets (see
Appendix VII) show that work is only just
beginning as can be seen in particular from the
fact that only some of the stalf shown on the
organogram had been recruited. The initial
remarks that accompanied the budget proposals
for 1993 mention this situation:
* The main reason for the reduction in the
pace of establishing the Centre has been
the delay, currently of four months, in
taking the decision of which consortia
should be selected to supply the initial
operational equipment for the Centre. As
a consequence the Director has delayed
the appointment of most of the staff. In
addition it has not been essential to move
the staff who have been appointed from
the temporary accommodation being pro-
vided at Torrej6n by INTA into the refur-
bished building on the Spanish air base
until all building work is complete. "
39. Hence one should refer directly to the
1993 budget, although a comparison with esti-
mates for the previous financial year allow an
idea to be obtained of the evolution of the
process of making the Satellite Centre opera-
tional.
40. In 1993, the Centre should have recruited
most of the staff (see Appendix VIII) shown on
its organogram. The recruitment of these staff,
which is being done gradually, will certainly, at
the end of the year, lead to savings under
Chapter I, Personnel @sts, to which the
Director of the Centre referred in the mid-term
review on 30th August 1993. The other chapters
of the budget, whose structure is in conformity
with those of the budgets of the other ministerial
organs, call for no comment.
41. However, it should be stressed that there
is a peculiarity in the management of the Sat-
ellite Centre that its Director pointed out in his
mid-term report:
* The Satellite Centre will frequently need
to enter into multi-year commitments or
place a contract in one year with the
majority of the expenditure falling in a
later year. A particular case has arisen
regarding the need to place a contract
for the maintenance and support for the
operational equipment currently being
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installed in the Centre. It is now apparent
that to achieve a smooth transition
between the procuement phase which
ends in December 1993 and the support
phase, the contract will need to be in place
before the end of 1993 and before the
1994 budget is approved. As this situation
was not foreseen when the 1993 budget
was prepared, a request for approval in
accordance with Article 4d of the
Financial Regulations of WEU was not
includedr. However, expenditure on
maintenance in the later years of the
experimental phase has been foreseen in
all estimates of completing the phase
within the ceiling budget. "
42. The Centre's request to the Budget and
Organisation Committee to be authorised
to commit expenditure in L993 of up to
150 million pesetas for each of the financial
years 1994 and 1995 for maintenance and
support for its equipment and software therefore
seem justified.
YIII. Action talen on Assembly
Recommtndation 521
43. In adopting Recommendation 521 (see
Appendix X), the Assembly recommended that
the Council:
* l. Give the Secretariat-General the
wherewithal to exercise its activities
during a period which, although transi-
tional, is no less important and
complex;
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural
changes that are envisaged on the
occasion ofthe transfer ofthe Secretariat-
General to Brussels and of the measures
taken in respect of staff not wishing to be
transferred;
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions
taken in regard to staff policy in the
framework of the co-ordinated organisa-
tions, particularly in respect of the
flrnancing of the pension scheme. "
M. In its reply to this recommendation, the
Council gave an assurance that the first two
points would be examined in a constructive
spirit. On the financing of the pension scheme,it said this was still being studied by the
Co-ordinating Committee on Remunerations(ccR).
l. According to this article, 'Items of expenditure involving
the commitment of funds for more than one financial year
shall be annotated and the expected incidence ofthe expend-
iture for each financial year shown separately ".
45. Analysis of the Secretariat-General's
budget has allowed your Rapporteur to note that
the Council has indeed tried to give that body
the wherewithal to exercise its activities during
the transfer of its seat from London to Brussels
and.in the subsequent stage of reorganising its
servlces.
46. The question of the financing of the
pension scheme, however, is still just as
important. The Assembly wishes to be informed
ofthe conclusions ofthe study being conducted
on this question.
47. In the context ofstaffpolicy, the problem
of the social security illness coverage for per-
manent staff serving in France is worthy of
mention. They are currently insured by a joint
system in which the French social security
system intervenes first (in accordance with the
agreement between the Government of the
French Republic and WEU on the application of
French social security legislation to staff
employed by that organisation in France with
subsequent complementary intervention by a
private insurance company, the AGF.
48. At present, this system costs:
(a) Frcnch social security cover: 20.75%
of basic salaries (6.800/o by the staff
member and 13.95% by the
employer);
(D/ complementary insurance cover:
4.8090 of total salaries (1.600/o by the
staff member and 3.2Wo by the
employer).
49. Your Rapporteur has been informed that
the OECD has already tackled the same
question and, as from lst January 1993, intro-
duced a private insurance scheme after termi-
nating its convention with the French Gov-
ernment. The Council of Europe has also carried
out a study of the same subject (see document
AS/Bud (44) 20). On the basis of the OECD's
experience and in accordance with the con-
clusion of the Council of Europe study, it may
be estimated that WEU could change to a
private insurance scheme which would cost a
global premium of about 8 to 100/o of total remu-
nerations. The significant savings that this
would involve for staff and the organisation are
quite clear.
50. It is interesting to note that such a private
insurance scheme had already been adopted for
staff in London and is now in force for staff in
Brussels. Contributions to this scheme now
amount to 8.53190 of total remunerations. There
is thus definite interest in carrying out an
in-depth study of this problem in consultation
and in agreement with the staff. The Assembly
wishes to be kept informed of the action taken
on this matter.
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1992: Funds to be called in
1993: Funds to be called in
APPENDIX I
Funding table for transfer *pcnditurc
1992 for lst January 1993
1993
t992 l 993 Total
BF f BF t BF E
Chapter I
Personnel Costs
Chapter II
Travel
million
(a) t6.62
(c) 27.20
22.t0
35.44
57t 270
l7 000
25 000
(a 24s600
million
(b) 12.4s
71.65
37 800
million
29.07
98.8s
22.10
35.44
57 t 270
17 000
25 000
283 400
Chapter III
Other Operating
Costs
Chapter IV
Capital Purchases
Chapter V
Buildings
Chapter A.I.A.
Pensions
Torlr 101.36 858.870 84.10 37 800 1E5.46 896 670
Notes (a/ Includes BF 1.8 m for expatriation allowances, BF 8.8 m installation allowances, BF 5.52 m consultants and BF 0.5
overlap of stalf - BF 16.62 m.(b) Balaaoe of expatriation allowances (i.e. BF 14.25 m less BF 1.8 m)(c/ Rent first quarter 1993 : BF 18.2 m 1
Service charges fint quarter 1993 : BF 6.0 m I BF 27.2 mInsurance annual pre-payment : BF 3.0 m )('/ 
Hil,tlfr'lowances r,rst quarter ree3 ; f'il 333 ) ez+s ooo
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APPENDIX II
Summary of estimated *penditure and income
of the Secretariat-General for 1993
Expenditure
/income
l99l
Credits
approved
for 1992 (a)
Credits
proposed
for 1993
Difference
between 1993
and 1992
Expenditure
Personnel costs ....
Travel
Other operating costs
Purchases
Buildings
(BF) (BF) (BF) (%)
292s 963
91 705
339 225
28 329
7 067
186 016 327
6 686 640
22703 492| 421 237
88 800
236 107 940
4 574000
96 815 250
2 438 000
60 000
50091 613
- 
2 rt2 640
74 ttr 758
l 016 763
- 
28 800
26.93
- 
31.59
326.43
7t.54
- 
32.43
Toral. 3 392289 216 916 496 339 995 190 123078 694 56.74
Income
WEU tax
Other receipts
t 073 826
59 410
68 458 880
1 568 800
'18729 000
I 521 100
t0 270 120
- 
47 700
15.00
- 
3.04
Tornr. | 133 236 70027 680 80 250 100 10222 420 14.60
Net ror.lr, 22s9 053 146 888 816 259 74s 090 tt2 856 274 76.83
Pensions 408 435 23 656 320 26 865 000 3 208 680 13.56
Tornr. 2667 488 r70 545 136 286 610 090 tr6 064 954 68.06
B (e2)
Page
l4
13
c-B (91) ls
B (e2) t2
c-B (e3) l
Note fal Includes amounts brought forward from 1992 (B (92) l2).
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1. Organogram of the Secretariat-General
ru
E
E'z
U
X
(,oo
Secretary-General
Deplty Scretary G-eneral
SG's PA DSG's PA84 B4
Assistant A2l3
Secretary B 3t4
Division Assistant 84
Head LT5
English Section
Keviser trTzt-
Translator LT3
French Section
ZEenslebrs trT3 (*)
Translators LT2 1*x;I Sec. Ass. Termin. B4
3 Secretaries B2l3l4
(*) One to be promoted LT4
when need arises.
(**) Vacant, frozen, to be
filled if necessary after mid-
term review.
tt
i rsPG 1**y ittL------------J
(*) New posts - to be requested at mid-term review.(**) The incumbents are paid nationally and are with WEU on a temporary basis, without prejudging the establishment plan.
Uoo
tnz
-{
t,\o\()
lU
'oif,,z
U
X
Press and Information
Head N4
Translation DepartmentSection
A3t4
Azt3
Assistant
Administration
t,o
Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General
Head of Division A5 (**)
Assistant B4l5
Secretary B2l3l4
Secretarial pool
7 B2l3l4 +
I B2t3t4 (*)
Head of Finance Section A3l4
Deputy Head of Finance Section A2l3
Chief Accountant AA3
Accountant 84
Secretary/shortland typist B2l3l4
Head of Communications, General Services,
Registry and Security
A2t3
Security
10
c2t3t4 (1)
Communication
tB3t4
Telephonists
2BA3
Registry
B 4t5
Archives
tB 3t4 (*)
Maintenance
1 Gen. purpose man
c3t4t5
Reproduction
2B 2t3
General Services
2 Messengers Cll2l3
2 Drivers C2l3l4
Storekeeper Inventory Bookkeeper
B4t5
(*) New posts to be requested during mid-term review.
(**) I-egal adviser
(l) Two guards at present hired from SECURITAS.
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U
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U
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APPENDIX III
2. Establishment of the Secraadat-General
Function t992 Yariations in 1993 t993
Secretary General
Deputy's"crit".y d;;;;"]' :
SG'S Personal Asst.
DSG's Personal Asst. .....
I. Policy Division
Director
HG
HG
B4
B4
A6
B3t4
B4
Azt3
A2t3
A3t4
Azt3
A4t5
Azt3
A3t4
LT.5
w.4
LT.3
LT.3
LT.2
A4
B5
B3
+ A3l4
+ A3l4
+ A3l4
+B2l3l4
+B2l314
+B2l314
+B2l314
HG
HG
B4
B4
A6
B3t4
B4
A3t4
A2t3
A3t4
Azt3
A3t4
Azt3
A4t5
A3t4
Azt3
A4
LT.5
LT.4
LT.3
LT.3
LT.3 +
Bzt3t4
Bzt3t4
B2t3t4
B2t3t4
A/5 +
B5
B2l3t4
Secretarw
Asst. of Division ....
Security Policy Section
Head of section .... .
Assistent
Defence Policy Section
Head of section .....
Assistant
Policy planning Section
Head of section
Assistnnf
II. Council/Executive Secretariat
Head
Deputy Head
Assistant ----
III. Press & Information
Head
IV. Translation Department
Head
Reviser/Translator
Translator
Translator
Translator
Seerefarv
Secrefe
Secretarv
Sec/Asst. (Terminology)
V. Administration
Head of division
Assistant
Secretarw
'Regrading.
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Function t992 Variations in 1993 1993
General Services
Head of General Services
Documentation (Registry)
Commnnieetion
A2
B4
B3t4
92
92
BI
BI
C3
c2
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
C3
Bzt3t4
B2t3t4
Bzt3t4
B2t3t4
Bzt3t4
Bzt3t4
Bzt3t4
B2t3t4
Bzt3t4
Bzt3t4
Bzt3
A3l4
A2
B4
+C3l415
+C2l3l4
+C2l3l4
+C2l3l4
+ C2l3l4
-B2t3t4
-B2t3t4
-B2t3t4
-82t3
+ A2l3
+8415
+8213
A2l3*
B4l5*
B3t4
B2l3*
B2l3*
B2t3*
B2l3*
czt3
c2l3*
c3l4*
c3l4*
c3l415
c2l3l4*
c2t3l4*
c2t3t4*
c2t3l4*
czt3t4*
czt3t4*
czl3l4
czl314
c2t3t4
czl314
Bzt3t4
Bzt3t4
B3t3t4
B2l3t4
B2t3t4
Bzt314
Bzt3t4
A3l4
A2t3
A2l3*
B4
B4t5
B2t3
f,l cnrnrlrretion
Renrodrrction
Telenhnnisfs
Telenhonists
Messenger/Stock-Keeper
Messenser
I)ri
I)river
General Purnose
Security Service
Senrrrifw (herds
Seeuritv Grrards
Seerrrifv (hrards
Senrrrifv (}rard
Seer ritv Guards
Secrrrifv Gnards
Seerrritw f}rerrls
Seeurifv Grrards
Secrrrifv Grrards
Senrrrifw (}rqrds
Secretariat Semice
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Secretaries (POOL)
Finance Section
Elecd nf Seefinn
Chief Accountant PC
Chief Accountant SG
Accountant
Sfnrekeener
Seerefarv
Torar. supr' 53 + ll 64
303
* Regrading.
DOCUMENT 1399 APPENDIX IV
APPENDIX IV
llEU budga estimata for 1993
Pmposed erpenditure and income
* BF 2 000 000 blockedtt BF I 200000 blocked and BF I Ol5 000 frozen.
**r Thesurplusonthel99lSecretariat-GeneralbudgetisinSterling. Itamountsto2l33T2.Itisreturnabletomemberstatesin
1993. Special arrangements will be made for its return separately.
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Section A
Brussels
Section B
EX.PMO
Paris
Section C
ACA
Paris
Section D
Space
Studies
Section E
Planning
Cell
(BF) (F) (F) I (BF)
Expenditure
Personnel costs
Travel
236 107 940
4 s74 000
96 815 2s0
** 2 438 000
60 000
0
0
0
0
0
t 240200
14 500
2 500
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6 84s 000
* 4 000 000
t9 796 250
285 000
0
Other operating costs
Purchases
Buildings
Torer
Income
WEU tax
Other receipts
Torar
Nrr rorer
Net pensions ... ....
Tnrar
339 995 190 0 t 2s7 200 0 30 926 zso
78 729 004
1 521 100
0
0
413 600
0
0
0
2236000
174 000
80 250 100 0 413 600 2 410 000
259 745 090 0 843 600 28 516 250
26 865 000 rt 474000 0
- 
224000
+* 286 610 090 tt 474000 843 600 t 754 597 + 28 292 250
Budget surplus l99l (-)(B (e2) 14 P.5)
Net contributions 1993
Difference:(a) 1993 total compared
with approved 1992
budget C-B (91) 15 and
including credits brought
forward to 1992(B (e2) t2)
(b) 1993 total compared
with approved 1992
budget C-B (91) l5;
excluding credits
brought forward
to 1992(B (e2) t2\
*** 42 654 l5 172
286 610 090 tr 431 346 828 428 1754597 28292250
+ 6890 + 890 + 13.60/o
+ 69Vo + 8o/o + l3.6Vo
APPENDIX V DOCUMENT 1399
APPENDIX V
Table of utablhhment
of the Institute for Securiry Stadies
Post No. Grad{s) of Post Function
ISS 3NS4
ISS 5
ISS 6
ISS 24
ISS 7
ISS 8
ISS 9
NS IO
ISS II
ISS 12
ISS 13
ISS 14
ISS 15
ISS 16
ISS 17
ISS 18
ISS 19
ISS 20
ISS 2I
ISS 22
ISS 23
ISS I
ISS 2
H.G.
B.4
(proposed for
regrading to 85)
A.ztA.3tA.4
A.2lA.3lA.4
A.ztA.3tA.4
A.ztA.3lA.4
A.ztA.3tA.4
B.3/B.4
B.3/B.4
B.3lB.4
A.4tA.5
L.3tL.4
L.3lL.4
B.4
B.4/B.5
8.4
B.3
B.4 *
c.4
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
c.3
Director
Assistant to the Director
Research Fellow
Research Fellow
Research Fellow
Research Fellow
Research Fellow
AssistanUShorthand typist
Assistant/Shorthand typist
Assistant/Shorthand typist
Head of Administrative Services
Translator/Interpreter
Translator/Interpreter
Administrative Assistant/Shorthand typist
Book-keeper
Information assistant
Chief Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Security Guard
Switchboard operator
Technical and administrative assistant (building
general services)
and
New post requested
ISS 25 *r,
ISS 26
ISS 27
A.ztA.3tA.4
B.2tB.3
B.ztB.3
Research Fellow
Shorthand typist
Book-keeper II
. Graded B.5 in a personal capacity.
*. As from lst July 1993.
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APPENDIX VI
Recapitulatory table of atimtted *pcnditure and receip*
of the WEU Institute for Secufity Studies for 1993(amounts and percentages in braclcets take into account the supplementary budget for 1992)
Expenditure/
in l99l
Credits
approved
for 1992
Credits
approved
for 1993
Difference
between 1993 and 1992
(F) (F) (F) (F) (%)
Expenditure
Personnel costs
Travel
t2 924 088
235 622
t 225 915
642904
199 575
t 364 067
t4 624000
330 000
r 900000
2 400 000
780 000
140 000
I s02 100
l6 ts1 7N
365 000
100 0002
814 000
100 000
l 553 000
l 533 700
35 000
200 000
- 
300 000
34 000
- 
40 000
s0 900
+ 10.48
+ 10.61
+ 10.52
+ 12.5
+ 4.35
- 
28.06
+ 3.39
Operating costs specific to the
Institrrfe
Purchases
Share of the Institute in joint
expenditure on the premises ..
Total t6 592 t7t 19 276 t00
t9 776 r00
2l 089 700 l 813 600
l 313 600
+ 9.4t
6.64+
Income
WEII tax 4 605 583
202 695
5 171 000
120 000
s 774700
l l0 000
603 700
- 
l0 000
+ 11.67
8.33Other receipts
Total 4 808 278 5 291 000 5 884 700 593 700 + 11.22
Operating net I I 783 893 13 985 100
l4 485 100
l5 205 000 I 219 900
719 900
+ 8.72
4.97+
Pensions
Expenditure .
Receints
77 729
419 801 441 000
882 300
509 300
882 300
68 300
Total 342072 441 000 {,- 373 000
- 
814 000
' To be borne by the special account opened for this purpose.
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APPENDIX VII
Summary of atimated expenditure and income of the WEU Satellite Centre for 199i
Credits approved
for 1992
Credits proposed
for 1993
Estimatod expenditure Millionsof pesetas
Millions
of pesetas
I- Personnel costs 288.50
l1.60
t43.20
32.20
79t.90
86.60
541.44 |
27.90
145.82
143.00
866.07
14.442
II Trevel
ru
ry
v
General operating costs
Mission operating costs
Cqnital exnendifrrre
Continsencies
Total crrrrenf cost l 354.00 1738.67
Income
VI WF.II fax 8 1.10
0.00
81. r0
158.30
15.80
174.10
VII Other receinfs
Oneratins income
Nef oneretinp crxfs t 272.90 t 564.57
Pensions
P I Ernenditure 0.00
7.20
0.00
14.10PII I
Net 7.20 14.10
Nef exnenditrrre | 265.70 1 550.47
l. Pesetas 3.71 million frozen.
2. Pesetas 14.44 million frozen.
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APPENDIX VIII
Toble of atablishment of the WEU Satcllite Ceatre
Post No. Grad{s) of Post Function
WEUSC 1
WEUSC 2
WEUSC 3
WEUSC 4
WEUSC 5
WEUSC 6.9 *
WEUSC t0-24*
WEUSC 25
WEUSC 26-27
WEUSC 28
WEUSC 29-30
WEUSC 3I
WEUSC 32-33
WEUSC 34
WEUSC 35-36
WEUSC 37
WEUSC 38
WEUSC 39-40
WEUSC 41
WEUSC 42-43
WEUSC 44.45
WEUSC 46
WEUSC 47-48
WEUSC 49-50
A6
A5
B4
A4
B3t4
A2t3
Au2
AU2
B3
A4
A3t4
A4
B3t4
A2
B3
A4
B3l4
BU2
AU2
C3
C3
A3
B4t5
B3
Director
Head of Implementation
Personal Assistant to Director and Head of Implemen-
tation
Head of Operations & Training Division
Secretary to Head of Operations and Training Division
Instructor/Senior lnterpreter
Imagery Interpreter
Head of Photolab
Photographic Assistant
Head of Scientific Support Division
Researcher
Head of Informatics Division
ADP Support Oflicer
Database Network Manager
Database Operator
Head of Administration and Personnel Division
Secretary to Head of Administration and Personnel
Division
Typist
Head of General Services Section
Security Guard
Technical Assistant
Head of Section Finance and Budget
FinanciaUAdministrative Assistant
Documentation Clerk/Librarian
r Includes proposed change of upgrading one Interpreter post to Senior Interpreter post.
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APPENDIX IX
Extroct from Document AS/Bud (44) 20 " Activities of the Administration
and stalf policy at the Council of Europe in 1992 "
Social insurance for permanent staff
Permanent staff are currently insured against accidents and illness by a combined system
involving, primarily, the French social security scheme and, subsidiarily, a scheme run by a private
company, AGF.
In l99l the Administration was asked to reopen the debate on the desirability of switching to a
wholly private scheme. The same debate led a few years previously to a decision to remain within the
social security scheme.
It is indeed widely held by staff members that the price of our affiliation to social security is too
high and that it would be advisable to follow the course embarked upon by other co-ordinated
organisations, most recently OECD, by electing to entrust all welfare coverage to a private insurance
company.
In response to a request by the General Meeting of Staff, the Administration has commissioned a
study from an outside exp€rt whose report, presented to the staffin June, considers six different possi-
bilities, among them the retention of the current arrangement and a switch to a private insurance
scheme.
Meanwhile, the Administration also asked the Council's insurance broker to estimate the cost of
wholly private coverage offering equivalent guarantees to those which the staff currently enjoy.
According to the broker's reply, the aggregate premium rate would be in the region of 80/o of total
emoluments. By way of comparison, the present aggregate rate calculated on the same basis (total
emoluments) stands at 21.630/0, of which 8.210/o is borne by the staff.
In the light of the broker's reply, the Administration considered that it would be advisable to
keep the matter under consideration and define in detail the contingencies to be covered, the extent
thereof and the desired guarantees with a view to preparing a list of requirements and a call for tenders.
A joint working party has accordingly been set up and the list of requirements is in preparation.
Irrespective of the results achieved, a change in the system will obviously be contemplated only
after consultation 
- 
and with the consent 
- 
of the staff. Furthermore, should such a change be made,
staff members would retain the possibility of remaining under the existing scheme.
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RECOMMENDATION 521 
'
on the budgus of the ministerial organs of Walem European anioa
for thc finorcial year 19922
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that:
(a) in Maastricht the ministers of the WEU member countries decided to transfer the
Secretariat-General of WEU to Brussels;
(b) the budget of the Secretariat-General of WEU for 1992 does not consider the financial impli-
cations of this transfer and is therefore of a provisional nature;
(c/ credits in this budget, in particular those relating to the mission expenses of members of the
Secretariat-General of WEU, are estimated on the basis of restrictive criteria;
(d) the budget of the Institute for Security Studies sets out the financial requirements of that
Institute without modifying the organogram authorised last year;
(e) the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are extremely cost-effective;
(/ problems relating to staffpolicy are still being studied by the co-ordination bodies concerned
and that, among these, the problem of financing the pension scheme is becoming increasingly
important;
(ii) Welcoming the fact that the budgets of the ministerial organs of WEU are presented clearly and
efliciently and allow a detailed examination of those organs' needs,
RrcouusNos rHAT rnr CotrNcrI-
l. Give the Secretariat-General the wherewithal to exercise its activities during a period which,
although transitional, is no less important and complex;
2. Notify the Assembly of any structural changes that are envisaged on the occasion of the transfer
of the Secretariat-General to Brussels and of the measures taken in respect of staff not wishing to be
transferred;
3. Inform the Assembly of decisions taken in regard to stall policy in the framework of the
co-ordinated organisations, particularly in respect of the financing of the pension scheme.
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd June 1992 during the first part ofthe thirty-eighth ordinary session (sth sitting).
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by tord Mackie of Benshie on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs
and Administration (Document 1303).
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
to Retommendation 5211
l. The Council assures the Assembly that it will examine in a constructive spirit the proposals
which the Secretary-General will submit to it in this regard.
2. Any changes of structure arising from the transfer will also be communicated to the Assembly
together witl ttre measures to be taken for the benefit of those staffunable to follow the organisation.
3. The question of the financing of the pension scheme is still being studied by the Co-ordinating
Committee on Remunerations (CCR).
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th September 1992.
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Document 1400 23rd November 1993
l. Adopted unanimously by the committee.
?r. Merylep of the committee:_Mr. Baumel (Chairman) ; MY. oq Decker, de Puig (Vice-Chairmen) ; Mr. Alloncle, Mrs.Baarveld-Slhlam.a!, ryIM. Borderas, Briane, B_4to, Chevalier, Cox, De Carolis (Alteri'at'e: ierriril, bies,'oumont, Ferianttis
!!r|u"s, Ferrarini, .tlardy, Irmer, Jacquat, Kelchtermans, Leccisi (Alternate:' Foschi), urs. teii-Cirneue, Mfl. ,an O.iLrnd-en,.Jvlannino (Alternate: !aire), !4qte\, Lord Newall (Alternate: Sir Russell Johnston),MM. pecchioli, Reis Leite, Scheel
li-r pulley Smith, Sir Keith Speed, MM. Steiner, Lopez Valdivielso (Alternate: Lopez rtbnaria, viqiei, z|"ro tittfi;i;iMiiller)
N.B. Tie names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics.
The European Corps
REPORT 
'
submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee2
by Mr. Zierer, Rapporteur
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DRnrr RecourrleNpenoN
on the European corps
ExpLRtrRtonY MEMoRANDUM
submitted by Mr. Ziercr, Rapporteur
I. The start of a European security and defence policy
II. Responsibility of Europeans
III. Task-sharing in the alliance
IV. Reinforcement of the European pillar
V. Common security policy
VI. WEU as an institution for security policy
VII. Not without the United States
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The Assembly,
O Welcoming the recent inauguration of the Strasbourg headquarters of the European corps;(ii) Aware that the European corps will not be able to carry out its three missions in full until the
constitutional restrictions on the deployment of German troops outside national territory have been
lifted;
(iii) Noting that, in January 1993, the French and German Chiefs-of-Staff concluded an agreement
with SACEUR on the use and tasks of the European corps, while no such formal agxeement has yet
been concluded with WEU;
(iv) Welcoming Spain's decision and Luxembourg's intention to join the European corps and noting
that both Italy and the Netherlands have shown their interest in developments;
(v) Noting that Poland has made it known that it would like to be associated with the European
corps;
(vi) Considering that, for practical reasons, only a small number of different national forces could
actively participate in an army corps, and that, as a consequence, more than one European corps may
have to be established if more nations wish to contribute troops;
(vii) Recognising the impomance of the French-Italian-Spanish initiative to contribute to a pre-
planned, ad-hoc,loint Euiopean air and naval force which would have an air and ggound force
deployment capability, ready to respond to WEU requirements and complementary to their
deployment within the framework of NATO;
(vilfl Noting the urgent need for a full list of forces answerable to WEU;
(ix) Noting the success of the joint military exercise Ardente 93 in October 1993, a good example of
an exercise designed to prepare for the missions which will be assigned to WEU;
(x) Aware that, as confirmed at the EC's extraordinary summit meeting on 29th October 1993,
Western European Union will have to implement the various provisions embodied in the Maastricht
Treaty and the annexed statements of WEU member states;
(xi) Stressing the need for WEU, as the European Union's defence organisation and as the European
pillar of NATO, to have full operational status in order to be effective;
(xii) Convinced that the concept of ' separable but not separate forces ", which would enable WEU to
act'with the backing of NATO aisets and infrastructure in the event of the United States not wishing to
participate in a givbn mission, is the only reasonable and feasible solution to accommodate Europe's
new security requirements;
(xiiil Noting that a new balance must be established in the Atlantic Alliance so that Europe will be
able to assume a greater share of responsibilities for security in Europe and beyond;
(xiv) Stressing the need to maintain the defence budgets of WEU member states at an adequate level
in order to ensure the maintenance of meaningful European military capabilities,
RrcouurNos rHAT tHr CouNctt
l. Provide itself with the means of action and draw up guidelines for any operation under WEU
responsibility by concluding agreements with member states and NATO regarding the European corps
and other forces which could be placed at WEU's disposal;
Urgently establish a full list of forces from member states which could be placed at WEU's dis-
3. Promote the early establishment of a European air and naval force in the southern area, enabling
Europe to deploy military forces rapidly in that region in case of emergency;
4. Seek any solution allowing links between WEU and SACEUR to be strengthened;
)
posal;
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5. In co-operation with NATO, agree on a joint staff concept in order to ensure a proper command
structure in the event of specific WEU operations;
6. Provide the material means and necessary guidelines for the effective functioning of all WEU
bodies which have been established to implement the Maastricht Treaty for WEU to become, in
co-operation with NATO, the instrument of European security policy;
7. Enhance military co'operation with its partners in the Forum of Consultation in order to extend
security towards Central Europe.
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I. The start of a. European secufity
and defence Wlicy
l. Since the end of the cold war, East-West
confrontation and related political changes, the
requirements for a European security policy
have changed dramatically. Today, the deter-
rence and defence capability built up against the
former Soviet Union is of less importance than a
general crisis and conflict prevention and man-
agement capability, even if the mere existence of
powerful military forces in the successor states
of the Soviet Union still remains a possible
source of danger for many years to come. Mil-
itary peace-keeping and peace-enforcing means
must remain a last resort, yet they still have to
be taken into account.
2. The war in the Balkans has dramatically
brought Europeans up against their short-
comings in these areas of action and has accel-
erated efforts to establish an effective strategy of
war prevention and crisis control. We know
today that we have failed - and not least because
we in Europe were unable to agree on the steps
to be taken. This prepared the way for horrible
massacres and also allowed a brutal aggressor to
occupy foreign territory without being punished.
We allowed annexation. War in Europe became
possible again. Since then, the old security
policy adage that armed conflicts must be
nipped in the bud is once more gaining impor-
tance.
II. Responsibiw of Eumpeans
3. The United States, which restrained the
dictator Saddem Hussein in such an impressive
way and recently in Somalia stood firm on the
side of international law and human rights,
could not gain acceptance for intervention
because ofa lack ofunity and resolve on the part
of the Europeans. As a consequence, half-
hearted measures wene taken such as the impo-
sition of a military no-fly zone and the control of
Bosnian airspace by allied air forces. In the pnd,
we all fell short of giving a clear signal to the
aggressor to halt his attacks. The killing is con-
tinuing relentlessly.
4. We must take note of the fact that the
United States cannot and does not wish to play
the full r6le of world policeman any longer. The
United States cannot in its own right, shoulder
the responsibility of intervening in every area of
violence in this troubled world. Its military and
Explanatory Memorundum
(submitted by Mr. Zierer, Roppofleut)
financial resources could not bear the strain, nor
can it any longer obtain a politically-sound
public consensus on this subject. In the United
States, certain neo-isolationist tendencies are
becoming obvious, even in governmental circles.
Because of all this, the question of where
European responsibilities lie arises with
unmatched acuteness. Europe is no longer a
divided continent under direct threat from a
powerful enemy. Consequently, Europeans are
now free to defend themselves with their own
forces against new risks and dangers.
III. Task-sharing in the alliance
5. On the other hand, NATO needs to
shoulder new tasks, in particular as regards its
relations with states of the former Warsaw Pact.
In this framework, the r6le of European coun-
tries within NATO should also be redefined.
Task-sharing in the alliance according to geo-
graphical areas of responsibility and according
to the degree of challenge would enhance the
effectiveness of the organisation. This means
reinforcing the European pillar and developing
an autonomous European security and foreign
policy, not competing with but complementary
io NATO, providing the community of Europe
with urgently-needed coherence in foreign and
security policy. WEU, which almost forty years
ago was already on the verge of being given the
r6le of Europe's security and defence organ-
isation, presents itself as the authority to
establish and lead this security policy aspect.
6. For the time being, we Europeans are not
capable of managing on our own a protracted
and distant military conflict without the help of
the United States and all its options. Certain
military resources, such as satellite intelligence,
air and seaJift capability, sea-borne airforces(aircraft carrier groups), are lacking or are only
insufficiently available. The weapons systems
used by European NATO member states are
very different and incompatible in terms of
munitions and spare parts. Soldiers of one
country can do nothing or very little with the
weapons and equipment of another allied
country. This leads to limited efficiency and
diminished combat value, and also higher costs
because of the obligation to keep multiple stocks
and separate logistics. On top of this, there are
considerable difliculties through the use of
various languages and different methods of
training.
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lIY. Reinforcement of the European pillar
7. In the future, therefore, we need the
highest possible degree of standardisation of
European national armed forces and extensive
co-operation. The vision of a European army is
still unrealistic and existing forms of military
integration fail to reach beyond corps level
because of the objective obstacles mentioned
above. Clearly, recognition of the shortcomings
of nationally-organised security and defence is
gtrowing while, at the same time, as a result of
the carnage in the Balkans, there is a growing
readiness to give up certain national prejudices
in the interest of greater stability.
8. When, on l4th October 1991, President
Frangois Mitterrand and Chancellor Helmut
Kohl told the then President of the European
Council, Ruud Lubbers, that, as a contribution
to increased European responsibility for security
and defence, they would form a Franco-German
corps in which armed forces of other WEU
member states could participate, it was not met
with unanimous agreement. The United States
was immediately afraid that this would drive a
wedge between the allies. A more limited action
by Europeans in security and alliance questions
aroused worries in the United States lest
American interests and the influence of the
United States in Europe be jeopardised. There
was also concern that Germany, together with
France, which since as early as 1966 was no
longer taking part in the military organisation of
NATO, would loosen its ties with the alliance.
At the same time, the Bush administration, in
various statements, had already supported the
establishment of a " European security identity "
because it wished to be less involved in Europe.
The then Chairman of the Joint-Chiefs-of-Staff,
General Colin Powell, mentioned in the summer
of 1992 that a European defence identity was
" politically and militarily appropriate for the
,, management of inter-regional crises, humani-
tarian operations and peace-keeping'.
Y. Common security policy
9. American objections have since been dis-
pelled by a number of statements emanating
from everyone concerned, and in particular the
so-called SACEUR agreement. On the basis of a
mandate given by the North Atlantic Council,
SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe)
and the Chiefs-of-Staff of the nations partici-
pating in the European corps signed an
agreement on 2lst January 1993 on the fol-
lowing issues:
- 
the tasks of the European corps in the
framework of NATO, in particular
regarding the implementation of Article5 of the Washington Treaty (main
defence/ crisis reaction) and apart from
this its tasks in peace-keeping and
peace-enforcing and in humanitarian
action;
- 
the conditions for subordinating the
European corps to SACEUR (opera-
tional command) ;
- 
planning competence and liaisons
between SACEUR and the com-
manding general of the European
corps.
10. Through this * double-hatted principle ",
the European corps, within the framework of
European institutions, can be assigned to both
NATO and national authorities and has
obtained a tangible and alliance-friendly form in
which primacy has been given to NATO
assignment. At the same time, France has come
considerably closer to the military organisation
of NATO. By subordinating its troops partici-
pating in the European corps to operational
command, France is, according to experts, pro-
viding a contribution to the establishment of a
European security component and to a reform of
NATO which goes far beyond day-to-day policy.
At the same time, it should be noted that this
larger European armed unit could build on the
experience of the FrancoGerman brigade which
was established in the late eighties. Already in
this earlier unit it had become clear that its
importance would extend far beyond the stage
of a bilateral experiment and that it would be
the start of a broader European defence
co-operation. Now, since Maastricht, it is clear
in which direction it is moving. Article J4 of
the Treaty on European Union states: " The
common foreign and security policy shall
include all questions related to the security of
the union, including the eventual framing of a
common defence policy, which might in time
lead to a common defen@. "
YI. WEa as an institution for security po@
I l. The foundations for closer security,
defence and political co.operation were already
established at the NATO summit meeting in
Rome in 1991. In paragraph 52, the alliance's
new strategic concept stated: " Integrated and
multinational European structures, as they are
further developed in the context of an emerging
European defence identity, will also increasingly
have a similarly important r6le to play in
enhincing the allies' ability to work together in
the common defence'. Apart from this, it is
made clear in the Maastricht Treaty that in the
framework of crisis prevention, apart from
political and military aspects, social-economic
and ecological issues are playing an increasingly
important r6le and will have to be co-ordinated.
The scope for armed forces is accordingly
becoming larger and capability for crisis man-
agement will become more important.
316
DOCUMENT I4OO
12, The agreement of La Rochelle, concluded
on 22nd May 1992, establishes the schedule for
setting up a 35 000 strong European corps by
1995. At the same time, it explicitly invites
other countries to participate: the defence min-
isters are charged " to gain the participation of
other WEU member states in the European
corps ". So far, Belgium has decided to partic-
ipate and Spain and the Netherlands have sent
liaison officers. The task of the European corps
is stated as follows: " The corps can be deployed
for the common defence of the allies according
to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty or
according to the Brussels Treaty. [t can also be
charged with measures for keeping or restoring
peace and it can be deployed in the framework
of humanitarian actions. National contributions
to this unit do not affect the existing obligations
towards other organisations. " Consequently, on
lst October 1993, the command staffwas estab-
lished with a German general as first com-
mander. Readiness for the deployment of
certain staff with the Franco-German brigade
in humanitarian actions is planned for lst
January 1994. On lst July 1994, staff head-
quarters and the supporting staff battalion
should be ready, while on lst October 1994 all
the participating troops should be ready for
deployment.
13. The capabilities of the European corps -
interoperability, divisibility, force projection,
operational availability and endurance - ensure
its usefulness for crisis solution and conflict
management. Depending on the tasks assigned
to it, more forces may be incorporated. The
wide spectrum of possible tasks f,rts into the
framework of the United Nations; according to
the La Rochelle declaration and the SACEUR
agreement, the deployment of the corps can take
place under very different conditions, not only
in the framework of WEU as * forces answerable
to WEU " but also as a special contribution
from Europe to NATO, * Euro-component ".
With the establishment of a multinational
European corps, the objective of a common
foreign and security policy of the European
Union as expressed in the Maastricht Treaty has
been further achieved.
YII. Not without the United States
14. A new European security architecture,
which has to be established in close co-operation
with the Atlantic Alliance, will have to be closely
involved in political and economic develop-
ments in the countries of the former Soviet
sphere of influence.
15. The CSCE could also contribute to this
when it is given a new mandate and it could
prepare the ground for a future enlargement of
NATO. It would be quite disastrous to consider
the United Nations, NATO, CSCE, EC, WEU
and the Council of Europe and all the options
concerned with these institutions as being in
competition with each other. All these institu-
tions are connecting parts in the building of a
common European home and in the estab-
lishment and preservation of peace and stability
in Europe and the world. It would also be fatalto consider the European corps and the
European component as being in competition
with the regular alliance. The goals which we
have set ourselves can be reached not through
competition but through complementarity and
task-sharing within the alliance and within
Europe. With this complementarity, we can
achieve a new burden-sharing with the United
States, a burden-sharing which is adapted to the
new and changed conditions. Nobody would
think of diminishing the American influence
and even less offorcing them out ofEurope. Any
form of American military presence in Europe is
always welcome, but at the same time Euro-
peans clearly understand that in the future they
will have to rely more upon themselves. A start
has been made with a better and more effective
European security and defence policy. We must
make a success of this modest beginning. It is in
our interest to ensure that what happened in
Yugoslavia can under no circumstances be
repeated again.
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Amendments lr 2r l and 4 2fth November 1993
The Eumprcan corps
AMENDMENTS 1,2,3 and 4 r
labW by Mr. Ziercr, Rappneur
l. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after'European corps', leave
out * while no such formal agxeement has yet been concluded with WEU'.
2. After paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as
follows:
* Noting the existence of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for the use of the
European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard, although no
details have been released;'
3. After paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, add a new paragraph as
follows:
* Aware of the recent ltalian initiative envisaging a multinational ground force intended to
enhance the operational significance of the abovementioned tripartite air and naval force; "
4. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows:
" Communicate to the Assembly the text of the joint declaration setting out the conditions for
the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this regard
and the text of the report on relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU);"
Signed: Zierer
l. See llth sitting, lst December 1993 (amendments agreed to).
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Declaration by the WEU Council of Ministers
Luxemboarg, 22ad Novcnber I9i
The WEU Council of Ministers met in Luxembourg on 22nd November following on from the
European Council of 29th October and the entry into force on lst November 1993 of the Treaty on
European Union.
Given the importance for WEU of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Ministers focused
their discussions on WELI's relations with the European Union and, with a view to the next alliance
summit, on WEU's relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Ministers agreed that relevant statements in
Part I of this document were intended as a European contribution to the alliance summit.
I
1. WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers warmly welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty on
European Union, a decisive new stage in the process of European construction and in the estab-
listrment of a European security and defence identity. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen
WEU's contribution in this connection. Implementing the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations con-
tributes to this objective.
In this context and in accordance with Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, Ministers took note with
satisfaction of the qualitative step forward which had been taken by the European Union in developing
a common foreign and security policy and endowing the European Union with the means it needs to
face the challenges and opportunities of the post-cold war period.
Ministers welcomed the fact that the links now established between the European Union and
WEU were such that concrete form could now be given to the definition of a global concept of security
in accordance with the aims and conditions of the Maastricht Treaty and recalled that European
security included political, economic and military aspects. In parallel, WEU would continue to develop
its activities on the basis of the guidelines established in the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. In
so doing, WEU would also contribute to the framing of common European defence policy. This might,
in time, lead to a common defence. Thus WEU would reinforce the dynamic process of European
Union.
Ministers acknowledged the importance for WEU of the conclusions reached by the Heads of
State and Government at the European Council in Brussels on 29th October on the implementation of
the common foreign and security policy of the European Union.
ln this context, Ministers:
- 
reaffirmed that WEU was fully prepared to play its rOle in accordance with the Treaty on
European Union and the Maastricht declaration of WEU member states and to respond to
requests from the Union concerning its decisions and actions having defence implications;
- 
recalled the effort already initiated to develop WEU's operational capabilities and stressed the
importance of actively pursuing this objective. This would enable European partners and
allies more effectively to shoulder their defence responsibilities;
- 
endorsed the measures to ensure close co-operation between the European Union and WEU
set out in Annex IV of Chapter IV of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council of 26th
October on the implementation of the Treaty on European Union, which had been approved
by the European Council on 29th October;
- 
reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing and completing the implementation of these mea-
sures.
Ministers agreed to reduce the period of the WEU Presidency to six months from lst July 1994
as suggested by the European Council. They requested the Permanent Council to consider further the
question of harmonising the Presidencies of the European Union and WEU and to report back.
2. Ministers reaffirmed the fundamental importance to European security and stability of a strong
transatlantic partnership. Welcoming the continued engagement of North American allies in Europe,
through their full and active participation in the Atlantic Alliance, including the presence of substantial
military forces, Ministers stressed their resolve to develop WEU as the means to strengthen the
European pillar of the alliance. They reaffirmed their belief that:
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- 
the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty would bring greater cohesion to the European
pillar and a more effective European contribution to the alliance;
- 
the development of the European security and defence identity would be an essential'com-
ponent of a renewed and strengthened transatlantic partnership;
- 
this would thereby contribute to the adaptation of the alliance to the new challenges.
They welcomed the further development of close working links in Brussels between WEU and
the alliance. They recalled that the relations between the two organisations continued to be based on
transparency and complementarity. They reaffrrmed their decision to intensify their co-ordination on
alliance issues representing an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions
agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the alliance. They underlined that the alliance
remained the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on pol-
icies bearing on the security and defence commitments of allies under the North Ailantic Treaty.
ln future crises, WEU and NATO should hold consultations, including as necessary throughjoint Council meetings, on whether and how they might cG'operate.
Ministers welcomed the progress being made in adapting the structures of the alliance to the new
challenges in the field of European security. They looked forward to the NATO summit which would
provide an important opportunity for the alliance to continue the adaptation of its military structures
and procedures in a way that reflected the increasing European r6le.
3. Ministers stressed the urgent need for WEU to develop further its operational capabilities and
reaflirmed their countries'resolve to organise themselves in such a way that the contribution by Euro-
peans to the alliance was strengthened and made more identifiable.
As the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European
pillar of the alliance, WEU would require the military capabilities necessary to enable WEU member
states to shoulder their responsibilities, in particular for the tasks specified in the Petersberg decla-
ration. Ministers recalled that the multinational European structures answerable to WEU would also
contribute towards reinforcing the allies' capability to work together for their common defence.
Aware of the need to allow for specific European military options outside the cases of collective
defence specified under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Ministers looked to the NATO summit to
endorse the principle that WEU should be able to use not only European allies' forces and resources
but also collective assets of the Atlantic Alliance such as communication systems, command facilities
and headquarters. The circumstances and modalities of the application of this principle should be
further explored, including, as WEU's own operational capabilities are developed, the possibilities of a
corresponding use of these.
Ministers asked the Permanent Council, in consultation with the North Atlantic Council leading
up to the NATO summit, to give full consideration to the ways in which the aforementioned objectives
can be achieved and report back to their next meeting.
4. Ministers approved the report on the relations between WEU and forces answerable to WEU(FAWEU). They welcomed the designation by member states of multinational and national forces
which could be put under the authority of WEU after sovereign decisions of the member states in
accordance with their national constitutions. The European corps, the Multinational Division(Central) and the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force had already been declared as multi-
national forces answerable to WEU.
Ministers warmly welcomed and endorsed the adoption of the joint declaration setting the con-
ditions for the use of the European corps in the framework of WEU and the understandings in this
regard.
They noted also the intentions of the nations contributing to the other multinational forces to
propose arrangements for those forces.
Ministers welcomed and agreed to study the Italian initiative envisaging a multinational ground
force aimed at enhancing the operational significance of the air-maritime initiative.
5. Ministers reaffirmed the importance they attached to WEU's relations with its Central European
consultation partners. They recognised the need, in the interest of increased stability in Europe, for
closer consultation on security.issues. Particularly in the light of the entry into force bf tne Treaty on
European Union, these relations should be broadened and deepened in parallel to the closer
co-operation of these states with the European Union.
Ministers welcomed the Europe agreements recently concluded which provided the basis for
increased co.operation geared to the objective of membership of the European Union opening, in turn,
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the perspective of membership of WEU. In this context, Ministers requested the Permanent Council to
reflect on an enhanced status and its content, including the Franco-German proposal of l2th
November, for those consultation partners who had already concluded or would conclude a Europe
agtreement with the European Union. The Permanent Council should thus identify ways and modalities
to allow those countries to participate to a larger extent in the activities of WEU and to be involved in
initiatives and missions as envisaged in the Petersberg declaration.
II
1. Ministers welcomed the increasing r6le of the United Nations and of the CSCE and recalled the
readiness of WEU to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with WEU procedures, the
effective implementation of conflict-prevention and crisis-management measures - including peace-
keeping activities 
- 
under United Nations authority or CSCE responsibility. Ministers invited the Per-
manent Council to consider how to enhance WEU's relations with the United Nations and the CSCE.
2. Ministers agreed that the CSCE, as the European and transatlantic organisation covering all of
Europe would have a particular rOle in the future security structure. To this end, they would continue
to work for co-operative and common approaches to security in the relevant CSCE fora. They wel-
comed the progress which the CSCE had made to strengthen its operational capacities and they reite-
rated their support for its further development as an instrument of preventive diplomacy.
Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to early substantial progress in the work of the CSCE
Forum for Security Co-operation. They welcomed the initiative by the EC and its member states intro-
ducing a common proposal on the CSCE code of conduct in the field of security and on principles on
the transfer of conventional arms in the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation.
3. Ministers welcomed the increasing interest by other countries in the r6le and activities of WEU.
The WEU Presidency and Secretariat would continue to inform representatives of those countries. Fol-
lowing the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty, the information contacts offered by Ministers in
May to the countries negotiating to become members of the European Union were now of particular
relevance.
Ministers welcomed progress towards the consolidation of democracy in the countries of the
former Soviet Union, which they believed was essential for European security. In this context, they
noted the importance of parliamentary elections to be held in Russia in December 1993, which repre-
sented an important step forward in Russia's democratisation process, a freely-elected parliament
being a necessary condition for the solution of Russia's economic and political problems. Ministers
also noted the importance of the elections to be held in Ukraine in March 1994.
Ministers took note with satisfaction of the recent contacts made by the Presidency and Secre-
tariat with Maghreb countries in accordance with the mandate given at their meeting last May to
enhance the dialogue with those countries. They agreed that these contacts should be pursued.
4. Ministers welcomed the conclusions of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of the European
Union this morning on the situation in the former republic of Yugoslavia.
Ministers noted with satisfaction a report on the ongoing WEU police and customs operation on
the Danube, which has contributed successfully to the full implementation of the sanctions rdgime of
the United Nations against Serbia/Montenegro. They emphasised the excellent co-operation with Bul-
garia, Hungary and Romania which are also consultation partners of WEU. Through this operation as
well as through the combined operation Sharp Guard of WEU and NATO in the Adriatic, WEU
actively participates in the efforts of the international community to put an end to the conflict in
former Yugoslavia.
Ministers reaffirmed that WEU is prepared to contribute where it can to the humanitarian
efforts, to the implementation of a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and in support of a pos-
sible r6le of the European Union in Mostar.
III
l. Ministers welcomed the progress made in developing WEU's operational r6le in accordance with
the Maastricht and Petersberg declarations. In particular they took note of a Presidency report on
WEU's general r6le in peace-keeping and of a study on humanitarian missions. They invited the Per-
manent Council to examine how the conceptual work already done might be taken forward.
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Ministers requested that work on planning for the tasks defined in the Petersberg declaration be
continued, especially on peace-keeping and crisis-management including peace-making.
The Planning Cell was tasked, in completing the list of FAWEU incorporating national inputs, to
identify forces especially suited for humanitarian tasks.
They welcomed the seminar on practical experiences in the field of peace-keeping operations to
be held by the Luxembourg Presidency in February 1994.
2. Ministers welcomed the progress made in developing a WEU exercise policy by the WEU Chiefs
of Defence Staff and stressed the importance of implementing an effective WEU exercise programme
in order to develop WEU's capability to conduct operations in the fields defined in the Petersberg
declaration. WEU's exercise programme should be implemented in harmony with that elaborated
within NATO.
3. Ministers took note of a progress report of the work under way in the field of strategic mobility.
Furthermore, they tasked the Planning Cell to finalise work on a force generation plan for European
maritime forces taking into account the advice of CHODs.
4. Ministers reaffrrmed the importance of WEU's space activities. They welcomed the progress
made by the satellite centre since its oflicial inauguration on 28th April 1993. They will discuss a
progress report on the possibility of establishing a WEU earth observation programme at their next
regular meeting in spring 1994.
5. Ministers noted that most WEU nations will have ratified the Open Skies Treaty before the end
of the year and looked forwar( to its early entry into force. They underlined the important confidence-
and security-building activities of WEU in this regard and encouraged work to be continued in this
area. They welcomed the generally favourable responses to the approach to third parties with a view to
their participation in a WEU pool of observation systems, in accordance with the preliminary set of
rules.
6. Ministers took note of the transfer, with effect from lst August 1993, of EUROCOM activities,
which were now being carried out in the WEU framework. The same would apply to public relations
activities and to EUROLOG and EUROLONGTERM, with effect from lst January 1994.
TV
The Defence Ministers of the thirteen nations of the Western European Armaments Group
(WEAG) met before the WEU Council to review the armaments co-operation activities carried out by
the Group. Further to their meeting in Rome on l9th May, Ministers reviewed practical arrangements
to guide the work of the Group and agreed to close the present Secretariat in Lisbon in spring 1994 and
to establish in parallel an Armaments Secretariat within WEU. Ministers also noted with satisfaction
the signature in October 1993 of a memorandum of understanding on the feasibility study for the
Future Large Aircraft and welcomed the potential for co-operation on this project. Ministers took note
of the increasing number of EUCLID research and technology projects and endorsed steps to improve
arrangements for implementing that programme. Ministers welcomed continuing work to develop the
open European defence equipment market and endorsed guidelines and measures to support devel-
oping defence industry countries which are intended to enable such countries to participate more fully
in that market. Ministers welcomed a first report on the possible role of a European Armament Agency
and agreed that work would continue on this subject under the direction of the National Armaments
Directors. The agreements by Defence Ministers were subsequently adopted by the Council at
Thirteen.
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C.ommunication from the Chairman-in-Otfice of tne Council
Luumbourg, 2ird Noycmber 1993
A. Operation Sharp Guard
1. Over the period l2th to 20th November 1993, the number of vessels under investigation by the
Italian authorities remained unchanged (20). There are no specific incidents to report.
2. (a) Five ships, supported by a United States vessel, are operating in the Montenegro area under
the command of the Commander of WEU naval forces, four are in the Otranto area and
eleven are in transit to operational areas or in Adriatic or Mediterranean ports 
- 
four of
them in the port of Ha'rfa (United Kingdom, Greek, Turkish and Italian vessels).
(b/ Since the last period, 503 vessels have been challenged (total 8 635), 36 inspected (total 751)
and 12 vessels diverted for closer inspection (total 180).
37 speed boats were detected and handed over to the Italian customs authorities (total 435).
(c) Air cover continues unchanged (24-hour in Montenegro and l8-hour in Otranto).
(d/ No vessel has violated the embargo.
(e) United States, United Kingdom, Netherlands, French and Italian vessels are providing
support to the operational groups.
3. The risk to units remains unchanged: minimal outside the two areas of operation, average inside
the areas but outside former Yugoslav territorial waters and high within these territorial waters.
The Chairmanshipin-Office welcomes the smooth-running of the operation which can be
counted a marked success thanks to the commitment of the units and perfect integration of head-
quarters staff on land and at sea. Proof lies in the fact that there has been no violation of the embargo
by any vessel.
The Chairmanship-in-Office wishes to thank all the countries which were willing to contribute to
the establishment of these two WEU headquarters staff.
22nd November 1993
B. WEU mission on the Danube
The mission currently comprises some 240 officials from seven member states and 7 motor
launches from three member states. Rotation of personnel is achieved by a system of regular reliefs.
Over I 200 inspections have been carried out since the start of the mission.
The Chairmanship.in-Oflice is aware from meetings with the authorities of the states along the
Danube and visits to the Co-ordination and Support Centre and to inspection areas, of the importance
of WEU's contribution to the overall effort to apply the sanctions and the effective way in which this
mission is being carried out.
This success is due to the deterrent effect ofa large-scale operation and the synergy between the
efforts deployed by WEU, the states along the Danube and the Sanctions Assistance Missions and also
to the professionalism of our officials.
Not a single convoy has attempted to force a passage and the infringements detected by WEU
are usually negligible. Incidents outside WEU's area of operations, in particular upstream from
Calafat, have been reported to us.
Non-governmental organisations known as'White Rose " and " New Byzantium'have set up a
barrage at the level of Belgrade. Most convoys are stopped there and required to pay tolls, normally of
the order of $20 000.
Despite all efforts towards a resolution of the conflict, it seems likely that present system of sanc-
tions will be maintained in the short term. In any event, a partial system would require considerable
effort on the part of the states along the Danube because of the increased complexity of a selective
system.
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C. The activities of the Council Working Group on Mostar
At the European Communities General Affairs Council on 4th October, at which the adminis-
tration of Mostar was discussed, Ministers agleed to ask WEU to consider the support it could give
with organising a police force and improving certain vital supply functions, in particular in the field of
medical assistance.
Since that date, the Permanent Council has kept the question on the agenda of its weekly
meetings. It has set up a special working group to report back, on the basis of the meetings that have
been held of medical and police experts. Two preliminary reports by the experts have already been pro-
duced.
Each report defines a number ofoptions. They cannot be regarded as final responses to the ques-
tions raised, due to the uncertainties as to developments in the situation on the ground and because the
precise terms of the European Union's acceptance of the mandate under the Geneva plan are not yet
known. Similarly, WEU itself is not in a position to determine the extent of the responsibilities that the
European Union administrator may be called upon to exercise.
The Presidency feels that a number of basic principles should underlie the thinking on a r6le in
support of the European Union administrator in Mostar. A WEU contribution, whether in the police
or in the medical field, should in principle be under the authority of the EU Administrator. It will be
pointed out that the way in which co-ordination and cooperation on the ground with UNPROFOR or
NATO functions will depend on how the EU Administrator's mandate fits into the overall implemen-
tation of the plan. In principle, such a contribution should be made only if a local type of solution is
not possible. Furthermore, the contribution should be only in those fields not covered by the military
side of the agreement or that might be better covered by the team around the EU Administrator. Close
attention should also be paid to the arrangements set up by the United Nations in Sarajevo, in order to
maintain a proper balance in the international community aspects of the two bodies. Lastly, it would
be better for a structure not to be set up in Mostar so long as no agreement has been implemented any-
where else. The security of such an operation is at stake.
Because any WEU contribution is linked with the administration of the European Union, WEU
should adhere to the conditions laid down on a preliminary basis within European Union bodies.
As regards its own contribution, WEU should add the following two conditions: the military
implementation of the plan should have begun, in order to provide an adequate security environment;
and there should be a specific agreement with UNPROFOR/NATO to establish the circumstances in
which the military element could be called upon.
Throughout the exercise now initiated, WEU has been in close contact with the Presidency of the
European Union.
The United Nations authorities have reacted favourably to the possibility of a WEU contri-
bution, especially in the police field, although the various interlocutors stress the need for such a con-
tribution to be inserted in the framework of global implementation and for vital co.ordination with
UNCMOL to exist. WEU is participating in the ad hoc Group on Planning Co-ordination set up by
the Atlantic Alliance. At its meetings, WEU has voiced its concern about the creation of an adequate
security environment and the possibility of calling on the military element in the event of need. The
NATO authorities have taken due note of this concern.
The WEU Presidency suggests forwarding this report to the European Union, indicating that it is
provisional and incomplete due to uncertainties linked with the process of negotiation and develop-
ments in the situation on the ground. At the same time, we should ask the competent bodies in our own
organisation to continue with their work on the subject so that there can be a prompt reaction if an
ag"reement is reached.
22nd November 1993
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QUESTTON 318
pat to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 31st March 199i
Has the Council's attention been drawn to
the statement which appeared in London news-
papers that, according to European Community
officials, the blockade of Serbia and Montenegro
is being regularly broken by means of railway
trains transiting from Greece across Bulgaria? Is
the Council further aware that the Bulgarian
authorities are prepared to take the appropriate
action if proof of sanction-breaking is supplied
and will they urgently arrange for the proof,
apparently available to the European Com-
munity, to be given to Bulgaria?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on Sth October 199i
The Council is aware of the statement to
which the Honourable Member refers. It
attaches the utmost importance to the strict
enforcement of the United Nations Security
Council resolutions on the embargo against
former Yugoslavia. WEU member states have
clearly demonstrated their resolve to take every
measure within their power to enforce com-
pliance with the economic sanctions imposed by
the United Nations Security Council. At their
meeting in Rome on 20th November 1992,
WEU ministers adopted a declaration on former
Yugoslavia which states that " they also
affirmed their willingness to make similar con-
tributions (i.e. similar to the initiatives on the
Danube) to the implementation of the control of
the land embargo at the frontiers.
QUESTTON 319
pat to the Council by Lord Finsberg
on 21st April 199i
Does the Council of Ministers ever intend
to take any action upon the unanimous proposal
of the Assembly contained in Recommendation
490 which requested that Article IX be so
amended as to permit each parliament to decide
if its delegation to WEU should be the same as
that to the Council of Europe, as it is now, or if
parliaments appoint some, all or no members
holding such a dual mandate?
29th November 1993
Why was the opportunity not taken to
make such a change, which was decided by the
democratic parliamentary assembly, when the
issue of Greek membership was under dis-
cussion?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated. to thc Assembly
on Sth October 1993
In its reply to Recommendation 490, the
Council stated that " the principle of a revision,
as and when necessary, of the modified Brussels
Treaty was agreed [when Portugal and Spainjoined WEU]". This principle still stands.
Nevertheless, the Council did not consider it
politically advisable to envisage either a general
or a partial revision of the modified Brussels
Treaty when the issue of Greek membership of
WEU was under discussion.
QUESTION 320
pat to the Council by lard Finsbery
on 21st April 1993
Will the Council inform the Assembly
whether the legal experts referred to in its
answer to Question 306 were employees of their
respective governments or independent
persons?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
on Sth Octobcr 199i
The Council considers that to submit the
question of the commencement of the period of
validity of the modified Brussels Treaty to arbi-
tration by independent international experts
might create a precedent that could be invoked
whenever a difference of opinion arises between
the Assembly and the Council. The Council pre-
ferred to consult legal experts who are civil ser-
vants in their own governments, and their con-
sidered opinion, based on the principles and
sources of international public law, was
embodied in its reply to Assembly Questions
306, 309, 314 and 315.
Written questions i18 to 324 and replies of the Council
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QUESTTON 321
put to the Council by Mr. Pdcriotx
on 6th May I99i
During the exchange of views between the
Political Committee and the Secretary-General
of WEU in Rome on Monday, 19th April 1993,
the latter said that WEU might act indepen-
dently on the territory of former Yugoslavia if it
considered it should do so in accordance with
the modified Brussels Treaty. He rejected the
idea that it was necessary to obtain the prior
agreement of the United Nations, although it is
clearly preferable for WEU to act with the
agreement of the Security Council. [n particular,
Mr. van Eekelen rejected the argument that
WEU must be considered as a regional
organisation within the meaning of Article 52 of
the United Nations Charter.
On 22nd April 1993, the External Rela-
tions and Defence Committees of the Belgian
Chamber of Representatives and Senate jointly
met the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. At this meeting, I asked Mr. Boutros-
Ghali what was his point of view on this aspect
of the relationship between WEU and the
United Nations. Mr. Boutros-Ghali answered as
follows: " In accordance with Article 52 of the
Charter, a regional group can act only with the
agreement of the Security Council. If WEU
decides to act, it must obtain authorisation or a
mandate from the Security Council.'
What is the Council's position on this
essential juridical question?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
communicated to the Assembly
oa Sth Oaober 1993
As a collective defence organisation,
WEU could not perform a direct r6le in a peace-
keeping or peace-making operation conducted
under the auspices of the United Nations unlessit received an express mandate to do so by a
United Nations Security Council resolution.
QUESTTON 322
pat to the Council by Mr. De Decleor
on 14th June 1993
Answering a question put by Sir John
Hunt, Mr. Archie Hamilton, United Kingdom
Minister of State for the Armed Forces, said in
the House of Commons on l9th March 1993:
" There is already discussion on and
co'ordination of policy towards reserve
servicemen between the United Kingdom
and its allies, including the member states
of Western European Union, the National
Reserve Forces Committee, and the
Interallied Confederation of Reserve
Offrcers. "
Can the Council say:
l. how its reply to Recommendation 535 can
be reconciled with this statement;
2. to what this discussion and co-ordination
relate;
3. whether the reply to Recommendation
535 means that the Council no longer feels
bound by the undertakings it has given on
several occasions, in particular in its replies to
Recommendations 298, 319, 330, 420, 472 and
509, to report to the Assembly on the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty even
when this is done in frameworks other than
WEU?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
Qr,rEsTroN 323
put.to the Council by Mr. De Deckcr
on 15th Octobet 1993
On 6th October 1993, the French weekly
information letter, TTU, gave the following
information:
" Six Romanian barges transporting oil
violated the international embargo on
Serbia under the nose of WEU observers
in Calafat (Romanian-Serb frontier).
Oflicially destined for the Romanian port
of Turnu-Severin, 80lan upstream on the
Danube, the barges transporting 4 415
tonnes of petrol and I 334 tonnes of fuel
oil were unloaded at the port ofPrahovo,
on the Serbian bank, near the Iron Gates
lock. Similar violations had already
occurred last January when barges from
Ukraine repelled by Serb vessels had
unloaded at Prahovo".
l. Can the Council confirm the truth of this
violation of the embargo? Can it confirm the
Romanian nationality of the barges?
2. If so, why was the WEU unit on the
Danube not able to prevent this violation?
3. Why does the Council continue to refuse
to publish the list of violations noted on the
Danube and in the Adriatic whereas, in the
absence of coercive means, such publication
would be the only democratic means of pressure
to deter these violations?
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
QUESTTON 324
pat to the Council by Mn Stoffelen
on Eth Novcmbr 1993
Is the Council prepared to communicate
to the Assembly " Appendix IV, relating to the
links between the Union and WEU, of Chapter
IV of the document concerning the implemen-
tation of the Maastricht Treaty " which was
approved on 26th October 1993, as announced
in a press communiqud dated 27th October?
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL
No reply has yet been received from the
Council.
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Yiews *pressed by the Greek Delegation of Obsemers on doctments
on the agenda of the second part of the thiq-ninth ordinary sessbn
Information document published at the request of the Greek Delegation of Observers
by decision of the President of the Assembly
Hellenic Delegation to WEU
Dear Mr. President,
Attached herewith please find the memo-
randum with the comments of the Hellenic Del-
egation concerning the documents 1387 and
1395. We wish this memorandum to be dis-
tributed to the members of the Assembly.
The Head of the Hellenic Delegation
V. PepaNpnrou
Parliament of the Hellenic Republic
Greek Delegation to WEU
Dear Colleague,
We feel that we have to draw your
attention to the following points which, we
believe, are of the utmost importance to our
country as well as WEU. As you know, the
Greek Delegation, pending the forthcoming full
accession, participate in this Assembly as active
observers only.
We have therefore not been able to con-
tribute to the formulation of the reports(Wintgens, Johnston), more specifically to the
parts referring to Greece. To our view the need
to clarify certain points and to underline inac-
curacies and/or unfounded arguments is abso-
lutely necessary.
Greece is not only a member of EU,
NATO and WEU, but also a Balkan country
directly concerned in safeguarding peace and
stability in the area. This has always been our
firm and consistent policy.
By this paper an effort is undertaken to
assist our colleagues in order to reach a more
objective and a global understanding of Greece's
position.
We also trust that a more constructive
approach of WEU to the problems of the Balkan
area can, in this way, be achieved more easily.
More specifically we wish to draw your
attention to the following points:
(a) Johnston report
Paragraph 33
It is incorrect to say that Greece has used
its veto to block EC recognition of FYROM.
Greece has explained in detail the reasons why
FYROM's use of the name ' Republic of Mace-
donia " as the name of an independent state
would destabilise the region, create friction and
perpetuate conflicts in a volatile part of the
Balkans. Accordingly, the EC adopted unani-
mously four resolutions upholding Greece's
arguments.
The Badinter Commission examined the
issue of the recognition of FYROM from a
strictly legal point of view, not being qualified to
address the issue from its political angle. We
stress that its recommendations not only on
FYROM but also on Croatia were not heeded by
the EC Council of Foreign Ministers.
Paragaplu 34-35
It is certainly a totally incorrect presen-
tation of Greece's position. Contrary to the alle-
gations contained in the paragraphs stated, it is
not an issue of historical accuracy nor an emo-
tional one, but of strictly political consideration
as it is a fact that all actions of FYROM (Consti-
tution 
- 
see preamble Art. 3,49, etc.), change of
borders, hostile propaganda, maps, adaptation
of flag and symbols etc.) clearly indicate an
expansionist policy against neighbouring coun-
tries and, mainly, Greece.
FYROM's behaviour, if allowed to con-
tinue, will definitely lead to destabilisation of
the area.
Paragraphs 37-38
Apart from sporadic and unfounded press
allegations, Greece has never been accused by
any country, international organisation or
mission, of violating or even conniving at viola-
tions of the United Nations sanctions against
Serbia and Montenegro. On the contrary, the
EC/CSCE Sanctions Co-ordinator, Ambassador
Napolitano, has repeatedly acknowledged
Greece's commitment to strict implementation
of the embargo and prompt co-operation with all
parties concerned on this issue.
The unfounded and libel-like articles in
the press totally disappeared after the imple-
mentation by the Greek authorities in close
co-operation with the FYROM Sanctions
Assistance Mission (SAM-FYROM) of a pre-
verification system for all Greek oil and oil-
products exports to the FYROM as from 16th
July 1993. The abovementioned measure, in
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addition to the detailed data conveyed to the
President of WEU by Ambassador Macris, is
one more indisputable proof of Greece's strict
implementation of the United Nations sanctions
and her close and full co-operation with the
competent international organs, i.e. the Sanc-
tions Co-ordinator and the Sanctions Assistance
Missions.
Paragraphs 39, 40 and 41
Regarding the comments of the report on
the last Greek elections: the decision of the
Greek people, freely expressed by democratic
elections, has to be respected.
Paragraph 42
Greece never " pulled out of the United
Nations-sponsored negotiations " as, completely
inaccurately, Johnston's report pretends, obvi-
ously misinterpreting the letter of the Greek
Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General to the
United Nations. It is a misunderstanding not
shared by Mr. Boutros-Ghali.
Paragraph 43, 44 and 45
" European interests " are those of the
u 12" and Greece is part of them. Greece is the
only EC country of the Balkans, it has a long tra-
dition of association with the other Balkan
peoples and has an insider's view of develop-
ments, people's idiosyncrasies, etc. Moreover, it
is the only EC country directly 
- 
and even
vitally affected by developments in the area.
Paragraph 48
It goes without saying that neither morally
nor from a legal point of view anyone could
question the adhesion of Greece in WEU for
which there is an accordance of the governments
concerned.
In view of the above we strongly suggest
that paragraph 5 of the recommendation should
be deleted.
(b) Wintgens report
Most of the points referred to in the
Johnston report above can be applied mutatis-
mutandis to the present report.
Paragraplu 4-5
We wish to note that there has been no
decision on l2th May by the Twelve, there have
been only some deliberations at an informal
meeting. On the contrary, we wish to recall the
decision taken at the summit conference in
Lisbon in June 1992; * The European Council
reiterates the position taken by the Community
and its member states in Guimaries on 'the
request of the FYROM to be recognised as an
independent state. It expresses its readiness to
recognise that republic within its existing
borders according to the declaration on l6th
December 1991, under a name which does not
include the term Macedonia. It furthermore
considers the borders of this republic as invio-
lable and guaranteed in accordance with the
principles of the United Nations Charter and
the Charter of Paris ".
Paragraphs 78-79
It is not acceptable to label a policy as
" alarming " which, as the text itself shows, is
totally defensive and, strictly speaking, a policy
of d6tente aiming solely at the territorial
integrity of the country.
As far as the protection of Cyprus is con-
cerned, it is an obligation emanating from inter-
national treaties. Regarding the hints for the
defence ofour border areas, that is to say ofour
territorial integdty, we simply state that to
contest the right of defence of any country is
contradictory to WEU's raison d'Otre.
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Revision of Rule 14 of the Rules of Prucedure
MOTION FOR A DECISION 
'
tabled by Mn Cuco and othefi
The Assembly,
(i) Considering that Rule 11, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly does not allow
the President of the Assembly to take part in votes in the Assembly;(i, Considering that Rule 14 requires the Presidential Committee to act on behalf of the Assembly
in periods between sessions, which implies that Rule I l, paragraph 2, applies to its deliberations;(iii) Considering that it is equitable for any delegation of member countries to take part in the deci-
sions of the Presidential Committee,
DrctoEs
To add at the end of the first sentence of paragraph I of Rule 14 the following words:
" and the Chairman of the delegation of which a member is exercising the duties of President of
the Assembly.'
Signed: Alexander, Borderas, Brito, Cuco, Dicl<s, Fabra, Fenner, Grau I Buldu, Guirado, Hunt,
Rathbone, Roman, Thompson, Tummers, Ward
l. See l2th sitting,2nd December 1993 (motion referred to the Presidential Committee).
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